FROM ETHNIC ISOLATIONISM TO OPENNESS: THE PREVAILING MODEL OF DEVELOPMENT *

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Abstract. *The author uses three research relations to test what citizens of Serbia think about their own security in the international environment; about their own cultural tradition as opposed to the cultural tradition of other nations; about the disruption of national identity under the influence of ideas (behaviours) from the outside, and about dangers lying behind the integration process – with the goal to determine whether the current isolationism is an insurmountable obstacle. The first research relation identifies indicators of national/ethnic enclosure and defines the dominant type of isolationism; the second one points to factors hindering the ethnic/national identity and stresses the dominant type of xenophobia; the third relation embodies dominant thinking patterns and a conception of a model of development between the cultural-ethnic principle of a closed state and the new civic concept. Our results show that current isolationism and xenophobia are gradually lessening in intensity and becoming more moderate.*

Key words: *Serbia, Europe, national/ethnic isolationism, national/ethnic xenophobia, model of development, contemporary integration process.*

ENCLOSED IN ONE'S OWN ETHNICUM

Our analysis begins with the study of key concepts, which is a necessary condition to understand the complex problem of enclosure in one's own ethnicum. This is a composite construct at whose grounds lies identification based on ethnic and national affiliation. If this identification type is dominant, the issue at hand is that of ethnic isolation. The question that follows is whether this isolation may present an obstacle to rational positions on the need to become involved in the modern integration process.

Ethno-national communities, or *ethnicums*, are a form of social organization. Dilemmas among sociologists occur when constitutive elements of such organizations need to be singled out. The socio-cultural approach is interested in what ethnic affiliation relates to. In that respect A. Giddens remarks that ethnicity includes cultural specifics which help us "distinguish ethnic groups from one another [where] the most usual are language, history of ancestry, religion and styles of dress or adornment" (2003: 283). Based on such differences, ethnic identity emerges. If these differences are constructed upon prejudice and stereotypes, national/ethnic affiliation may become dominant, which breeds fastidiousness, intolerance, hatred, and so forth. All this leads to *national isolationism*, a pattern traditionalist in nature, followed by xenophobia, which opposes any reformism. Together with national isolationism we find *ethnocentrism* – "suspicion of all people not belonging to our group, and valuation of other cultures on the basis of our own" (269).[1] Ethnocentrism, permeated by prejudice and stereotypes, results in the view of others as dangerous outsiders, where prospects of ethnic conflicts are strong. Finally, the *enclosure of the group* is the process in which other ethnic groups are excluded in different ways, which results in social and cultural unequal opportunities. On one hand we find privileged ethnic groups, and on the other, there are groups bereft of all rights, where the distinction is not always based on sheer numbers of group members. Dialogue with the different is rejected. Hence, ethnic diversity often leads to antagonism among ethnic groups.

The concepts in question are indeed regressive forms of identification and stand for *retraditionalisation*, since, instead of plural identities, one identity (the national one) prevails. In times of crisis, when physical existence is markedly jeopardized, national identity emerges[2] as the traditional model of identity, offering people some security. In such times, national identification is more pronounced as compared with other identification types. The rise of national identification goes hand in hand with the strengthening of ethnic distance toward "others".[3]

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[1] See: Mihailović, S. (1998) «Etnički stereotipi i heterostereotipi na Kosovu», *Sociologija,* LX, 3; Popadić, D. i Biro, M.(1999), «Autostereotipi i heterostereotipi Srba u Srbiji», *Nova srpska politička misao,* VI, 1-2.

[2] See: M. Lazić et al, (1994) *Razaranje društva - jugoslovensko društvo u krizi 90-ih.* Beograd: Filip Višnjić; Z. Golubović, B. Kuzmanović i M. Vasović, (lec.) (1995) *Društveni karakter i društvene promene u svetlu nacionalnih sukoba.* Beograd: Filip Višnjić.

