RELIGION AND CULTURAL-HISTORICAL ARCHETYPES

UDC:316.7:316.63

Nonka Bogumilova-Todorova

Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Sofia, Bulgaria

Abstract. *The religious spirit, diversity and even unity in the Balkans very often are dominated by state interests, ideology, as well as by mass mentality. Following the paradigm of cultural-historical archetypes, the paper will try to outline some dominant archetypes:*

1) The archetype of acumene (according to D.Obolensky, J.Meyendorff, P.Mutefchiev, etc.). Born in the time of the Byzantine Empire, it includes a powerful state and cultural center which has "privatized" Christianity and God, sacralization of the military and the cultural invasion of the "Center" toward "Periphery" ("barbarians", "heretics", "infidels", "pagans"). Within the acumene the distinct states continuously fight against each other and also with the "center" in order to take its place (for most Balkan countries the ideology and practice of totalitarian socialism reproduced the oecumene archetype in modern political form, the notions - federation, union, "camp").

2) The archetype of yoke and liberation: the conqueror is identified through its religious faith (enslaver - Islam, enslaved - Orthodoxy). Nowadays this identification becomes more and more intensive.

3) The archetype of powerful and weak state-organization − Diversity in the level of state identity depends on the historical fate and the synthesis between religion, the state and mentality. The most powerful centers in this respect are Serbia, Greece, Romania - partly (Obolensky, Litavrian, Iorga, Mutafchiev, etc.); the weakest - Bulgaria, Albania. Humanistic discourse is based on the idea that the inertia of cultural archetypes could be overcome through their rationalization and through the cultivation of universal values - human life, God, liberty; through stimulation of positive self-identification and not the "enemy" theory. This ethics is addressed both to local conflicts and to developed countries. It requres understanding, mutual respect, consideration of cultural and historical specifics.

1. THESES AND HYPOTHESES

Christianity, especially the early variant, is a grand cultural, mental process, overcoming the social and cultural partialization into groups, strata, characters. In the place of identification through nature-determined factors (blood, tribe) the ethnos puts communication and self-awareness through love and faith to a culturally-reproduced figure – God, Christ. Thus the substance of the historical process is spiritualized, socialized. Blood, locality, territorial restrictions are replaced by spirit, sense, thinking – universal, limitless essential human powers.

If within the limits of the Roman empire, especially during the first centuries of dissemination of Christianity, its universalizing mission is realized as a more or less autochtonic, limited process, marked with signs of naturalness, spontaneity, self-organization, then the Christianization of the new Slavic states, of the so-called "barbarians" is a new, original phenomenon. It is a process of acculturation, transfer of ideas, functions, institutions marked by universal content and cultural claims in a heterogeneous environment (in the ethnical, religious respect).

Which are the main directions of the acculturation carried out by Byzantine Christianity in the Christianized states?

1) The Spiritual-doctrinal legitimation of the states' origin (one of the basic institutional indications of civilization) through the idea of a divine, sacral sanction upon the head of state. Although for the Byzantine empire this process of the formation of Slavic states was in fact an amputation of its territories, for the Slavic tribes (which up to that moment have developed as capsuled, traditional tribal formations) it was a process of social-political unification with a higher sociocultural quality – centralized state power. Christianization, adopting Christianity gradually replaces kin-tribal identification, self-awareness through unification-correlation of different tribes and ethnoses to a universal cultural product – a religious political institution. In the states where this sacralization of the state system is combined and strengthened by traditional local peculiarities (sacralization of a definite ruling dynasty through a basic myth – e.g., in Russia and Serbia) there are created unique sociocultural conditions for inertness and reincarnation of the cult to the head of state even in the sacralized culture of the XX century.

2) Byzantine Christianity (implanted as a spirit and sacral motivation into the Byzantine political theory and institutional practice) is a universal-integrating factor for the Chrisitanized states to a unitive spiritual and political centre, to the city-metaphor – Constantinople. Thus, Eastern Orthodoxy is the spirit and the doctrine which make possible and natural the transference or (according to the words of academician Likhachov) transplantation of institutions, texts, models of thinking and behaviour from the centre to periphery. It is that sociocultural ether which makes from separate and often hostile states one ecumene, Kingdom of Christ or Byzantine Commonwealth – as it is called by D. Obolensky in the monograph bearing the same name [1]. This correlation, coherence of the localstate culture, institutions, spirit of the Orthodox peoples with a universalizing, integrating centre shows strong historical inertia. The heads of states and capitals of Bulgaria, Serbia, Russia, Romania for centuries tried to situate this centre in their one state; i.e. to reduce, nationalize its impersonally-integrating character (as it is known, just in this imperial imitation the famous historian P. Mutaftchiev sees the tragedy of Bulgarian history) [2].

