THE GLOBAL CITY AND CHANGES IN THE CONCEPT OF CITIZENSHIP

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Abstract. *This paper aims to show that the mobility of the population, caused by global capitalist flows, changes the structure of the population in cities, creating a multicultural urban citizenship, which makes demands to nation-states for the definition of new concepts of citizenship that are not reduced to belonging to a nation and national identity. The paper presents an overview of some of the more significant theoretical concepts which deal with this problem. One of them is the global city as a form emerging from the activity of global economic and political flows, yet at the same time as a multicultural environment and the centre of creation of new identities. Furthermore, new concepts of citizenship based on identities that are not national are considered, with the description of some of the influential cosmopolitan concepts which search for universal citizenship principles.*

Key words: *global city, erosion of national citizenship, new concepts of citizenship, cosmopolitanism.*

SOCIAL FRAMEWORK OF THE GLOBAL CITY

The current process of globalization is the basic context within which the circulation of capital, information and people takes place. The sovereignty of a nation-state is weakening due to the strengthening of transnational institutions, but also of sublevels, such as regions and cities. Consequently, the national identity is also diminishing, with other forms of identity coming to the fore, such as, for example, ecological, cosmopolitan, racial, gender, sexual, minority, regional and others.

David Held believes that the nation-state has lost its sovereignty due to a number of factors, which he summarizes in the following five: strengthening of international law, internationalization of political decision-making, hegemonic forces and international structure of safety, globalization of culture, and global economy (Vuletić 2006: 175). Because of the given international rules and conventions, the nation-state has become second

to the supra-entities, and its role is to implement these rules into its own system and follow them accordingly. Therefore, it can be concluded that the nation-state does not play the most important role in international relations, but that other forms of states appear as actors on this stage. According to Ulrich Beck, these are: the neoliberal state, supranational state, and cosmopolitan state. Only the latter can protect the interests of its citizens from neoliberal hegemony, but also from xenophobia and the radical right (Vuletić 2006: 200). In such a constellation of relationships, cities are redefined both in the sense of functions and in the spatial-organizational and aesthetic sense. The global city appears as the dominant form, which is the expression of economically most developed and politically most powerful societies in the world, the centre of capital flows, and the multicultural environment and the point of meeting and creation of new identities. The most significant global cities, according to the theorist Saskia Sassen, are New York, London, Paris, Tokyo, Frankfurt, Zurich, Amsterdam, Los Angeles, Sidney, and Hong Kong, yet other cities also belong to this network, such as Sao Paulo, Buenos Aires, Mumbai, Bangkok, Taipei, and Mexico City (Sassen 2000: 51).

The trend of global economy implies organized international flows of capital, goods, raw material, and information at the level of daily business transactions. Such a manner of global business results in the polarization of the world to poor regions, such as Africa, partially integrated countries of Latin America and East Asia, and wealthy countries of Western Europe and the United States. This is why Manuel Castells says that in the given global structure "Western Europe has, in fact, become a fragile island of prosperity, peace, democracy, culture, science, welfare, and civil rights" (Kastels 2005: 185).

The polarization which occurs as a consequence of competition in capitalism is not only observable in the global area. At the local level as well, on the territory of a single city, social and economic fragmentation is visible. The geography of centrality and marginality manifests itself in a developed business centre of the city, where technological, financial, and educational institutions are concentrated, and where capital flows and places of power are gathered, on the one hand, and the industrial outskirts which can barely make ends meet, on the other (Sassen 2005: 201).

