

**IN CONTRIBUTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF TOPOS FROM
AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL STANDPOINT
(Various Views of a Body in a Certain Place in Space)**

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Abstract. *The philosophy of the spirit, consciousness, subjectivity, etc. whether it resides on logos or maybe on emotional-voluntary guidelines or on eros, philosophy on the platonic-Christian trail cannot solve the problem of place, body and space without making them appear to be illusions, without overcoming them and thus proving them to be the subject matter of spiritual work. Even the type of philosophy which starts from a materialist viewpoint does not solve things in a different way, and instead favors the same position as the previous one since it also introduces a principle which transcends the fact that a body can be found in a certain location in space. Both of these approaches annul places, bodies and space. Neither one of them is considered unique. For that reason, the question of in which part and for what reason in the process of obtaining knowledge do we resort to reifications? Are we aware of what it means and what a change in the location of the body brings? Are we today in such a situation, precisely because of the way in which we see them?*

Key words: *place, body, space, knowledge, viewpoint, belief, content of knowledge, object of knowledge.*

What can we say or what do we know about a "body", "place" and "space"?¹ Very little. It all boils down to the following claim: "A body occupies its own place in space". Any time when we ask where something is or where we should put it, the answer is that we should put it in a particular place. A body, thus, is something that exists in a particular location in space. If it is contained within something, then we can ask ourselves whether it exists or whether the location and space are examples of something? We often ascribe independence to space, which is not the case with place. But still, it is difficult to say what

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¹ *A rock is at times warm at other cold, but always extends somewhere. Just like the one that continues to be identical, it has a place (Stelle) in space and time.* Fink, 1989:202. We are referring to the place a body has in space, in the most basic sense, without including even the concrete determinants such as "sameness", "duration", "longevity" and so on, reducing in part this thought by Eugen Fink.

space would be without places and bodies. We introduce very slow movement, first as body's change of position in space, in order to establish a relationship among these three entities. But, is that merely an excuse? With this fourth question we actually start moving away from a place, body and space in the direction of introducing newer and newer "players": speed, type of movement, force, purpose and so on, and other categories of knowledge and the formation of their schematics or cognitive wholes. These cognitive wholes are rare views of a body in a certain place in their "original form". Schematism requires, as a whole and a system of knowledge, some sort of principle and finally a purpose, sense, truth and "the place of truth".² Thus we come to what is determined to be the main cause and instigator in the form of a spirit, deity, idea, the original motivator and the like or something which does not have any dimensionality, is not a body, does not require space, is the epitome of pure mobility, and so on. We acquire "knowledge", "the place of truth", "the place of the body as something outside of the body", "the embodiment of spiritual forms", "the locations of a man who acquires knowledge where at the same time he is the focus of attention". Our starting point, after a certain period of time, will, to put it mildly, be neglected, as if it did not exist, but will in fact be forgotten. The basic point and the most elementary facticity will be made redundant, **that a body can be found in a certain place in space**. Because, if we abstract this fact, what are we left with?

What we find in movement and knowledge is "the forgetting of our facts". These can certainly not be found without "a body in some place in space". In this way we do not want to claim that they are fiction, but that movement and knowledge contribute to the distancing and reduction in the final known instance into something which is no longer a body in a place in space. At any time there is always a body moving through space taking up a place in it, which can be the object of knowledge. Still, this too will be disregarded, for the sake of any type of movement in the sense of any change and the work of all those "conditioning" players which are revealed through knowledge, by adding them (without the order of the addition being considered relevant as is indicated by various knowledge-system solutions) so that they can like a "cluster" hang from the body "deeper" or "more shallow", that ones can fall off while others "clasp onto them" and seem to be more important in determining – the body in some place in space

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Democritus' idea, that from the smallest to the biggest body what is shown is the basic point and the most elementary fact, has been forgotten³. It is not the fact that worlds and

² *Maybe it will come to pass that the space of a place (Ort) and the space of the world could be interpreted differently without falsifying their phenomenological basic sense into a real-spatial structure. In the space of a place (Ort), which has only just distributed places to Things (Platz) and allows them to enter it, the determining, basic phenomenon of movement occurs.* Ibidem, pg. 151.

