SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF VALUE SYSTEMS IN THREE BALKAN STATES [*]

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Abstract. *The analyzed results show that in the Balkans at this moment there are two basic groups of value systems or orientations relevant to the ongoing social and cultural changes. The first one is nationally and traditionally oriented, the second one is more reformist and cosmopolitan leaning. Certainly, those two orientations could be isolated and confronted only in mind, and for strictly methodical purposes. That is because between those two Weberian "ideal types" there is also a significant interval-space fulfilled by various elements of both types. Those elements are subject to change concerning the improvement or*

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deterioration of political or economic situation into the specific Balkan country, or in its position within international community. In addition, the instant psychological reasons of orientations toward different values are not either consistent or rational. Both kinds of values are rather the product of long-lasting frustrations and the urgent need to recuperate the damaged cultural identity, than the result of rational choice between the offered political and other alternatives.

Key words: *Value orientations, Balkan States, Nations and Ethnic Groups, Prejudice, Cultural Policy, Endangering of Culture, Europeanization, Americanization, Traditionally and Reformatory-oriented Groups*

The recent transition and integration that Balkan peoples face require modifying their value system, in order to be put in the various integrative processes both at the regional and at the broader rank. The current socio-cultural environment of the societies at the Balkans – especially the roles of cultural norms as well as their impact upon the transformation process – seems to be one of the most important questions of this big alteration. The problem of values and norms becomes more than ever obvious in times of social shifting, when all the previous ideals are questioned and the traditional living patterns shattered; and a new search for collective and individual identity is desired. Values by itself, represent a major referent framework for all human thinking and behavior, including those "cultural" sources and causes that underlie making political decisions. There is a close relation between value systems and certain types of political systems; in particular, with democracy that is a desirable goal of all Balkan states today. Democracy and values (represented, at first, in Civil or Democratic Political culture) are complementary: there is no lasting democracy if the values are conservative or in chaos. Politics provides the means of implementing choices at the domestic and international levels – not alone but rather in accordance with certain value orientations. Values pose fundamental answers of how to organize or perhaps change certain societies. The normative effect of values on society depends largely on what ideals and symbols are evoked. For example, if the most frequent attitudes in the public arena are still leaning on prejudice, ethnocentrism, nationalism, etc., this is not what we could call "civil" influence. The decay of communist ideology in Balkan countries has produced a particular moral vacuum that still represents a permanent danger to democracy. In certain cases, the proponents of authoritarian political culture use demagogic slogans to promote old values and to create fear in people, instead of encouraging them to participating in a peaceful integration into Europe.

Therefore, a particular awareness should be dedicated to the cultural characteristics of the ethnic groups at the Balkans[1] through the identification of those values and value

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[1] Considering the Serbian society, several surveys dedicated to the mentioned characteristic have been done. One of the most prominent research was conducted by Z. Golubović, B. Kuzmanović i M. Vasović, and was published as *Društveni karakter i društvene promene u svetlu nacionalnih sukoba* (*Social Character and Social Changes in the light of National Conflicts*), Beograd, Filip Višnjić, 1995. One can find some interesting results about Serbian cultural mentality in the book signed by Jovanović, Đ., Petrović, J. and Madić, S. entitled *Parodija tragičnog, kič kao konstituens političke i kulturne ideologije* (*Parody of Tragedy, Kitsch as a Constituent of Political and Cultural Ideology*). Kosovska Mitrovica – Beograd – Niš: Filozofski fakultet – Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju – Istraživačko-analitički centar, 2002. Of course, we should not forget a numerous articles and anthologies dedicated to the Balkan culture, ethnic and other relations which were published during the extent of the mentioned macro-project "*Cultural and Ethnic Relations at the Balkans – the*

orientations that could contribute (or not) in approaching to the future United Europe. Of course, the previous goal could be reached in many ways, through examinations of various attitudes, questions, and overall cultural inclinations. This article presents those orientations by data that consider attitudes about similarity between Balkan nations, the Balkans belonging to Europe, possible European prejudice, cultural policy direction, and acquaintances with Balkan cultural history. Needless to say, through all these attitudes one could test readiness amongst Balkan peoples to affirm and (re)create common cultural basis of multiethnic, multi-confessional and multicultural societies, for the reason of the joint profound collaboration of every Balkan states and nations.

