

## IDEOLOGY IN BETWEEN RADICAL AND DIABOLICAL EVIL: KANT'S 'ETHICS OF THE REAL'

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Iavor Rangelov

London School of Economics and Political Science, UK

E-mail: iavorrangelov@hotmail.com

**Abstract.** *Kant's distinction between **radical evil** (i.e. 'pathologically' motivated via recourse to certain contingent interest) and **diabolical evil** (i.e. disinterested, lacking any self-oriented, contingent motivation) presents itself to a Lacanian-style analysis that illuminates the mechanism by means of which ideology functions at its most deleterious yet fundamental level. In **de-subjectivizing the Law**, thus relieving the subject from the indeterminacy inserted by Kant in the moral **Law** – the indeterminacy which ultimately forces the subject to assume full responsibility for his own deeds, ideology is capable of effectively rendering **diabolical evil** conceivable. Indeed, in instances such as the Holocaust or more current genocides and fights against "terror", **diabolical evil** becomes phenomenizable once the subject loses his recourse to the dimension of "teleological" or final judgment and replaces it with certain pseudo-final judgment defined by the imperatives of a contingent duty within a particular ideology. Herein lies the kernel of Kant's 'ethics of the **Real**' as a fundamental rejection and condemnation of ideology: the encounter with the moral **Law** is always conditioned on its failure, on 'not going all the way', since at the 'end' awaits the diabolical evil of jouissance, the terrifying dimension of the **Real**, of self-disintegration and collapse of reality and morality alike. This paper attempts to conceive of a possible phenomenization of **diabolical evil** as manifested in the conflict in Chechnya, therefore becoming extremely topical in its reference to "war against terrorism" and its potential for becoming an ideological mask for the mechanism that brings about the eruption of the Lacanian terrifying dimension of the **Real** in the midst of contemporary social reality.*

**Key words:** *Ideology, Radical evil, Diabolical evil, De-subjectivizing the (moral) Law, Jouissance, Ethics of the Real, War against terrorism*

The alarming concentration of negativity globally – from devastating wars to ecological catastrophes and exploitation as a result of globalization – has rehabilitated the notion of *radical evil* and transposed it from Kant's *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* to the pages of contemporary social theory. The fundamental contribution of Kant's discussion of *evil* to our understanding of ideology becomes conceivable against the realization that Kant unconditionally affirms the radically indeterminate nature of both the notion of duty and the moral *Law* itself: they emerge as devoid of *any* positive content and thus force the subject to assume full responsibility for his own deeds. The subject, then, ceases to be 'morally good' both in the act of freely choosing to adhere to any pathological external concerns (out of self-interest) and at the moment he falls into the trap of blindly obeying any particular duty, i.e. any particular 'false' (or pseudo-) incarnation of the *Law* as opposite to the *Law* itself. The latter is precisely what happens in the elementary ideological claim for universality (of the national unity, racial purity, religious orthodoxy, etc.) always-already enforced by imposing on the subject the imperative duty of becoming an 'instrument of purpose'. In order for the subject to internalize an ideologically defined duty as the prescription of the *moral Law* itself, i.e. to become the 'instrument' of a genocide and still to be capable of conceiving a *moral* justification for his deeds, the perspective of the final (teleological) judgment must be eradicated. What is striking in the perception of (Nazi, Stalinist) ideology from the perspective of Kant's morality is the possibility that for the 'true' believers (the faithful and rigorous Fascist, Stalinist, etc.) the *radically evil* act of fulfilling a duty conceived as 'the absolute duty', is identical to adherence to the *moral Law* itself, disinterested in any potential personal sacrifices or benefits. At the same time, the lack of any self-oriented, contingent pathological motivation in their behavior, outside their duty, renders these individuals *diabolically evil* as to the *a posteriori* evident outcome of their deeds. *Diabolical evil* thus emerges as Kant's notion correlative to Freud's *death drive* and its phenomenalization is possible due to ideology's most deleterious capacity to de-subjectivize the *Law*: rendering it impersonal precludes the subject from assuming responsibility and from a recourse to the dimension of 'teleological judgment', which is replaced by a pseudo-final judgment defined by the imperatives of a contingent duty within a particular ideology. Herein lies the kernel of Kant's 'ethics of the Real' as a fundamental rejection and condemnation of ideology: the encounter with the *moral Law* is always conditioned on its failure, on 'not going all the way', since at the 'end' awaits the *diabolical evil* of *jouissance*, the terrifying dimension of the Real, of self-disintegration and collapse of reality and morality alike.

