

AN EPILOGUE OR A FURTHER POSSIBLE OBJECTIVIZATION OF KNOWLEDGE OUTSIDE OF MAN *

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Abstract. *Every force of nature has some characteristic powers, and cognition is no different. Formally speaking these include: the ability to organize, to be at the heart of the matter, to present the very essence of something. Its basic strength lies in: self-knowledge, or the systematizing or grouping of the self and everything outside it, authoritarianism or the determination of what is true, clear, valuable, and certain, in various types of embodiment and shaping and in institutionalization. Knowledge, as the complex cognitive and learning ability, is related to man. With its powers it shapes the image of man and his ambient – places on this earth, to the extent that it is constantly replacing him.*

Key words: *cognition, the power of knowledge, institutionalization, epistemic and laymen, systems of knowledge, models of knowledge: mythic, economical, virtual, teletechnoscience, the substitution of man.*

EVERYTHING MODERN ABOUT US HAS STEMMED FROM TECHNOLOGY¹

1. And at the same time or in the meantime as Kenneth White says: *There was practically no one outside, in the field, (only the ethnologists and maybe a poet or two); it was difficult to find anyone who could bear the title of 'philosopher' with just cause, and in*

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* This essay consists of segments (mainly taken from the introduction and conclusion) of a more extensive paper of mine, a study, which is currently undergoing preparations for publication and which is entitled *Zemaljski pečat* (The earthly brand) and bears the subtitle *Naše - mesno saznanje konstituisanje* (Our-local constitution of knowledge). The topic of the study is the relation between knowledge and man.

¹ In the complete version, Abdulah Šarčević gives the following diagnosis: *We live in a technological age, in a world which has been created by technology many times over, in a unique techno-culture. We have ourselves become the objects of invisible manipulation: technological, and biological, and socio-technological and informational-technological etc. We are, in a word, used to accepting the industrial, technical-scientific world as our natural surroundings, and have been so for a long time. Everything modern about us is technological. Everyone is experiencing the Everything and Nothing of techno-culture.* Abdulah Šarčević, *Samorazumevanje čoveka u modernom svetu* (The self-comprehension of man in the modern world), postscript, *Filozofija modernog doba* (Modern-day philosophy), Veselin Masleša, Sarajevo, 1986, pg. 367.

*the complete and Heraclitean sense of the word.*² Socrates came closest to this definition – he is the paradigm of the philosopher "in the field". To be Socrates today, as the first and last man to reign over knowledge, is possible only in the theater, in the movies. When someone wishes to be so, he becomes comical, and for this purpose knowledge has produced the paradigmatic Don Quixote, a layman and amateur. The reason for this is that Socrates' complete (practical-theoretical knowledge) has been relocated to institutions. The philosophical and scientific, religious and artistic – everything epistemic and everything that has to do with faith, everything has been institutionalized. Everything to do with Socrates has been dislocated, distanced from life, and has given itself importance through institutionalization. Knowledge, having in its own right declared that field work (since the days of Plato and Aristotle) is incompetent, dilettante, insignificant (in some cases less important), promotes the organizational as the mediator. It mediates over life and what cannot "take care of itself". Mediation is usually for educational purposes, used to guide us, decisive and thus used to develop tele-educational systems of grandiose proportions, up to and including the internet. Today we are not marked by great knowledge, and are not capable of taking care of ourselves, but the clinics, academic institutions, institutes, schools, the media, the courts, agencies, ministries etc are, from the level of absolute control to the very substitution of man. This care is imposed upon us to the point that it is still being carried out in situations of obvious "debacles" of institutionalized knowledge. Ecological crises are now resolved by the very institutions which led to them, for economical, religious, health, urban and political reasons. Nevertheless, anything that still desires to mediate and care for some kind of knowledge yearns to be an institution. Every alternative, movement, and sect desires to become institutionalized.

Socratic nature, nevertheless, still is not merely a thing of the theatre or the movies, but of man in everyday life, as every one of us is different, a local Socrates. This type of cognition is not accepted by institutions – they do not see things the same way, but in an epistemic manner – knowledge is what knows. There is a constant divide, collision between the systems of knowledge of institutions and people as individuals in everyday situations. Everyday man finds himself in the position that he is always making mistakes, and thus, is in collision with whomever it is that knows. For this reason, the shaping and overcoming that is involved in the process of substituting man as such by institutional-systematic knowledge is constant. The substitution and determination is theoretical-tactical and takes the form of a wide range of definitions, conclusions, recommendations, decompositions and replacements of parts. Man becomes subjected to the reign of the powers of cognitive constructs, especially in a dogmatic sense, when he begins to build permanent and eternal systems and solid constructions (architectonics-architecture), which no longer serve him, and instead he finds himself in their service. Man is reduced to matter and is under the absolute power of his constructions and institutionalized knowledge. The external world and local man are forgotten and ultimately distorted – replaced as the original source. Nevertheless, not only solid constructions, but each new role, new take on the matter, new technological device and substance become the causes of the substitution

² Kenneth White, *Nomadski duh* (The nomadic spirit), Centar za geopoetiku, Beograd, 1994, pg. 239.

of man as an individual being replaced as such, at which time the relations of alienation and disalienation no longer work, and instead are replaced by irreversibility.³