1. THE SIMILARITY BETWEEN BALKAN NATIONS

Despite the operation of some structurally settled differences between the nations, which are represented in one or another type of ethno-nationalism[2], one could be encour-

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possibilities of the Regional and European Integration". Three authors edit almost all of them: Lj. Mitrović (chief of the whole macro-project), D. B. Đorđević (steersman of the empirical survey) and D. Todorović (secretary of the macro-project). Here are some of the titles of the antologies: *Kulturni i etnički identiteti u procesu globalizacije i regionalizacije Balkana* (Cultural and Ethnic Identities in the Process of Globalization and Regionalization of the Balkans) , Niš, JUNIR/CBS, 2002, *Globalizacija, akulturacija i identiteti na Balkanu* (Globalisation, Acculturation and Identities at the Balkans), Niš, Institut za sociologiju Filozofskog fakulteta Univerziteta u Nišu/Punta, 2002, *Kvalitet međuetničkih odnosa, svest o regionalnom identitetu i mogućnosti saradnje i integracije na Balkanu /Preliminarni rezultati empirijskog istraživanja u jugoistočnoj Srbiji/* (Quality of Interethnic Relations, Sense about Regional Identity and the Possibility of Cooperation and Integration at the Balkans/Preliminary Results of Empirical Research in Southeast Serbia), Niš, Institut za sociologiju Filozofskog fakulteta Univerziteta u Nišu/Sven, 2003, Modeli kulturne politike u uslovima multikulturnih društava na Balkanu i evrointegracionih procesa (Models of Cultural Policy in the Conditions of Multicultural Societies at the Balkans and Euro-integration Processes), Niš, Institut za sociologiju Filozofskog fakulteta Univerziteta u Nišu/Sven, 2004, Društvene promene, kulturni i etnički odnosi i evrointegracijski procesi na Balkanu (Social Changes, Cultural an Ethnic Relationships and Euro-integration Processes at the Balkans), Niš, Institut za sociologiju Filozofskog fakulteta u Nišu/Sven, 2004, etc. For information about some ethnic themes and related issues at the Balkans elaborated by authors outside Serbia, see: Genov, N. (ed.) *Ethnic Relations in South Eastern Europe.* Berlin and Sofia: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and Free University Berlin and Institute of Eastern European Studies, 2004. Also: *Perspektive multikulturalizma u državama Zapadnog Balkana* (*Perspectives of Multiculturalism in West Balkan States*, Bašić G. (ed.), Beograd: Centar za istraživanje etniciteta i Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2004, and: Jakovlevska-Joševska, L. *Socijalnata distanca kaj adolescentite vo Republika Makedonija/Empirisko istražuvanje* (Social Distance of Adolescents in the Republic of Macedonia/Empirical Research). *New Balkan Politics* 2. Avaiable at:
http://www.newbalkanpolitics.org.mk/OldSite/Issue_2/jakovlevska.mac.asp

[2] There is no place here to stress all reasons that cause ethno-nationalism, especially the ones which refer to the wishes of various authoritarian regimes to improve their own political power at the expense of national identity itself. The main cause of nationalism of both majority and minority of people in the one particular state seems to lie in the very foundations of creation of national or some other collective identity. Every group-identity can be defined only by taking into account interactions with "others", since there is no "me" which is not a branch of "we". Humans and social groups define themselves relating to something that differ enough from them, or - as S. Huntington briefly pointed out, – "people determine their identity according to something that they are not." (Semjuel Hantington, *Sukob civilizacija i preoblikovanje svetskog poretka* /Samuel Huntington, *Clash of Civilization and the Reshaping of World Order*, CID, Podgorica, Romanov, Banja Luka, 2000, str. 73.) Yet, collective identity represents a permanence of generations' experiences and the "joint memory" of the shared past. The basis and the past are related in the group identity, as well as history and the future, increasing the feeling of belonging and shared aims.

aged by the fact that the majority or 60% of the Balkan people (which means people from Serbia, Macedonia, and Bulgaria in which we carried out our research)[3], think that the Balkan nations are more similar to each other, than in relation to other nations in Europe (picture No 1.). Believing that it is the biggest one in Macedonia (66%), after which goes Bulgaria with 57,3% and Serbia with 55 percentages of interviewed people.

Fig. 1. Serbia, Bulgaria and Macedonia together: Are Balkan Nations similar?

As far as *Serbia* is concerned, (Fig. 2), the opinions about similarity are pretty much divided, especially at the national basis. For example, only 23 % of the interviewed Albanians think that the Balkan nations are alike, 34 % do not have any attitude about that, while 42, 9% of them had answered that question with *No*! On the other side is Bulgarian community in South Serbia, according to which the Balkan nations are alike in 75, 5 %, followed by Serbs (67,3 %) and much less by Romany people – (43,5%). It is interesting that Bulgarians both in Serbia and in Bulgaria rejected similarity between Balkan nations at almost identical, and also very low level – (about 14 %), while the high number of Serbian Romanies does not have any attitude to the mentioned question.

Fig. 2 . Serbia / Nationalities: Are Balkan Nations Similar?