[3] Let us stick to some empirical findings: according to the Report of Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, strong ethnic distance is an important feature of Serbian society. Public opinion research of the Federal Ministry of National Minorities has revealed that in Serbia the distance toward ethnic minorities is extreme in 3.3% of the population, pronounced in 28%, and moderate in 54.8%. Only 10.3% subjects do not report any distance towards others. Over 70% of the surveyed population in central Serbia, Belgrade, and Vojvodina believe one should be cautious when dealing with Albanians. In south Serbia, 73% Albanians and 61% Serbs showed ethnic distance. Asked whether they could be friends to one another – 56% Albanians and 43% Serbs answered this would be very difficult to achieve. Even 96% Albanians and 95% Serbs would not allow their child to marry a member of the other ethnic community (OSCE, 2003: 3).
We draw the reader's attention to the research "*Quality of Interethnic Relations, Awareness of Regional Identity and Possibility for Cooperation and Integration in the Balkans"* carried out in 2003 on the sample gathering subjects from Serbia, Bulgaria, and Macedonia, implemented by the Institute for Sociology of the Faculty of Philosophy in Niš. The results of the study are an empirical basis for the present paper. In particular, of interest is its segment on *social distance* that Serbs report to have toward other nations, national minorities and ethnic groups in southeast Serbia. The aim is to see how the majority, Serbian nation views others, how positive or negative this image is. Our results have shown that stereotypical views of others by the majority nation are indeed saturated by negative attributes. The biggest distance is shown towards the Albanians and

Research has shown that ethnic distance is related to negative ethnic stereotypes (those stressing negative qualities and cherishing negative stereotypes of others show the strongest social and ethnic distance to other people). Also: total ethnic distance is, largely, determined by national affiliation. This is a social and cultural context favourable to marked social distancing, qualification of "others" by means of negative determiners, and ethnic intolerance" (D. S. Zaharijevski, S. Kostić, S. Spasić, 2004 : 263).

All this points to the need, so to speak, for the social and historical reality of Serbia (a multicultural and multiethnic community) to be analyzed in between these two typological models of development. One of them is accorded with the "cultural and ethnic conception of the nation" and the other with the "civil conception of the nation" (S. Divjak, 2001: 129-135). *The cultural-ethnic concept of the nation* vouches for a culturally and ethnically defined state, which insists on substantial unity, coming from pre-political times (origin, beliefs, customs…) *The civil concept of the nation* skips cultural and ethnic affiliation and proposes a constitutive principle of the civil state (with emphasis on political culture, the ethos of individual rights, etc.) It is obvious that the ethno-cultural conception favours ethnocentric collectivism, organic solidarity, isolationism, xenophobia; in contrast, the civic concept insists on: universalism, competition, openness, individualism – i.e. instead of national and ethnic affiliation, it allows an individual the freedom to choose his or her own identity.

The cultural-ethnic principle, as a grounds for the constitution of a state, takes one form of social identity – national – to be absolute. When one operationalizes this concept, its constituent elements are revealed: 1/ unity and security only in one's own nation; 2/ insistence on being jeopardized by others; 3/ glorification of one's own culture and nation. The key question is, therefore, whether in Serbia at present the cultural and ethnic principle of the enclosed state is being restored, or whether a new, civic concept is being developed? The answer to this question will be our attempt to give a realistic assessment whether Serbia is closing up, or opening to the world.

METHODOLOGICAL REMARKS

The paper is based on the results of the empirical research "Quality of Interethnic Relations, Awareness of Regional Identity and Possibility for Cooperation and Integration in the Balkans", carried out in Serbia, Bulgaria, and Macedonia in 2003.[4]

The focus of present interest is the Serbian subsample (five districts in southeast Serbia: Nišavski, Toplički, Pirotski, Jablanički and Pčinjski). Apart from majority Serbian population (43.4% - 258 subjects), the subsample (totalling 594 subjects) included Roma-

Romanies, especially in terms of marriage (85.1% Serbs would not marry an Albanian, and 83.5% would not marry a Romany). The highest distance is seen in the population group aged 50-59 – which provides room for some hope, since the younger population is much more tolerant. (See: L. Milošević, «Srbi o drugima», *Kvalitet međuetničkih odnosa, svest o regionalnom identittetu i mogućnosti saradnje i integracije na Balkanu –* preliminarni rezultati empirijskog istraživanja u jugoistočnoj Srbiji, Institut za sociologiju, Filozofski fakultet, Univerzitet u Nišu, Sven, Niš, 2004.)

