

CERTAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PLACE AND KNOWLEDGE

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Abstract. *Knowledge leads to human locations, groups of people and the individuals within them being what they are, that the places differ from one another, people as individuals, groups of people as communities, and thus knowledge in all its manifestations is objectified in a local way. Light can be shed on this relationship and the effects by the problematizing of the relationship between a place and knowledge, the folding nature of the production of a place through knowledge.*

Key words: *place, knowledge, the objectivization of knowledge or "the third world", cognitive system.*

We can speak of knowledge and its objectivization as the shaping of an individual in the immediate cognitive situation (a person from Nis, an European...), of the human locations themselves (buildings, streets, bridges... then there is also Nis, Paris...), the different cultural artifacts (books, temples, artwork...) ontologically speaking, as a special kind of a "third world" (see, Popper, 2002:101).¹ This "third world" is shaped thanks to knowledge, that is, all those powers, moments and characteristics of knowledge, but according to the local-knowledge determination. Simply put, a location is not an ordinary factor and category of knowledge, and instead represents the "foldings of the being" – the place² (is) where the knowledge occurs, the location is the cognitive **matrix**.³

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¹ Popper's "third world" is similar only in one part to Plato's – in the fact that it is objective, but unlike Plato, it is a human product. It thus seems to be closer to Hegel's position, and not Plato's, since with Hegel there is an objective spirit and a subject-human who is included in the production of knowledge and what is more important, its creation. Man is also included, but, seen as a whole, man is only a medium (the manifested side – the phenomenon) of Hegel's "objective spirit" which has been made into a hypostasis or a defining essence in the creation of the world. Hegel practically achieved that in the Aristotelian spirit, rejecting the Platonist third world by merging "the process and subject matter of thought" and "the ascription of consciousness to the objective spirit". See, *ibid*, footnote 2, pg. 144. and see, *ibid*, pg. 103.

² We use Foucault's term "foldings". Explaining this term, Gilles Deleuze states that: *It has no determined outside borders, but is only moving matter, brought to life by peristaltic movement, folds and foldings, and forms on the inside:*

1. We are on the earth so that we could become humans through knowledge. The earthly spaces in which we become people are places. If a location is "unspoiled nature", then the places are "cultivated landscapes or the habitats of people". Nevertheless, a place is not within the landscape, the landscape exists on its own. ... *a certain space is not contained within a greater space as a Russian doll made of wood is contained within another, instead it is a partial segment of a wider space for example, the earthly space.*" (Waldenfeles, 1991:204.) Between this wider space and a location – a segment, there is a border. The border of a place is the border of knowledge. A labyrinth of mixing and creation: of people, artifacts, the world of things and cognition itself.

A place, as a factor of knowledge and the main element in the determination of man, was not taken into consideration due to the neglect of the earth as an element (stoicōn translated from the Latin *elementum*, where stoicōn essentially means "to step", "to walk in line"). This "forgetfulness" dates from the first Greek philosophers, only for the earth to be turned into "a valley of tears" with the arrival of Christians, a place where people occasionally stayed and with modern science, a geometric, geographic, climatic space, just to name a few. Nevertheless, the earth with all its places is what brings together all three worlds (the human, the divine and the earthly). We might even say there were more worlds of each. The question is of course how and thanks to what does something like this even happen?

Through knowledge, the given earthly nature, human activity (which stems from needs such as survival and making sense of things) come things such as houses, temples, bridges, books, computers, things such as institutions, and the like. Heidegger says: *No place can exist before the construction of a bridge.* (Martin Heidegger, 1982:98.) But at the same time, there is no bridge without knowledge, without a certain space which needs bridging – without human activity which is enabled through knowledge. A place actually determines human space and time with what it guards. Thus, it is not just a mere human shelter and habitat on earth. It is a space-time dimensionality for man. Ontologically it is so in both a spiritual and material sense, but thanks to knowledge.

For a certain place (what we refer to as "the spirit of a place" *"spiritus loci"*)⁴ what is decisive are not all the forms and objectification of knowledge, but only some of them. They, as the "markings", make up the characteristics of a place and constitute what makes it different from others. They represent or contain some form of local memory. They

not something else in relation to the outside, instead, precisely the inside of something outside. Gilles Deleuze, 1989: 99. Merleau-Ponty will speak of "the ontology of the flesh", and Heidegger of "being-in-the-world".

³ **Matrix**, from the Latin *matrix* is an anatomical matrix. Actually at its basis lies the word mother-mater, which figuratively means origin, source, and the like, a basis for instance. In the physiological sense, a cell – the cells from which other cells are developed; inanimate matter (for example bone or cartilage) into which live cells are introduced.