³ They have forgotten, primarily in philosophy, while in the other epistemological systems, that is science, art, myth in its own specific way, the case does not hold. Art is may even be the most determined and closely related so to speak, in allowing the manifestation of "a body in some place in space", nevertheless, considering the fact that this is a symbolic system of knowledge then it is determined by art itself. In the philosophy of nature which is more recent, the concept of space is problematized (as is that of time), partly the concept of the body but also from a geometric point of view and in relation to space, the nature of light (corpuscular or wavelength), such as heavenly bodies and so on. Alfred North Whitehead in his *The concept of nature*, considers space, time, movement, objects. An object is more of an epistemological than an ontological

complex things occur through movement that is considered elementary, through their merging and separating atoms, since that can be altered, and instead that from the level of the atom to the level of world, what is valid is – **that a body can be found in a certain place in space**. The body of an atom, the sun, galaxy, man... are all in some place in space.

Somewhere between 460 and 370 BC according to our calculation of time, in the work of Hermann Diels we find that surprising fact that Democritus came to the realization that *...in essence there are atoms and emptiness,..., and an emptiness is some place in which all bodies, moving downwards and upwards for eternity, or intertwining or clashing or bouncing off one another and thus recombining, once again separate and merge, and from it form all the remaining groups, including our bodies and their states and their impressions* (Diels, 1983: f 49.)

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Why "surprising"? Because for a man who was ten years younger than Socrates (470-399) we say that he is one of the "pre-Socratic" thinkers.⁴ He lived after him but thought before him. It is contrary to what the postmodernists think, that "in order for something to be modern it has to be postmodern", we could say "that in order for something to be postmodern it has to be modern". Still, Diogenes Laertius places Democritus after Socrates and Plato, but he is "not the most reliable historian" and "expert". Socrates is far more reliable because he did not write anything down, believing that the living word (which no longer exists) is more valuable than the existing one. Plato, in his axiomatics, determined the order. What comes first is what in the peace of intelligibility, lying at a feast in the palace, in spirit determines the "cluster" hanging from what is factual, but having no contact with it.⁵ By working, Demiurg organizes what is apparent – the world, an intermediary between what is the peace of intelligibility, lying at a feast in the palace, in spirit determining the "cluster" hanging from what is factual. What we add to it or group with it is the platonic and Christian, in order for the following two millennia what

category, and is thus in part positioned in Whitehead's work: *One object is a component of the description of an event*. Whitehead, 1989:145. Unlike that, for example, Gaston Bachelard speaks of the poetics of space, while we can add other poetics as well.. Topological philosophy is found later, in traces. In science this depends on the science in question, but from a position of "a plan", a geometric display and from the position of a specific aspect of the body, for example in medicine, astronomy, physics, biology. for instance there is "chorology", (chorology = *choro* (Gr. *khōra*, the first part of the compound is marked by what refers to the place, end, space, earth) + *logy*, as a science about occurrences and the laws of the dispersion of plant and animal life on earth. *Chorograph* = someone who describes a country or a landscape).

⁴ *What is more: who can explain how a philosopher from Abdera can be pre-Socratic whose preserved corpus is the most extensive, when we know that evaluations allow for the fact that the two of them were born at almost the same time, and that he survived Socrates by three decades?...In the empire of official philosophy, the fables win*. Onfire, 2007:51.

⁵ In the words of Jacob Burckhardt...*a certain exception in that respect is the first really great scientist was Democritus from Abdera...* (Burckhardt, 1992:329.) He was closest to the bodies in some other place in space, wanting to include them in facticity. The others did not care about facts, (they liked fables and ...*lying, but they kind-heartedly accepted each other's lies, just like hunters accept each other's tall tales today* Ibidem, pg. 338.) except for maybe Aristotelians, epicureans...*we should pay attention to how Lucian mocks knowledge and the study of peripatetics...he claims that such a person knows how long a fly lives, how deep the sun falls into the sea and what the YUC» (degree of consciousness) of a clam is. He does not even guess how all these, in the eyes of science, are in fact objects* (Ibidem, footnote 351, pg. 338.)

would be worked on in Europe is the fact that **a body can be found in some place in space**. Because, the body is not first in some place in space, but what creates it and that is precisely where Democritus interferes.

The dominant paradigm is "the human body spread out on the cross". It will be negated, crushed, destroyed, massacred, disparaged, murdered, while all the other bodies which are not human (along with space) will be "squeezed into" physics and geometry or the spiritual cognitive schematism. In the final instance, at the beginning of the third millennium, everything that is bodily, spatial and local will be changed relentlessly, so that it can become what it is not. The increase in speed and the changes in everything regarding man is evident (especially his body) on the earth. Because, we almost abandoned it all in the act of Armageddon, the definitive destruction of everything local, spatial and bodily. They say that only some fine locations will be left without the body and space, in which some of us will find ourselves even without our own bodies. Where will this entire bodily universe disappear to?