3) This mental-religious coherence, connection of the local cultures of the Byzantine area created by means of the Ortodox culture and the institutional drive to a trans-state unity, integration, accepts later in the history different doctrinal, mental-ideological masks and realizations – Pan-Slavism, federations on a territorial principle, the idea of Orthodox brotherhood, of the socialist camp, etc. The integrating model embodying the spiritual mission centre (transplanting on this basis institutions, cultures, machines, the infrastructure) is preserved in different historical conditions. Due to specific historical, cultural, geographical conditions and peculiarities its ideological and institutional intensity is different in different states and cultures (e.g., stronger in Russia and Serbia, weaker in Bulgaria, etc.). In this explanatory context the so-called nationalistic movement could be understood as a crisis of communal identification, which is the result of the loss of the integrating centre – after the fall of Constantinople, after the disintegration of the Ottoman empire, the Soviet empire, etc.

4) These cross-cultural interactions, institutional and interstate integration have their ideological foundation in the incorporation, through the circulation of cultural products (literature, art, cult) to general, universal faith and love, to historical memory and self-awareness of being a part of the human history. The creation, original sin, eschatological perspective are the religious-ideological frame in which universal moral norms, ideas and notions of time are being implanted. This turn, this great jump from the local to universal, from barbarianism to civilization, from "darkness" to "light" in the young Slavic literatures is connected with Christianization. Probably from here begins the durable existence (in them and in mentality) of the cultural image-metaphor of the past as non-existence, of the present as an absolute, premiseless beginning which does not come from the inner self-development and self-awareness of the socium, but can be gifted, transplanted, transfered, etc. As a miraculous change from the archaic to the vanguard, as a link to modern universally accepted patterns, models; a movement from the local pathology to universal "normality", etc [3].

5) If at the level of institutions – state and official church circles – the surmounting of the local, partial becomes in the great and still territorially and organizationally restricted limits of the Byzantine area, and the latter is involved (often as a hostage) into the cultural schism, contraversion "East – West", there exist spheres, structures, forms confirming a general Christian and all-cultural universality. These tendencies met among the Byzantine philosophers and writers-humanists, among the monastic circles, penetrate and become a part of the spiritual atmosphere of the young Slavic cultures through translated texts, through cosmopolitan spiritual movements, through religious heresies. As the famous researcher John Meyendorff mentions in his book "Byzantine Theology", the religious schism "East – West", destruction of unity and the European-universal character of Christianity is not a much and mainly dogmatically, theoretically motivated process, but rather a cultural-historical, cultural-political process concerning mainly institutions, while the tendencies for integration and universality can be found in the literature, philosophical, and theological thought. These contraversions and tendencies can be found in the later forms of the socio-political schism "East – West" – within the limits of the Eastern "socialism" and Western capitalism.

6) The process of universalization of local cultures by means of Christianization, written culture, formation of a clerical stratum has its inner, local contraversions. They are connected, provisorily speaking, with at least two tendencies. The first one is the distance,

in a certain sense, opposition between the official cultural-religious stratum and the folk mentality (the slow and painful interpenetration of Christianity and paganism in the folk culture). As an active cultural matrix in this respect, the famous Bulgarian sociologist Ivan Khadzhiysky indicates world outlook, the ethnos of the patriarchal community [4]. He involves Christian symbolism, cult, ideas into a specific attitude to the world and community. The second one concerns different (from the official ones) forms and tendencies with which the integration and universalization of the local cultures and mental peculiarities is connected, both within the Byzantine Orthodox area and within the limits of the universal Orthodox one. The circulation of the apocrypha, of folklore, of the so-called folk heresies – Bogomil movement, Paulicianism, etc. is not only a resistance, opposition to the official local culture and state system, but it forms a general flow in the European folk culture, the cultural subject of which are the peasants [5]. The historical inertia of these social-mental constants can be found in the new forms of the official and peoples' ideology and mentality in the XX century – the elite and mass culture, rebellion against the institutions, consumer's boom, etc. – processes and tendencies not acknowledging national frames and ideological schisms.

On the cultural-historical material of Christianity we can find a durable, constant pulsation from local to universal and vice versa, having a place both in wider cultural and geographical spaces and within a particular state. Christianity motivates and spiritualizes the processes of integration, universalization, overcoming the natural drive of blood. At the same time in historical situations of domination of the local (states, ethnoses, nations) it is often used for identification and spiritualization of the archaic appeal of blood.