[4] The research was part of the project *Cultural and Ethnic Relations in the Balkans – Possibilities for Regional and European Integration*, implemented by the Institute for Sociology of the Faculty of Philosophy in Niš, financed by Ministry of Science, Technology, and Development of the Serbian Government.

nies 18.4% (109), Albanians 21.2% (126), and Bulgarians 16.0% (95). The remaining numbers up to 100% are taken by the group "other nationalities".[5]

Research topic focuses on ethnic and national isolationism and xenophobia in the population, as a form of identification and attitude to others.

Research goals

We needed to decide whether isolationism and xenophobia are a majority or minority point of view. Then, we were to identify indicators of national/ethnic enclosure and national/ethnic xenophobicity.

The starting hypothesis of this research is that stronger national and ethnic isolationism is followed by pronounced xenophobicity. This further means that national and ethnic enclosure promotes regressive forms of identification, inducing the cultural-ethnic conception of the state, taking the country away from Europe.

1) The first research relation identifies some indicators of national and ethnic enclosure and defines the dominant type of isolationism:
  – how subjects assess their own cultural tradition in relation to others;
  – how they assess security in their own national environment.

2) The second research relation identifies factors which jeopardize, or may jeopardize, ethnic and national identity, pointing to the dominant type of xenophobia:
  – how they assess the influence of foreign ideas and behaviour patterns on their national and ethnic identity;
  – how they assess the European integration process in terms of the disruption of national and ethnic identity.

3) The third research relation studies the relation between indicators of isolationism and xenophobicity, which gives room for the conclusion on the prevailing model of development (open or closed).

NATIONAL/ETHNIC ISOLATIONISM

The first research relation studies what the Serbian population thinks of security in their own national environment ("isolation"), and how much Serbs venerate their own culture ("glorification"). These variables are taken to be indicators of national/ethnic isolationism.

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[5] Statistical data on the population of Serbia according to nationality and ethnicity testify to the fact Serbia is a multiethnic and multicultural country. In central Serbia and Vojvodina, apart from Serbs, we find 22 national/ethnic groups. In this research, the sample included the following nationalities: Serbs, Albanians, Bulgarians, and Romanies. According to the census, in Serbia there are: Serbs (89.5%), Albanians (1.09), Bulgarians (0.3%), Romanies (1.4%).(Serbia in Numbers, Serbian Statistics Bureau, 2003 http:// www.statserb.sr.gov.yu).

National/ethnic isolation

Histogram 1. One can feel fully secure only when one lives in the environment with the majority population of one's nationality.

The general impression is that citizens of Serbia mostly *disagree* with the position that a person can feel fully secure only when he or she lives in the environment predominantly populated by members of his or her nation (45.1 % : 39.9%). Citizens of Serbian nationality stand out in terms of percentage of agreement with this position (22.6%), although we should keep in mind that 16.9% of Serbs do not agree with the position at all. The position of Albanians is suggestive since they disagree with this statement in a bit higher percentage than the Serbs (8.9% : 7.5%). The number of Bulgarians and Romanies disagreeing with the statement on security in a nationally homogeneous environment is twice as big. Albanians and Serbs report more indecision. It is obvious: minority nations feel safer in Serbia's multinational environment than majority Serbs (i.e. among Serbs there are more people feeling safer surrounded by their own nationals).

Although disagreement with this position prevails, we should bear in mind the high percentage of those who still fear others, who are insecure in their environment, and who do not genuinely trust others. If one is tucked in one's own national nest, this is a clear indicator of national/ethnic enclosure.

National/ethnic glorification

Praising one's own cultural tradition is also an indicator of national and ethnic isolationism.

Concurrence with the statement that own cultural tradition is *better than that of others* is by far more frequent than disagreement with this statement (47.7% : 28.3%). In fact, Serbs, Albanians and Romanies twice more often agree than disagree with this position. Disagreement with the sentence is a bit higher only in Bulgarians. Most marked glorification of own culture is found in Serbs, and then Albanians.