The body, place and thus space will completely be neglected as such and reduced to the size accepted by science, art, religion and something that needs to use human work and divine aims.. Their existence is relative, they can change, move for a variety of purposes. Crushed in such a way, reduced to various particular and singular forms, they will from one viewpoint to another, look one way or another, as either valuable or worthless – relative. Until then time and the spirit will become solutions to everything and the "most valuable" or their true place. Everything in European culture will be made subservient to the spirit and time... *the horizons are always horizons of some period of time, some historic situation and culture* (Elm, 2009: 8.) The horizon of sense, of the possible, better, is determined in relation to time, the spirit, while as a part of space, the body, place will not be an inherent sense, instead a mere *res extensa* and a change in place. Just like on some "pedestal", a "cluster" will be formed by hanging various phenomena of the spirit in time on the given extension. Precisely in the platonic sense of *soome* or *corpus*, *...like a dead (inorganic body), a corpse*, (Pavlović, 1978:199) which needs to be "revived" and "whose life needs to be taken". Thus the bodily, in some place in space, dead, cannot be a horizon.

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How and why is a "cluster" formed? How is the spiritual to become the location of everything, without it having a place of its own? The answer lies the fact that for all this time we are only dealing with a cognitive "ruse", which resides on, on the one hand, the nature of cognition itself or its important features: that it gains knowledge until it becomes knowledgable of its own self, to move in a cognitive sense, to organize and present the essence, and that it allows things to change and move in some direction, that they can be used to act and so on. On the other hand, cognition is in a particular relation to our life needs, which we can reduce to needs for making sense, surviving and belief,⁶ which we can realize with the help of knowledge. And finally knowledge is closely related to objects – knowledge is always knowledge about something. Nevertheless, knowledge leads us to the equation of the objects of knowledge and the movement of knowledge as a formation of the content of

⁶ Beliefs as the most elementary pre-religious needs of man. *This need we call pre-religious, since it makes us face the history of mankind.* Kristeva, 2010:18.

knowledge with factual movement. Or what was indicated by Democritus,⁷ and which is manifested as the gnoseological equation with all the content of knowledge, which at the same time is not an ontological difference. So to speak, it all begins with the first cognitive form or function, and that is observation. The subject matter of observation is identified with the content of the observation. Through inertia or based on this principle, consciousness as well, the psychological experience as such, due to the possibility of self-observation (gaining knowledge about knowledge) is equated with consciousness as such. In the final instance the cognitive "ruse" in the spirit is a substantiality which is in possession of ontological status: that it is and that it is a purely forming movement.⁸ To put it simply, in a Kantian sense, how things are in and of themselves we cannot know, and instead we only know on the basis of the sensory material and our sensory synthetic abilities.

The second moment in the entire story comes from the direction of our need to "believe" (as a life-long longing vitalistically speaking)⁹ Believing helps us to form ontological identifications of gnoseological content and the objects of knowledge. Thus the identification of content and the object of knowledge, forms and content, in the end manifest themselves as a unifying spiritual substance, which by creating construals, concepts and knowledge, ideas, is creative, illuminating, holy, motivating and so on. Nevertheless, the

⁷ We are referring to the already mentioned fragment which begins with: *Based on public opinion, it is a color, based on public opinion it is sweet, based on public opinion bitter, while in truth they are atoms and emptiness.*

⁸ Based on the fact that *...the process of acquiring knowledge takes place in concrete individuals, and not in consciousness in general*, (Selers, 2004:149.) we will reach the objectivization of the subject of knowledge and the spirit. The fact that the subject of knowledge is embodied in the individual human body and that thanks to knowledge it can act on our and other bodies, will lead us to the conclusion regarding the power of the subject over the object of knowledge. "The longing" of the living is transformed into the spirit. "The longing" of the spirit for spirit, as a pure act can be realized over time. *...it is a clean, unaffected actuality...* Rothacker, 1985:35. In principle the features, primarily of knowledge, are added to the features of spirit: to know, organize, express the essence of and so on. In the act of knowledge all the way to ideations, as the final instance in knowledge, the spirit through knowledge is all the time overstepping the boundaries of objects: it negates the given objectivity into the logically given objectivity. It then widens the borders of something more important, some feature independent of experience, the number of observations to "the essential side of the existing" as a form of the structuring of the world itself. Knowledge acquired in this manner is valid for all types of worlds. At the same time the spirit is transformed, through the identification of the object of knowledge and the content of knowledge into a singular spirit as a singular precondition for everything.