2. TRANSFERENCE OF THE IMPERIAL POLITICAL RELIGION TO THE SLAVS: HISTORICAL ARCHETYPES

Although in doctrinal, dogmatic respect Eastern Orthodoxy is distinguished for its conservatism and continuity, its cultural-historical being, i. e. its existence in the system of a particular type of culture and in the historical forms of its movement which is notable for its dynamics and diversity – of functions and social roles, of interactions with other cultural strata, etc. The historical process of Christianization of the young Slavic states (IX-X centuries) is both a complex process of the acculturation of their political and mental strata and a natural process of future partialization, the "barbarization" of Christianity itself. This process is realized on the basis of correlation, the coincidence of cultural-economic and ideological interests and with the needs of the two parts participating institution the interaction. For Byzantium it means preserving the influence over territories important for maintenance of its trade and military balances, as well as its interrelations with Western Europe, on the one hand [6]. And on the other hand – after the loss of the Eastern provinces and territories inhabited by the Slavs process of cultural and language domination of the Greek element the long ago begun threatens to acquire an explicit ethical form. The monoethnical character of the empire threatens the essential foundation of its political religion, the sacrality of the traditional imperial Christian ideology, presuming the spiritual-ideological idea of the ethnic variety through the notion of "a Christian". Its hellenization interrupted the connection with the political-ideological heritage of the Roman empire, as well as the basis for a dogmatic and institutional rivalry

with the papal institution [7]. (Not accidentally just in the process of Christianizing the Slavs by Byzantium the religious schism between the Orthodox and Catholic areas is increased and gets an official form. The reason is not only in the fact that behind the contraversion of the dogmatic and institutional authorities already stood in intensive ethnically-founded cultural-linguistic opposition "Greeks – Latins", but also the rivalry between the two centres of Christianization of the Slavs has outlined and forced the inner process of polarization of the Christian world and spirit through its gradual reduction to socio-cultural elements of a partial, local, lower order – institutions, ethnoses, state formations, etc.) [8]. Cultural cultivation, Christianization of the "barbarian" material both in the East and in the West becomes a form of realization and intensification of rivalry and division of the two cultural areas in the European Christian world, puts the mental-religious as a means of political power (in the East – the imperial, in the West – papal institution).

Although Christianity began to take root among the Southern and Eastern Slavs long before Christianization (through merchants, prisoners of war, assimilation, etc.) the latter was realized as an intensive political-administrative act in the IX - X centuries. A widely-spread idea among the authors is that the reason for this are the ideological needs of the newly-born centralized state formations constituted through the political domination of one ethnic and tribal element over another or others (Bulgaria and the Kiev Russia) [9]. A historical meeting of the state-organized ethnos (e.g., proto-Bulgarians) with the tribal and clan-divided or broken ethnical element (the Southern Slavs), determined by the necessity of defence and self-preservation, stimulated this process. Of particular importance were the processes of transition from kindred to territorial forms of organization of the Slavic element which caused for new forms of spiritual and social organization of the communities to appear. Neither one of the tribal pagan religions managed to become the uniting ideology for the new state unions due to its connection with a particular communal mental and organizational tradition and because of the fact that through it the system of state was constituted not as a political union of individuals, but as a domination of one ethnical or tribal group over another. The latter could be overcome only by (connected with discord, rivalry, instability of the state) only by means of a universal mental form, transcending the natural, ethno-limited paganism [10].

Christianization of the young Slavic states forms a new cultural form, way of living of the Eastern Orthodoxy – its "transborder" transfer in an environment still differentiated per nature-determined signs and determined by them a pagan conception of the world. The wide spectrum of problem fields arising in this connection (the civilizing role of Christianity as regards morality, culture, literacy, etc.) has been widely investigated in the world literature and is not the aim of our research. Following its logic we shall concentrate our theoretical interest upon the new historical and cultural forms acquired by the contraversion (or synthesis) politics – mentality both for the source and the object of religious acculturation. Investigation of this question has a number of strategic and "secondary" theoretical consequences and effects connected with the outlining of the formed, in the process of state formation, ideological and social-structural constants, possessing strong historical inertia and inclined to traditional reproduction; type of the system of state; the relations between the ideologically and institutionally autochtonous and allochtonous, determined in the studied area; effectivity, the organic nature of the "transplanted" (to use Likhachov's term) ideas and institutions and their interrelations with

the "local", "aboriginal" mentality and forms of communication, etc.

For the newly-Christianized states the adoption of Christianity led to: 1) the creation of transcendent, universally-mental groundwork for political power, especially the power of the head of state; 2) the final separation of the religious and state-power sphere between different persons (tzar, prince and patriarch) and institutions (state-political and church hierarchy); 3) correlation, the indirect character of these tendencies and processes with an exterior ideological and institutional centre – Byzantium. Besides solving the inner-political, social, etc. tasks, the adoption of Christianity by one of the two basic religious centres (Rome and Constantinople) was a political and cultural identification of the new states, i.e. the transition from an object of military pressure and destruction by the more powerful centre to an object of acculturation – religious, institutional, diplomatic, etc. Such a different attitude towards the pagans – barbarians before Christianization and towards the newly-Christianized children of the "pater familias" is not only a theoretical position in the Byzantine political religion but a real military and diplomatic activity (the continuous period of wars during the VII - IX centuries proves this convincingly) [11]. The new state formations should be constructed within the limits of this dilemma. Not only due to its long and convincing cultural tradition herbarized in philosophical categories and poetical metaphors; not only due to the fact that the cultural image of Christ ceased his free hovering about among peoples and kingdoms, "stopping" for long in Rome and Constantinople, but also due to the fact that behind all this there stood an irresistible military power, an irresistible "pious army".

