Vol 5, No 1, 2006 pp. 47-63
UDC 17.02

---

MARGINAL HUMANS, THE ARGUMENT FROM KINDS
AND THE SIMILARITY ARGUMENT
Julia Tanner
Department of Philosophy
Durham University, United Kingdom
j.k.tanner@durham.ac.uk

---

In this paper I will examine two responses to the argument from marginal cases; the argument from kinds and the similarity argument. I will argue that these arguments are insufficient to show that all humans have moral status but no animals do. This does not prove that animals have moral status but it does shift the burden of proof onto those who want to maintain that all humans are morally considerable, but no animals are.
Key words: Marginal Humans, Argument from Marginal Cases, Argument From Kinds, Argument From Similarity. 

---

MARGINALNI LJUDI, ARGUMENT VRSTE,
ARGUMENT SLIČNOSTI
U ovom radu proučavaju se dve reakcije na argument marginalnih slučajeva; argument vrste i argument sličnosti. Smatram da su ovi argumenti nedovoljni da pokažu da svi ljudi imaju moralni status ali ne i životinje. Ovo ne dokazuje da životinje imaju moralni status, ali prebacuje teret dokaza na one koji tvrde da se svi ljudi smatraju moralnim, ali ne i životinje.
Ključne reči: marginalni ljudi, argument marginalnih slučajeva, argument vrste, argument sličnosti