The initial characteristic is that all of the mediated cognitive systems, mythic-religious, and scientific disciplines, and tele-tech-scientific ones, the philosophical sciences such as philosophical anthropology, philosophical trends (such as, for instance, existentialism, etc) up to special sciences such as psychology or sociology, in the case of man, completely eradicate any differences, in an attempt to define man from their own perspective on knowledge by means of definitions and concepts, dogmas, existentialisms, and the like. The differences are wiped clean in the sense that "we are all different – each is a local Socrates". Institutions or "instrumentals" (Heidegger) are always at work on that. Not rejecting necessity, the same questions, and topics, needs, technologies, globalization and the extinction of species (not only of the animal kind, but human kind as well), that is, everything that epistemic knowledge has created, it is still the case that each one of us is different, every human place is different from any other one, every philosopher different from any other philosopher. What makes us different as people, what at the same time makes us both similar and different, is cognition. The questions are: What is it about cognition which at the same time makes us different and negates this difference? That elevates us and at the same time extends beyond us? That is, the key question is: What is knowledge?

The concept or word cognition refers to the complex phenomenon of knowledge. Within its range it contains knowing and learning.⁴ What is certain in regards to cognition is that it is related to man. Mainly, everything that is alive is active, it works and acts, but what separates man from everything else are his cognitive skills. It is a decisive factor in his activity and his formation. It resembles a sculptor's endeavor or the adding and peeling away of material and the transformation into a different form – figure. **Cognition molds the human form and his ambient – his place on earth – cognition is the earthly brand.**

Every force of nature has certain powers, and thus cognition (as a "force") also has certain powers. Formally speaking they include: the ability to organize, to be at the heart

³ The final attempt to return was made in the postmodern period; nevertheless, they are all new cognitive systems with a new and already substituted man. Rousseau's "kind savage", many of today's "farms" and "reality shows" are not a return to an old role, but the taking on of a new one. For these reasons we use the term "substituted" and not "changed", as the former term conceals the meaning of for the better or for the worse. "Substituted" means that man is somewhat more different in relation to his previous state, but not his original one. His original features are still present. These include the practically animal features: to feed, feel, sleep, even learn, but everything else or everything changes in the form of the "third world" and itself. These changes are such that to revert back to the old is impossible.

⁴ In most cases there is world of human cognition and it is referred to in wonder. It is difficult to describe something that is awe-inspiring. *There is no doubt that the phenomenon of human cognition represents the greatest miracle in our universe.* Karl Popper, *Objektivno saznanje* (Objective knowledge), Paideia, Beograd, Cid-Podgorica, 2002, pg. 7. Or as Ernst Cassirer says in his four-volume book entitled *Problem saznanja* (The problem of knowledge), dedicated to the historical aspect of studying knowledge: *The question of the essence and source of human knowledge is not a late product of philosophical speculation. What is more, it belongs to the basic questions asked by mankind, for which we cannot find an origin in history, since their first traces stem back to the ancient layers of mythic-religious thought. For myth and for religion, true embodiment is connected to the miracle of cognition. This miracle stands at the beginning of the overall human history* (emphasis added, SD). *It marks the essence of man and his god-like nature; but in his case he knows the limits of that essence to its depths and its most painful parts. Knowledge assures man of his divine origin.* Ernst Cassirer, *Problem saznanja* (The problem of knowledge), volume IV, Izdavačka knjižarnica Zorana Stojanovića, Sremski Karlovci-Noví Sad, 2003, pg. 7.

of the matter, to present the very essence of something etc. **Its very strength lies in: self-knowledge, in the systematization or grouping of the self and everything outside it, authoritarianism or the determination of everything that is true, real, valuable, certain etc., various types of embodiment and shaping and institutionalization.**

Cognition, in the plainest of terms, gathers knowledge about something. In this process it reveals, enlivens and makes available, or certain what we call cognitive factors and itself becomes, in this process of revelation and clarity, a part of these factors. The revelation does not take place spontaneously, instead, it takes place according to a certain order and based on organization which is bathed in moments of clarity of insight. Ordering is what cognitive power is made of. The power of knowledge, through ordering which is meant to clarify – clarity, a clear story, determines the subjects and objects in it at the same time. Or, by means of cognitive forms – cognitive functors it "produces" something. The results are "cognitive factors". They are ontologized and are referred to in a matter-metaphysical manner as the cognitive "categories".

Cognitive factors are diverse. Firstly, they are constituents of cognition without which it seems that it would not exist or, in other words, they are cognitive categories. The other factors are those who are shaped by cognition itself, but without which it too would not exist, and these are cognitive systems. They are of an institutional-ordering and hypostatic character. In relation to them, we can differentiate between various types of cognitive systems and models. The factors refer to each other in such a way that they shape each other. Cognition claims that certain factors are more important, superior, more perfect, and the other, less important ones, it deems subjected and deformed. For example, institutionalized knowledge considers anything laic to be confused and partially correct, closer to ignorance than knowledge, more primitive, etc, and thus inferior in relation to anything institutionalized. Within institutionalized knowledge, we find additional tension based on the level of significance; for example, philosophical knowledge in relation to the scientific one and vice versa, mythic over another, etc. And then within the cognitive system and institutions we find a rivalry based on level of significance, especially in relation to the truth, correct action, power and order.

The cognitive categorical factors, even though they "determine" knowledge, are themselves shaped and determined by knowledge. In addition, man – the agent in the cognitive process, who in our day and age is considered the creator of knowledge, is himself shaped and determined by cognition. Knowledge shapes and thus creates a man, his spirit, his locations and everything about him. **Cognition is that one characteristic by means of which man attains his identity, practically acts and constructs his local world and in the case of whose absence everything would disappear.** Therefore, there is nothing in the human sense that exists without knowledge. Man exists, he is not deleted through the absence of knowledge, but he exists in a different way – as another being.