Gerard Delanty considers the ways in which the global city appears in Europe in the conditions of European integrations. He believes that, by increasing territorial competition, European integration makes cities the winners, and the rest losers. Megalopolises, such as London, Paris, and Berlin, but also smaller global cities, such as Frankfurt, Amsterdam, Barcelona, Milan, Brussels, Vienna, and others, manage themselves successfully in the postindustrial and information era by forming networks of power. These cities do not take up a high position on the ladder of power by their size or administrative function in the national system, but with the question whether they contain the headquarters of multinational corporations, transportation and international services (Petrović 2009: 30). On the other hand, former great industrial cities do not succeed in adapting to new conditions of the postindustrial society, facing unemployment and other difficulties imposed by globalization. As the consequence of the game of competition, the polarization into global, semi-peripheral, and peripheral cities appears on the territory of Europe. Global cities are taken out of their national and regional context, and are adjusted to the global market and the new network of power (Delanty 2000: 81). They become autonomous units of political decisions, with a simultaneous decline in the importance of the nation-state (Kastels 2005: 186).

Numerous theorists provide an explanation that even though modern cities are multicultural environments, citizenship does not create mutual contact, cooperation, and solidarity. The domicile population shows distance and disinterestedness in their fellow citizens, while immigrants are also often prone to tribalism, that is, closing into their own ethnic-territorial circles. A modern citizen, in that sense, is psychologically and politically removed from the "other", creating an impression of many parallel worlds existing within one city. The theorist Richard Sennett explains this phenomenon by flexible capitalism, as an economic-cultural order which dictates and shapes life in large modern urban environments. As basic characteristics of capitalist cities Sennett names flexibility and indifference, which are primarily produced in the area of work. Namely, there is an increasingly greater number of short-term jobs, resulting in the lack of the feeling of dedication and loyalty in people toward the organization that they are working for, as well as toward other people that they are working with (examples of this kind of work organizations are *fast food* restaurants and *call centers*).

The idea of them being employed for only a short period of time in a certain job, and the fact that in a few months they will be somewhere else, in a different workplace and a different work organization, causes the loss of the feeling of belonging and solidarity. Such a type of relationship in the area of work can also be seen in the field of architecture and design of modern offices, which are constructed in such a way so as to make them easy for redesigning and adapting to the needs of a new workplace (so-called *skin architecture*). The city is becoming a place of superficial and short-term relationships.

The dialectic of flexibility and indifference occurs in three forms: the physical connection between a person and the city, the standardization of urban environment, and family relationships (Sennett 2005: 116). As far as the physical connection between a person and the urban area in which he or she lives is concerned, it is evident that it is growing weaker. Frequent job changes result in frequent changes of residence, thus leaving the individual no time to develop a sense of belonging to the environment in which he or she is situated, nor is it possible for them to form a sense of belonging to the city. With the feeling of indifference toward the public sphere, of course, there is no room to develop a critical potential or any type of social action and civil gathering. Another important characteristic of the global city is the standardization in the area of production and consumerism. Shopping malls, which function as miniature cities, are organized in the same manner in leading capitalist countries. Such uniformity is also spreading over the appearance of the cities themselves, which look like each other more and more. The family is also struck by the process of "alienation". Disloyalty, lack of dedication, and short duration have become characteristic of human relationships which disorient the family. All in all, the author concludes that people alienate themselves from each other by living lives dedicated to making a profit. The awareness of the other is lost, along with civil solidarity and civil practice. There are, however, some positive implications of flexible capitalism for the city, and they relate to the development of tolerance toward other cultures which coexist in the city and openness toward the other and the foreign.

The fact that public space is being increasingly privatized and made adjustable to the demands of the capital shows that the city has become a place of distance, a monofunctional and economy-oriented entity (Horvat 2007: 24). In that sense, the political function of public space loses its contemporaneity, with history and collective memory vanishing in privatized and public consumption spaces. The space of flows has superseded the space

of places (Kastels 2005: 192). Srećko Horvat thinks that the city today is *omnipolitan*, has no centre, but spreads everywhere (Horvat 2007: 19). Postmodern urbanism that characterizes global cities is more of a process of raising walls and fragmentation than a process of unification of space and people.[1] Cities are becoming the centers of circulation of people, instead of the centers of gathering and civil activity, where an individual turns from an active citizen into a passive consumer. The lifestyle of people that takes place in this pseudo-public sphere is reduced to daily strategies of finding one's way (Petrović 2009: 176-7). Shopping malls emerge as new places of controlled socialization through which individuals are taught to be *citizens of the consumer society*. Their critical potential is numbed by giving in to momentary material satisfaction.