⁴ At first sight it seems that cognitive forms, such as for instance myths, can only have a temporal dimension since as a story and a mental image they do not have to have a material form in space. ...*Since "a myth" as such, in this basic meaning, does not include any spatial but purely temporal understanding; it marks a certain temporal "aspect" which incorporates the world.* Ernst Kasirer, 1985:110. Still, a myth as a story refers to other events in space and in the form of the presence of mythic forms in a certain location (for example Olympus) and a man with a mythic consciousness is somewhere on the earth and daily reaffirms the myth through certain activities, rituals, things and so on. Every religion must have, in addition to a purely temporal side of the mythic story itself, its materialization in space in the form of material symbols, cultural locations, temples, rituals and so on. Art can already be divided into the spatial and temporal arts, but they always involve some sort of object.

make up the "tradition", the arche of the community. At the same time the markings determine current and future knowledge, different cognitive constructions – reconstructions, interpretations and the like. To be more specific, all of the markings of a place, a village or a city, or a wider community (state) rest on some objectification of knowledge – the markings. Places (villages and cities) retain knowledge and thus represent objectified memory. We do not learn all over again, instead we start from the mark of the place we live in.⁵

Our connection to a place is essential and determines our identity (philosophically) or our mentality (psychologically). It keeps our feet firmly on the ground – it keeps us in a very thorough manner: spatio-temporal. We are brought together, we gather in a certain place and seem to be "in" or "from" it. A place pulls us together and it does so by local memories preserved in local markings. Heidegger, when speaking of this essential bond, states: *Retention actually means preservation. What essentially preserves us, holds us only as long as we hold onto what is holding us. We hold onto it when we do not let it evaporate from our memory. Memory is a collection of opinions. Thoughts – of what? Of what holds us at our very core, if we are at the same time thinking of it. To which extent do we have to think about what is holding us? The extent to which it is from the very beginning what needs to be thought out.* (Heidegger, 1999:101-102).⁶ And what it is that is supposed to be thought about is what brings us together. A place holds us together, as a place of knowledge, of things which are its objectifications and the objectifications of memory.

Thus, local memory (knowledge) is offered through the cognitive objectifications – local markings which represent (preserve) the arche – the oldest element and thus the one that is most responsible for determining. What is important is preserved and it preserves us. Preservation determines the way in which we as the inhabitants are built, so that what is being preserved is not hindered in terms of the preservation of its essence. Constant are the retention and the extent of knowledge (memory and memories), that is understanding, retention and memories (protension, from the Latin *protego* = to protect, to cover, to shield...). At any given moment I am determined by some local object, the place where I am, and at the same time these local objects in a pulsating manner make up the place as a place: Paris, Nis, Europe, Serbia etc. and me as the Parisian, European and the like.

In addition to the marking, knowledge is objectified through institutions which preserve the systems of knowledge or what is conceptual. The institutions are also local, but they are not completely bound to a certain location. But, if some local marking-artifact is transferred to another location it no longer has that effect, and is only meant for being a museum exhibit. Contrary to that, conceptual knowledge, institutional, and the institutions themselves can act everywhere in the same manner, and at the same time not lose their importance, effect, purpose and the like. Institutionalized knowledge is uniform. One formula can be applied everywhere. Mathematics is studied in all schools, and schools are the same, etc. Nevertheless, institutions are still local. Conceptual knowledge is accumu-

⁵ The important American anthropologist Franz Boas was...*against every global vision of society and the social geometry of social forms like the ones proposed by Max Weber and Georg Simmel: Not being in favor of hazy evolutionism and simplified courses of culture Boas believed that each culture should be formulated in its own zone, in its own milieu. Thus, logically, we would be moving away from »great geographic syntheses«, the ones Carl Fischer especially insisted on.* Ratko Božović, 1993:570.

⁶ To be more precise, one needs to look at Heidegger's interpretation of "building", "dwelling" and "thought" in *Building, housing and thought from Thoughts and poetry*, Nolte, Beograd, 1982, pg. 83-104.

lated from concrete individuals and so we have a single transformation, the merging of concepts and markings, both in the knowledge itself but also in its objectifications. Institutions of knowledge such as schools, courts, faculties over time become local markings and carry some sort of local knowledge and memory. It is a sort of local space-landscape.

In addition, in a purely cognitive sense or in knowledge, in what is referred to as the spiritual sense, every piece of knowledge is subject to local varieties in the system of local knowledge, models, ideations and the like. Now we are speaking, and in an abstract sense, of the temporality of local knowledge. Thus, concepts are the basic form of knowledge, as insight into a certain piece of knowledge regarding something. Markings and concepts are close cognitive features, with the addition that it seems that concepts are generally acknowledged, since they are located within the institutions, science and the scientific system etc, while marking are often a local issue. When they are objectified, then we are once again speaking of single concepts, but not of the changes in the concept during objectification in time and space. Nevertheless, the time and space in which a concept is being objectified are not physical space and time, but local –human and this is where certain shifts and convergences of concepts and markings take place. Concepts can be brought closer to markings, maybe in the manner of Foucault's understanding of concepts in general. Mainly, Foucault cites as the pattern the claims of J. Canguilhem regarding the transfer and transformation of concepts so that: *...the history of a concept, all in all, is not the history of its progressive definition, its constantly increasing rationality, its degree of abstraction, and instead it is the history of its various fields of constitution and validity, the history of its consecutive rules of use, the many-layered theoretical milieus in which its development began and was completed.* (Michel Foucault, 1998:8-9.) Local variety could also be added. On its part, the marking is a concept, since it constitutes the local state of the spirit and the knowledge of the people in it. But, this is a concept which is in a certain field of validity, because as a certain concept it lives, not in "history", but in the local histories "of its various fields of constitution and validity".