The distinction between radical and diabolical evil becomes conceivable against the backdrop of an important clarification (if not alteration) of the traditional conception of Kant's morality. The criticism of the 'purely formal nature' of Kant's categorical imperative claims that the moral subject, in his attempt to proceed from the obligation to do his duty to actually fulfilling a particular duty, is forced to extract the content of his duty from the contingent, pathological content of his immediate existence. Žižek explains how this particular feature of the categorical imperative effectively renders it 'non-contingent', indeterminate:

It is this very apparent weakness of the categorical imperative, however, that accounts for its compelling impact: the injunction of the categorical imperative is unconditional in that it is empty-tautological. This void signals that the

moral subject is fully responsible for the translation of the categorical imperative into a concrete moral obligation. In this precise sense, one is tempted to risk a parallel with Kant's *Critique of Judgment*: the concrete formulation of a determinate ethical obligation has the structure of an aesthetic judgment, that is, of a judgment by means of which, instead of simply applying a universal category to a particular object or subsuming this object under an already-given universal determination, I as it were *invent* its universal-necessary-obligatory dimension, and thereby elevate this particular-contingent object (act) to the dignity of the ethical Thing.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, Kant not only precludes the moral subject from justifying his failure to accomplish his duty via reference to contingent externalities, but proceeds further to prohibit his invoking of external circumstances as a pretext for accomplishing one's duty. The subject remains fully responsible for his deeds in the act of accomplishing his duty, and here the notion of *evil* is extended to accommodate the case of doing a contingent, ideologically defined duty as the flip side of not doing one's duty at all. If self-interested refusal to accomplish your duty is *radically evil* precisely because the subject makes a choice based on pathological, contingent motivation, unconditional obedience to a particular externally defined (i.e. from outside the subject, by the Party, State, etc.) duty is *evil* as well: *radical evil* if the subject invests any expectations for benefiting directly or indirectly, yet diabolical evil when he surrenders any personal judgment and responsibility for his own deeds to the extent of self-effacing, of morally collapsing in the abyss of 'doing it for its own sake'.

But how is ideology capable of erasing all traces of humanity from the subject, transforming him into a 'monstrous' creature of darkness? It is precisely against the backdrop of Kantian morality that *diabolical evil*, 'doing it for its own sake' even when the consequences are so devastatingly *evil*, becomes both conceivable and (from a certain perspective) phenomenalizable. The ideological gesture *par excellence* is the claim for universality of the particular, ideologically defined content that it instills in the *moral Law*: a certain 'Master signifier' or *point de capiton* intervenes to replace the indeterminacy of the ethical Universal with its own imperative duty. This ideological claim for universality is what forever separates the subject from the necessity to assume personal responsibility: my loyalty (to the Party, Nation, etc.) 'buys' me the privileged position of being 'exempt' from responsibility (or at least Our responsibility forever separates me from dealing with it personally). In this way the very kernel of Kant's morality is subverted, reversed beyond repair: instead of affirming his 'human' character *qua* accomplishing one's duty, the ideologically interpellated subject surrenders his most valuable – that dimension in which he exceeds himself, outside of his particular deeds (which supposedly *he* is the one to freely determine, to choose) – in choosing to blindly pursue a 'false', externally imposed ideological duty. Once the subject is subjected to the ideological claim for universality, i.e. the very moment he internalizes a contingent duty in exchange for 'liberation' from responsibility, he loses the possibility for transcending par-

<sup>1</sup> Slavoj Žižek, *The Indivisible Remainder: An Essay on Schelling and Related Matters*, London & New York: Verso, 1996, p.169.

ticularity (of the specific ideological *Law* or duty) and coming to terms with the ethical Universal (where the only unconditional duty is the *Law* itself precisely in its subjectivized phenomenization).