Global cities as footprints of the aforementioned economic, political and cultural processes in space, give evidence to new instances of power in the global society, becoming "laboratories" for the study of new types of civil identities, which are less and less founded on a national basis.

EROSION OF NATIONAL CITIZENSHIP AND NEW CONCEPTS

The best-known concept of citizenship was developed by T. H. Marshall and applied to post-war societies through the analysis of relationships between class, welfare state, and citizenship (Turner 2000: 131). According to this theory, citizenship evolved through the legal, political, and social aspect of civil rights from the middle of the 17th century until the formation of the welfare state in the middle of the 20th century, relying on the belonging to the nation-state. The concept of citizenship was realized in a political community, which was the nation-state. Therefore, it can be said that the national framework was the basic area of recognition and enjoyment of civil rights and duties, with the national identity and national culture being the civil identity and civil culture (Turner 2000: 135). However, to understand the concept of citizenship in modern society, one must step outside Marshall's framework. While the battles over civil rights were reduced to class conflicts in the early phase of industrialization, in the 21st century they are more often an expression of culture and identity (sexual identity, gay and lesbian rights, gender equality, and preservation of primitive cultures) (Turner 2000: 133). Many individuals today belong to more than one society. Citizens are not exclusively those who are born in cities or who belong to the given nation-state. Population mobility caused by global capitalist flows is greater than ever before. That is why Milan Mesić rightly claims that "the historical success of the Western model of progress in the domination over the world periphery, now brings into question the nation-state itself, since it has established the connections which have enabled the flow of capital and goods, but also of people and ideas – in both directions" (Mesić 2006: 296).

Turner determines the notion of citizenship in the following manner: "Citizenship can be defined as a collection of rights and obligations which give individuals a formal legal identity; these legal rights and obligations have been put together historically as sets of

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[1] As the culmination of attempts to privatise city areas and subject them to businessmen, Horvat cites the case of Manhattan, where its mayor Michael Bloomberg announced that he would start charging for the entrance to Manhattan, with the argument that that would be the only way to reduce the crowdedness in this part of New York (Horvat 2007: 141).

social institutions, such as the jury system, parliaments and welfare states" (Turner 2000: 131). The modern development of citizenship is connected to the creation of the nation-state from the period of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, with the basic logic behind this creation being the ideology of nationalism. These processes were founded on the idea of *otherness* and the establishment of boundaries between "us" and "them". In that sense, all those who did not belong to a specific nation were denied the rights to resources of the given society, that is, nation-state. National citizenship was the criterion for resource allocation and the basis of social solidarity and development of identity (Turner 2000: 139).[2] Citizens proved their dedication to the nation-state and belonging to the citizenship over three sets of duties: family, work, and army. Population reproduction, i.e. maintenance and increase in the nation took place through marriage and family, and it was an important part of the development of society, endorsed by the state through its social, health care, and educational systems. Economic prosperity was realized in the area of work using the production of goods and services, while the defense of the country was the third most important civic duty fulfilled through the military system. The aforementioned obligations and duties of the citizens correspond to the three fundamental types of identities produced from them: parent-citizen, worker-citizen, and soldier-citizen. According to Marshall's concept, this would be the basic structure of the national civil society, while Turner believes that a fourth type should be added, since it played a significant role in its strengthening. That is the citizen-intellectual. Writers, poets, linguists, philosophers, and other learned people often contributed to the preservation of language, myths, and national culture in general (Turner 2000: 138).