Cognitive factors – categories are usually and habitually: the agent in the process – the one who learns; the object of knowledge – what is being learnt; the logical form – what orders cognition; the bearers of meaning – what carries knowledge. People usually do not consider the cognitive factor and its location to reside in the one who is the agent in the process. Over time – perhaps an age they will, along with the social situation, communication and institutions, along with inheritance factors, but not location. When we sometimes speak of locations of knowledge, then institutions are usually numbered: academic institutions, schools, and monasteries. At the same time, we forget that these are not only

locations of knowledge, but in addition, creations of knowledge in certain locations, which with other creations – objectivizations make a location what it is or make it different from others.

Cognition determines what is real (things) and it does not exist without some kind of ordering and self-organization. Self-organization belongs to a different category, the most dominant of which are cognitive systems. We can speak of the following cognitive systems: the mythic, artistic, philosophical, scientific and everyday one. The systematicity also varies. The least amount of ordering is present in everyday cognition, to the extent that it might be called a system. The greatest systematicity lies in the scientific one, and it takes on the guise of the true and paradigmatic.⁵ What we are talking about are scientific systems, which are used to organize things and to obtain what is real.

The first systematizations of knowledge coincide with institutionalizations. This kind of systematized and institutionalized knowledge rules the everyday lives of people, the needs of man, and shapes the local space, us as individuals and our communities. Everything specific takes place in everyday life and the local situation. Therein lie the institutions of knowledge, the people and the local area itself. All of the tension and changeability takes place among these three moments.⁶

⁵ This is why Hegel will say that: "The true form in which truth exists can only be its scientific system." Hegel, *Fenomenologija duha* (The phenomenology of spirit), Bigz, Beograd, 1979. pg. 3. We do not use the term "true" but "real", "clear" etc. The truth is also a product of material-metaphysical knowledge and it insists on the truthfulness of cognition for a substantiality - being. That is perfectly correct, but at the same time, we lose the role that cognition plays and the nature of knowledge as something that determines. That is why the terms real, clear, valid, etc are closer to knowledge as a phenomenon.

⁶ It is difficult to say when the first institutionalization of knowledge occurred; it peaked at the same time as man's need to live in a community with other people and to organize his life. So, the roots of institutions (not only educational ones, but in general, as organized forms of various types of knowledge) should be sought in man as a social being or a being which can only live in a community, in a way that organizes communal life and communal activities. *Communal living, then, is all about forming and forms. Visible forms of communal life are called institutions*, claims Max Müller in his *Princip slobode i fenomen institucionalizacije* (The principle of freedom and the phenomenon of institutionalization), *Proceedings, Filozofija modernog doba* (Modern day philosophy), Veselin Masleša, Sarajevo, 1986, pg. 124. Müller makes an observation in a footnote, on the same page: *For more on the concept of "institution" as an "objective system of social relations" especially refer to H. Schelsky (ed.), "Zur Theorie der Institution", Düsseldorf: Bertelsmann 1970, pg. 10 and on: the volume contains extensive literature on the theory of institutions*. There can be no society without organization. It forms the basis of human society and is a deciding factor in the common life of people. Institutions can be divided and differ from one another, but not merely for the sake of division and classification, but because the division of institutions indicates wealth and regulators: **"the figure or form" of unrestrained human action, creation and building.**

Actually, knowledge as a whole has always determined and governed mankind, in a way that it shapes some people as rulers and others as the subjects. The former ones are guardians of knowledge and at the same time are ruled over by knowledge itself. They themselves (the chieftain, priest, sorcerer, and shaman) or more of them are the precursors of true institutions of knowledge. The institutionalization of what we know as "knowledge gained by means of education" (without mentioning other kinds such as the courts, assemblies and the like, which also require knowledge), as it is today, where institutions are a divinity in relation to anything laic, we obtained with early scholastics or late ancient times, that is with Christianity. Some of these indications can still be found in the case of the Greeks, primarily Plato's Academy and Aristotle's Lyceum, with the separation of the epistemic and the doxie, nevertheless, an important distinction lies in the fact that those who enrolled in these schools did not gain any diplomas or power to act in society, instead it was a case of personal prestige. It seems that this type of institutionalization, of gaining power through knowledge, begins in the late ancient times. Flavius Cassiodorus (born, 477 BC) worked on the constitution of schools – the system of education of the Christians (priests and monks) and even wrote about it: *Institutiones litterarum divinarum et saecularum* (*The*

2. The power of knowledge is evident today but is it in fact the power of man himself? The question is quite pertinent, if we take into consideration the new age (for instance Bacon's) take on knowledge which increases human power and sovereignty over nature. It may just seem to us that we are in control, since we fill those institutions of knowledge, govern the local, technological and various other objectivizations of knowledge, at the local level as the local residents, peoples, residents of the Balkans, etc, but actually, it is knowledge that is in control, while we are simply the means by which it does so. Even negative anthropology, the one which is not "for man" but "against man", also requires mediation in terms of knowledge. Philosophic knowledge in general terms, as the most problematic type, offers answers not unlike the one offered by Nietzsche⁷ about the end of man or the possibility of a super human, or Gunter Andersons "aging of man", as well as