Glorification of our own culture at the expense of others is more pronounced as compared with the previous isolationism indicator (security in own national environment). This potentially means that *national isolation is more moderate than glorification*. However, we notice that the number of "undecided" individuals is higher in terms of glorification of own cultural tradition than safety in own national environment. This can mean that national awareness is on a higher level, since commitment to one or the other position is

higher. It seems, however, that irrational elements still prevail in relation to cultural tradition. Thus, it is indicative that self-determination by means of identifying with one's nation is lessening in intensity.

Histogram 2. My people are not perfect, but our cultural tradition is better than that of others.

National/ethnic xenophobicity

The second research relation identifies factors hindering, or prone to hinder, ethnic and national identity. More precisely, we wanted to determine how much citizens of Serbia are afraid of outside ideas and behavioural patterns on one hand, and accession to Europe on the other. What do they fear more? What is it that more strongly threatens their national and ethnic identity?

Jeopardy from accession to Europe

Does unity with Europe require renunciation, loss of national identity, or can it actually be a confirmation of this identity?

Table 1.

Nationality	Which of the following statements do you agree with?					
	National and ethnic identities are a matter of the past.	Renunciation of national and ethnic identity is a price we have to pay to enter Europe.	Accession to Europe does not mean loss of national and ethnic identity.	Accession to Europe does not mean a complete loss, but rather certain amount of adaptation of national and ethnic identity.	Accession to Europe boosts national and ethnic identity.	No position
Albanian	2,1%	**4,1%**	**6,2%**	**5,0%**	2,2%	2,1%
Bulgarian	1,4%	0,9%	**7,5%**	**2,9%**	1,4%	1,7%
Romany	0,7%	0,7%	**5,5%**	**2,7%**	0,7%	8,2%
Serbian	2,6%	**5,1%**	**12,5%**	**11,1%**	2,4%	**9,9%**

The impression is that in Serbia there prevails the position that accession to Europe does not presuppose the loss of national and ethnic identity. Rather, this accession requires the identity to be adapted to some extent (53.4%). Subjects of all studied nationalities mostly do not view approach to Europe as something threatening. That this is a price that has to be paid is believed by 10.8% of our subjects, while equal numbers believe either that this shall even boost national and ethnic identity (6.7%) or that such an identity is a matter belonging to the past (6.8%). Still, 21.9% subjects do not have a position on this. What does this mean: disinterest, resistance, or belief that anyway someone else is to decide on this matter? If we should point to the most xenophobic portion of the sample, let us say that some Serbs and Albanians feel victimized (5.1% and 4.1%). However, this is a very low percentage. Among those with no position, Serbs are most common (9.9%).

Jeopardy from foreign ideas and behavioural patterns

One of the fears following opening up to the world has to do with the question how much national identity is threatened by ideas and behaviour from the outside.

Histogram 3. The main threat to our national identity
comes from the influence of foreign ideas and behaviours.

The prevailing position is that national identity is threatened by foreign ideas and behaviours (41.8%). Naturally, one should right away add that 35.5% of all subjects, of all nationalities, disagree with such a statement. Among Serbs, we find twice more people feeling threatened than those not feeling threatened (23.5% : 11.8%). Albanians agree and disagree with the statement in equal numbers. Bulgarians and Romanies show a bit higher rates of disagreement with the idea that national identity is jeopardized by ideas and behaviours from the outside. Therefore, the most xenophobic are Serbs, and after them Albanians.

It is obvious that Serbia *fears foreign ideas and behaviours much more than it fears accession to Europe.* This is indeed expected, since the previous analysis has shown that citizens of Serbia largely view entrance to Europe as a certain amount of adaptation of their own national and ethnic identity. However, it is most likely that foreign ideas and behavioural patterns are more dangerous, as they may threaten and cast into oblivion everything representing the national past, national myths, ideologies, and also errors which have persisted for centuries. For peoples in the Balkans and Serbia these "roots" are still very important, which is why they fear the foreign and the unknown.