However, as family, area of work, and system of defense have experienced major changes, so has the concept of citizenship evolved. The family has undergone changes in the domain of values. Be married and have more children are not what individuals in the Western world strive for anymore. The application of contraception also changes the order of reproduction, making it rely more on immigrants, who are observed as the chance for demographic renewal. In the area of work, globalization has brought about changes by creating a global market with a huge number of immigrant workers. Ethnic diversity and multiculturalism have weakened the sovereignty of the nation-state and subjected it to global political relations. Loyalty to the state through military service is also diminishing. Bearing all this in mind, Turner poses a question and ascertains: "How can the state secure the loyalty of younger generations who are under-employed or unemployed, who will never serve in a national army, and who may not form families either because of personal sexual preference or because they may not be able to afford children and support a family? They are citizens only in a superficial and formal sense by being in possession of a passport; in fact we may give them the title of quasi-citizens'" (Turner 2000: 140).

Due to the erosion of the order in which the nation-state was the strongest foundation of identity, the postmodernization of identity occurs, with the creation of its form that Turner calls *cosmopolitan virtuality*. Unlike the 19th century in which the development of society was based on the ideology of nationalism, in the 21st century global society is founded on di-

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[2] Contrary to this, modern society strives for the development of supranational values and identities, rooted in the European Convention on Human Rights in cities and the Charter for European Urbanism. Both of these acts affirm diversity and multiculturalism, that is, efficient integration and participation of immigrants in education, culture, politics, health care, and other social subsystems (Vujović 2003: 181).

versity and hybridity. A cosmopolitan virtualist, as the dominant model of the modern citizen, possesses the following characteristics: irony as a method and mental frame; distance and coldness in relationships toward others; skepticism toward grand narratives; care for cultures which are different; postemotionalism; orientation toward the present instead of nostalgia; secularization and ecumenism as a worldview. Even though the mentioned characteristics of postmodern citizens imply cold and distant human relationships, the cosmopolitan virtuality should not be deemed morally indifferent. On the contrary. It carries the engagement in the protection of different cultures, for example, the so-called primitive ones, which are under threat from the process of globalization, and special care for environmental protection, which results in the creation of an ecological identity (Turner 2000: 145).

Mark Purcell explains the changes in the concept of citizenship by three social changes. First, a *re-escalation of social power* occurs, with the power being transferred from the nation-state to the level of suprainstitutions (EU) and sublevels (regions, cities, neighborhoods). Next, the *reterritorialization* weakens the sovereignty of the nation-state and the political loyalty to the state. And the third change deals with *reorientation*, where the layeredness of identities, as a current trend, diminishes the national identity. Purcell believes that the dominant economic and political order of neoliberal economy has given birth to the dominant order of citizenship in the modern society, which is the *liberal democratic form of citizenship* (Purcell 2003: 565). In such an order the greatest power and rights to the city are enjoyed by the international corporations that possess the largest amount of capital, while the role of the citizens is limited. Citizen participation is active at the local and national levels, but not at the transnational level, which is very important in the modern globalised society and influences the everyday life of the citizens (e.g. the issue of investment of transnational corporate capital) (Petrović 2009: 218).

It was Henri Lefebvre who first presented the thesis on the *right to the city*, according to which belonging to a political community is not determined by formal membership, but based on *living* and *place of residence* of the individual. All those people who inhabit the city and live in it every day have the right to make decisions which deal with the production of the urban space. Citizens have the right to participate not only in the decisions concerning internal, but also external issues, such as, for example, where capital will be invested, where new workplaces will be opened, where the roads will be built, and so on (Purcell 2003: 577). Analogous to Lefebvre's thesis, Purcell advances the thesis on the *right to the global city*, which offers a solution to the life in modern multicultural urban environments. As mentioned above, in the modern constellation of social relationships, the right to the global city should be enjoyed by those that Zygmunt Bauman calls the globalised,[3] such as powerful capitalists and owners of international corporations and financial institutions. However, it is necessary to overcome the limits of such a liberal-democratic form of citizenship. Therefore, immigrants and all ethnic and other minorities