introduction to the divine and worldly eruditeness). Institutionalization means the protection of knowledge and what is important-sacred = clair (for this sense see, Jacques Derrida, *Vera i znanje* [Faith and knowledge]) by means of a radical separation from the everyday. This will, on its part, enable great influence and have regulatory power over everything outside the institution. The Latin word *institutum* means all this: classes, teaching, a plan, a basis, a foundation, an order, a system, an institution. Everything outside the institution becomes laic. The Latin word *laicus* (from the Greek word *laikós* = of the people) means: a person who does not possess enough knowledge about an epistemic field – a layman; a profane person - a citizen who differs from a cleric- a man of the church - clair (from the Greek word *klēros*, lat. *clerus* = a division, the chosen part), similar to lat. *claro*=to make clear, to enlighten. Today, on the one hand, what is considered ecumenical and epistemic, thus, knowledge will retain its form, that is its institutionality with all its authority and its care about the laic, and on the other, by conquering institutional knowledge the laic gains power (a diploma) to act as a mediator in the name of the institution in the community.

⁷ Here too we should think of Foucault, who is a part of the Nietzsche vitalist-biologist line, partially of Marx's and Heraclites', we might say image of the world as the *battle* of the forces among which we find the force of knowledge, and whose interrelations we can trace back historically and epochally as the relation between man, god, knowledge, and the world. For Foucault, according to Gilles Deleuze: *We need to determine with which other forces the force of (imagining, memory, representation, desire... SD) enter man in this or that historical formation, and which form comes out of this combination of forces.* Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault*, Izdavačka knjižarnica Zorana Stojanovića, Sremski Karlovci, 1989, pg. 127. Nevertheless, *In order for the form – Man to appear and take shape, it necessary for the forces inside of man to enter into a relation with very special forces on the outside.* Ibid, pg. 127. If this did not happen, and it did not always happen, then: *We can even now assume that the forces in man do not necessarily take part in the composition form-man, but can be invested differently, in some other combination: even if we were to take only a short period of time, Man has not always existed and will not always exist.* Ibid, pg. 127. And so we can track this realization within historical formations. Every form is transitory in a way that it is constantly changing, because it depends on the forces, and thus the form – God and the form – Man change and pass away. Death extends parallel with life. Nevertheless, if we are talking about forming, then forces can drag Man, as well as God, into an interrelation and then create forms which are not Man or God. *This is a correctly posed problem which Nietzsche called the "super human".* Nevertheless, an intermediate step was needed. *Biologics should have jumped into molecular biology, or in other words, that the broken life be gathered into a genetic code. The broken word should have been gathered and regrouped into a third kind, cybernetic or information technological. Which force is the one which will interact with other forces by means of which the forces inside man will enter into a relationship?* Ibid, pg. 136. This will lead to the creation of something, a form of some kind, which is not man. Seen from the viewpoint of the epoch, this will not be an exaltation unto eternity, as it is in classicism, nor will it be the finiteness of the XIX century, but the "limitless-final". What will be at work here is not the usual "folding" or "unfolding", but the "super-folding" which seems to be characteristic of the genetic code, the potentials of silicon, machines of the third kind, as well as the contours of sentences in modern literature when language bows down time and time again, and thus returns to itself. *And isn't this, wonders Deleuze, limitless-final or super-folding what Nietzsche has already termed the eternal return?* Ibid, pg. 136. It certainly is, as much as it is manifested in the diversity of the groupings of the living, inorganic or linguistic. Biologics, which have basically not been overtaken by genetics, have oddly enough not been taken as an art form. This may be the heralding ...of a

Marx's idea that man as such can be bettered, or as the alienated being, which would lead to a being with full freedom and an unlimited possibility to realize oneself, is incompatible with the institutionalized one, because it is cognitive by nature. In aiding the other side ("for man") they are in a way radical, an alternative, a movement, a revolution of what is actually institutionalized knowledge. This is a type of institutionalized knowledge which is more involved, which encompasses greater hordes of people, incites events and transcends smooth transitions. After all, it too is organized, firstly into party institutions, and then later in ruling state institutions and educational institutions, all the way to actual institutions. It is clear that new-age scientific knowledge, along with technology, that is, knowledge as knowledge takes its course, along with some objectivizations which in the process of replacement seem to be exceeding man constantly, and anything philosophical or poetic of this kind, only appears to be possible, new, a sort of solution, so that it too would "fall" into the institutional as it too is certainly organizational. All this time man remains as he is in the basic sense (he cries, laughs, feels, eats, etc) and in his earthly embodiment, with local models or views of the world⁸, while scientific knowledge or "teletechnoscience" to a great extent communicates directly with the world. In addition, not only scientific, but mythic-religious knowledge in the form of fundamentalist religion uses man in for the purpose of satisfying what is knowledgeable about him. It seems that in the coupling of man, knowledge, and the world, man is the odd one out.⁹ The problem is, where does this lead? Fundamentalist religion, religion in general, speaks of the use of man for the aims and plans of god. It is possible that this road will lead to epistemic knowledge and teletechnoscience and our virtual worlds as well.

In order to understand this somehow – to know, we need to introduce a moment in which three main global ruling cognitive models exist in the history of our planet, and these include: the *mythic*, *economical* and *virtual*. The first model deals with the domination and rule of the cognitive image, in which case we are dealing with the unity and indelible nature of man, the world and the cognitive image. The second is based on the relation between knowledge, technology and man, where the world is the main object of domination in this coupling. The third one is the rule of technology, knowledge and the world over man, where man has a tendency of lagging behind, of being marginalized and in a way overcome until he is finally faced with the threat of literal extinction. The final sce-

new form, neither of God, nor of man, which we can only hope will not be worse than the other two. Ibid, pg. 137.