Without commenting in detail upon the interesting question concerning a more human character of the above-mentioned type of acculturation in comparison, e. g. with racism, not admitting any possibility of spiritual incorporation of the lower into the higher races [12], I'll pay attention to the new type of cultural-political being of Orthodoxy – through a transfer of ideal, institutional, literary, religious models the paternalistic role of the Byzantine empire and patriarchy is realized in relation to the new Slavic states; involving them in the religious-cultural orbit of the empire is the channel, means, basis for the economic, diplomatic influence, as well as for maintaining the sacrality of its political religion. The apprehension of Christianization by the latter, not only as a culturally-universalizing process but as a political Greek-ethnical domination of an alien system of state, can be clearly seen both at the political-power and mental level. This contraversion can be seen in the logic and philosophy of the history of the nearest per territory and most powerful in the military and mental respect and rival of Byzantium – the Bulgarian state. The basic trends of this contraversion are expressed in the following: 1) putting the question of autocephalicity of the Bulgarian church as the basis requirement both for Christianization and at different turning points in the relations of the two states [13]; 2) the key importance of replacing the Greek liturgical language by a Slavic one and the double character of this process – the deeper penetration of Orthodoxy into the mass culture, as well as its synthesis with a new ethnical and consequently, national self-awareness, i.e. its further partialization and subordination to archaic-blood or territorial forms of uniting and identification; 3) connecting the strength of the state position (both as a political-religious doctrine and military and diplomatic practice) with the so-called "mirror image" [14] – as appropriation of the imperial quality by the state and imperial title by the head of the state by taking them from Byzantium through different "techniques" – aggressive, mental, diplomatic, conquering the chosen of God, city

Constantinople; the idea of transference of the centre and throne chosen of God – Preslav, Tarnovo; "theft" of relics, saints, etc., which are in the possession of the people, chosen of God – rival; [15] acknowledging the equality of the Bulgarian tzar's and patriarch's titles with those of the emperor and the patriarch in Constantinople, etc. [16]

In general, the imperial idea and its numerous rebirths among the Byzantine state communities [17] is not only an expression of military and economic rivalry, but also of the ambition of the local state-political formations to appropriate by force or diplomatic acknowledgement the power and mental-religious centre of the community; together with the Byzantine Christian literature and institutions to "transplant" the political and mental quality of "causa sui", of God's elect and equal to God, to make immanent the transcendent religious sacralization of the system of state, of power, to compensate the lack of the appropriated, "usurped" by powerful cultural instruments (philosophy, literature, art) Christian sacralizing tradition, by means of mechanical transference, appropriation of religious, institutional, literary, philosophical models.

The idea of God's elect head of state and people can be found in the Bulgarian, Russian, Serbian official literature and apocrypha [18] as marking the process of the state-people self-awareness and situating them within the universalizing Christian tradition. At the same time the articulated in the official written cultural incorporation of this tradition through intermediation of the imperial institutions (Christianization) puts in the foundations of political and cultural history of the Christianized states an irresistible and reproducing further in their historical fate contraversion: the uniting them in the inner-political respect idea, mentality, basic culture-synthesizing factor (Christianity) in a still greater degree turns into a means and intermediary of alien and often hostile political force, in reduction of its universal spirit and functions to monoethnical, ethnico-dominant (Greek ethnos, language, interests) [19]. This tendency becomes a dominating one at the time of Turkish rule in the Balkan region, when the religious bounding of the Balkan region with the exterior centre gradually loses its spiritual-cultural characteristics and is reduced to relations of institutional, ethnical, economical domination and dependency. The interaction no longer has a character of transplanting and creating culture, civilization, but turns into a spiritual prototype of Ottoman political-administrative domination [20].

The relation "state – church" in the newly Christianized countries are formed according to the model of such interrelations in the country-"godfather", i.e. co-ordination and often subordination of the functions and structure, church hierarchy, to the aims and functions of the state-political and administrative sphere. The continuously present question throughout in history, that of church independence, is in fact a question and process of a more complete and indivisible connection, subordination of the church with the policy and interests of the state by separating it from foreign political, diplomatic influence [21]. The reason for it is not only the fact that the state, the head of state is the initiator and intermediary in the formation of the church institutions in the respective country, nor is it only the imitation, transplantation of the Byzantine model. The connection of the church with the state-political origin both on religious-ideological and in administrative-, diplomatical-political plan also evolved from factors of autochtonous character: economic dependence of the church on the state, caused by the supreme property functions of the latter; the state-political idea as the most intensive form of existence and expression of the nation; the cultural-historical inertia of uniting the priest