When speaking of places, knowledge and memory, then what we are primarily dealing with markings. Markings (naturally concepts as, but in the previously outlined manner) are a point of conversion, "stitches" which bind earthly space and men. They are interwoven into everyday life and it is difficult to achieve pure markings as the concepts from artifacts or natural objects. The difficulty lies in the sense of reaching the analogous in the concept of pure chemical elements very few of which exist in reality and which do not speak much of the complete wholes in which things basically can be found. We can approximately define markings as signs, moments which mean something important to people and have a determining function. They preserve knowledge and function as a basis for daily reconstructions and constructions, ideations and understandings.

Local cognitive variety, in the form of objectification, determines the contact between man and earthy or *the border*. Just as we have previously mentioned, knowledge determines local boundaries. We move about in this variety and within its borders, but not in order to always and without fail interpret it and clearly know the concept, but in order to give shape to ourselves and live in order – for the lack of a better term **to know through believing**. Our places with their markings are labyrinths-matrices of our cognitive shaping, the birth and preservation of everything that is important to us.

Taken on their own, local experience and memory (based on markings and concepts) of that experience are not merely a construction but also a reconstruction (to the presenta-

tion as a representation), as a necessary ideation and transcendence of the present itself.⁷ It is also the designing of the "religare", that is, the connection between the very border with the third world or the knowledge which is a bond between us and a certain world. The connection is enabled by **the holiness** of the local markings themselves (temples, symbols...) by ideations and hypothesizing. What we are talking about is a local story-myth and legends which have universal value, for our place and all the possible worlds. According to Derrida, from this religious as "the temptation to believe" or that ontologization which from the past brings promise into the present for the future, stem scrupules which determine the meaning and role of the word religio. Scrupules, which indicates the root of the religio in words and the real "answer to" (spondeo – respondeo to the Greek sponde), which prevents by giving a promise regarding the future event as a certainty in the present thanks to the past.⁸

Ideations – local knowledge moves in the direction of overstepping the event itself in the form of remembrances, in order to alter the present and thus the future present or future. Ideations are always made in time but in a local sense up to that personal local position, where the difference is made between the ideated world here and should in part be merged and fitted.

2. We can speak of local cognitive constructions-reconstructions, up to the European, since Europe is also a place on earth, today in the form of the European Union. Constructions impose themselves upon the present as a bond between worlds, from the most general to the particular, in various irrational-rational forms from: mythic-epic, via the artistic or ritualistic, scientific to philosophical constructions of time which determine what is known as the "spirit of the times", all the way to those daily and laic ones. The oldest and most paradigmatic is the mythic-epic reconstruction of time and the bond between worlds or the designing of the borderline.⁹ In it memory is most often a serious-tragic memory

⁷ At the basis of spiritual experience and memory we find what is the oldest or arche or some determining principle that is a hypostasis. It, in the form of culture and tradition, can be understood as the **memofunds** or as the information complexes of cultural evolution. Namely: *...if we accept the theory of Richard Dawkins regarding human culture as a second evolution, which begins at the same time as the first, biological evolution accumulates enough critical mass of information of human experience, and thus the principal points of this theory is that memofunds, as the information complexes of the cultural evolution (combinations of genes which are destroyed) are practically indestructible, (...) and that the reconstruction of every memofund that has ever been created is possible. The same applies to Lepenski vir.* Kljajić, Ljubomir, 1991:68.

⁸ *...two etymologically possible sources of the word religio: a) relegere, from legere ("bringing together, gathering": according to Cicero... b) religare, from ligare ("to bind", "to tie together"). This knowledge originates from Lactantius and Tertulian... Cicero with an emphasis on relegere, the semantically similar and formally proven at least in appearance: to gather in order to renew, and thus we get to religio, considerate attention, respect, attentiveness, literally embarrassment or humility - and on the other hand (Lactantius and Tertulian) religare, etymology "which was made up by the Christians", states Benveniste, connection religion to the link, to be more precise with an obligation, tie, that is, a task and thus with the other, etc. Between people or between people and God... one such difference for us is of limited value..."To gather" that is the translation offered by Benveniste...etc. Jacques Derrida, 2001:70-78. We could also add Augustine's re-elegere "to read again", "to choose again". The word religion means all that, literally stated: the holy, connections, gathering, rereading, a promise and the like.*

⁹ Perhaps the term "deconstruction" is the closest to the entire concept of construction and reconstruction. Wondering whether religion is a word which has remained without adequate translation, Derrida points to the deciding role of this religio for European culture as the bearer of "the temptation to believe in knowledge ...in

due to the inability to realize what has already been realized, and thus the constant demise, the steps back, the inability to prevent repetition. Because of that there is only pain which is transformed within history as a sort of resignation and desire to overcome what is given in terms of the idea of the exalted. For example, that is the European local memory, as a civilization of pain and suffering, always a religious memory which has equated "holiness" and "trust". *Dying within or without transcendentalism, persecution or homelessness or the slipping of madness into crime, are all the features of an epic universe of Europe as an essential (dimension) of tragic reality, the reality of self-delusion. Freud's stylizing and the transformation of Oedipus into the basic archetype of the European man (homo europeensis) has in itself its justification and thus obtains its truthfulness and authenticity.* (Peter Rau, 2001-2:28.) Tragically known, evil is always more sublime and makes man seem more important than the ordinary and normal-life-bordering, and only so the remembered-memory could still be the most valuable in current understanding. The tragic does not happen to everyone, but it does include everyone. It must, as in the original bridging between the spirit, fatally be repeated because it is more worthy than the ordinary and everyday.