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[3] Into the mentioned areas, the sample consists of the majority of population as well as of people from three minority ethnic groups (in Serbia - Romanies, Albanians, and Bulgarians, in Macedonia Romanies, Albanians and Serbs, in Bulgaria Romanies, Turks, and Vlachs). The realized sample of 1786 people comprise 43,7% of Serbs, 18,5% of Romanies, 21,4% of Albanians and 16,1% of Bulgarians (Serbia), 38,6% of Macedonians, 16,7% of Romanies, 22,6% of Albanians and 21,9% of Serbs (Macedonia), as well as 53,5% of Bulgarians, 20,8% of Turks, 15,6% of Romanies and 9,4% of Vlachs (Bulgaria).

In *Bulgaria* (Fig. 3) situation is somewhat different. No national group rejects the similarity for more than 11% . In addition, two of three national minorities (Romanies and Vlachs) see the likeness in 47 or 44, 4 %, while the Turks go on even before Bulgarians. For interviewed Turks, the resemblance between Balkan nations exists in 66, 1%.

Fig. 3. Bulgaria / Nationalities: Are Balkan Nations Similar?

In *Macedonia*, (Fig. 4) Serbs took the role of Bulgarian Turks and Serbian Bulgarians. 81,4% of them think that Balkan Peoples are similar. The same idea is shared 77, 5% of Macedonians and 69, 7% of Romanies, but not also by the majority of Albanians within only one third, or 32,1% see the analogy between Balkan Nations. For pacification of ethnic tensions in the region, in particular in Macedonia and Serbia (or Kosovo and Metohija), that is definitely not a good sign. However, while the rest of the Balkan national minorities try to mitigate strong nationalistic winds that blast throughout the Balkan region – by allegation that the long-term acculturation has made the Balkan Nations similar – the majority of Albanians reject that proposition. In new political circumstances, only time can tell how Albanians could reconcile their own national romanticism with integrative processes not only in the Balkans but also in European outline – which require community, participation, universal principles, and toleration.

Fig. 4. Macedonia / Nationalities: Are Balkan Nations Similar?

2. DOES BALKAN BELONG TO EUROPE?

An extreme variant of nationalism, chauvinism or "aggressive nationalism" usually comes into existence from the fear of missing its own national identity. Inside the particular national communities in the Balkans, it shows up also as a reaction toward Europeanization. Because of that, there is a caution of joining Europe completely, both on the Balkan and the European side. Above all, one has to admit that the Balkans does not still share the same standards with Europe, in particular with the European Union. Nevertheless, the majority of Balkan people do not think like that (Fig. 5). Over fifty-two percents (52, 6%) of interviewed people think that the Balkan is already in Europe, or represents "European cradle".[4] According to our results, one can conclude that, generally speaking, in the Balkan soil there still exists a certain traditionally oriented exlusivism, which consider the Balkans, if not more original, as a constitutive part of Europe both in geographical and cultural sense.

Fig. 5. The Balkans / Do you think that the Balkans is a part of Europe?

The data from *Serbia*, presumably, do not show enough realistic comprehension of the Balkans as a specific socio-cultural entity that is a little bit distant from Europe. In fact, 44,1% of people think that the Balkans belong geographically to Europe, but still need to develop itself in order to join Europe. However, the answers which already situate the Balkans in Europe (37,7%), or see the Balkans as a cradle of European civilization (18,2%) prevail (together they constitute 55,4% of interviewed people). Regarding particular nationalities in *Serbia* (Fig. 6), the most sober answers to that question gave Bulgarians within whom prevail those believing that the Balkans belong to Europe only geographically (56,8%), while the answers which already include the Balkans in Europe or pronounce the Balkans to be the European cradle are represented by 33,7 and 9,5%. Behind them are Serbs, Romanies, and Albanians, but with all three nations the answers that uncritically favor the Balkans represent the majority. It is interesting that Serbs, which

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[4] In fact, our question was "*Do you think that the Balkans is a part of Europe"*, after it we have offered three answers: (a) Only geographically, but it has to be developed if it wants to become a real part of European civilization, (b)The Balkans is a part of Europe according to its culture, tradition, the way of life, although it is less developed, and, finally, the answer (c)The Balkans is a cradle of European civilization, "the first and real Europe".

were often accused that they are burdened by the ideology of "blood and soil", perceive the Balkans more realistically than Romanies and Albanians. Only 12,5% of Serbs conceive the Balkans as "European cradle", which is three times lesser in comparison with Albanians in the South of Serbia. In the last mentioned national group, those who consider the Balkans as already in Europe or see the Balkans as "original Europe" together consist of 64,8% of the examined people.

Fig. 6. Serbia / Nationalities: Do you think that the Balkans is a part of Europe?