and military-administrative functions in one person – having a place in the Slavic traditions, etc [22]. That is why the church and religious figures and writers are among those who most intensively ground the ideas of transference of the imperial centre from Constantinople to Serbia, Preslav, Tarnovo, Moscow, by means of arguments of being God's elect, sanctifying through temple building and transportation of relics, the ideas about the third Rome, etc. And if in Bulgaria, due to its territorial closeness and more intensive military-political and cultural, civilizing aggression on the part of Byzantium, these ideas become an ideological basis for military, political, diplomatic steps for their realization [23], in Russia they find more favourable grounds for development only after the Uniate negotiations of the Constantinople Orthodox hierarchies with the Catholic area (the Council in Florence) and especially after the fall of Constantinople [24]. Strong psychological, ideological shock caused by this fact in the Orthodox countries is a manifestation of a tremendous spiritual influence and cultural rooting with the latter of the idea and faith in sacrality of this imperial and religious centre, in its providential mission not subordinated to the earthly, human challenges [25]. The idea strengthened by its own historical experience.

3. HISTORICAL ARCHETYPES AND MODERN REINCARNATIONS

In spite of the vicissitudes in their state-political history (destruction for centuries by foreign rule of their state-political and cultural strata and the concentration of spiritual energies in non-aggressive, autochtonous, traditional folklore forms, their "opening" to different spiritual, economical, ideological influences, including to Catholicism – Tzar Peter's reforms in Russia, the period after the creation of national states in the Balkan region, etc.), the idea of a united trans-state political and mental centre continues to exist, although in new doctrinal forms. Both politico-theoretically and practically it exists in Russian, Roman, Serbian and Croatian versions. Along with the idea of the Orthodox community (gradually pushed into the background), the union, integration, federation of the Orthodox cultural countries is more and more often connected with the Slavic ethnical element or its compact parts – the Southern Slavs, the Eastern Slavs, etc [26]. The religious-mental integration, subordination as an intermediary of the cultural, political, economical, as a uniting idea is gradually shifted by the Slavic- ethnocentrical idea [27]. This idea is of a higher integrative quality, as it allows integration and interaction of the differentiated per language, religion but inhabiting the adjacent territories and having similar socio-economic state countries, nationalities. The intensive development of capitalism in Western Europe puts to the fore economic and technical rivalry and opposition in its interrelations with Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, removing in this way as secondary, marginal, the religious division of Europe, as well as the religious integration of its Eastern and South-Eastern parts. The general, cultural area, actually uniting the latter in sociocultural respect, being united for centuries by Orthodoxy, is here the prevailing peasant population with communal agrarian traditions and the centralized system of state founded upon them. Researchers connect this specificity with the traditional for the basic Slavic element and steady, impenetratable for the exterior aggression rural community [28].

Shifting the religious form from the specific and culturally-integrating (the Orthodox

area) and dividing (the Orthodox and the Catholic areas) functions and replacing it by ethnically-founded national and imperial ideologies finishes the process of regional, national, state-political partialization, disintegration of the showed universal potentials early Christian spiritual movement. (Of course, this universal potential is not lost once and for all, it remains and is preserved at the moral level – as a possession and an invisible, not organized, not institutionalized brotherhood of fellowmen, following Christian morality, but this level is rather determined by personal character of traditional group morality – of the clan, guild, patriarchal community, etc. and to a smaller degree – by a specifically religious code of regulation) [29]. But in spite of the fact that the concepts about the union, integration, as well as about groundings for showing up the uniting, integrating state-political centre change, the ideas themselves of the one and the other remain continuously renew and reproduce themselves in the politics and culture of separate countries (the Russian Pan-Slavism, ideas of the Balkan Federation, the Yugoslavian Federation, etc.).

If within the Byzantine cultural area the powerful Bulgarian state was the most active carrier and potential realiser of these ideas, then as the result of the specific history of the latter (and especially of the tragic fate of the Bulgarian state as the result of its geographical situation of the crossroads) and after creation of the new national states in the region this role has been taken over most of all by Serbia and Russia. In these countries the ideas and stability of the state-political body as a powerful integrative nationality factor developed with extreme force. Besides a more indirect and disconcentrated Byzantine cultural and political influence, one of the essential reasons for it is a powerful cult of the state system and its ruling dynasty, created in these countries through a combination and mutually strengthening of national, folk forms with a purposeful literary and canonizing role of their churches (the cult of St. Sava and the Kosovo epos in Serbia, the cult of St. Boris, St. Gleb and the Tzar in Russia, etc.) [30]. Not only the real historical fate, but also this cultural interaction between the masses and the church, religion for re-creation of the idea and a sense of common fate, destiny, personified in the ruling dynasty creates a spiritual, religiously an indirect cultural form, replacing the traditional pagan influence of the blood-dynasty succession. A Strong impact of these synthetic cultural forms combining in themselves universal Christian values (pain, self-sacrifice, applied to particular realities), providential mission of the leader and the people, their being God's elect, and expressing in conventional civilized forms a powerful archaic cult to a leader, to the tzar-priest, is manifested in their historical universality. The so-called "Kosovo ethos" (Serbia) or cult to the leader of the state (Russia) still exist and are effective even in the newest history of these countries [31]. The question is: which social power or ideology will realize the most effective and operative synthesis with this foundation-laying archetype? It was successfully connected (at least for a definite historical period) with the ideas and parties of socialism and communism.