In our constant desire to realize what we carry in our memory as realized (due to sanctity and trust, Derrida) we lose. The present never is and never even becomes a realized past, and instead is lost in that game. Thus our time appears to be lost, for the sake of the memory which is borne by the local markings. We search for what is never realized and repeated (in this lost time) and grieve for it. The search, the tragic nature, the grieving are all states caused by knowledge. In an ontological sense we speak of our thirst for the spirit, the spirit of the Balkans, of Europe. The spirit must be objectified, or as Hegel would say "realized", but because it cannot be done in the present it is then "conserved" in a segment of the memory or with our memory, and just like that, is actualized through new knowledge. It is always conserved in the space-time local objectifications of the spirit, most often in art, literature, from folk to popular. Or, as we have said, in the objectification of knowledge. With their reading in the present, what has been remembered as knowledge is affirmed.

The search for the lost and never realized past – because it has not happened, is the cognitive turn of the "spirit of the place" to the analysis of the sense of history and "elevation" outside of local boundaries. It is a reconstruction of the sense of history and the various types of ideational positioning. The most frequent pattern in maybe Derrida's direction is the uncritical equation of the holy and the known. Thus, no ordinary epic construction of time (in the form of a mythic story) with the "ordinary" elevated feelings of spirit; instead the attempt to reconstruction or deconstruction of time until the question of sense is asked or the question of the determination of sense itself. This analysis appears as the *search "for lost time"* in literature, for instance, in the case of Marcel Proust or in the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche (in the form of nihilism in terms of faith and knowledge), Walter Benjamin and the like. It will have a significant effect on many philosophers, theoreticians, authors and artists in general, that is, will leave an additional mark on the "spirit of the times".¹⁰ We might say that memory, through the engagement of

the experience of promise or the untouched victim of a fire, a word that binds the future in the present on the topic of a past event: 'I give you my promise that it has arrived'. Ibidem, pg. 65.

¹⁰ Kant criticizes these constructions and reconstructions considering the problem of the beginnings of the

us-the spirit does not back down from the intention to from the present and to crystallize – regulate borderline events. These cognitive reconstructions-constructions can be found throughout Europe, up to the smallest local spaces. In this way a place, a community, individuals are determined as such in their idiosyncrasy.

The objectification of life at the local border can also be found in relation to the past or in tolerance. A memory understood in this sense corresponds to what Schopenhauer saw as a way out of European philosophy of force, which is was prime in Hegel's imperialistic system, as he is a part of the non-European philosophy, which is a gesture of tolerance. Schopenhauer also finds solutions for the European cognitive reconstruction-construction partly in Indian philosophy. Benjamin's presentation of the New Angel and memory, the understanding of the suffering of the other, is in the spirit of eastern thought and practice. Without any desire to change anything, "practically without a voice", the angel without the use of force, good without the use of force (Ghandi – passive resistance), he does not spread fear like classic angels and is himself a victim of fear and almost seems not to be moving. Benjamin's angel *...marks the transformation of the moral missionary progress, the transformation of European desire to lead and dictate the way, while at the same time the military avant-garde, cursing its origins, turns into an artistic movement* (Peter Rau, 2001-2:31.) Benjamin's New Angel is the symbol of the melancholy memory of man. It in turn rests on art and in this case on Durer's creation "Melancholy".

It only seems that art, as a sort of myth-aesthetic, is the last refuge of the European man, a bridge that bridges a gap between us and the indifferent world or is a real cognitive-symbolic system for the reconstruction of time. "Salvation in art" could be doom, since enormous build-up (industrialization) of artistic production can take place very quickly due to the decrease in the power of the tele-technocracy. An enormous amount of energy is used, so that this use can cause and already causes an evident decline and erosion of European people or the local spirit of Europe or Europe as a place, a community. But it is not only a case of the decline of Europe, but of the world, due to the expansion of the European ecumenism. Hyperproduction¹¹ of artwork is a clear danger within, so to speak, the general ecological crisis of the modern man. History also shows that a hyperproduction in artwork can at a time of the decline in values, the decrease and waste of a given culture, civilization or a people, at a time when everyone thinks that everything can be done with reference to the current climate without any sense. Thus the field of art, as a possible means of analyzing time, turns into a weapon of the spirit memory-faith and knowledge to a banal decline. Only two things remain, if we are to believe Fukuyama, in post-history: religion and science. *In the time of post-history there will be no art or philosophy. There will only be unending worry for the perpetuation of the museum of human history* (Fukuyama, 1990:162.) It is the only time in which the local sense of spirit is realized in its absolute dominance.

history of mankind. He believes that "to include speculation" and "imaginings" into the reconstructions of the history of mankind, due to the beginning of history and to fill in the blanks within the historical events themselves is something that could be a "blueprint for a novel" and "something made up". This reconstruction must seriously be derived from experience itself. Nevertheless, it is obvious that primarily we Europeans can do no different, since through the tragic we achieve importance and the sublime. See, Kant *Speculations on the origins of the history of mankind*, from *The Mind and Freedom*, Ideje, Beograd, 1974, pg. 71.

¹¹ Hyperproduction these days is manifested as the world economic crisis.