What we are dealing with is the "production of a new subject" and the "mutation of capitalism".

⁸ For example, there is word of a "Balkan esthetics" as the local cognitive model, (see, Georgi Stardelov, *Balkanska estetika edna možna estetika*, Makedonska akademija na naukite i umetnostite, Skopje, 2005. A seminal and epochal work in the sense of the volume by Radomir Konstantinović *Filozofija palanke* (Philosophy of small towns), which indicates a local spirit shaped by the local Serbian cognitive model. This author in his study entitled *Belezi iz vilajeta* (Notes from a vilayet) analyzes this local model. There are many works on the Balkan models with various starting points; nevertheless, few of them are critically minded, so that most of them "fall under" this "Balkan esthetics" and hypostasize its significance.

⁹ Cognition, knowledge and learning will go on. If up until now it has seemed as if man possessed knowledge (that he is conscious, confident and in possession of the truth), now this impression is moving in a certain direction. What consciousness encompasses or is equal to this blooming of knowledge characteristic of this day and age? We could say that it does not even exist, except for the problematic "absolute spirit" or god. Knowledge can increase only through teletechnoscience, we might even say that it absolutely produces it and thus produces itself. The question of the existence of knowledge in technology is unquestionable, because it also belongs to the "third world", so its existence is also unquestionable.

nario originates from the perspective of globalization, and first and foremost from the ecological crisis where teletechnoscience coupled with the earthly world poses a threat to man.

In the case of local shaping, some areas and places remain in a certain cognitive model and they will not be able to reach the rest. This may be a case of an "anti-tendency" to the expanse of a single "common world culture" and "technical-economic civilization". In that sense, the following conclusion is very important: *Uniqueness is preserved from a sentimental distance, as in it we have found a unique strength, a unique value, exactly as a counter-attack to the increasing grayness of unification.*¹⁰ This is the case with the Balkans, the Mediterranean and some other parts of the world and corners of the earth. The Mediterranean is exhausted by mythic, philosophical and artistic cognitive models. This part of the world has long ago said what it had to say, and the only thing that is left are a couple of film festivals. Exhaustion also means **weariness**, and this leads to the impossibility of doing anything else.¹¹ It also means the people who live in these areas of memory are spent, but not only that, it also means a change in the content of the worlds as well. These places are varied, we can tentatively refer to them as "physical locations" with "endemic cognitive forms".

The end has begun with new-age cognition. What the new age had to offer – knowledge as power, is the **viewpoint** of man with the help of scientific knowledge. One kind of future will be much better for man (the platonic-Christian model), but only thanks to science which has taken over the rights previously awarded to faith-religion. It has turned out that this was a cognitive perspective with the help of institutions and technology, or better yet, teletechnoscience. The main help, means, is teletechnology, which the institutions of cognition are constantly improving on the road to the realization of human betterment. Nevertheless, this cognitive model only at first glance offers man prosperity and actually enables an improvement in teletechnoscience, in which case the man is the means. Every means has a certain and final usage value. Once it is spent, the means are discarded, outdated, and useless. This is not merely the rejection of the means, but also of an entire system, a world to which the means belong. In this sense, Gunter Anders starts his second volume *The Outdatedness of Human Beings*, saying that: *...what we mean by technocracy is not the rule of technocrats (as a group of specialists who would dominate politics today) but the fact that the world we live in, and which in a technical sense makes decisions about us – which goes so far as to disallow us to say that in our historical situation technology exists, among other things, instead, we have to say: history takes place in the state of the world, called "technology", that is, technology has become the subject of history, with whom we are only "historically connected".*¹²

The state of being spent does not only entail the substitution of one subject for another one, it is still a case of incorrect metaphysics of substantiality, and instead is the alteration

¹⁰ Michael Landmann, *Budućnost povesti u regnum rationis* (The future of history in the regnum rationis), Proceedings, *Filozofija modernog doba* (Modern day philosophy), Veselin Masleša, Sarajevo, 1986, pg. 143.

¹¹ An addition to that is omnipresent, modern recycling. It occurs as a kind of "salvation", which is once again offered by the institutionalized teletechnoscience. An add-on is organ transplantation which offers great possibilities which enable nanotechnology and genetic engineering. We see the creation of people by means of artificial insemination at work already. Recycling, which is taking on the shape of the recycling of sense, with these substitutions is justifying the Foucault-Nietzsche attitude about the changes to the form of god and man, for the new role of super human.

¹² Gunter Anders, *Zastarelost čoveka* (The outdatedness of human beings), Nolit, Beograd, 1985, pg. 9.

of worlds or everything that accompanies as certain "subject". What we are dealing with is the placement of things in relation to other roads, spoken in the true spirit of the "Copernicus twist", or the forces which organize a new world and new order of things. Thus, Gunter Anders will view the aging of man on the plain of aging in general, which makes up the human world and its orbit, thus the outdatedness and transformation towards something different and which man merely serves. From a Heideggerian point of view, we might ask: a means for what? A means of turning knowledge towards something that, at this point, is unfathomable. That is, something which at this particular moment we can determine is the outdatedness of the human world and the hint of a change towards something different, where we are the material which is being used up. We are always under the power of knowledge; this has become both evident and radical. It is clear in this day and age that we are subjected to the authority of teletechnoscience and fundamentalist religion and their institutions of learning. Fukuyama speaks of the disappearance of philosophy and art, as systems of cognition and the perseverance of myth-religion.