One should not mistakenly assume that *evil* is 'particularity' as such: (*radical* and *diabolical*) *evil* results precisely in the 'perverted' unity of particularity with the Universal, which renders ideology so virile and insidious for both Kant's moral subject and Kantian morality in general:

When a political agent (Party, etc.) claims to represent the universal interest of the State or Nation – in contrast to its opponents who, of course, are accused of pursuing only their narrow power-seeking goals – it thereby structures the discursive space so that every attack on it – on this particular political subject – is *eo ipso* an attack on the Nation itself. 'Evil' in its most elementary form is such a 'short circuit' between the Particular and the Universal, such a presumption to believe that my words and deeds are directly of the big Other (Nation, Culture, State, God), a presumption which 'inverts' the proper relationship between the Particular and the Universal: when I proclaim myself the immediate 'functionary of Humanity' (or Nation or Culture), I thereby effectively accomplish the exact opposite of what I claim to be doing – that is, I degrade the Universal dimension to which I refer (Humanity, Nation, State) to my own particularity, since it is my own particular point of view which decides on the content of Humanity.<sup>2</sup>

And the more I claim Universality for the purpose of legitimizing my own, particular actions, the more I reinforce it as mere means to my own self-assertion. The Stalinist Communist Party, for example, claimed exactly such Universality: the mission to liberate the whole of humanity from the chains of capitalism. In accusing each and every one of its critics in being 'morally corrupted' (i.e. not referring to the ethical universal but to the contingent interest of Western capital) it practically attempted to elevate its purely ideological claims and presumptions to the status of universal principles that *must* guide all humanity.

If the communist leadership was taking advantage of this ideological subversion of the *moral Law* (countless privileges, career opportunities, control, etc.), the average citizen of Stalinist USSR suffered much more than he benefited from it. The question arises: how were the ordinary people capable of actively participating in the enforcement of policies that killed millions of people? The *radical evil* of the Communist Party leadership is conceivable because one can easily discern the pathological motivation behind it; however, the 'true' believers in the bright future communism was about to build were involved in *evil* acts that resist any rational, common sense explanation. Kant refused to accept the possibility for existence of such 'disinterested' evil and ultimately rejected *diabolical evil* as impossible, irreconcilable with the human nature. But in the fact of the concentration camps one is terrified by the encounter with people that conceive their externally (from the Party, Nation,

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<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 65.

State) prescribed duty precisely as the "absolute duty", the one duty imposed by the *moral Law* itself. No material interest can either explain or justify some particularly horrifying massive acts of terror and extermination in the 20<sup>th</sup> century: there is something beyond the contingent interest of the Nazi or Stalinist executors, a boundary that has been transcended and beyond which *radical* is not a strong enough description for *evil*.

In this case, the most destructive potential of ideology is actualized at the expense of the subject completely losing recourse to common sense, compassion and humanity in general. The subject, once 'liberated' from the personal responsibility of translating the abstract injunction of the *moral Law* into a series of concrete obligations and actions, abandons all rational and ethical constraints that might preclude him from 'going all the way' and *chooses* to serve unconditionally to the 'moral' obligation imposed by the big Other. Furthermore, he no longer admits that there might exist some other perspectives or imperatives beyond (if not above) the ones he has internalized completely. The only excuse and justification for the subject's duty is the tautological reference to duty itself; this is when all (internal, ethical, rational, etc.) boundaries facilitate my *evil* acts as opposite to precluding me from completing them: I have to kill for the good of the Nation, and the taboo/interdiction on murder is conceived as merely a hypocritical, pseudo-moral gesture that aims at reinforcing my enemies, who don't conceive of it as their duty; in this sense, the 'good of the Nation' supercedes all superfluous, contingent content of (any other, apart from 'the good of the Nation') *moral Law*.

This is the moment when the ideologically interpellated subject surrenders to the illusion of the historical necessity of his deeds, losing the dimension of the final judgment in which he exceeds any particular act of his and, in this sense, exceeds himself. This is what renders the abandonment of responsibility (and common sense, and rationality) possible: the subject is no longer subject to any other (moral) *Law* outside the one defined tautologically by the very ideology it justifies and serves. Joan Copjec defines this as the advent of, as she calls it, *modern evil*, although its definition approaches the one of diabolical evil and is applicable within a rather large historical frame: from Ancient Rome and the Holy Inquisition to the genocide in Kosovo and Chechnya:

It is only by including within itself this limit or final point [the final judgment] that the subject avoids reducing itself to its inextricable inadequacies, its own ineradicable evil... But radical evil contributes to the historical phenomenon, modern evil, only on one condition: the elimination of the perspective of the final judgment. When this limit is no longer included within the subject as part of its definition and is instead infinitely deferred, placed outside it, modern evil results. That is, when the subject is no longer conceived as that which exceeds itself, as that which is the same despite all its divisions, and is reduced to mere becoming or deferred being, then it becomes subject, for all the reasons I have given, to a harsher judgment and a cruel, insatiable judge... The greatest post-Enlightenment danger has turned out to be not our capacity

to make reason instrument of our will, but reason's capacity to make instruments of us.<sup>3</sup>

This is how ideology is capable of rendering the individual *diabolically evil*, evil to the extent that no rational or ethical categories apply any longer. And this is as close to the phenomenization of *diabolical evil*, condemned by Kant as being impossible, inconceivable and irreconcilable with human nature, as humanity has come in its history so far.