In *Bulgaria* (Fig. 7) the Turkish minority is the most realistic one, because 46% of people think that the Balkans is just geographically in Europe, while only 12,5% consider the Balkans as "European cradle". On the contrary, the Bulgarian majority asserts that the Balkans is already in Europe (53% of them). Fifteen percent of them proclaim the Balkans to be the "European cradle", while one third of them regards that the Balkans belong to Europe only geographically. Therefore, the real issue is that in all three nations uncritical attitudes prevail that the Balkans is already in Europe, or represent a "cradle of European civilization". In addition, one datum appears to be very interesting. It is about differences between attitudes expressed by Bulgarians from Bulgaria and Bulgarians from Southeast Serbia. Namely, the last one are much more rational in the evaluation of the real social and cultural significance of the Balkans, which is evident by a simple comparison of the percentage in the previous picture (which was related to Serbia), and is followed by one (which pertains to Bulgaria).


Fig. 7. Bulgaria / Nationalities: Do you think that the Balkans is a part of Europe?

In *Macedonia* (Fig. 8), just in contrast to data obtained in Serbia, Albanians expressed the highest sense of reality. Eighty three percent (83%) of them claim that the Balkans merely geographically belongs to Europe. After them, there are Romanies and Serbs, and, finally, Macedonians, within whom the attitudes which consider the Balkans as an inherent part of Europe, or as a "European cradle" occupy more than a half of all opinions. (52,%).

Fig. 8. Macedonia / Nationalities: Do you think that the Balkans is a part of Europe?

By itself, affirmative attitudes about the Balkans as a constitutive or essential part of Europe could be read, at least, twofold. If the approach to Europe is an acceptable goal, it is helpful that the Balkan inhabitants do not consider Europe as something completely strange, qualitatively different from the states in which they already live. That psychological position could motivate the Balkan people to "renew" what they, allegedly, already know in their daily activities. In another case, they consider the Balkans a bit away from modern Europe (which is more realistic), their explicit proclamation that the Balkans is a constitutive part of Europe, could represent a brake in the Balkan future development. Simply, there is no need to go anywhere if we already have reached our hypothetical destination point. The previous logic is well known within traditionalists of every color in the Balkans, when they ritually repeat that the Balkans completely or a particular Balkan country is "already in Europe". Between that belief and the attitude that presupposes that in existing states there is nothing which should be changed – there is only a step. Pertaining to that, one has considered that the Balkans should work hard in its approaching Europe. Europe is primarily social and cultural concept, a way of life, not a geographical category.

3. ENDANGERING OF DOMESTIC CULTURE

It is usually considered that within the Balkan nations there exists a rooted prejudice that European unifying process can endanger identity and ethnic being of particular social group. Some of our questions have tried to confirm such belief. One of them was "Do you consider your Culture and tradition as endangered by values from European Countries"?

The answers in all three countries show up that the majority of the Balkan people do not think like that any more – only 34% of people expressed their fear of Europeanization.

In *Serbia* (Fig. 9), 61,9% of interviewed people have answered with "No", while 38,1% have answered with "Yes". In *Bulgaria*, the fear from Europeanization is much more less, because only 22,6% have answered with "Yes", while 77,4% with "No". In *Macedonia*, the attitude is almost identical to the Serbian one: 59,2% of people do not feel the fear of European values, while 40,8% feel endangered.


Fig. 9. Three Countries separately: Do you consider your culture and tradition as endangered by values from European countries? (%)

It is quite different regarding the *American* values, in all three countries, in particular in Macedonia, where the fear of Americanization goes before feeling that domestic culture is safe (57% : 42,7%). In Bulgaria, the fear from Americanization is a little bit bigger than the fear from Europeanization, although still at the low level 35,2% feel fear, while 64% do not feel fear of American values. In Serbia, we face a real drama of this question, because the difference between those who want to protect domestic culture, and those who do not feel any danger from Americanization, is very small (only 5%). If we compare the answers concerning national belonging, the situation with Serbs seems more seriously – even 63% of Serbs think that their culture is endangered from Americanization.

Referring to different nationalities in *Serbia* (tables 1 and 2), Bulgarians and Romanies show the least fear (23,2 per 28,4%), they are followed by Albanians and finally Serbs. One could presume that Albanian and Serbian attitudes are primarily induced by current political situation. Serbs still remember sanctions imposed by United Nations, NATO air strikes, as well as they can see very poor results of NATO led government in South Serbian province – Kosovo. The same happenings within Albanian nation were welcomed, and were seen as a protection of Albanian population and culture. They have produced a kind of fictive Albanian "opening" toward Europe, although both Serbian and Albanian nations still suffer from traditionalistic values and the feeling of strong national belonging. To prove that in case of Albanians, it is enough to repeat some characteristic Albanian answers from the beginning of this article. Hence, for the majority of Albanians, the Balkan nations are not similar: they are also three more times greater in number than Serbs in part of Balkan population that uncritically proclaim that Balkan represents "the very first and original Europe". Total percentage of those Albanians from Southeast Serbia who think that the Balkans is already in Europe or represent "real Europe" is 64,8, in

comparison with Serbs with whom the number is 56,9 %. According to these data, one could expect that Albanians should be a little bit reserved toward European values, although they are not (of course, only in our survey).