3. Heidegger gives his diagnosis of the whole matter in the light of new-age science and technology, still not noting the new development in communication and technology, that is, tele-techno-logic. *An important occurrence in the new age is its science. On a scale of importance, it is just as important as engineering.*¹³ Science is the theory of the real, a concrete authority which rules by means of technology. Nevertheless, modern technology is not subjected to the authority of exact sciences. Vice-versa: technology uses science. That is why it is necessary to explain what technology is and what it discovers in relation to the demands of science in terms of what is real. *The principle of discovery that rules modern technology is a challenge which requires nature to deliver energy which as such can be extracted and accumulated.*¹⁴ What is important for new-age technology is the **challenge – asking nature to deliver something** or for it to be accumulated. Discovery in modern technology means: releasing, transforming, accumulating, transferring, but with great certainty and in a controlled manner. In the end, "managing" and "ensuring" have become the most important features of discovery, to the extent that the truth of technology lies in the constant state of "readiness" for new maintenance. This is the "state" which represents "independence" that allows something to be done or "delivered".

We usually think that the things that man determines are those that depend on the epochal relations between cognition and a being, but that they are at the same time incorrect. Nevertheless, they are not wrong, and instead represent certain cognitions in relation to man and the world, which at the same time determine man's role. Man is: "a political animal", a "creature of god", "a machine", a "sentient being", a "self-made being" and the like. These are all prescribed roles and not guidelines for the essence of man. Cognition is merely toying with us. "...man always finds himself already placed within what is not hidden ..." as Heidegger would say, and he is actually located in the truth, what we are really being offered by cognition, or this time, science and technology. The present-day state of things, in the sense of the rule of technology and science, indicates the fact that

¹³ Martin Heidegger, *Doba slike sveta* (The age of the world picture), Printing funded by students of philosophy, Sarajevo, 1989, pg. 7.

¹⁴ Martin Heidegger, *Pitanje o tehnicima, Predavanja i rasprave* (The question concerning technology and other essays), Plato, Beograd, 1999, pg. 16, (2) pg. 18, (3) pg. 23.

technology and science prescribe roles for man. Technology *uses* man as it does everything else around it. Thus ...*the ensuing discovery can take place only if man on his part has already been challenged to release natural energies. If he has been challenged to do so, lead to do so, does he not also belong more naturally than nature itself to the state?*

(2) This is most certainly so to the extent that it is good to do so, as this is what makes him a man. Cognitive demands of the day have always treated man in this fashion. For this reason, technology, as the epitome of the rationality of a "paradigm of rationality", demands consistent behavior on the part of man as the only rational thing to do and for the purpose of satisfying the demands of technology. If in the past, man as a creature of God was good at fulfilling the requirements of the canon, now the canon has merely been replaced by the technological manual. If someone does not follow the technological manual, he is not a man. This kind of man "disappears" outside of technology. Technology is what originally groups or determines a man. Still, the grouping is not usual, and as such, is essential and authoritarian. The rational idea of technology is an important factor for man as well – what makes him a modern man. The rational idea of technology is not technological, but merely an idea which claims that only this type of production is configuration. An idea is the product of cognition, and this time it is a new-age exact science. What it does is take a certain plan – an idea and offers it to reality and asks it to be that. Technology carries this through and takes it over and imposes it upon everything, including man himself. Technology generally uses instructions to lead people to the "right" path. The *grouping guidance which only leads man to the right path of discovery we call destiny... Man's activity becomes historical only if it is connected to destiny.* (3) Guided by cognition, **technology determines the fate or the creation of man by man.** It seems to have kept its connection with art or the original idea that skill is the ability to directly give shape.

Technology is no longer that technology which represents an additional and helping mechanism, a means which serves man for the purpose of a better and more productive realization of his thoughts and the cognitive-productory aims. The intermediate phase of modern teletechnology is that kind of technology which not only increases human abilities, but also represents a model for the understanding of man in every respect. This is a time where we first equate man and the machine, and then man is replaced more and more by machines until we come to today's technology or teletechnology, which establishes an independent communication between itself and within itself but with the world as well. At the same time, by replacing man and god – the super human, it places him in the eternal spheres or enclaves and areal locations as ephemeral places, in order to "improve" and "support" the entire process of substitution. This analogy is not only cognitive, but cognitive in a real sense, that is, it makes up a special part of the "third world". It is a challenged and created actual state, created primarily by means of knowledge, scientific in nature, and is not merely a cognitive and subjective analogy. What we are talking about is the identity of the cognitive and the real, but not merely as a reflection and adequacy, but of the real event as such. If the new-age man gradually intensifies his work and increases the extent of its quality with the help of machines, then, in a very real fashion, a machine world is created, which gradually replaces man. "The man machine" is not the only cognitive subjective escapade, but the peak that man and machine reach, which leads to the ever increasing dominance of the world of the machine over the world of man. In the collocation "man machine", he too has become a machine or takes on the role of one, and is replaced, recycled, artificially

created and the like. At the same time, eternal super humans, areal locations, and new mythologies occur as a transition and improvement and embellishment.