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[3] Bauman makes a difference between two types of citizens of the modern society: globalised and localised. Mina Petrović sums up that difference in the following manner: "The globalised live in time, space is of no relevance to them since every distance can be crossed in a moment, they vote with their feet', that is, they express their political dissatisfaction by changing their working and living location. The localised live in a space which connects time to itself and keeps it out of reach of the population, their time is empty, nothing happens, only virtual television time has some structure for them. Even though these groups live in the same world, they live in different spaces" (Petrović 2009: 178).

should enjoy the right to the city, equally as the local indigenous population. Purcell emphasizes that the rights of the global city population would relate to two basic rights: the right to the use and exploitation of urban space, life, work, and creative exploitation, and the right to participate in making decisions which produce the space of the global city (Purcell 2003: 579). The concept advocated by Lefebvre and Purcell would overcome the limits set by the concept of citizenship on a national basis, and also remove the restrictions of the liberal-democratic concept, transferring power directly to the hands of the citizens who inhabit the global city. Delanty is an advocate of this concept of citizenship as well, and he predicts that it will be realized in the future (Delanty 2000: 87).

John Urry claims that until the 1950s identities were based on the categories of class and vocation, but that that constellation started changing in the 1970s. The indicators of age, sex, and sexual identity began having greater importance. The boundaries of identification are not fixed and given at birth. Very often, individuals do not sense the identity of the ethnic, religious, or other community that they belong to, and the categories previously considered incompatible are now being mixed, constructing new hybrid identities (Petrović 2009: 183). With that in mind, Urry points to new types of citizenship, which emerge due to the activity of the process of globalization and weakening of the nation-state, where Marshall's tribology should be revised and supplemented. He believes that in the modern society one can speak of different types of citizenship, such as ecological, cultural, minority, cosmopolitan, mobile, and others. *Ecological citizenship* is based on the developed ecological awareness and identification of the individual as the citizen of the planet Earth which needs protecting from the uncontrolled development of the human society. *Cultural citizenship* relates to the right to cultural participation of all social layers in the global city. *Minority citizenship* promotes the right and duties of individuals to inhabit the place that they want to, while *mobile citizenship* implies the rights and duties of visitors of other societies and cultures. *Cosmopolitan citizenship* deals with the issue of people developing orientation toward other citizens and cultures across the planet. Saskia Sassen introduces the notion of *economic citizenship*, which has a negative predeterminer. It relates to the economic elite of the global economic network which has the power over state institutions and possesses more rights to the city that the ordinary citizen, but does not fulfill civil obligations and duties in return (cf. Petrović 2009: 220).

Economic citizenship, on the one hand, and the citizenship of increasingly larger numbers of underprivileged workers (most often women, immigrants, and other races), on the other, make modern cities polarized *dual cities*, as Castells calls them. These social groups are two extremes of citizenship, which differ in their education, ethnicity, and age (Kastels 2005: 193). The economic cosmopolitan elite creates and controls global cities, while the local population is excluded from those processes. Sassen believes that "the city indeed appears as a place of new demands of both global capital which uses it as organizational goods', and deprivileged parts of the urban population, whose presence in big cities is very often internationalized to the same extent that capital is" (Sassen 2005: 197). Deprivileged citizens embodied in immigrants possess social rights on the basis of participation in the labor market and legal work permits. In this way, through the mechanism of social welfare, the state controls immigrants and reproduces social inequalities, not providing them with the full status implied by the citizenship. In that sense, immigrants make *substantive* citizenship, which stands in opposition to the *formative* citizenship which is the bearer of the full citizen status that implies political and civil rights (Petrović 2009: 156–7).

Guido Marinotti also considers changes in the structure of city population caused by the increased mobility. He differentiates between stages in city development on the basis of new types of citizens which mark it and define its development. According to the categories of place of residence, workplace, and place of using the city, Marinotti provides four types of urban population of the modern city.