In case of American values, Albanian fear is smaller. Just 18,4% of them consider their culture as endangered by Americanization, while 81% claim the opposite. These answers toward individualistic oriented American culture cannot be explained without intermediary (situational) factors, in which American foreign policy in the Balkans at the very end of the twentieth century was dominant. American sympathy toward Albanians political demands also produces that Albanians feel twice as much fear from European culture (38,4%), than toward American culture (16,4%).

Indirectly, the previous thesis is proved by the unequal reception of American values from other Balkan nationalities. Besides Romanies who at some high level (66,7%) adhere to American values (but still significantly less then Albanians), the majority of two other nationalities in Serbia (Bulgarians and Serbs) think that their cultures are actually endangered by Americanization. 55,9% members of Bulgarian national minority in Serbia assume that American values jeopardize their culture, as well as 63,9% of Serbs.

One could assume that different acceptance of European and American culture is based on some qualitative characteristics. Bulgarians in Serbia (toward whom American foreign policy was indifferent in the previous years) do not think that they are endangered by European, but by American values. Within Serbs, 63,9 % of people think that their culture is endangered by Americanization, in contrast to 47% which feel fear from European culture.

Table 1. Serbia / Nationalities: Do you consider your culture and tradition
as endangered by values from European countries?

Nationality	Yes	No
Serbian	47,3%	52,7%
Romany	28,4%	71,6%
Bulgarian	23,2%	76,8%
Albanian	38,4%	61,6%

Table 2. Serbia / Nationalities: Do you consider your culture and tradition
as endangered by Americanization?

Nationality	Yes	No
Serbian	63,9%	36,1%
Romany	55,9%	44,1%
Bulgarian	33,3%	66,7%
Albanian	18,4%	81,6%

In *Bulgaria*, the jeopardizing level from Americanization within all national groups goes between 34,1% and 39,8%, except the Turks who are within that level less than one third (24,8%). In *Macedonia*, as it is already stated, the fear from Americanization prevails (57%), while attitudes toward the influence of European values is almost identical to Serbian attitudes (the majority of 59,2% of people do not feel endangered by European

values, while 40,8% are afraid of it). In this country 76,6% of Romanies, 62% of Serbs, and 66,7% of Macedonians are afraid of Americanization, therefore, everyone except Albanians who (because of here already mentioned "situational" or recent political reasons) express in 77,3% that their culture is not endangered by Americanization.

Therefore, one impression is clear: the Balkan peoples are significantly more reserved toward American values, then European ones. In Serbia, for example, 63,9% of people are afraid of American values, while 52, 7% do not feel scared of European values.

4. COULD ONE BELIEVE IN EUROPE?

One of our questions tried to detect attitudes of Balkan citizens toward possible European prejudices. We offered two possible answers: 1. First, If the Balkans get economic development, keep peace, and strengthen democracy, the Balkan countries would be accepted without prejudices as part of Europe. 2. Second, No matter what has been changed in the Balkans, the rest of Europe would ever have a negative prejudice about Balkan peoples. Yet, we also put the possibility for everybody to say that he has no attitude to that question.

It is truism to say that that is much easier to join somebody if "somebody" likes you, or at least, does not have negative prejudice about you. The answers from all three countries, nevertheless, show that the Balkan nations are suspicious in giving optimistic announciations concerning the possible easy acceptance from developed European nations as a peer. Almost forty three percent (42,8%) of people, indeed, believe that Europe will accept Balkan peoples without prejudice, if they get the economic development, keep peace, and strengthen democracy. Unfortunately, the significant part of people shows resignation. More than thirty six percents (36,6 %) of people believe that no matter what changed in the Balkans, the rest of Europe will have a negative prejudice about Balkan peoples. If we add those who did not have any attitude toward this matter, the percentage of "euro-skeptics" arises to 57,2 which could represent very bad psychologically-dispositional occasion in approaching the European Union. As it was expected, the most pessimistic one were Serbian inhabitants: more than forty six (46,3) % of them consider Europe as full of prejudice. The same opinion share 37,4% of people from Macedonia, and 26,1% of people from Bulgaria. At the same time, only 38,3%, of people in Bulgaria entirely believe in European impartiality, while one third of population do not have any attitude to the mentioned question. The biggest credence toward the rest of Europe, was actually expressed by the examined people in Macedonia, who believe (in 54,4%) that Europe will accept the Balkans if it has been democratized and developed. Generally speaking, the full truth about what Balkan people think that Europeans think about them, is not possible to reach, since the Balkan people consist of various nations, which do not share the same opinion toward this question.