4. In the case of the real cognitive state of things, if we were to refer to it as a simple cognitive relation, then we would be acting from a mythic plain of unity or the "animal" as Adorno would say, and not the actual cognitive. Speaking of the "egoism" which we have and computing machines do not, Adorno confirms that this difference is made thanks to the human ego, and we must add, the set human attitude (of the new-age man) that the entire world and all its wealth is here for us. The animal lies in the realization and relation, since animals behave in such a way that other animals would not eat them. In the case of the egoism, such as the human one, when we mention computing machines, Adorno says: *No, no such egoism exists among them, but as so-called people of science, whose responsibility is self-reflection, we should, certainly ask ourselves, are we not being led by a single illusion, are we not being led, for instance, by our own inherent superstitions and the dignity of man or even some animistic representations, which we might have about our souls, that we in a dogmatic fashion set a difference between us and those machines.*¹⁵ One thing is sure, that egoism or what is "mine" which accompanies personal perceptions and cognition, is missing in the case of computing machines, but during communication, then this egoism partially "disappears". The contents of my consciousness in communication become the contents of the consciousness of someone else. Now we must speak of the functioning model of the cognitive or perhaps knowing consciousness, and not the individual or egological one. Or, better said, if we were to start with Kant, then we would be dealing with a model of the harmony between the functioning of consciousness which is an abstraction in relation to the live consciousness, and is represented as a functioning of common sense. *Thus, says Adorno, we come to a single, perhaps paradoxal explanation for the virtual and potential ability to differentiate the transcendental consciousness from the so-called computing of the machines.* (2) The difference is one which is so to speak non-existent. Mainly, ever since the days of Descartes, an "ideal" of cognition has been promoted as "causal-mechanical cognition" which at the same time corresponds to the model which is used to create machines, but which also corresponds to the structure of *res cogitans*. The causal-mechanical is as a kind of knowledge (a science) backed or supported by mathematical sciences. Descartes also speaks of a "universal mathematics" which as the determination of a structural law can be found to underlie all things and which uncovers the truth about nature itself. An impetus has existed since the time of Copernicus, in the sense of mathematical explanations of celestial paths, which the celestial bodies follow. The mathematical explanation of the celestial pathways at the same time explains the movement of these bodies. Descartes expands this concept to nature in its entirety. So will Kant's transcendental subject be conceived as mechanistic or as a machine. Mainly, a real subject is "hooked" onto the celestial pathway of knowledge just like the celestial bodies. *Since the machine is, we could say, concludes Adorno, the ideal of the scientific and cognitive theoretical subject, there is nothing contradictory in the opinion that machines have finally been found which are almost in-*

¹⁵ Theodor Adorno, *Filozofska terminologija* (Philosophical terminology), Svijetlost, Sarajevo, 1986, pg. 327, (2) pg. 327, (3) pg. 328.

distinguishable from this subject. (3) To be more precise, in the spirit of Kant, reality as a whole, that is the real and third world of objectivization of knowledge (machines, houses, streets, books, etc) are not arbitrary constructions of knowledge, but are necessary in their constructions ...*built upon the criteria of those principles of construction which also create our own cognitive apparatus and for that reason do not deceive us.*¹⁶

The cognitive model of Descartes and Kant still reside on mechanistic representations, manufacture, so these machines are only a part and extension of human abilities. The newly created scientific knowledge will enable not the simple addition of mechanical models and functioning according mathematical-mechanical laws, but a mathematical, chemical, biological one all the way to that of particle physics and the fields within which other forces act. The trajectories of the planets, of man as the subject and everything in nature takes on a different shape, and with it the third world of cognition in the form of computing machines and telecommunication. The mechanical models of the clockwork mechanism and the functioning model of human consciousness, will meet their match in computers. According to Adorno, no such "embodiment" has taken place, and the logical cognitive subject assumes the existence of a computing machine. This means that the "living subject" cannot be reduced to a computing machine, but it does not mean that this never will happen or that this phase has not already started at the beginning of the century.

5. It would still appear that technology is not what is threatening man, but his acceptance of technology makes "discovery in the original sense" impossible, as it does the testing of original truths. This is why we should perhaps be more thorough in our endeavors to discover more about technology and its essence from which stems both what is dangerous and what can save us. So to Heidegger it seems that as long as we take technology as an instrument we cannot understand its essence. But if we were to investigate any further, how its instrumental nature fares, we would be heading towards the essence of technology. Only then will the essence of technology reveal its double nature and rules over us: as instruments and devices or it allows us to be the ones who are guardians of the truth in the very way it presents itself. The way out, according to Heidegger, is not to face technology as if it were an instrument, but in the actual sense that it is something beautiful. The essence of technology is not something technological, but is related to something different and yet connected to it, which we have already suggested is art. Wondering about technology we have to ask whether we want to move further away from simple positioning and whether we wish to delve into the very depths of art.

It would seem that it is a little late for this way out, because we cannot go back to what once was (the archaic view of things) and that some kind of art or romance could "save us",¹⁷ instead, in these attempts cognition drags us further and further into "embodiment".

¹⁶ Anemari Piper, *Misli sam* (Think for yourself), Akademska knjiga, Novi Sad, 2007, pg. 42.

¹⁷ Knowledge has exceeded the root and meaning of the term technology, mainly *techne* or the shaping of the beautiful, but the very power to shape. Today's contemporary or "modern technology", it would seem, does not have much in common with the ancient Greek understanding of *techne*. From the mythic union and a single form, art, science and modern technology emerged as different forms of shaping, but a later merger ensued which lead to the rule of science and technology. See the introductory remarks of Hotimir Burger entitled *Tehne i tehnika, Filozofija tehnike* (Techne and technology, the philosophy of technology), Naprijed, Zagreb, 1980, pg. 20-39. Nevertheless, as we have already mentioned, technology even shapes art if we were to consider examples of multimedia, installations, electronic music, design and the like.