	Residence	Work	Use
Inhabitants	Yes	Yes/No	Yes
Commuters	No	Yes	(Yes)
City users	No	No	Yes
Businessmen	No	Yes	Yes

Contrary to the traditional city whose population mostly comprises *inhabitants*, that is, people who live and work in the city, the first generation metropolis is characterized by *commuters*, or citizens who travel to the city to work and spend most of their time in the central part of the city and work organizations concentrated in it. The second generation metropolis or the city of late modernism develops with the increased mobility of individuals, and is characterized by the presence of a specific population, which Marinotti calls *city users*. This population uses public and private city spheres, such as shopping malls, cinemas, museums, restaurants, health care, and educational institutions. According to socio-economic characteristics, this category of citizens is heterogeneous. It consists of middle-class tourists of various ages, teenagers who come to the cities for weekends, specific groups of fans or concert audiences, students, and others. Some cities in certain seasons during the year have more city users than they have of the local population. This is the case with Venice. However, this phenomenon is not characteristic only for the countries of the West, but also for cities in Asia, where Singapore is at the front. Another type of citizen has crystallized in the last couple of years. These are *metropolitan businesspeople*, i.e. the population which comes to central cities for the purpose of establishing business contacts, and remains in them for several days. They are also city users, and they are very picky when it comes to choosing hotels, boutiques, exhibitions, museums, as well as saunas and gyms. In the sociological sense, they make the transnational middle class, which does not dwell in a single city, but in several of them or between them (Marinotti 2005: 93-101). It can be said that this category of citizens is closer to the one that Sassen calls economic citizenship.

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In the theoretical sense, there are three basic standpoints on the performance of globalization on the sustainability of the model of nation-state and national citizenship. Mesić determines them as *pronational* and *postnational* standpoints. The advocate of the first thesis is Robert B. Reich, who thinks that the class structure of the society has transformed with the decrease in the manufacturing industry in the United States, constructing three new types of employed citizens: routine production workers (whose number decreases), service workers, and the so-called *symbolic analysts*. While the first two groups are oriented toward the national labor market, symbolic analysts are part of the global labor market, and as such have no sense of loyalty, thus Reich also calls them *indifferent cosmopolitans*. The author,

however, believes that it is possible to renew national solidarity through "new patriotism", which would be based on the loyalty to a place and historical and cultural connections instead of economic self-interest which is currently dominant (Mesić 2006: 298).

Yasemin Soysal, contrary to the previous standpoint, observes the state as a dependent variable. According to this, the postnational model, suprainstitutions and international organizations through their conventions and norms protect human and civil rights, independent of belonging to a nation, while the nation-states become instruments for the implementation of such conventions and rights. The modern concept of citizenship is deterritorialised. If such trends continue, the state will increasingly become an administrative unit of a suprainstitutional policy based on human rights, which is more inclusive than exclusive (Mesić 2006: 300).

The third standpoint is a "middle-of-the-road" one, where it is considered that the nation-state and national identity will not become strong enough under "new patriotism" as a reaction to the presence of a large number of immigrants. On the other hand, the significance of the nation-state will not diminish entirely due to the activity of suprainstitutions, since it is still the basis of decision-making and it plays an important role in international relationships. Furthermore, the fact is that its contemporary form of a multicultural state is not the same as the classical nation-state, but it is much more shaped by the external transnational processes (Mesić 2006: 304–7). However, regardless of this, the new geography cannot still entirely be reduced to a simple network of urban centers, making it more precise to say that globalization reconfigures nation-states by distributing their power to other entities (Petrović 2009: 31).

POSSIBILITIES OF URBAN CITIZENSHIP BASED ON COSMOPOLITAN PRINCIPLES

Bearing in mind the fact that the nation-state is under pressure from globalization and transnational institutions, numerous theorists believe that it has become too narrow a framework for solving increasing global problems and defining civil rights. Culturally and ethnically diverse urban citizenship needs to be organized according to new principles. One of the ideas being affirmed in recent years in social theory is cosmopolitanism. While some think that cosmopolitanism is an ideology of neoliberal transnational class or nothing else but imperialism, others are trying to shed some light on that side of cosmopolitanism which is not a mere utopia, but a real possibility that needs to be transformed into political principles of (trans)national institutions.