⁹ What we add to this is the internal attitude, which in epistemology indicates that we have no individual sensations, pure sensory perceptions and strictly experiential conceptions, and instead it takes place from an internal cognitive-experiential-interest complex. When we perceive something, we already have the support in the formed knowledge and relationships towards the object of interest. Perceptions are never individual impressions and so on. In the final instance, according to Jean Piaget, which indicates our European (spiritual) orientation and positioning of the object of knowledge (the body, space, place): *Our knowledge does not stem from either sensory perceptions, nor from noticing, but from a unified action in which perception functions as a source of information. In fact it is not characteristic of intelligence to contemplate but to "transform", its mechanism is essentially operational...* In all of this, the spirit, the mind of man is activity, (as we have already mentioned), in relation to the aim and intentions and is characterized by the use of cognitive means. The spirit, mind identifies, evaluates. It uses the senses for purposes which do not at first glance belong to everyday life, but instead belong to rationality. What binds it all into a unified whole, which enables the unity of perception, are not the products of rationalization, concepts, but the human body instead.

Essentially, the object can be known only if it is acted upon and if it is being transformed. Piaget, 1983: 91-92. There are two ways of acting and changing the objects of knowledge. Piaget calls one "physical action" (when the position is changed, the movements, features, in order to "study nature") and other "logical-mathematical" (when the object is enriched with new features, remodeled, when old features are retained but are subject to classification, measuring and so on)

belief is connected with our interests, Piaget's moment regarding knowledge, and thus in this sense the field of exchange is formed and finally the identification of the spiritual within us in the very objects of knowledge. The final instance is the spirit which in its acting revives, (as it is a replica of the living longing and movement of knowledge)¹⁰ moves us, our body, the dead thing-body around us, creating forms and thus local spaces. From this elementary belief stems the belief about how a certain faith and the knowledge-story is possible. Both indicate the truth... *which I need, which enables me to exist.* (Kristeva, 2010:21.) They are intertwined, turning gnoseological equalities an ontological ones.

We will be focusing on the need to believe and know, since it is of paramount importance for viewing places, bodies and space, and it is not necessarily religious in nature, and instead belongs to the wider meaning of "religare". The Latin "credo", which is of Sanskrit origin, according to Julia Kristeva in that sense means, *...involving yourself in something with your heart and your life strength in the expectation of a certain compensation.* (Kristeva, 2010:21.) Compensation, from the perspective of...*the act of giving which includes the belief that the object will be returned to me* (Ibidem, pg. 21.) What will develop from this is also something religious and economic that can be given on credit. Knowledge in all shapes and forms will develop since...*a man can know only under the conditions that he believes he does know* (Kristeva, 2010:13.) A perpetual circle is formed consisting of receiving and giving, from knowledge to faith. The perpetual circle in which man finds himself "while speaking". Thus the "cluster" becomes a "sphere", the unity of the spirit and world, in one place a certain protective bubble which practically protects us from "the indifferent course of things – the river of the world in which the human world is built in a certain location in space. The sphere is ontological, cognitive but also interesting in a value-ridden sense. Top or central, thus, internal spiritual reference around which the sphere revolves is what colors the sphere with a certain atmosphere. This specific, concrete atmosphere is always of a local type. For example, in the bank it is money, interest, in the temple, in school knowledge...but always in terms of concrete objects, institutions with endless local and wider ethno-local atmospheres.

That is how insight is created, such as... *that the spirit itself is in some way to be found in space. Or maybe it is better said: what was once considered the spirit, people have always thought of as the inspiring and inspired community in space* (Sloterdijk, 2010:19.) That is also the spiritus loci. This is revealing of Hegel's attitude that the spirit has been given as the "the spirit of the people". It is...*the essence which exists all on its own and for itself ...the awareness in general of what it encompasses in itself of the sensory certainty, observation and sense* (Hegel, 1979:257-8.) But in a concrete sense it is realized as the "spirit of the people"¹¹ as the spirit of a particular people in a particular place, with concrete people who are present in a physical sense. Of course, for Hegel all this produces and forms the spirit, which is the high point of forgetting the body, space and place. For him, what is necessary is not necessary, and instead it is something else that is of paramount importance. It is clear that there would be no absoluteness, without what enables it. It is difficult to imagine it, without the body, space and place. Without any products and actions.