3. The Balkans (as a place) were not shaped by the cognitive idiosyncrasies in the sense of a clear classification of all types of knowledge, but are a cognitive "mix" which cannot fully be decomposed into the natural elements of the institutional and laic knowledge or in the direction of cognitive systems into: the mythic, artistic, philosophical, scientific and everyday. The idiosyncrasy of Balkan cognition is that there is no idiosyncrasy. The special feature we can refer to as the "Balkan aesthetics" in a wider sense as the basic characteristic of the Balkan spirit. Our speech, the knowledge which shapes us, is the daily mythologized-estheticized speech. It makes it possible for us, from this special idiosyncrasy without anything special about it, to speak of everything. This special esthetic act is always individual with universal dimensions. The people of the Balkans thus do not have to clear representation of God, since everyone has their own personal deity in the objectless aesthetic experience. The subject matter of the esthetic experience, since each one must have some sort of subject matter, in this case does not exist. The cognitive does not exist in this experience, since knowledge is always the knowledge of something. It is a pure experience as the current state of things without the subject matter of cognition. An individual from the Balkans identifies himself with this experience or feeling and thus presents himself as the reference and the subject matter of the objectification. Speaking of anything, he speaks of himself, that is, becomes an atomized deity.

Places which are shaped by a special esthetic, the experience of people who are individualized to the point of being idiosyncratic, make the Balkans realistically more of a chaos than a cosmos. Thus, every emerging image of the original matrix, the presentation of the representation is carved stone, crystallized, not as tragic, but as an image of tears and laughter. Thus, not even of tears and laughter, but of **teary-eyed laughter**. The only chaos from which, every now and again, like the protruding rays of the sun, a cognitive overstepping of the boundaries take place very quickly, the ideation of knowledge, in order to once again fall into it. A call which is automatically frozen within the Balkan crystallized cognitive image, the crystallized spirit of the Balkans or the cultural field – the call becomes only a single fractal of this chaos.¹² It does not have the strength to change anything, as it cannot obtain the critical mass of people for itself, because people and atomized divinities and thus hypostatic values. In the Balkans nothing worthy in the cognitive sense has been created, with the exception of the "ancient Greek miracle", except that everything was sublimated, receded as the tide or is receding into the ancient Greek-byzantine creations and from them both the individual and local is constructed-reconstructed. Nothing relevant that would alter the state of things or be a defining moment in a universal sense. Everything remains at the local level, but with constant universal pretensions – in the spirit of divine intentions. Every individual, community or people has its solution, reconstruction and construction and considers it to be the best, while it is actually a case of an esthetic experience without the subject matter of the experience.

This is confirmed by the "*The Balkan aesthetics, another kind of aesthetics*" (Georgi Stardelov, 2004.) For us, the inhabitants of the Balkans, in the "crystallized chaos" we always want to talk about "crises" (usually on a global scale) "on the other side of the

¹² Even when they bombed us, in the very heart of the Balkans, it was as if nothing was happening. Then they finally understood and they stopped, so that was a war we neither fought nor lost. Actually it was not even a war, but not peace either, but a "campaign".

fence" (in the spirit of the village - Konstatinović), in order to justify the inevitable "decline into chaos" which we frequently, with the joyous and happy tearful laughter –call the return to life, our roots, our global past, the origins from which we and everything else came from. Thus, the academic-esthete now of an esthetics as a philosophical discipline, Georgi Stardelov, having concluded that we have come into a major crisis, which is of course always manifested in reflected knowledge – since it thinks in terms of times– finds a way out in the local "Balkan esthetics" or in local art (See, also, pg. 14.) Thus, just like great European epic reconstructions. Mistakes can be found in the fact that the solutions to global crises cannot be sought for in the local in life, since that is a case of various forms of knowledge and the impossibility for the global to come to the local level and vice versa, without it experiencing an transformation.¹³ Then, esthetics, as a philosophical discipline, is also a local product which is institutionalized and ever since then, there has been no more "Socrates" as a philosopher in the field. The institutions treat the local as a laic entity.

The constructions and reconstructions of time are most often mythic-artistic but they in some places turn into philosophical ones. Namely, without actually approaching the problem in a more systematic manner, we could claim that there is no global philosophy or European philosophy, but only local philosophies: the Greek, the English, French, German, American, Roman, and the rest are all branches of institutionalized philosophy and a matter of domination over border and local areas. Thus, we need to determine whether there is a Balkan esthetics.¹⁴ If there were no philosophy in the Balkans, then there would be no philosophical esthetics, which is indicated by a single simple fact of the lack of dialogue, and instead we have an atomized divine monologue. It is doubtful to say that it was a question of the "forgetfulness of the philosophy in the Balkans". Nevertheless, we, from our Balkan position almost always proceed from our own "esthetics", independently of the type of knowledge we started out from, and we save world values which actually are not there.¹⁵ We can thus speak of a single specific – Balkan hypostasis.

¹³ We should make the distinction between epochal crises reflected in knowledge and life crises understood and experienced locally.