The ideological archetype of God's elect and its providential mission can be found in Russian literature and Russian religious philosophy under different categorial masks: Russia as a unifier of the Slavs, as a transcontinental and transreligious factor, as having the advantage of Orthodoxy with its mentality and anti-institutionally directed "brotherhood", as the Saviour of mankind from pragmatism and the technocratia of Western capitalism, etc [32]. This ideological archetype takes different forms, depending on the dominant cultural language and style of time, but its ideological functionality

remains – to give grounds to the policy of integration, unification (community, brotherhood, federation, union, etc. – the categories are different depending on the spirit of the time, move from the utmost intuitive religious-spiritual to those with regulated political-economical connotations) of peoples with a common ethnical origin, religion, ideology – Marxism. At the same time and as a natural consequence of it is a counter-opposition of this community, united around one spiritual or political centre against the not-included into this world – the non-Ortodox West, Western capitalism, technocratia, etc. This ideological archetype, without being the only and even unlimitedly dominant in the Russian mental, ideological, political space (the so-called Westerns, pragmatics looking for a rational balance between different cultures are its constant counterpoint) [33], has this outlook, psychological advantage that although in a consummate – philosophical, artistic, – form it expresses and reproduces the idea originating since the appearance of the Russian nationality and state system, i.e. at a time when the uniting community, nationality, ideas, as well as spiritual transmission between the mass and elite, folklore-mythological and officially-religious, spoken and written, etc., were created culturally and confirmed in military and political ways. These archetypes are carried and reproduced by the cultural tradition – continuity of topics, subjects, heroes in the folklore and official culture; the inner continuity of the people, national idea, preserving the spirit of being God's elect and providentionalism behind a different language and idea logical cover [34]. The most harmonious is the combination of a powerful cultural tradition with military and political power, the more steady to ideological and force destruction is the state community based on it.

This foundation-laying idea of a united centre, the leading role, mission, historically originated in the religious form, has a strong inertia to cultural reproduction, because it articulates in the abstract language of science and in the colourful language of art and extrapolates upon a wider and qualitatively new social formation (nationality, state) archaic and powerful mental strata, basing the dominance of power, interest, difference of one consanguinal community from another. At the same time its powerful influence in culture is an expression and symptom of strong resisting energies of the respective community against exterior aggression (cultural, economic, military, etc.), trying to force forms of activity, thinking, power, property, etc., different from traditional ones. The idea of being God's elect, of a providential mission is in fact an idea grounding either a conservative closing and traditional reproduction of the community, or directed outside military and cultural aggression, with the aim to realize this providential mission in practice. In such cases consummate, mystical or populist, patriotic ideas acquire "material power", merge with the practical, physical energies of the "masses", directing itself against the alien, the enemy. In contrast to the first ones, proven with arguments and grounded with the help of rhetoric and artistic images, the latter ones clarify and prove with actions, with practice, revolution. Philosophical resistance against rationalism, alien religiousness, wealth and things-mania, institutions (features characteristic mainly of West-European civilization and already implicitly developed within the limits of its religious culture) express and reproduce stability of the emotional-irrational type of relations in the patriarchal rural community; its non-aggressive but efficient resistance against alienation in a wide cultural sense; the value of ascesis and magic inclusion of subjects in communal interrelations, etc [35].

One of the reasons for the ideological and political victory of the Marxist trend here

(respectively revised and adjusted Marx's world view) is its correspondence, association with the basic, traditional mental arrangements and stereotypes, pushed to the background and suppressed during the periods of centrally-forced openness, receptivity to the opposite for them exterior political and cultural influences. The idea of the victory of socialism in one separate country, of its vanguard role among the world proletariat, of the realized, as a real social movement, mankind's century-long dream of equality, brotherhood, abundance of material wealth, removal of the state and institutions [36] reproduce through language and the specificity of a new doctrine the old idea of messianism, being God's elect, providential mission. These ideas, although dressed in philosophical, theoretical form and language, are harmonious with the mass mood, picture of the world, rising against the alienated and bureaucratized institutions – state, church – against the historically based role of wealth and power owners. When the state-political and spiritual-ideological institutions are reduced, both in their real existence and in mass consciousness, to owners, possessors of wealth and power, i.e. the indirect functions of the emotional-irrational, folklore-mythological attitude to them are exhausted, then comes the hour of rebellions and revolutions.