¹⁰ The basic characteristics of psychological experience include: cognitive, volition which resides on the longing and belief and emotions. The spirit will also be such in its own self-movement, for some cognitive (logos), for some volutive (the simple movement forward or simple longing), and for some eros.

¹¹ *As a real substantiation the absolute spirit is one people.* Ibidem, pg. 261.

The horizon is absolutely expanded, to the possibility of allowing every body to be acted upon at all times to the possibility of releasing oneself from it without any repercussions. The point of Hegel's philosophy of spirit is that it can achieve absolutely everything or is absolutely valid for everything and for all times¹². Thus the spirit and time of one place achieves its peak in autoia, which for Plato is the ideal type of organization of a community (the local state of a nation) and the free realization of human community in a state of well-being, and in Christianity the eternal life of affluence. This idea is in reality connected to interest, desires, the needs of groups, people and individuals, as if to the final borders of sharp affluence in all the aspects of human life.

"Ou-topós (a place which does not exist) as such is only an idea, the final instance in knowledge, which, joined with the concrete local people, transforms itself into an ideology, well-being in the sense of scientific progress, economy or the way in which the given and local is transcended. Thanks to this last instance, the body, the Earth as a body and place, and primarily human, will definitely and like never before be bestially destroyed in the name of the spirit (god, communism, capitalist economy, fascism, scientism). The work of one connection, a place which does not exist, the spirit which is not the body, the essence and point which are removed from the world. "Ou-topós is the negation of the place and thus the body. This means that we completely forget that "the body is found in a certain place in space ".

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"Place as a horizon"¹³ is a precondition of "seeing" the body, space and place. This means averting attention onto them as the original and unavoidable phenomena.¹⁴ The difficulty lies in the fact that "seeing" a variety, rests on the aforementioned "cognitive ruse" and is thus manifested "as seeing at a distance", "seeing from", "needs", "seeing in a sense of familiarity", "intolerance" and so on until we reach what can be "seen" through thinking, the spirit which returns to the previous guidelines. And especially "seeing" in the European sense. And even if our sense of sight was even by Plato considered to be the most important sense,¹⁵ he will by considering the sensory presence itself as an illusion, argue for (the work the soul does on itself) the uplifting of the soul in knowledge from the level of the "copy" of physical objects, via mathematical entities to the level of "forms" or "ideas". This is at the same time the uplifting of the spirit or the consciousness through a change in state in the sense that the soul increases in quality. It ranges from the level of imagination, for example "beautiful bodies", apprehensions or daydreaming of the appearance of things (opinion, and not knowledge) which is accompanied by conviction, beliefs, to the level of knowledge of mathematical entities (for example the idea of the point, circle and pyramid), and that is not a naive level of thought, understanding and abstraction. The final, highest level of the conception of an idea by means of the mind, is the highest

¹² That is why for Plato, "time is a mobile image of eternity". See, Plato, 1981:38abc

¹³ Heise, 2009:420.

¹⁴ We will not go into all the complex problematic of the concept "phenomenon" or "self-appearing". The basic fact that "the body can be found in a certain place in space" is close to the concept of a phenomenon. On occasion we will find phenomenological attitudes in the text, including Husserl, Fink, Waldenfels.

¹⁵ *Eyesight, for us, in my opinion, is the greatest source of well-being, because no one would ever have spoken these words we have just uttered if people were unable to see the stars, the sun or the sky.* Plato, 1981:47a

level of knowledge, cognition and love.¹⁶ That is the unity of the spirit, the object of knowledge and the object of knowledge, which can without doubt be used to deduce everything. To see something means to explain it starting from the utmost truth or the idea of things as the perfect model. That is, every concrete place, body and space can be seen from the perspective of the absolute, and this means a complete depletion of their wealth of detail.