¹⁴ Will we say that Socrates was not a philosopher, that he did not do good for the entire world, and instead cared for the Athenians and Greeks? It did not even occur to him to solve the crises of the entire world, the barbarians, Indians, Persians, and so on. The fact that his solutions in philosophy regarding good expanded, remained and entered the constitution of the institutionalized philosophy, does not mean that it is now Serbian, Macedonian or any other philosophy. No one will say that Coca-Cola is theirs just because they bought it believing that it is good, instead, it is an American product. Institutionally things function from above, by being imposed locally, their influence is transformed and thus the procedure from below cannot change things inside the institutions. **The institutional can be multinational.**

¹⁵ Without once again citing all the numerous romantic and neoromantic claims and perceptions from the past regarding various missions and roles of global proportions, we could cite a recent claim of a philosopher. This is the stand of Jovan Arandelović who, now from some "meta fictive philosophy" and not from philosophy since we have none in the Balkans, sees the fate of the Serbs to protect Europe from itself. We outrage everyone else with our hyper-philosophy and metaphysical mission of the defense of Europe. We are always in some "special missions" from the local – Balkan esthetics. But independently of that, Arandelović believes that thanks to the fact that in the case of our people "philosophy has overstepped the boundaries of eruditeness and has become something infinitely more important, if it has achieved life power". This "life power" of the Serbian meta-philosophy is the basis of our heroic defense and salvation of Europe from itself, and of course us, in the last war. *Once it has acquired this power, the defense of Europe will become for us not only the act of salvation from the violence of the world which we still do not belong to, but a defense of ourselves. That is*

From this meta-savior¹⁶ perspective the observation of Stardelov follows. "The life power" of everything from the Balkans is a never-ending source of help to everything which is in a state of crisis. *I have advocated, the standpoint claims Stardelov, that everything that has to do with what we can give from the esthetics of the Balkans to Europe and the world, these are primarily esthetic ideas sublimated in the great works of Balkan authors and artists in general, which means an individual esthetic experience, with a deeply ingrained idea of the transformed artistic act and that they are believed more than common sense, reflective philosophical ideas regarding the essence of art and the beautiful, elaborated rationally and dully without any contact with art in the thick volumes of esthetics and tractates.* (Georgi Stardelov, 2004:15) Thus, our offer from the Balkans from a special idiosyncrasy has a universal effect, but it follows from our "esthetics" as a universal esthetics of an individual type. Our esthetics is the fruit of our special "esthetic experience", if it is proven that esthetic experience is generally widespread as a matrix, so that the same thing can happen everywhere, just like in Descartes', Galileo's, Newton' scenarios of the world, then the products of that experience – knowledge can be a valid recipe for the people of Europe and the world. Wanting once again to be free of this mechanistic metaphysics, of "spiritual sciences" (used as a basis) is not able to free itself of uniformity, that is, so that everyone has the same experiences in the world but that it does not remind us of the mechanistic and physical understanding of things.

The general justification for everything lies in what we in the Balkans especially love and have: games, holidays and customs. Definitely, the healing property of the Balkan esthetics lies in: *Games, in celebrations in rituals where the heart of the Dionysian esthetics lies* (Georgi Stardelov, 2004:17). And what is the objectless subject matter of the esthetic experience if not a Dionysian matter. But is it Dionysian? It is quite certain that in our mentality we can find what seems to be Dionysian, but it is confusing and chaotic, that is, not Dionysian, because it surfaces without the apollonian. Our reduction of the apollonian or better said the lack of any rationality is made up for by something that always guarantees the dimension of the measure and the rationality, and that is the subject – thanks to the fact that the subject is the factor of knowledge. Nevertheless, we should bear in mind that the subject, (including an individual from the Balkans), is not merely a factor, but what is shaped and obtained from knowledge. It is not something we take into consideration when we ourselves are at stake, since this requires rationalization, and instead, independently of it, in our region, any individual from the Balkans is a self-atomized divinity – the subject is always both the criterion of the truth and the one who determines values.

when the talk of the Serbs defending Europe would mean that it defends the principle on which it is founded ... In the concluding paragraph we can shown that Serbia defends Europe from barbarianism. Jovan Arandelović, 2006:117.

¹⁶ This word meta is multiplied and so if it shown that one position is problematic, we move to another one in which a certain negativity, once we have recognized it, is presented as positive and a scientific recipe for others. This is the case with Arandelović, where if we have no philosophy then we have a meta-philosophy, then a "Balkanology". Have we even heard of Apenninology, Pyrenology, Alaskanology? It would seem not. One article states: *Even if we were to determine that the Balkans are a prototype for irreconcilable differences, even that could be of use in the historically stifled conflicts and tragic situations. The mission of Balkanology is to describe the stereotypical models of the Balkans, to demystify historical misconceptions, to study the original pictures of the world and the mentality of the Balkan people, to incite strategic comparative research (mythic images, migrations and conversions) into the Balkans.* Kata Kulavkova, 2006:19.

"They", (games, celebrations, rituals, SD), *unfortunately, are interpreted by Gadamer outside of their subjective base and in that case they are not in agreement with the hermeneutic method as the closest interpretation of art* (Georgi Stardelov, 2004:17). Gadamer actually understands the danger of localizing games and their reduction to the local subject of knowledge, where such an ontologization leads to the absolute dispersion of truth and understanding. It is not the subject that plays– the man, instead "the game is played", and thus the game is not the service of the subject and instead is more of a feature of the world into which we are wedged, which should be understood.¹⁷ Localism to individualism with universal pretensions is not even solipsism which accompanies developed institutionalized philosophies of cognition, "the spiritual style of the village" "the tribe in agony" – "since that is how it was and how it always will be" (Konstantinović). Nevertheless, we firmly stick to the fact that from its "Balkan esthetics" the *...concept of truth does not contradict experience (as the esthetic, but not the psychological category) instead, it makes it more convincing, suggestive, which means more true. Because that was how it was and how it will remain: only if one truth is experienced can it be close to us, can become our own, and not, thus, someone else's, belonging to the other side, but our own, a truth belonging to our side* (Ibidem, pg. 18.).