Cosmopolitan citizenship is often equated with powerful capitalists who are the bearers of the process of globalization and neoliberal ideology. Costas Douzinas takes a Marxist standpoint in which cosmopolitanism is the ideology of imperialists, which began during the times of the Roman Empire. The final goal of capitalists is the expansion of the market, with cosmopolitan ideology as a constituent part of that process. It is, in fact, the case of hegemony of great powers (above all the USA), thus Douzinas thinks that the inevitable assumption of the creation of global citizenship is the dominant centre of power (Duzinas 2009: 226). Yet, this standpoint can be challenged, especially in the view that the bearers of cosmopolitan consciousness are not today embodied in a single type of citizenship or class (powerful capitalists), but cosmopolitan citizenship also comprises those who oppose the domination of these people, such as, for example, antiglobalists, as well as all those who support environmental protection (the so-called ecological citizenship).

Cosmopolitan consciousness is reflected in the identification of global problems (out of which global social movements emerge), but also in the identification and solution of the local problems of the citizens, caused by the domination of powerful people in the global economy, who enjoy the support of local actors (urban movements of middle classes).[4]

According to Delanty, the domination of the local-global nexus over national space is the basic context of strengthening of cosmopolitan policy which is reflected in the facts such as international law, minority rights, global solidarity and global justice, and cultural rights of various sorts (Delanty 2009: 111). Europe is a space which has adopted the elements of cosmopolitan ideas more than others, thus the author believes that the entire identity of Europe is based on cosmopolitanism. Beck takes a step further, claiming that the entire state of humanity has become cosmopolitan. The cosmopolitan standpoint as a defining norm of the modern society is based, according to Beck, on five principles: the principle of the experience of global risks and crisis in world society which overcomes the boundaries between us and them; the principle of recognition of cosmopolitan differences; the principle of cosmopolitan empathy and of perspective-taking and the virtual interchangeability of situations; the principle of the impossibility of living in a world society without borders and the compulsion to redraw old boundaries; the mélange principle which means that local, ethnic, national, religious and cosmopolitan identities interpenetrate (Beck 2006: 7). To "defend" cosmopolitanism from being equated with imperialism, as well as separating it from the utopian-philosophical concept of cosmopolitanism, Beck puts forward the idea of *cosmopolitan realism*. While the philosophical cosmopolitan standpoint is based on idealism, the sociological one rests on realism, thus, contrary to the philosophical perception of cosmopolitanism as a worldview consisting of a conscious and willing attitude toward united humanity and a world without borders, the social and scientific realism produces an unconscious cosmopolitanization of people. The unconscious, passive, or latent cosmopolitanisation is reflected in the behavior of the individual dictated by the conditions and problems of the global society. Increasing global problems which a nation-state cannot solve on its own produce global consciousness and global identities. Without a conscious will, Beck believes, individuals become part of the wider global society by becoming cosmopolitan in its orientation. Modern Europe is the Europe of diversity, and cosmopolitan policy implies the logic of inclusive diversity (Beck 2006: 172).

Anthony Giddens' observation is an interesting one. He believes that, even though the nation-state has lost a part of its sovereignty and delegated it to supra levels, a global society which would be based on city-states is not possible. That is why the renewal of the nation is necessary, but in a new light. It must not still be exclusive and oriented only toward itself, but it needs to show its strength and stability by accepting other identities on its territory. It has to be cosmopolitan, culturally pluralistic: "To make way for cosmopolitan identity, laws on citizenship have to be amended and a huge cultural step needs to be taken" (Gidens 1999: 133). This is possible with *cosmopolitan nationalism*.