But how are we to account for this condemnation (in the refusal to allow for the very possibility of its existence) of *diabolical evil* on the part of Kant, clearly articulated in *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*? Kant had to negate the possibility of adopting an *evil maxim* as the determining ground of human action, the content of our duty prescribed by the *moral Law*, precisely because he left the *moral Law* indeterminate, empty, devoid of any positive content. What appears to be a contradiction is actually the ultimate essence of Kant's morality: precisely because *diabolical evil* as a pure form is the impossible content of the *moral Law*, he had to preclude it from actualization in forever separating the *Law* from any particular content. The subject, precisely in his failure to act ethically remains an ethical subject, since the fact that *diabolical evil* is indistinguishable from the call of the *moral Law* conditions the preservation of his ethical dimension on preserving a proper distance: as Žižek states it, approached too closely, the ethical act turns into its opposite, into *diabolical evil*.

To the extent that ideology renders possible the only conceivable phenomenization of the *moral Law* precisely in the inconceivable/impossible act of *diabolical evil*, it is responsible for provoking the most violent and bloody episodes of the eruption of the Real, of *jouissance*, in the history of mankind:

What we have here is the properly *perverse* attitude of adopting the position of the pure instrument of the big Other's Will: it's not my responsibility, it's not me who's effectively doing it, I am merely an instrument of the higher Historical Necessity... The obscene *jouissance* of this situation is generated by the fact that I conceive of myself as exculpated from what I am doing: isn't it nice to inflict pain on others in the full awareness that I'm not responsible for it, that I am merely fulfilling the Other's Will... *this* is what Kantian ethics prohibits. This position of the sadist pervert provides the answer to the question: How can the subject be guilty when he merely realizes an 'objective', externally imposed necessity? By subjectively assuming this 'objective necessity' – by finding *enjoyment* in what is imposed on him.<sup>4</sup>

Kant's notion of the *diabolical evil* thus points in the direction of what Freud designates as the *death drive*. And Žižek, in his attempt to exhaust the subject, contradicts himself in his statement later on in *The Unconscious Law* that the Nazi Holocaust is not

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<sup>3</sup> Joan Copjec, 'Introduction: Evil in the Time of the Finite World', in *Radical Evil*, London & New York: Verso, 1996, p. xxvi.

<sup>4</sup> Slavoj Žižek, 'The Unconscious Law: Towards an Ethics Beyond the Good', in *The Plague of Fantasies*, London and New York: Verso, 1997.

*diabolical evil* precisely because the Nazi soldier was killing without the 'benefit' of *enjoyment*. What Žižek obliterates in the end of *The Unconscious Law* is that *jouissance* always comes afterwards, in completing the act, and therefore it is not definable as a possible pathological interest that might have justified labeling the Holocaust (or the Stalinist gulag, or Srebrenica) *radical* and not *diabolical evil*. Furthermore, once the dimension of the final or teleological judgment is erased, the subject is precluded precisely from *not falling* into the clutches of *jouissance*. If Žižek himself claims that Kant reasserts the ethics of proper distance, of consideration and self-limitation, of avoiding the temptation to 'go right to the end', (the possibility) for *diabolical evil* is given the very moment ideology requires from the subject to 'go right to the end', completely and irreversibly disregarding the human dimension of his deeds.