Thus, the experience of the artwork enables tapping into the deepest truth, since it is the only given element in art work.¹⁸ The truth of artwork is general and all-encompassing or objectively-subjective and vice versa. *Then I am the World and the World is I, so without one or the other neither the life-giving, nor the philosophical, nor the esthetic experience can be established, within which and as a part of which the truth in artwork becomes esthetic truth* (Georgi Stardelov, 2004:18). The promotion of the local is the only possible through some sort of experience. This time it does not seem possible, even though at first glance it appears so, from the universal experience or art, but instead from the local determination of the Balkans as a field of art. At the same time we forget that the art of the Balkans is not separate from myth-religious knowledge, and thus such a recommendation of art and experience as the experience of truth is not independent and instead requires rituality, custom, ritual, games as the specificity of the Balkan instinct, again the "objectless esthetic". "The lived experience is the basis of the experience of the truth of the artwork in the present. And we have already said that such reconstructions in time are the consequence of a memory paradox and a local one at that. Local memory is such, that it cannot be completely valid, not only for us, but for the other person in the present.

4. It is thus a case of hypostasis. Hypostasis in general, as the Balkan local hypostasis, is the power of knowledge and not experience, to extract, from the majority of possible essences, some and place it at the basis of everything as the most vital, it enables clarity and certainly in a gnoseological or ontological sense of the existence of everything. The

¹⁷ In that sense see, Srboľjub Dimitrijević, *Man, games and the world*, pg. 83-99.

¹⁸ Whether this truth is the deepest one is a separate issue. It is problematic to speak of artistic knowledge, the artistic cognitive system; that the aim of art is not truth but artwork. Certain thinkers (Sartre) do not speak of the truth, but of lies, Heidegger speaks of art as the truth of the being; that a work of art is real, but that what it presents can be unreal. Instead, for example, we find the title of the work of Mirko Zurovac, *Art as the truth and lie of a being*, in a certain way indicates the extent to which it is relevant to speak of the possibilities of experience – the experience of the actual truth on the basis of art as its bearer.

essence which is now a hypostasis is untouchable and unchangeable.¹⁹ At the same time it is a reduction in the sense of the importance and the hierarchy of things – what is essential in relation to what has been derived from it. The procedure in knowledge which is being ontologized is something spiritual to the degree of absolute truth. The current state of affairs (opinions) indicates that it is impossible to think in any other manner, to act and take care of oneself without hypostases. The truth is ontologized by the realization of what is cognitive and ideational, and contrary to that, when the important is not realized, then the lie is ontologized. The hypostasis itself is not a relative and free act, but is conditioned by the local line which is positioned as the "hypostasis plane".²⁰ Hypostasis is always local, but with universal importance, and this means that it extends beyond local boundaries. In the case of the Balkans, the state of chaos, a hypostasis plane is an atomized divinity of whoever is creating the hypostasis, that is, creating a hypostasis of oneself through "objectless esthetic experience". More or less everyone in their cognitive designs shapes things in the general attitude of "I know", "I say", "I said". The wonder expressed by Michel Montaigne from his own position seems relevant and valid in our time, especially for the circumstances in the Balkans. Namely, the local and political become a boundary for everything: "...what kind of a goodness is that, which glimpsed at and valid yesterday, no longer is so tomorrow, and which, once a river is crossed, becomes a crime? What kind of truth is it whose borders are these hills, but on the other side of the hills, it becomes a lie?" (Michel Montaigne, *Essay*, from Ernst Kasirer, 2003:135.)

Human and historical time is connection with knowledge and thought in a deciding manner, thus with these local "planes of hypostases" (we have already stated that the local spirit is temporal-spatial). As an answer to the question: *...in what way does time, the flow of history, emerge as a decisive force of these forms of human spiritual life, that is, why*

¹⁹ According to Karl Popper, Plato discovered *...the third world of Shapes or Ideas...* Popper, 2002:115. This world represents a final explanation or "the explanation with the help of essences". *...explanations whose explicans is neither able nor has the need for further explanations. It is a theory of explanation with the help of essences, that is through words that are hypostases.* Ibid, pg. 115.

Adorno says: *I used the term "hypostasis"; today I often hear the poorly coined word from Greek and German "Hypostasierung" (= to class as hypostases)... Under the hypostases we in philosophy understand that some concept, which itself has become something, something which has originated from something else, as it was stated in the age of German idealism, something set up, treated as if it were something that exists of itself.* Teodor Adorno, 1986:450. When we speak of Plato's ideas, then they are the common features and units of a multitude, of something special. Hypostases come into being when these ideas, features are viewed as something that exists on their own, where their origin is lost and its extraction is from this multitude. They somehow stand on their own, independent of the thinking and the existing, subject and object, which Popper points to.

A concept which I would like to delineate here from the concept of a hypostasis is the concept of supposition,... "Supposition" means...placing as the basis of something, but placing in a hypothetical sense... Teodor Adorno, 1986: 451.