In this context, Held considers the possibility of a political community based on cosmopolitan democracy. Perceiving the inefficiency of the nation-state in solving global prob-

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[4] The basic conflict in the global city takes place around the dissatisfaction of citizens over the government which finances and legally supports global corporations at the expense of the local population and endangered layers, thus there are numerous urban movements of middle classes focused on the critical relation toward privatisation, affirming the usage value of public space and civil participation in its creation independent of profit.

lems, but also the inefficiency of transnational institutions, Held advocates a new democratic order which would represent a network of institutions with a global reach, with democratic law at its core. The basis of this legal order comprises cultural, political, economic, health care, social, and other civil rights, and the rights of the citizenship are extended to encompass members of all political communities included in the network (Held 1997: 315).

Other relevant theorists propose different variants of social order which would be based on cosmopolitan principles. All these ideas have come from the perception of the fact that the nation-state is no longer operational as a framework for solving problems resulting from global flows, on the one hand, and from the tendency to find a compromise solution for the coexistence of numerous identities which are parts of the same territories, on the other.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Global economic and political flows result in an intensive mobility of the world population that is concentrated in big cities of capitalistically most developed countries – global cities. As a consequence of this movement, cities are becoming multicultural environments. Such a reality shows that nationality is no longer the most dominant form of identity and that the citizenship defined within the nation becomes too narrow a framework for defining civil rights and duties in multicultural political communities.

Newly-developed social conditions have led theorists to reimagine the city and citizenship, which has put forward ideas such as Lefebvre's on the right to the city, i.e. Purcell's on the right to the global city, while the most general one is embodied in the theory of cosmopolitanism, as a moral, legal, and democratic framework upon which the rights of the diverse urban citizenship of contemporary cities should be based.

Even though cosmopolitanism is under a lot of criticism, particularly in terms of it representing imperialistic pretensions of leading capitalist powers and the domination of the USA, it is still a significant theoretical standpoint which presents an attempt at creating a "more righteous" world based on plural identities. Even Kant discussed the idea of eternal peace consisting of creating an alliance of peoples and transnational institutions, where one of the important principles was *hospitality*, which implied the rights of the strangers to dwell on the territory of a nation-state which was not their country of origin (Kant 1995: 51). The place of birth of an individual is a mere coincidence, which is why people have to be respected and enjoy the same rights wherever they find themselves. This whole idea was developed by Kant with the aim of finding an order which would raise the principles of humanity above all other identities that differentiated people. In a way, it seems that Kant predicted the cultural pluralism which is now emerging and is today imposed as a reality on nation-states. In a global interdependence through the circulation of goods, information and citizens, Kant saw a tendency to come closer to a peaceful association of cosmopolitans.

The fact is, then, that multiculturalism is a challenge for nation-states and that it makes a demand for redefining the concept of citizenship. However, this does not imply the possibility of creating a cosmopolitan civil order, since solidarity and respect of human rights are not a sufficient condition for it. It is hard to form a consensus concerning political values upon which the future cosmopolitan order would rest. This does not mean that one should not search for a solution which would establish a wider framework concerning civil rights, since it is evident that only new forms of membership could address the demands of postnational societies.

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GLOBALNI GRAD I PROMENE U KONCEPTU GRAĐANSTVA

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Cilj rada je da pokaže da mobilnost stanovništva izazvana globalnim kapitalističkim tokovima, menja strukturu gradskog stanovništva pri čemu nastaje multikulturalno urbano građanstvo, koje postavlja zahteve nacionalnim državama za definisanjem novih građanskih koncepata koji nisu svedeni na nacionalnu pripadnost i nacionalni identitet. U radu se daje prikaz nekih od značajnih teorijskih koncepata koja se bave ovom problematikom. Jedan od njih je globalni grad kao forma nastala dejstvom globalnih ekonomskih i političkih tokova, ali istovremeno i kao multikulturalna sredina i središte kreacije novih identiteta. Takođe se razmatraju novi koncepti građanstva zasnovani na identitetima koji nisu nacionalni i daje se prikaz nekih od uticajnih kosmopolitskih koncepcija koje tragaju za univerzalnim građanskim principima.

Ključne reči: *globalni grad, erozija nacionalnog građanstva, novi koncepti građanstva, kosmopolitizam.*