The source of tension here becomes conceivable once Žižek's rhetoric is submitted to a 'spectral' analysis that distinguishes between the different, alternative perspectives – the one of the Nazi leadership and the one of the ordinary soldier. Žižek is right in claiming that, to the extent that Eichmann acted 'for the sake of the German Fatherland', there is a contingent positive content present. However, the very eradication of the dimension of the final judgment that rendered the Nazi soldiers capable of such massive slaughter 'for the sake of the German Fatherland' requires the internalization of the *duty* unconditionally, for its own sake: otherwise, the human dimension of their deeds would have 'checked' their behavior, i.e. the realization of how *radically evil* they were would have ultimately rendered them dysfunctional, precluding the possibility for entering the monstrous realm of the *diabolical*. The fact that they were unable to come to such realization points in the direction of *diabolical evil*, where, as Žižek himself claims, the very distinction and boundary between *good* and *evil* are already blurred. Conceiving of such an extreme form of *evil*, as something good and justifiable, is in itself *diabolical* precisely because it is devoid of any possible pathological interest or justification, except probably for the *a posteriori* erupting *jouissance*.

Thus, Kant's opposition to ideology in the *moral Law qua diabolical evil* sustains the parameters of a certain 'ethics of the Real' (as defined by, or, at times, *in spite of* Žižek). Paradoxically enough, the ethics that has been accused of opening the possibility for the subject to enter the abyss of *jouissance*, to negate the necessary responsibility that accompanies his act and by doing this to negate also the human dimension of this act, is the one that unconditionally prohibits precisely such de-personalization, de-subjectivization of the *Law*: "'Law' is the name for the limitation the subject imposes on himself – say, with regard to another human being, the name for the 'respect' which enjoins me to maintain a distance towards him or her, to abstain from trying to penetrate all of his or her secrets."<sup>5</sup> Kant's 'ethics of the Real' opposes ideology in its most fundamental dimension: in allowing the subject to come too close, to annihilate the distance, to go 'all the way'. The fundamental anti-ideological prohibition of the *moral Law* refers to not going 'all the way' in the sense of 'beyond' the contingent character of my deeds to the 'universal' justification (always external to me) for them *irrespective* of their content, which erases the basic fact that, in the final analysis, my deeds are always particular, contingent and, consequently, I am always fully responsible for them. Kant is unconditional in his conditioning of the

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., p. 238.

ethical act on our (the subject's) adequate subjectivization of the *moral Law* by assuming full responsibility for our deeds without reference to any particular pseudo-Universal (the Nation, the State, God, etc.) and its respective duty. Our failure to do so opens the possibility for erasing the distance that, in distancing us from the Thing, from the terrifying dimension of the Real, of *jouissance*, sustains both morality and reality as we know it. Kant, with a rather complex and controversially interpreted gesture, both opens the possibility for rationally conceiving of the realm of the *death drive* – the elusive concept of *diabolical evil* – and, at the same time, forever condemns to *nonexistence* and *disintegration* the moral subject who dares surrender to this Real of *jouissance*. The resolution of what appears as a contradiction is the inner necessity behind the very 'contradiction': in order to articulate his 'ethics of the Real' in precluding *diabolical evil* from actualization, Kant first has to assume its possibility for existence, to allow for this possibility. Recourse to *diabolical evil* in the Real, to *jouissance* and the *death drive* is necessary, although only to preclude us from ever fully coming to terms with them.

**Chechnya as a possible phenomenalization of *diabolical evil*: Kantian morality in the context of the contemporary politico-ideological struggle in Russia**

One need not go too far in the past, even too far in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, to encounter the mechanism by which ideology functions as a violation of Kant's 'ethics of the Real', in direct opposition to the Kantian moral prohibition. The contemporary conflict in Chechnya exemplifies the logic of de-subjectivizing the *Law* with the direct result of violent *evil* and complete obliteration of the human dimension of one's deeds. After the first war in Chechnya in the early 1990's, the Russian generals wanted revenge for their shameful defeat in the previous war, while the reactionary Russian politicians wanted revenge against the 'vile liberals' and the 'irresponsible loudmouths' who in 1994-96 roused public opinion against the bloody demonstration of Russian state power. The new Chechen war, however, was used as political ammunition above all by Vladimir Putin: unknown at the time, with no chances of winning the Presidency in spite of Yeltsin's explicit appointment of him as an heir to Kremlin. Putin desperately needed to demonstrate that he is the 'strong hand' the Russian people wanted so badly and after the victory in Dagestan proceeded with sending troops to the Chechen Republic:

Putin never even tried to initiate contacts with the legitimate government in Chechnya. He didn't consider it necessary to present President Maskhadov with an ultimatum. He wanted war, and it was clear why he wanted it... The only way Putin could manage a political victory [in the coming presidential elections] over his Moscow competitors was to achieve a military triumph.<sup>6</sup>

Manipulating the public opinion skillfully, Putin received a final 'confirmation' of the *evil* he was fighting in Chechnya when the September nighttime explosions through Moscow and Volgogradsk killed more than 200 people.