Prevailing Model of Development: between Isolationism and Openness

In order to accomplish the defined goals of the research, and based on previous analysis, in the third research relation we cross-referenced indicators of ethnic and national isolationism with indicators of xenophobicity, so as to decide which of the two state concepts (open or closed) prevails and whether Serbia is ready for cultural Europeisation.

The key question is whether more xenophobic are those who are predominantly tucked in their national environment or those who simply glorify their own cultural tradition, and therefore pose barriers in relations with others?

National/ethnic isolation and threat of foreign ideas and behaviours

Table 2.

One can feel fully secure only when one lives in the environment with the majority population of one's nationality.	The main threat to our national identity comes from the influence of foreign ideas and behaviours.		
	I disagree	I am undecided	I agree
I disagree	**23,7%**	8,4%	12,9%
I am undecided	3,8%	6,5%	4,4%
I agree	8,1%	7,6%	**24,9%**

Subjects feeling safe only when surrounded by the majority members of their own nation largely also think that their national identity is threatened by influences from the outside (24.9%). Likewise, those showing more moderate national enclosure are more open to foreign ideas, i.e. they do not feel that their national identity is jeopardized by foreign ideas and behaviours (23.7%). So, national/ethnic isolation is significantly related to xenophobicity along the ratio *more isolated – more xenophobic*. However, the almost equal percentage of those not at all agreeing that there is a danger suggests that a slow moderation and equalization of diverse positions is in progress.

National/ethnic isolation and jeopardy from accession to Europe

Table 3.

One can feel fully secure only when one lives in the environment with the majority population of one's nationality.	Which of the following statements do you agree with?					
	National and ethnic identities are a matter of the past.	Renunciation of national and ethnic identity is a price we have to pay to enter Europe.	Accession to Europe does not mean loss of national and ethnic identity.	Accession to Europe does not mean a complete loss, but rather certain amount of adaptation of national and ethnic identity.	Accession to Europe boosts national and ethnic identity.	No position
I disagree	2,7%	4,6%	**16,1%**	9,8%	2,4%	**9,1%**
I am undecided	0,9%	1,4%	4,5%	3,4%	2,2%	2,4%
I agree	3,1%	4,6%	**11,3%**	8,9%	2,1%	**10,4%**

For those showing prominent national isolation, accession to Europe does not represent a loss, or a complete loss, of national and ethnic identity, but rather a certain amount of adaptation (20.2%). On the other hand, those less nationally closed more frequently support the same position (26.9%), which means they are even more open and rational in their assessment that such a direction has no alternative. Therefore, national isolation influences the position on accession to Europe, but in such a way that nationally both more closed and more open individuals see it *as the only way*, where those who are more nationally closed are also *more xenophobic*, or restrained. It is suggestive that among those who are nationally isolated (10.4%), and among those who are not (9.1%) there is an almost equal percentage of individuals with no opinion at all on accession to Europe. What lies behind this is an open question: "it is still early to think about that!", "no one will ask us for opinion anyway", or something else.

National/ethnic glorification and jeopardy from foreign ideas and behaviours

Table 4.

My people are not perfect, but our cultural tradition is better than that of others.	The main threat to our national identity comes from the influence of foreign ideas and behaviours.		
	I disagree	I am undecided	I agree
I disagree	**13,9%**	4,6%	9,7%
I am undecided	8,0%	8,2%	7,7%
I agree	13,5%	9,7%	**24,7%**

Subjects agreeing with the position that their cultural tradition is better than the traditions of others look upon foreign ideas and behaviours as a threat (24.7%). On the other hand, those not glorifying their cultural tradition mostly disagree with this statement (13.9%). Therefore, *glorification and xenophobia go hand in hand*.

Upon deeper analysis one notices that in this cross-referencing the difference between those who are and those who are not xenophobic is more prominent than the previously described difference between the nationally isolated and non-isolated individuals. Equal percentage of xenophobic persons in both research relations gives indication that these variables are connected, however, we add that those not glorifying their own cultural tradition, as opposed to those who are nationally open, show more moderate disagreement with the position that danger comes from foreign ideas and behaviours. Accordingly, we reach the conclusion that enclosure caused by glorification of own cultural tradition is more prominent than enclosure caused by the opinion that a person can feel fully safe only when living surrounded by the majority of his or her own nation.