In certain cases, even within one nation deep differences appear. Those differences could not also be explained without considering diverse treatment of their (political) demands by the side of the western great powers (Fig. 10). Inasmuch as in previous turbulent period the European Union had sympathy toward some nation, that nation (or maybe, part of the one nation) generally does not see the presence of negative stereotypes in Europe, and vice versa: if European reaction toward some nation's demands lacked, its

members think that no matter what changes, Europe will ever have prejudice toward Balkan inhabitants. For example, the Albanians from South Serbia, who did not receive any NATO support for their demands to separate from Serbia, led on the list of "euro-skeptics", since 66,9% of them pronounced that the rest of Europe will have prejudice toward Balkan forever. In sharp contrast to that, within Albanians in Macedonia (who host NATO peace keeping troops in order to diminish tensions between Macedonians and Albanians) that pessimistic opinion is shared only by 26,5% of Albanian population.

The most optimistic one in *Serbia* are members of Bulgarian community: 51,6 % of them think that the Balkan countries will be accepted without prejudice as part of Europe. Surprisingly, the nation that follows is not Romanies, but Serbs, within 42,8% of population believe in European impartiality. That witnesses about certain reactive soberness of Serbian social consciousness, which was very traditionally oriented at the beginning of 1990. One must also know that Serbian isolationism was not spread broadly even in the time of the worst ethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. At that time, it was accepted by one third of Serbian population, while sporadic peaceful deeds and initiatives (like Dayton agreement) quickly reduced the spreading of Serbian nationalism.[5] In terms of that, one could suppose that Serbian distrust of European objectivity is also much more the result of the last political events, but id the feature of some unchangeable "Serbian mentality".

If the Balkans gets economic development, keep peace, and strengthen democracy, the Balkan countries would be accepted without prejudice as part of Europe

No matter what has been changed in the Balkans, the rest of Europe would ever have a negative prejudice about Balkan peoples

I have no attitude

Fig. 10. Serbia / Nationalities: Does the rest of Europe have prejudices toward Balkan peoples?

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[5] See: Golubović Zagorka: Uvodna razmatranja, u: *Društveni karaker i društvene promene u svetlu nacionalnih sukoba*, Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju "Filip Višnjić", Beograd, 1995, (Golubović Zagorka: Introductory Discussion, in: *Social Character and Social Changes in the light of National Conflicts*), also, Vasović Mirjana: Vrednosne pretpostavke demokratske transformacije, u: *Lavirinti krize*, Institut za Evropske studije, Beograd, 1998 (Vasović Mirjana: Valuable Prerequisites of Democratic Transformation, in: *Labyrinths of the Crisis*).

In *Bulgaria*, the most hopeful are the Turks and Bulgarians (45,9% : 42,4%), whose brightness goes far before the Vlachs and Roma optimism – expressed in minor 28,9%, apropos 16,9%. More than 50% of the last two do not even have any attitude to the question about European objectivity. There is a big suspicion especially with Romany population. Only 16,9% of them, believe that Europe will take the Balkans without prejudice, as well as 28,9% of them think that Europe will ever have bias about the Balkan peoples.

The situation in *Macedonia* shows the inverse picture, regarding particular nationalities. Because of the mentioned political reasons, Albanians in Macedonia believe in European impartiality in 64,4%. One has to keep in mind that members of that nation in South Serbia expressed their believing in European objectivity only in 21,8%. Nevertheless, in this country Albanians do not lead on the list of "euro-optimists". The first one is Romany population, who see Europe free of bias toward Balkan people in 73%. This data directly oppose the expressed attitudes of that national group detected both in Bulgaria and in Serbia. It is difficult to say what created that optimism within Romany in Macedonia; perhaps, some rooted changes in their way of life or something else - with what author of this article is not familiar. However, two other national communities in Macedonia do not believe that the Balkans will be accepted as a peer to Europe, especially Serbs who expressed their distrust in Europe in 55,8%.

5. CULTURAL POLICY DIRECTION

Since it is much easier to integrate in the world community trough preliminary integrations in a smaller area, certain Balkan integration becomes preferable. To obtain that, the Balkan nations should contribute in building a kind of common regional Balkan cultural policy. In that way, a big cultural capital will be activated and put into function of necessary social reforms. Considering the possible integration of regional and global level (Fig. 11), it is encouraging that 35% of Balkan people want cultural policy oriented toward cosmopolitan culture first. Nevertheless, the next frequent expectations are not that optimistic. Twenty eight percent of people favor national oriented cultural policy, while the Balkan culture policy expects only 9% of them. Finally, the local culture is preferable only for 5% of people. Needless to say, one responsible cultural policy should promote values of national culture, as well as be open for participation in international cultural exchange.