After the explosions, the Russian public opinion was finally relieved of any moral burden that might have prevented them from supporting the war in Chechnya: "War and only

<sup>6</sup> Sergei Kovalev, 'Putin's War', *The New York Review*, February 10 2000, p. 6.



war is the solution!" became the slogan of all. Vladimir Putin (and other politicians) emphasized that what *we* (the Russian people) wanted was "the merciless extermination of the "adversary" wherever he may be, whatever the casualties, no matter how many unarmed civilians die in the process, no matter how many Russian soldiers must give up their lives for a military victory – just as long as we destroy the "wasp's nest of terrorists" once and for all."<sup>7</sup> By promising to bury the Chechens "in their own crap" Putin not only rallied political support among the Russians for himself as the long-anticipated "tough guy": by means of this gesture he effectively accomplished the Kantian de-subjectivization of the *Law*, ideologically instilling in it the 'only conceivable' moral duty of every Russian soldier – to exterminate unconditionally, without questioning, i.e. without recourse to the human dimension of what he was doing.

The violent slaughter that resulted not only failed to provoke any opposition in Russia – it continues to be perceived as the specific, historically necessary incarnation of the *moral Law* itself. Putin's ideological rhetoric erased the dimension of the final judgment by effectively identifying the soldiers with their (only) universal duty: to kill. Therefore, in Russia very few people are willing and capable of sustaining the 'proper distance' towards the war: they simply *enjoy* their duty for its own sake under the convenient excuse of war against 'terrorism'. The negativity that radiates from Western media's coverage of the conflict resists rationalization apart from recourse to Kant's *evil* and his 'ethics of the Real'. Žižek might claim that there is significant pathological motivation behind Putin's leadership; but in order for the Russian soldiers to abide by his orders, they must internalize their ideologically defined duty to the extent that they believe in serving the *supreme Good* in the monstrous act of *diabolical evil*. To the extent that there is no (actual or even potential) opposition, their only existing option has become to *enjoy* doing it. For its own sake...

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

## IDEOLOGIJA IZMEĐU RADIKALNOG I DIABOLIČNOG ZLA: KANTOVA ETIKA STVARNOG

Iavor Rangelov

*Kantova razlika između radikalnog zla (tj. 'patološki' motivisanog usmeravanjem ka nekom mogućem interesu) i dijaboličkog zla (tj. nepristrasnog, bez orijentacije na sebe, sa slučajnom motivacijom) podložna je analizi u lakanovskom stilu koja rasvetljava mehanizam uz čiju pomoć ideologija funkcioniše na najpogubnijem, ali ipak fundamentalnom nivou. Ideologija je u stanju da dijaboličko zlo efektivno učini zamislivim putem desubjektivizacije Zakona, na taj način oslobađajući subjekat neodređenosti koju je Kant uneo u moralni Zakon - neodređenosti koja u konačnom nagoni subjekat da prezme potpunu odgovornost za svoja sopstevna dela. Zaista, u slučajevima kao što je Holokaust ili skorašnji primeri genocida i borbe protiv 'terora', dijaboličko zlo postaje fenomenalizujuće čim subjekat izgubi pristup dimenziji 'teleološkog' ili konačnog suda i zameni ga određenim pseudo-konačnim sudom definisanim imperativima mogućih dužnosti u okviru određene ideologije. Ovde počiva jezgro Kantove 'etike Stvarnog' kao fundamentalnog odbacivanja i osude ideologije: suočavanje sa moralnim Zakonom uvek je uslovljeno njegovim neuspehom, time što se 'ne ide do kraja', pošto na 'kraju' čeka dijaboličko zlo u vidu jouissance, ona zastrašujuća dimenzija Stvarnog, samodezintegracije i propasti stvarnosti kao i moralnosti. Ovaj rad predstavlja pokušaj da se osmisli moguća fenomenalizacija dijaboličkog zla onako kako se ono ispoljilo u suklima u Čečeniji usled čega je postalo izuzetno aktuelno zbog pozivanja na 'rat protiv terorizma' i mogućnosti da postane ideološka maska za mehanizam koji doprinosi erupciji lakanovske zastrašujuće dimenzije Stvarnog u sred savremene društvene stvarnosti.*