This kind of "seeing" is certainly on the line (development) sight as a form of touch at a distance.¹⁷ Even a philogenetic interpretation of things indicates a distancing from the object of knowledge as a condition for seeing. *Mutation in the sense of sight and hearing is much more determined: between the impression and the sensation the gap increases, while the space at the same time is deepened, even when the organs of the sense of sight still picks up on what the object is emitting and even when the distance between the object and it increases* (Dufren, 1989:41.) It is a case of the cleansing and the ever increasing degradation of the subject of knowledge...*the sensation will in the case of man be cleansed until the level of the perception, and finally to the understanding and gaining control over the world which with reason is called the outside world, since the subject in order to overcome it builds up a wall to separate himself from it* (Ibidem, pg. 42-43.) These walls (of the European eye) will spread even further, in the negation of the concrete embodiment (the place, body and space) in the direction of cognitive insight with which the object of knowledge, in all its wealth of moments of knowledge appears as a "logically determined or organized knowledge". This product of knowledge is far from the concrete object of knowledge. It is a concept whose content is tied to the linguistic symbol. To see in such a way means to understand or gaining insight into something to the point of an idea. The concept of impoverishment, since it represents a copy of the multitude of states of the body, is found in a certain place in space.¹⁸ Is it then not excessive to conclude that this European view of the body, place and space is at such a distance that it could be considered intolerable.

The viewpoint can be followed from the sphere of art (which was not foreign even to Plato), poetics and so on which is one huge symbolic area and represents a different kind of knowledge from the rational-conceptual. We can, in the Bachelardian sense try using the initiate to introduce something archaic, what has always been considered a factor of life and that is the soul and everything spiritual, in the hopes that we will be closer to our bodies, place and space from the cognitive-rational viewpoint. This is where we start the more immediate approach, one not guided by senses, but emotions. Not by means of the spirit, since the spirit is something timely, which introduces a distance, something systemic....*The spirit is left only with the task of completing a system, of forming the variety experiences so as to attempt to understand the world the soul does not live in the flow of time. It finds peace*

¹⁶ *You have understood it completely*, said Socrates to his pupil Glaucon, *For the four parts of the overall world now take four qualities of the soul for the ultimate knowledge, and put reason second, faith third, and leave doubt for last; organize them according to sense and believe that they play a part in clarity just like things which they refer to play a part in truth.* Plato, 1957:511e.

¹⁷ The eye is the sense of touch, the touch of light. It does not define space, it deepens it.

¹⁸ Analyzing the various approaches to myth, Jaan Puhvel cites the opinion of Max Miler, the English mythologist from the 19th century: *He considered that the human language is an unfortunate creation which hides and twists the purity of thought, and which is constantly facing doom because of the dying out of metaphor.* Puhvel, 2010:26. In this case myth is a defensive mechanism so that metaphor would not disappear, but the problem is in the multiplication of myth, the work of reality itself.

in the worlds which daydreaming creates through imagination. (Prohić, 1982:9) The spirit lives in time creating cognitive systems, believing in the continual process of the connection between past (previous knowledge which resides on the cognitive form of memory) and present knowledge. The soul does not live in the flow of time, it a "gathers time" into moments of sensations, since sensations are not subject to time and only know of duration, and are thus timeless.¹⁹ Feelings are, psychoanalytically speaking, gathered into the basics of dream-like worlds. Thus the spirit, which is born from the soul, as a cognitive moment carries within it this imaginary, dreamy gathering. It gathers knowledge by forming a relationship with the sensory, dreamy, imaginary. It gathers things in relation to the past and future This possibility can already be found in the soul which is...*primarily bipolar...Man thinks that he is telling a tale, a story, but he tells it in such a way that the story pulls him into it and becomes a part of current psychology* (Bachelard, 1982:83.).²⁰

This bipolarity leads to the "separation" or the spirit. The animus *thus includes plans and worries, two ways of being separate from oneself.* The anima *includes daydreaming which lives in the presence of happy images* (Ibidem, pg. 89) Well-being, peace and warmth of the anime is to be found in the kingdom of images, the animus is at the same time alert, ready for action, criticism...*is ready to respond* (Ibidem, pg. 90) In this bipolarity the cognitive world-atmosphere is created. In it we live at the same time daydreaming, crying, laughing and knowing. We live in a world with things – the bodies around us. The animus is not strength, while the anima is weakness. It is not weak in a sensory sense, but is rationally strong. Because, one offers us peace, protection, and the other unrest and action. Daydreaming and the unreal will lead to the ideal, while unrest and action, to vigilance to that rational materialism. One makes us believe, the other makes us know. Nevertheless, there are ways around this way of "seeing" the dilemma regarding the place, body and space. Is it an indirect sort of intimacy or is it intentional? That is, does the subject (the spirit and soul) constitute the world of intimacy or is it originally like that? We cannot say that the world is intimate, it is indifferent. There we have a reason for something to love, which can be felt, especially seen and sensed without being indifferent.