Fig. 11. Balkan / Cultural policy should be oriented first toward …

Particular data show up that those who prefer cultural policy oriented toward cosmo-
politan culture prevail in Macedonia, (49,8%). Surprisingly, the next country is Serbia
(31,7%), not Bulgaria (26,7%) which openly expressed wish to join the European Union
as well as it is already a member of NATO alliance. Nationally oriented cultural policy is
in the second place. This type is supported by 32,1% of people in Serbia, and 25,9% both
in Bulgaria and in Macedonia. Balkan cultural inheritance prefers only 9% of people in
all three countries.

According to multinational composition of Balkan countries, it is significant to see
what kinds of cultural policy favor various national groups (Table 3). It appears that the
cosmopolitan model of cultural policy is mostly preferred by the members of Albanian
nation (46,5% - also because of the mentioned political reasons), and then follow the
members of all other national communities. The *national* model of cultural policy is
mostly preferred by the members of Macedonian nation (35,9%), and so on. As it already
stated, the cultural policy oriented toward the Balkan heritage is not so popular. This type
of policy is the most desirable with Turks, but only with 13,3% of them. The local model
shares the same destiny, since only 13,3% of Vlachs favor it, while the other nations ad-
here with its values in less than 10% of cases.

Table 3. Balkan / Nationalities versus Cultural Policy choice

	Toward cosmopolitan cultural inheritance	*Toward Balkan cultural inheritance*	*Toward national culture*	*Toward local culture*	*I have no attitude*	*Two and more answers*
Turks	*20,4%*	*13,3%*	*15,0%*	*9,7%*	*33,6%*	*8,0%*
Vlach	*24,4%*	*4,4%*	*8,9%*	*13,3%*	*48,9%*	
Bulgarian	*35,9%*	*11,5%*	*24,6%*	*4,7%*	*20,8%*	*2,5%*
Romany	*38,0%*	*6,2%*	*12,5%*	*6,3%*	*37,0%*	
Serbian	*39,5%*	*12,5%*	*31,0%*	*4,5%*	*12,5%*	
Macedonian	*39,5%*	*9,9%*	*35,9%*	*4,0%*	*10,8%*	
Albanian	*46,5%*	*6,6%*	*31,0%*	*5,4%*	*10,5%*	

As it was expected, the *educational level* influenced cultural policy choice. The most
educated one prefer cosmopolitan type (43,5% of them). The nationally oriented model is
favored mostly by those with completed high school (36,5%). The policy oriented toward
Balkan heritage is favored relatively by low number of people, led by 11,2% of those who
finished elementary school. In addition, a lot of people did not have any attitude toward
this question, in particular those without education (39%) and incomplete elementary
school (36,8%).

The similar influence shows up in the case of age (Fig. 12) Forty percentage of young-
sters elected policy toward cosmopolitan culture, which is the biggest portion of people
who had chosen this kind of policy in general. Nevertheless, the adherence to cosmopoli-
tan values within this category of population is not much bigger in comparison with other
age categories – that is visible in the next picture.

Fig. 12. Balkan: Age and Cultural Policy choice

6. KNOWLEDGE FOR MUTUAL RESPECT

The previous elections of cultural policy models could be at least partly explained by putting them in the relationship with acquaintances with the Balkan Cultural History. Namely, within the overall number of interviewed people, only 13,3% of them think that they are completely acquainted with Balkan Cultural History; 53% claim that they are partly acquainted, while 33,7% admit that they are not familiar with the Balkan past.

Within those who consider themselves as acquainted with history, the biggest number comes from Macedonia (18,2%), then from Serbia (14,6%), while in Bulgaria only 7,2% expressed their familiarity with Balkan history. Generally speaking, the amount of those who admit that they are *not* acquainted with the Balkan past is too high – at the level of all three countries it is represented by 33,7%, or one third of all people.

If the last is true, what has to be done is a kind of agreement between the Balkan states, about the approximate equal presence of the Balkan Cultural History in school's curriculums. Needless to say, that the knowledge which affirms the common cultural basis of multiethnic, multi-confessional and multicultural societies in the Balkans should be specially emphasized for purpose of making mutual intense cooperation of various Balkan nations possible. At that point, what encourages are the data that the two thirds of people announce that they are partly or completely familiar with the Balkan Cultural History and, therefore, have the need to meet cosmopolitan culture.

It is interesting that the acquaintances with Balkan Cultural History are the most extended within the youngest ones who oppose the broadly spread opinion that that category of population likes to live "here and now" without any knowledge about history (Fig. 13). Of course, one can pose question how reliable their knowledge is, but the same question could be addressed to elders too. Moreover, according to other answers in our survey, one can suppose that knowledge of older people is both insufficient and full of prejudices. At that point it is maybe even better not to have any positive "knowledge" but the distorted picture about someone. By itself, the last sentence at first belongs to the field of intellectual disputes, but not only there. In the real world, defective knowledge and preconceptions about entire cultures and nations have too often produced dramatic physical reck-

oning between Balkan inhabitants. Therefore, prejudices about neighboring ethnic communities, states, and their prevalent values for today's Balkan peoples represent that king of intellectual and other "surplus" that they cannot afford themselves anymore.