Leninism and Stalinism were the Russian imperial versions of Marxism through which, in the place of bureaucratized institutions, an attitude of unequal ownership created two powerful charismatic institutions: the party-state and leader's personality cult. By means of them, under conditions of technical and economic challenges of Western capitalism, Russia and big parts of the Orthodox cultural area managed to develop the subject side of capitalist production relations (machines, technics) without changing the traditional type of the state system (centralized), the charismatic character of power (deification, patriarchal type of attitude to the leader), the irrational character of the institutions and the attitude to them. The rule, domination of the party over the state is in fact the rule and domination of the mass-mental, mythological over the rational-bureaucratic. Religion and church turn into private deed and reduced influence, not only due to militant atheism, but also due to the fact that there appeared a new, more powerful and efficient form of expression and existence of basic ideas, mythologems, which are constant in the national image of the world [37]. The impressive development of technics and production has for its motivation to reach and leave the enemy (Western capitalism) behind, competition with it, realization of communism (the new name for the earthly Kingdom of God), etc. As the result of the gradual prevalence of the practical-pragmatic attitude to the world (industrial labour, revolutionary practice) over the religious one (giving preponderance to the inner-spiritual over the exterior-active) in Western Europe, new criteria for superiority and opposition, for missionary work and being God's elect are imposed. They are connected with real, earthly practical actions and results. (It is no accident that Marx begins his philosophical work with criticism of this approach, pushing consciousness and not reality to the centre of theoretical attention) [38].

REFERENCES

1. Obolensky, D., The Byzantine Commonwealth, L. 1971
2. Mutaftchiev,P., Kam Filosofiyata na balgarskata istoriya, sp. Filosofski pregled, kn. 1, 1931, s. 34
3. Narodopsikhologiya. Antologiya. S., 1984, otkasite ot B.Penev, P.Slaveikov, D.Strashimirov.
4. Khadzhiysky, I., Bit i dushevnost na nashiya narod, S., 1966, s. 96-122.

5. Pribichevich, St., World without End. The Saga of South-eastern Europe, N.Y. 1939, p. 228-233.
6. Iorga, N., Formes Byzantines et realites Balcaniques, P., 1922, p. 28-29; Gjuzelev, V., La Bulgarie Medievale et l'Europe occidentale (IXe - XIe s.), in: Byzantino Bulgarica, v. VIII, p. 90-94.
7. Mishev, D., The Bulgarians in the Past, Lausenne, 1919, p. 101, 116.
8. Kuzjmin, A., Padenie Peruna, M. 1988, s. 67.
9. Karamzin, N. M., Predaniya vekov, M. 1987, s. 64-66; Mutafchiev, P., Istoriya na balgarskiya narod, Slavs. 1992, s. 141-143.
10. Karamzin, N. M., Predaniya vekov, s. 65; Gankova-Petkova, G., Contrubution au sujet de   la conversion des Bulgares au Christianisme, Byzantino-Bulgarica, v. IV, p. 35-38.
11. Mutafchiev, P., Istoriya na balgarskiya narod, Slavs. 1992, s. 101-125; Primov, Byzantine. Bulgaria in the Eighth Century. A General Outline, Byzantino-Bulgarica, v. V, p. 7-38.
12. Todorov, Tz., Zavladyavaneto na Amerika. Vaprosat za drugiya, s. 197.
13. Stanimirov, S., Istoriya na balgarskata tzarkva, S. 1925, s. 29, 33; Mishev, D., The Bulgarians in the Past, p. 25, 27, 29.
14. Obolenski, D., The Byzantine Inheritance of Eastern Europe, L., 1982, p. 17.
15. Tapkova–Zaimova, V., Quelques representations iconographique de Saint Demetrius ethnical et l'insurrection des Assenides – premiere scission dans son culte oecumenique, Byzantino Bulgarica, v. V, p. 261-267; Obolenski, D., The Byzantine Inheritance of Eastern Europe, p. 18-20.
16. Bozilov, Iv., L'ideology politique de tzar Symeon: Pax Symeonica, Byzantino Bulgarica, v. VIII, p. 78-82.
17. Iorga, N., Formes Byzantines et realites Balcaniques, p. 45-63.
18. Duichev, Iv., Prouchvaniya varhu srednovekovnata balgarska istoriya i kultura, S. 1981; Angelov, B., Starobalgarskite pisateli; Kratkii ocherk istorii slavyanskih literatur i yazykov, M., 1911; Obolenski, D., The Byzantine Inheritance of Eastern Europe, p. 56-83.
19. Mishev, D., The Bulgarians in the Past, p. 116-120.
20. Stanimirov, S., Istoriya na balgarskata tzarkva, s. 132-141; Snegarov, I., Otnosheniyata mezhdu Balgarskata tzarkva i drugite pravoslavni tzarkvi sled provazglasyavaneto na skhismata, S., 1929, s. 150-167.
21. Ibid.
22. Karamzin, N. M., Predaniya vekov, s. 52, 58; Froyanov, I. V., Vostochno-slavyanskoe obshchestvo VIII-IX vekov I khristianskaya religiya, in: Khristianstvo: Antichnostj. Vizantiya. Drevnyaya Rusj, L., 1988, s. 200.
23. Bozilov, Iv., A propos des rapports Bulgaro-Byzantines sous le Tzar Symeon, Byzantino Bulgarica, v. VI, p. 73-81.
24. Obolenski, D., The Byzantine Inheritance of Eastern Europe XV, p. 13-16.
25. Ibid.
26. Gabor P. Vermes, South Slav Aspirations and Magyar Nationalism in the Dual Monarchy, in: Nation and Ideology, N.Y. 1981, p.178, 180; Rock, R.W. Loyalty and Legality. Austria and the Western Balkans, ibid.
27. Pribichevich, St., World without End. The Saga of South-eastern Europe, p. 384, 387.
28. Ibid., s. 228, 231, 241, etc.; Khadzhiysky, I., Bit i dushevnost na nashiya narod, etc.
29. Ibid.
30. Emmert, T.A., Kosovo: Development and Impact of a National Ethic, in: Nation and Ideology, p. 61-69; Bogdanovich, D., L'Evolution des genres dans la literature Serbe du XIII siecle, in: Byzance et le Slaves, p. 49-57; Borisov, N.S., Tzerkovnye deyateli Srednevekovoj Rusi, M., 1988, p.54, 121, 123.
31. Emmert, T.A., ibid., p. 80-78.
32. Losev, A.V., Solovjov i ego vremya, M., 1990, s. 293-323; Berdyaev, N., Tzarstvo Dukha i Tzarstvo Kesarya, P. 1951; Berdyaev, N., Novoe Srednevekovje, M., 1991, s. 22, 50, 81.
33. Solovjov, V.S., Literaturnaya kritika, M., 1990, s. 292-331; Sukhov, A.D., Russkaya filosofiya, M., 1989, s. 139-154.
34. Szporluk, R., The Pokrovski-Trotsky Debate of 1922, in: Nation and Ideology; Brooks, J., Russian Nationalism and Russian Literature: the Cannonization of the Classics, ibid.; Riazanovski, Ideological and Political Extensions of the "Norman" Controversy, ibid.
35. Pribichevich, St., World without End. The Saga of South-eastern Europe, p. 231, 252, 271.
36. Fadin, A.V., Bremya etakraticheskogo soznaniya, in: V chelovecheskom izmerenii, M., 1989, s. 80-83.
37. Gachev, G., Natzionaljnye obrazy mira, M., 1988, s. 46, 47, 56.
38. Marx, K. and F. Engels, Sach. t. 1, s. 366; Sach. t. 3, s. 265, etc.