It is obvious that a philosophy, which focuses on the spirit, consciousness subjectivity, and so on, whether it is based on logos or maybe emotional-voluntary determinants or eros, a philosophy on the platonic-Christian trail cannot solve the problem of place, body, space without deeming them an illusion, without overcoming them and making them the object of the work of the spirit. Nevertheless, even the philosophy which stems from materialistic positions does not solve things in a different way and resembles the previous one. It also introduces principles which transcend the reality of the fact **that the body is found in a certain place in space**. Both one and the other approach annul so to speak the world of the body in some place in space, since neither one nor the other was adhered to in its self-validity. Bodies, man and the world are sacrificed from the viewpoint of the transcendental education. Thus the world and things are not to be found residing in reality and instead are constructed, and man does not live with the world, but instead constitutes it. Self-origination is not respected. This means that the horizon of sense and determination depends on place if

¹⁹ It only seems like we are dealing with pure duration, and not a cognitive shift and the flow from one object of knowledge for which sense develops. Sense is always the sense of something. It is precognitive, but is factitively bound to an object of knowledge or better said content of knowledge.

²⁰ We would say tri-partite, since in addition to the emotional, cognitive there is also to willing part of the soul.

we conditionally and cautiously understand it as originality. Because, "the source" includes what stems from it, where it further flows, what it flows into and all the other guidelines of "strong opinions". We are not starting out from a general principle, from rational-formal models or in Heidegger's sense...*that in some part of the being, for example in nature, we find located a detailed draft of natural occurrences.*²¹ Instead, the model should be built from a place as a context, the contingent world of things, bodies, occurrences as they are, but once again not fast enough to overlook the facts and to go far beyond them.

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Democritus and in part the peripatetic facticity is the possibility of sticking to the "factual state of the body in some place in space ". If everything changes, disappears and reappears, do places remain? Ultimately, Plato's ideas are also located in some place, which is the intelligible world, and thus a divide being must also have its place. A place seems to be the "alpha and omega" of everything. Every thing is in some place and that place determines it. But, can that place be something more? That a place is something, in the ancient times was last claimed by Aristotle, pressed between what first thought and then occurred and what had already occurred and then thought. Namely, it will come to be that if there were no place, there would be no existence, no thought, no action, since there would be nothing on which and in which one could act. Simply, nothing would be possible. If it is already there, in some place, then we could reach it, act and think on it. A place connects everything, it seems that it is a condition of everything, since nothing can exist without it being in some place. Both space and the being and movement exist though their location, thought Aristotle, and thus the place is what we should be dealing with. Nevertheless, precisely for the reason that it is basic and a precondition for everything, *...regarding "what a place is" many difficulties arise, those who are watching, do not see everything that is there* (Aristotle, 1987:208a, 35)

And not only that, but none of his predecessors did not say anything serious about it, and instead it was somehow taken for granted. Taken for granted, since for those who believe that thought first appeared and then it followed, consider that the place of everything is in thinking and the spirit, and for those who say that occurrence preceded thought, place lies in existence or in something found in space or body movement. Sometimes in one, then in another part of space, but never in a single place. In relation to a being which must always be somewhere, be it in one way or another, place is in accordance with the being. What is taken as granted in the sense that a being is always related to some place. But, is a place the same thing as a being?

Irrespective of how it is in relation to what it is a place is something that cannot be reduced to anything else. If that is the case, then "what constitutes a place" if...*it is neither a form, nor a thing, nor a spacing* (Ibidem, 212a, 5), nor the sky? For the first time, there is no possibility of its manifesting itself, and thus Aristotle takes recourse to comparisons and metaphors: *thus when in what has been set in motion something inside moves and*

²¹ Heidegger, 1989:9. Heidegger's thought refers to the research procedures of new-age science, nevertheless it can be used for all the metaphysical-ontological thoughts in philosophy, religion and the like since ultimately science "stems from" them. That means all the ways in which viewing something is built on a previous plan, draft and the like.

shifts, like a boat on the river, then "what contains something" serves more like a vessel rather than a place. Because it is in the nature of a place to desire to be immobile. That is why the entire river is a place, since it (like) a whole is immobile; and thus the place – is the initial immobile border of what contains something (Ibidem, 212a, 15-20.) A place is thus that space in which something happens to the body, without it being an empty space, and instead what retains the activity of the body or of anything else. It is the border of the body, without being either the body or the border. A place is the place of everything.