Fig. 13. Balkan / Age and Acquaintances with Balkan Cultural History

INSTEAD OF CONCLUSION: THE VALUE SYSTEM OF BALKAN PEOPLE AT THE CROSSING

The analyzed results (unfortunately, only partially visible in histograms and tables included in this article) show us that within the complete Balkan population at this moment there are at least two basic groups of value systems relevant to the ongoing social and cultural changes and integrations. The first one is nationally and traditionally oriented, the second one is more reformatory and cosmopolitan leaning. Of course, those two groups of values could be isolated and confronted only in mind, and for strictly methodical purposes. That is because between those two Weberian "ideal types" there is also a significant interval-space fulfilled by various elements of both types. Those elements are subject to change concerning the improvement or the deterioration of political or economic situation into the specific Balkan country, or in its position within international community.

The *national-traditional* value system characterize those groups which still did not liberate themselves enough from clamps of traditional values, which are followed by their relatively low social rank. However, the mentioned rank does not relate only to their bad material status but also to their general traditional direction and specific aversion toward broad environment of their own (national) state. This group consists of very heterogeneous population, both in social and valuable sense. Beside traditionally represented population from rural and semi urban areas, there are also segments made of disappointed believers in various (great) national projects, as well as re-traditionalized urban people whose actual culture and behavior represent reactions to ideological suppression of national identity in previous socialist period. Occasionally, in this kind of value, there appear certain inclinations toward European integration, but its meaning is rather to escape economic backwardness, then in the resolute breach with Balkan cultural exclusiveness.

The second type of value system, named *cosmopolitan* or *reformatory* expresses the tendency of members of different social categories (primarily, from which come the future

social elite) toward broader, European, or even world integration. This type signifies departure from traditionalism and nationalism, or from believing that the national state represents values that have to restrain all other values. Usually, it is most common between more educated and younger generations – prepared for including into the civilization trends of the present day immediately. The carriers of the reformatory value find relevance of broader modes of integrations both in the possibility of economic development and in abandoning of those kinds of cultural particulars that do not allow the Balkans to integrate in the European flows. They are also characterized by a clear resolve toward radical social and cultural reforms, as well as of modernization and general democratization of Balkan states.

Certainly, both valuable orientations are under the strong influence of changes into the political and economic ambient in related countries, as well as of their status within international environment. In addition, the instant psychological reasons of orientations toward different values are not either consistent or rational. Both kinds of cultural identities are rather the product of long-lasting frustrations and urgent need to recuperate damaged cultural identity of the Balkan peoples, than the result of the rational choice between offered political and other alternatives. Nevertheless, however motivated and unstable, the processes of identifications directed toward Europe and the whole world, versus the extremes of traditionalist and nationalistic identification, lead to the improvement of the integrative potential of the Balkan population in general.

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NEKE KARAKTERISTIKE VREDNOSNIH SISTEMA U TRI BALKANSKE DRŽAVE

Branislav Stevanović

Analizovani rezultati pokazuju da na Balkanu danas postoje dve bazične grupe vrednosnih sistema ili orijentacija koje si relevantne za tekuće društvene i kulturne promene. Prva je više nacionalno i tradicionalno orijentisana, dok je druga reformistički i kosmopolistički usmerena. Dakako, ove dve orijentacije se mogu izolovati i suprotstaviti samo u pojmovnom smislu, i to zarad striktno metodoloških ciljeva. Jer, između ovih veberovskih "idealnih tipova" postoji takođe značajan međuprostor popunjen različitim elementima i jednog i drugog tipa. Ovi elementi su podložni promenama shodno poboljšanju ili pogoršanju političke ili ekonomske situacije u svakoj posebnoj balkanskoj zemlji, ili u njenom položaju unutar međunarodne zajednice. Takođe, neposredni psihološki razlozi ovih orijentacija prema različitim vrednostima, nisu ni konzistentni ni racionalni. Obe vrste vrednosti su više rezultat dugotrajnih frustracija i urgentne potrebe za obnavljanjem narušenog kulturnog identiteta, nego što su rezultat racionalnog izbora između ponuđenih političkih i drugih alternativa.

Ključne reči: *Vrednosne orijentacije, balkanske države, nacije i etničke grupe, predrasude, kulturna politika, ugroženost kulture, evropeizacija, amerikanizacija, tradicionalno i reformistički orijentisane grupe*