Most citizens of Serbia do not view accession to Europe as a loss of national and ethnic identity, but rather as its adaptation. Those glorifying their own cultural tradition (24.4%) think this way. However, the same kind of thinking is found in those with less self-praise: in them, we expected this position to prevail, but our results do not confirm such an expectation (17.0%). Therefore, even though they do not glorify their own cultural tradition (and are not isolated), these people are not significantly convinced that accession to Europe is not a loss, but rather an adaptation of ethnic and national identity.

National/ethnic glorification and jeopardy from accession to Europe

Table 5.

My people are not perfect, but our cultural tradition is better than that of others.	Which of the following statements do you agree with?					
	National and ethnic identities are a matter of the past.	Renunciation of national and ethnic identity is a price we have to pay to enter Europe.	Accession to Europe does not mean loss of national and ethnic identity.	Accession to Europe does not mean a complete loss, but rather certain amount of adaptation of national and ethnic identity.	Accession to Europe boosts national and ethnic identity.	No position
I disagree	2,4%	2,2%	**9,7%**	**7,3%**	2,2%	4,7%
I am undecided	1,4%	2,9%	7,4%	5,3%	1,2%	5,5%
I agree	2,9%	5,5%	**14,9%**	**9,5%**	3,3%	11,7%

When we compare these data with the cross-referencing of the same variable in relation to national isolation, we notice that, in terms of accession to Europe, the nationally isolated are more restrained than the nationally glorifying (20.2% : 24.4%). The self-glorifying ones more often agree with the statement that this is not a loss of national and ethnic identity. However, the picture is clearer when we compare the nationally open and those not characterized by self-glorification. The assumption is that, once released from the reins (isolation and glorification), they will become even more open. This is indeed the situation with the nationally open, but not with the latter group (26.9% : 17.0%). Therefore, *departure from national isolation is followed by a rational view of accession to Europe, while departure from cultural glorification is significantly falling behind, in this respect.* It seems that layers of irrationality persist longer in the realm of the ethnic than that of the national. In favour of this thesis we find the fact that those glorifying their own cultural tradition, more often than those feeling safe only in their own national environment, think that European accession is the price that has to be paid (5.5% : 4.6%), but also the fact that precisely this group is the most undecided (11.7% : 10.4%).

CONCLUSION

The research started with the assumption that national/ethnic isolationism is followed by xenophobia. The two are viewed as significant social and psychological obstacles to the development of a modern civil state. National/ethnic enclosure provides room for regressive forms of identification, which preserve the cultural-ethnic conception of the state, and keep such a state away from Europe.

We have found that *isolationism and xenophobicity are not as exclusive* as they were in the early nineties; they are becoming more moderate, while irrational positions give

way to rational thinking, which is more open, tolerant, closer to togetherness.[6] In this model of isolationism and xenophobicity we no longer find the exclusive culturo-ethnic principle. To remind the reader: the *cultural-ethnic principle* of constituting the state promotes one social identity – national – as absolute. We were interested in how much this is a reality: is Serbia currently restoring the cultural-ethnical principle, that favouring the closed state, or is a new civic concept being developed?

The principal finding of this research is that around *40% of the studied population* of different nationalities from Serbia shows *isolationism and xenophobicity*. This percentage is *reduced to 1/3* when the data are cross-referenced in an attempt of deeper analysis. Therefore, the answer to the question posed above is that Serbia is opening up to the world, where the predominant determination by belonging to a particular cultural and ethnic group is giving way to something else. Instead of retraditionalisation we are witnessing the *re-integration of the cultural-ethnic model* – "moderate multiculturalism". This further means that the difference is accepted between separate cultures, as a difference encompassing relation and interaction. For that reason a specific culture, although preserving its particular features, is treated as an entity open to outside influences (S. Divjak: 2001: 133). Modes of coexistence and also modern forms of identification are tested in the community. In other words: Serbia is getting closer to the *civic conception in constituting a state*, but in such a way as to incorporate into this construct some elements of the ethno-cultural conception, since for this country, multiculturalism and multiethnicity are a reality. This model could also be called that of "*divided national ties*" (N. Rot, N. Havelka, 1973.), which denotes simultaneous tiedness to one's own nation and to other groups, and professes coexistence and cooperation between one's nation and others. This does not mean that there will be no more ethnic distance. Likewise, our results suggest that this distance is moderate, as illustrated, among other things, by similar thinking on all tested issues, regardless of nationality. Let us stop here and ponder: similarity of answers provided by Serbs and Albanians is striking. The real question is, therefore, what lies behind this similarity. Is this social mimicry, or a realistic model of sustainable multicultural