Art is gone, thanks to cognition and technology, in the direction of practical use (hyper production and art as a commodity) – to its end, claims Fukuyama, and the local areal modeling (for instance the "Balkan aesthetic"). Technology and cognition have "used up" and overvalued art when it comes to simulation of reality. Teletechnoscience used art (or its common initial characteristic) to create something new. It has absorbed the essential ability of art, and that is the creation of a new world and new worlds. It is time for the "virtual" cognitive model. Virtual still has the meaning of "apparent reality" or the ability of technology to produce something that only seems to be real. These possibilities are various: once it is a simulation which is an apparent reality, but which has all the characteristics of something real; another time it is a substitute of the real with something more lasting and effective. Man is also replaced from the "inside" by having organs transplants which involve organs that are technological products. Reality is altered by new realities which can be improved. *Thus everywhere we live in a world which looks more and more like the original – the things in it are replaced according to their own scenarios.*¹⁸ In a world such as this one, everything looks like its "original", including man himself.

What is left of the real, not including the maps, stills exists here and there in the deserts which do not belong to the empire, but are our deserts. The desert of reality itself.¹⁹ We are talking about **virtual** worlds²⁰ as new maps but also of deserts of the real world as virtual worlds of a different kind, composed of the remnants of the real one or areal regions and endemic cultures. The Balkans, for instance, are such a world. We as Serbia and the Serbs, Bulgaria and the Bulgarians, the Balkans and the peoples who inhabit it share the fate of the Mediterranean, without ever having participated in the creation of its spirit – we merely deal with the consequences or better said the post festum, completion without the experience of the duration, that is, being covered in ash without having experienced the heat of the fire. Europe has moved on to the worlds of economic and now technological virtual reality. This space is thus virtual, but has not directly been made so with the help of technical-computer aids, but indirectly, so to speak. We should repeat that similar worlds do exist on the earth, cognition and technology use them as a sort of "balance" and sometimes as something wrong or outdated, beautiful and original etc. Where cognition is going remains and unanswered question *things are falling into confu-*

¹⁸ Jean Baudrillard, *Simulacije i simulakrumi* (Simulacra and simulation), Svetovi, Novi Sad, 1991, pg. 15.

¹⁹ Ibid, pg. 5

²⁰In modern-day physics there has for a while back been talk of virtual processes and virtual particle matter. This is the new state of knowledge, which as in the time of Descartes, is backed by mathematics, which also enables a new identity of knowledge and the real, man and technology. In this case it would seem that the virtual processes and particles are a kind of "intermediary state" of the very states and particles themselves. *...at the level between creation and reality. In that sense the characteristic and term possibility or virtual have been introduced... It would not be an exaggeration to say that these are special states of regular "elementary" particles.* Dragiša M. Ivanović, *Istorijsko-filozofska pitanja fizike* (The historical-philosophical issues of physics), Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva, Beograd, 1985, pg. 365. The multimedia or the expansion of reality also occur virtually within art as a new possibility, as a synesthesia. *...once again virtually, quite close to the expansion, so that an object could receive its full meaning. If we were to understand it like that, then the virtual belongs to the object; and if we were to consider the imaginary as the virtual, then we should say that the imaginary lays siege to the real; in it, it is a kind of expansion of the being, an expansion of sense.* Mikel Dufrenne, *Oko i uho* (The eye and the ear), Glas, Banjaluka, 1989, pg. 240. In a more narrow sense, the virtual is also present in the simulations of modern technology. The virtual is the general substitution of man and his knowledge of the world and his objectivizations at which time technology becomes predominant.

sion²¹ says Adorno. Or, as Foucault would say, it is necessary to include new concepts into the "game"— "before each historical analysis": *discontinuity, separation, threshold, border, sequence, transformation...*²² One thing is certain: man has been replaced so many times that he is already a substitute. Opposition to this kind of methodology is also naïve, as it demands knowledge of something we are "absent" from.

EPILOG ILI DALJA MOGUĆA OBJEKTIVIZACIJA ZNAJANJA IZVAN ČOVEKA

Srboljub S. Dimitrijević

Svaka prirodna sila ima svoje moći, a takvo je i saznanje. Formalno, ono uključuje: sposobnost organizovanja, suštinu stvari, da predstavi suštinu nečega. Njegova osnovna snaga nalazi se u samosaznanju, ili sistematizaciji ili grupisanju sebe i ostalog izvan čoveka, autoritarnosti i određivanju istine, jasnoće, vrednosti, mogućnosti, kroz različite oblike institucionalizacije. Znanje kao kompleksna kognitivna sposobnost kao i sposobnost učenja odnosi se na čoveka. Sa svojim moćima, ono oblikuje čoveka i njegov ambijent – mesta na planeti, do te mere da stalno zamenjuje čoveka.

Ključne reči: *saznanje, moć znanja, institucionalizacija, epistemološko i laičko znanje, modeli znanja: mitsko, ekonomsko, virtualno, teletehnonauka, zamena čoveka.*

²¹ Teodor Adorno, *Filozofska terminologija* (Philosophical terminology), pg. 328.

²² Michel Foucault, *Arheologija znanja* (Archaeology of knowledge), Plato-Beograd, Izdavačka knjižarnica Zorana Stojanovića-Novi Sad, 1998, pg. 25.