²⁰ Pavel Florensky speaks of "planes of hypostases" when she makes a distinction between truth in comparison to certain nations: *The truth (emet, emes) for the Jewish, therefore, is not an ontological concept as it is for the Slavs, nor gnoseological as for the Jelina, nor a legal one as in the case of the Romans but a historic one, or primarily, a religious-historic, theocratic one. These are the conclusions of Pavel Florensky in her Second Letter in the volume A pillar and fortress of truth.* Platon Atanacković, Radivoje Pešić, Goran Arsić, *Učiti Sanskrit*, Udruženje Ved, Vranje, 2004. pg. 84. If it is a gnoseological plane, as in the case of the Greeks, then the truth matches itself and represents that aim which realizes itself. The truth is involved in speaking the truth and in that case knowledge is in itself a purpose. If it is an ontological plane, then the truth is a determining constituent of our being and everything that exists – without it there would be nothing and only with it does everything exist, primarily we. In the case of the Romans, the truth is a case of the law and the organization of the community itself. In the case of the Jews the truth is the realization of something in time.

in the understanding of certain forms of thought, in the interpretation of their sense, attention needs to be focused on the appearance of the times in which philosophy relies on them, in which it once again determines them and adjusts them to new causes which it sets for itself? (Jovan Arandelović, 2003:7.) we could say that this certainly is not a pure and measured time which gives a dimension to the hypostasis plane, instead it is the people, as local and spatial communities (Slavic, Jewish, Greek, Russian, English etc.) that do so, but once again as something not only measurable, but primarily as the people who live in certain places on the globe, in which these human spiritual forces, life activities aimed towards knowledge are realized through and via planes of hypostases. By taking only the planes of hypostasis and time as the deciding features of knowledge, opinion and the actions of people, we can avoid local diversity, the locality of anyone's opinion and knowledge, and thus only the time and the duration of ideas such as some universal features are manifested, and that they are, even though epochal, final since their epoch is a final thing.

Thus, knowledge and thought are local, hypostases appear locally, while their temporality is a relative matter. Thus it might be understandable why some forms of knowledge, some ideas and opinions exist in some points of the earth at a particular time but are gone during others, and the same could be said of human problems. At some places local determinations exist, but are not valid in some other places. This in turn proves even more the spatial and objectified spiritual designs from the temporal– spiritual duration, and thus the sense of being bound to a place – space and not time as the important dimension in the realization of the spirit. The example of truth in the case of Pavel Florensky indicates the location and temporal nature of the spiritual-cognitive designs for which truth is bound. It is a case of people who are as such as concrete, which is bound to a certain place and a certain time. And then, that the truth is also a thing of these concrete people and their knowledge. Planes of hypostases as local elements require a cognitive border – a border with the "third world" or "touch" and "mixing" with what is foreign which is translated into the local – locally mine and thus the hypostasis "grows". As we have already said, locally we are not bounded but live in a wide belt of a border. This indicates that the border of the "third world" is a funny zone, a labyrinth and that hypostases are local. Hypostases, even though they necessarily did not speak of necessity, are limited since they produce "a final image of ourselves".

There are two important delusions in the situations of "finished images of oneself", which are reduced one to the other: that things being with us as our personal beginning and we think we can think independently, and not in terms of hypostases – locally, that is borderline with others. What is necessary is that: *In order to think, we have to learn how to think.* (Martin Heidegger, 1999:102.) Learning takes places through a meeting with tradition ("schoolbooks", "literature", markings) and its part which first started to think about itself. With this type of learning we can understand, think and act. Thus: *'Origin becomes a methodological inspiration, memory transforms into a transcendental possibility of shedding new light and determines what happened and what is happening.* (Peter Rau, 2001-2:27) Or, if we follow Gadamera, then the interpretation of surrender has not only an intent within knowledge but in the application of this knowledge. He said: *The current thesis is that historical hermeneutics should be in charge of application, since it serves to read a purpose, by specifically and consciously bridging the temporal gap, which separates the interpreter from the text and extends beyond the sense of alienation which the text has experienced.*" (Hans Georg Gadamer, 1978:345) To reach our true identity means taking things apart to the very beginning, up to that level in which the knowledge of oneself is not based on us but

stems from others, or is based on something else, but is local and ours through hypostases. Our beginning is not our product or we are not our own product, instead it is the product of someone's ability, someone's gift to start talking about oneself, asking oneself about one's own opinion. **We learn to think only in a dialogue with the other – that is the hypostasis – local thinking is possible.** This has not only a logical, and cognitive but ontological function – its basis is also our own. Our ontologization of truth becomes our local beginning, aimed at being the law and the gnoseological and historical moment. Without it we remain with almost a mythic-esthetic image of ourselves and with the hypostases which leads us outside a place as a (stoice)on, time and space.

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NEKE KARAKTERISTIKE ODNOSA MESTA I SAZNAJJA

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Saznanje dovodi do toga da su ljudska mesta, grupe ljudi i pojedinci u njima budu to što jesu, da se mesta razlikuju jedana od drugih, pojedinci kao individue, grupe ljudi kao kolektivi, a da se preko toga saznanje u svojim realizacijama objektivizuje na mesni način. Ovaj odnos i učinci mogu se rasvetliti problematizovanjem odnos mesta i saznanja, onog nabirajućeg proizvođenja mesta saznanjem.

Ključne reči: *mesto, saznanje, objektivizacije saznanja ili "treći svet", saznajni sistemi*