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[6] As in the previous analysis of the Serbian sample, results of the study of these relations in Bulgaria and Macedonia show that prevalent is the *regional dimension of development from isolationism to openness:*

1) in the comparative overview of the variables "nationalism", "xenophobia" and "changes" (three studied samples) we noticed that there were no fully intolerant and exclusive options. With regard to the other two nations, the Bulgarian population shows more self-esteem in terms of its own (national) identity and less potential resistance to EU accession; the Macedonian sample ranks higher on the xenophobia and fear of changes scales; finally, in Serbia the nationalism score is the lowest, but (as in Macedonia) we witness a more pronounced fear of changes than in the Bulgarian sample;

2) the principal finding is that the majority of population of the region does not view accession to Europe as a loss of national and ethnic identity, but rather as a form of adaptation of this identity. Such a position is so frequent in Serbia and Macedonia that it testifies these countries are opening up to Europe. Although only a quarter of the studied population in Bulgaria shares this opinion, we should keep in mind that among them 45% do not report that they feel potentially jeopardized, which, with other previous findings in mind, indicates that they do not have a problem of national identity, at least not manifested in the way typical of Serbia and Macedonia (with accumulating uncertainty with regard to their territories and interethnic problems) (See: Jovanović, Dj, Cvetković, V. (2004) "Balkan Value Patterns and Cultural Values of the European Union", in: Mitrović, Lj/ Djordjević, B. D/ Todorović, D. (ed.) *Social Changes, Cultural and Ethnic Relations, and Euro-Integration Process in the Balkans*. Niš: Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Niš - ISI, Sven, p.183-199.)

and multiethnic coexistence? Southeast Serbia is very close to Kosovo, the venue of constant conflicts between Serbs and Albanians. This is a problem wanting a deeper analysis.

Based on all data given above one may conclude that the starting hypothesis has been partly confirmed, since isolationism and xenophobia present in Serbia today are not leading to retraditionalisation and restoration of national/ethnic exclusiveness. Rather, they strive to reintegrate the cultural and ethnic concept into the model of development that we may define as the *prevailing model of development – from isolationism to openness*.

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OD ETNIČKOG IZOLACIONIZMA KA OTVORENOSTI: PREOVLAĐUJUĆI MODEL RAZVOJA

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Autorka kroz tri istraživačke relacije ispituje na koji način građani Srbije razmišljaju o sopstvenoj sigurnosti u nacionalnom okruženju; o vlastitoj kulturnoj tradiciji u odnosu na tradiciju drugih naroda; o narušavanju nacinalnog/etničkog identiteta pod uticajem stranih ideja (ponašanja), kao i o opasnostima koje vrebaju u savremenim integracionim procesima - sa ciljem da utvrdi da li je postojeći izolacionizam njihova (ne) premostiva barijera. Prva istraživačka relacija identifikuje indikatore nacionalne/etničke zatvorenosti i utvrđuje dominantni tip izolacionizma; druga, ukazuje na faktore koji ugrožavaju etnički/nacionalni identitet i ističe dominantni tip ksenofobije; a treća relacija ustanovljava preovlađujuća razmišljanja i koncepciju modela razvoja između kulturno-etničkog principa zatvorene državne konstrukcije i novog građanskog koncepta. Dobijeni rezultati su pokazali da postojeći izolacionizam i ksenofobičnost postepeno gube isključivost i postaju umereniji.

Ključne reči: *Srbija, Evropa, nacionalni/etnički izolacionizam, nacionalna/etnička ksenofobičnost, model razvoja, savremeni integracioni procesi.*