We can, instead of drawing a conclusion state that actually things should be "seen" in such a way, that is cognitively determined by the attitude that a place is ours. Not only in relation to ontology but gnoseology as well. Namely, that we always find knowledge in a certain place and that what we know is always in a certain place. We could say, if it were possible within the boundaries of the existing European languages, that a place is the original starting point, but as point, "zero" (not in the sense of zero in mathematics, which is the border between positive and negative numbers), "nothing" (something not in accordance with the Greek idea that something exists, but there is nothing there). It is not even close to what in newer schools of thought is known as the "field of action", as a counterpart to the modern physics concept of the "unique force field" and so on. Because, "a unique force field" only confirms the possibility of the existence of an absolute force. Unlike that, when the place is taken as a "nothing", "zero", then the world is not grounded in strong, necessary starting points, and instead is the meeting place of the body and various relations.

The body can be found in a certain location, and then that location becomes important for its reoccurrence – it is the original ground zero or something of the kind. In addition, we also find the neighboring positions, but not in a strong sense, but as originating from the body. We get to know what is concrete on the horizon of a certain place and its sense. Getting to know something includes "a local network", and this network should be a general plan. One should be careful with the use of terms such as "internal" and "external", since the place thus positioned includes other places, within it and outside of it, "from" a certain situation and so on. These concepts immediately lead us to weak and strong positions, the essence and occurrence and so on. Places include action, external and internal, they border with one another and so on, but this is not a defining fact nor is it one that is aimed at an ultimate goal. If we are interested in the purpose, then it is a local one, since there are no other places and things outside of them.²² Places and bodies are

²² In the aforementioned title of the text by Heise, *Place as a horizon – the topical philosophy in Japan*, the topical philosophy in Japan, among other things is discussed, and the topical philosophy of Giovanni Battista Vico is included, one which stems from the direction of the critique of the new-age rationalism and demands the returns or *Topics have to be returned one step behind discursive speech...*(pg. 422.) The reason is that...*Rationalism, such as criticism, the direction of the validity of the abstracted principles and is characterized by anonymity; It does not take into consideration the specific conditions under which we reach these principles; the subjects appear here as subjects which are formally defined.* Ibidem, pg. 422. If language, myth and art are what defines a community according to Vico, then from there we conclude that the use of speech must be viewed in a concrete situation...*the concrete conditions under which the conversation takes place...* Ibidem, pg. 422. The topical collects and is richer, while the critical-rational opinion is more boring. What we are dealing with is a sort of rehabilitation of the "despised doxies" (Waldenfels), in favor of the episteme, the everyday in favor of the unusual. For more on this local concrete life see Waldenfels, *In the networks of the living world*, which is similar to Husserl's "life world", that is that everyday life is not a part of life, but that it instead permeates all fields of life, we can add that it is the only form of human life, that everyday knowledge is susceptible to the mythic, artistic, philosophical and scientific learning.

unique and singular. It is a fact that there are no two identical bodies or two identical places. To be honest, even the connection between neighboring places is local. That is the purpose of a body in a certain place in space. It, this local facticity, cannot be included under the term "strong opinion", the all-encompassing thoughts, but instead weak attitudes, thinking which leads to a relative sense of security that we might not have overstepped the mark in this respect.

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PRILOG FILOZOFIJI TOPOSA SA POZICIJE SAZNANJA (Viđenje tela na nekom mestu u prostoru)

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*Filozofija duha, svesti, subjektiviteta itd., bilo da počiva na logosu ili pak na emotivo-voljnim odrednicama ili erosu, filozofija na platonovo-hrišćanskom tragu ne može da reši pitanje mesta, tela i prostora a da ih ne učini prividom, ne nadiđe i u tome prikaže predmetom rada duha. Čak i ona filozofija koja polazi od materijalističkih pozicija ne rešava stvari na drugačiji način, već je na istoj poziciji kao i ova prethodna pošto i ona uvodi princip koji transcenduje činjenicu **da je telo na nekom mestu u prostoru**. I jedan i drugi pristup nište mesta, tela i prostor. Ni jedno od njih nije poštovano u samovaženju ili "viđeno na svom mestu" kao unikatno. Zato je pitanje, u kom delu i zašto u procesu saznanja činimo ovakva postvarenja? Da li smo svesni toga šta znači i do čega dovodi promena mesta tela u prostoru? Da li smo danas u takvoj situaciji, baš zbog načina njihovog viđenja?*

Ključne reči: *mesto, telo, prostor, saznanje, pozicija viđenja, verovanje, sadržaj saznanja, predmet saznanja*