VERSKA RAZNOLIKOST I KULTURNO-ISTORIJSKI ARHETIPI

Nonka Bogumilova-Todorova

Verski duh, raznolikost ili čak jedinstvo na Balkanu često su određeni državnim interesima, ideologijom, kao i masovnim mentalitetom. Prateći paradigmu kulturno-istorijskih arhetipa, ovaj rad pokušava da iscrta neke značajne arhetipe:

1) arhetip ekumenstva (prema D.Obolenskom, Dž.Mejendorfu, P.Mutafčijevu, i drugima). Stvoren u vreme vizantijskog carstva, on obuhvata moćni državni i kulturni centar koji je "privatizovao" hrišćanstvo i Boga, zatim sakralizovao vojnu i kulutrnu invaziju "centra" prema "periferiji" ("varvari", "jeretici", "nevernici", "pagani"). Unutar ekumena jasno uočljive države se neprekidno bore jedna protiv druge, kao i sa "centrom", da bi zauzele njegovo mesto (za većinu balkanskim zemalja, ideologija i praksa totalitarnog socijalizma reprodukovali su ekumenski arhetip u modernom političkom obliku, pojmove poput federacije, unije, "kampa").

2) arhetip jarma i oslobođenja; osvajač se identifikuje po osnovi vere (porobljivač - islamista, porobljeni - pravoslavac). Danas ta identifikacija sve više jača.

3) arhetip moćne i slabe državne organizacije. Raznolikost na nivou državnog identiteta zavisi od istorijske sudbine i sinteze između vere, države i mentaliteta. Najmoćniji centri u tom pogledu su Srbija, Grčka, Rumunija - delimično (Obolenski, Litavrian, Jorga, Mutafčief, itd.), a najslabiji Bugarska i Alabanija.

Humanistički diskurs se zasniva na ideji da se inercija kulturnih arhetipova može prevazići racionalizacijom i isticanjem univerzalnih vrednosti kao što su ljudski život, Bog, sloboda, odnosno, podsticanjem pozitivne samo-identifikacije, a ne teorije "neprijateljstva". Ova etika se odnosi i na lokalne sukobe i na razvijene zemlje. Ona zahteva razumevanje i uzajamno poštovanje, a uzima u obzir i kulturne i istorijske specifičnosti.