

**THE SOCIOLOGY OF GLOBAL POLITICS
AND THE REGIONAL FUTURE OF THE BALKANS**

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Abstract. *The current discourse of globalisation overlooks the nascent interdependence of the world it helps create. The awareness of global society posits a challenge to traditional identification. In the Balkans it has introduced internal and internal divisions in order to achieve identity-security and protection. However, this article explores recent scholarship into the sociology of international relations, and suggests a possible model for breaking-up with the present stasis of meaning in the region. The investigation revisits and redefines the concept of order as a pattern of self-sustaining predictability based on its three aspects: solidarity, regulation and security. This exploration propounds neoliberal constructivism as the locution for outlining Southeast European order as security community. The objective of these theoretical considerations is to inform regional policy-taking and decision-making with prospects from co-operation and community-building in the process of accession to Euroatlantic structures (i.e. EU and NATO). The viability of collective Balkan identity in this process can be maintained by political imagination, a form of rhetorical praxis, which stands for the representational force that regulates the security community. The implication is that although today, the Southeastern Europe is a hackneyed term for instability, the sociology of global politics offers an option for peaceful coexistence in the region.*

Key words: *accession, Balkans, neoliberal constructivism, networked polity, international order, political imagination, regionalism, security community.*

It is no longer a surprise that we live in a globalising world. However, it is still not clear whether the 'global society' is aware that, consciously or not, we (both as individuals and members of specific groups) depend on each other. This interdependence, characterised by economic, technological, political and social networks, has introduced into the current sociological debate a new perspective - a new way of how we see ourselves (and our roles) in the global environment. This dimension of globalisation has

put forth the question of how do we save ourselves from ourselves without losing ourselves? In its essence, this is an inquiry into our moral responsibility; into how we and the society we live in defines the range of our experience and action (inaction). Such modern dilemma queries the foundations of our self-confidence and grip on the present, and at its core, evinces a predicament of identification: how do *I* remain who *I* am (in other words, how do *I* retain a distinct voice in the clatter of global society). In the Balkans,¹ the challenge to identity-formation introduced and institutionalised the security of division and the certainty of hatred. In this context, the contemporary global sociology of international politics can inform regional interaction and proffer possible solutions to the posers of Southeastern Europe through co-operation and security-community-building. Prior to this, though, this research first re-examines the concept of order and then explores the regional prospect suggested by neoliberal constructivism.

The theoretical basis for the study of actors' identities and interests in the international arena has been called constructivism.² Constructivism investigates the influence of international interaction on actors' interests and identities, and challenges the rationalist (both realist and neoliberal) 'two-step'³ by introducing insights from a '*sociology of international community*'⁴ into the vocabulary of international relations. According to rationalists, actors' (and they mostly mean states') interests are formed prior to the process of interaction, and this process only affects the behavior of actors, not their identity. Constructivism, on the contrary, proposes that systemic interaction transforms state interests and, in the process, even affects their identity.⁵ The first precept of constructivism declares that actors' actions are constituted by collective meanings.⁶ The implication of this proposition is that actors attain identities according to the collective meanings, in which they take part: 'each identity is an inherently social definition of the actor grounded in the theories which actors collectively hold about themselves and one another'.⁷ The second position of constructivism declares that the process of interaction informs the meanings in which actors' behavior is organized. The underscoring mechanism in this sociology of interstate relations is learning: interaction reinforces some international processes by rewarding actors 'for holding certain ideas about each other', and, at the same time, discourages them

¹ For the purposes of this text, I would use Southeast Europe and the Balkans as denoting the same geographic and political entity. I would not like to dip in the debate about the boundaries of the region. There are plenty of writings on this topic and the majority of different opinions that have cropped up in this debate are all sufficiently well argued, with all the pros and cons taken into account. Just for a reference (or rather a starting point) on this issue see Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). In terms of the present investigation the Balkans would be broadly defined as comprising of the states (and their inheritors) that existed in the region at the end of the Cold War, namely: Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia.

² See Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

³ Jeffrey W. Legro, 'Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-Step', *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 90 (1), 1996, pp. 118-37.

⁴ Andrew Linklater, 'The Problems of Community in International Relations', *Alternatives*, no 15, 1990, pp. 135-53 (p. 136). Emphasis added.

⁵ Alexander Wendt, 'Collective Identity Formation and the International State', *American Political Science Review*, vol. 88 (2), 1994, p. 384.

⁶ In my theoretical framework of constructivism I am following Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', *International Organization*, vol. 46 (2), 1992, pp. 391-425.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 398.

from holding others.⁸ Thus, actors' identities and interests are always in process (not fixed as rationalists would like it) and their stability (which, however, is always relative) is an 'ongoing accomplishment of practices that represent self and other in certain ways'.⁹

In such constructivist context, the basis for investigating the regional future of the Balkans involves the redefinition of the terms underlying its inquiry. For example, the conception of *region* needs to be identified as an area within which there is a more '*intensive co-operation*' between countries and communities than in their interactions with the other parts of the world.¹⁰ Thus, the discussion of the prospective developments in the Balkans is put in the context of *co-operation* and *community-building*; and the opportunities they provide for chartering the future of this area. The first issue is how to define the Balkans as a region in the sense of *intensive co-operation*. The recent developments in Southeastern Europe have indicated just the opposite kind of processes - antagonism, confrontation, and (mainly) Balkanisation. The very mentioning of the region brings to mind a whole hog of connotations antonymous to the term *co-operation*. So, in this sense, is Southeastern Europe a region? According to this definition - no; but when we take into consideration the external perception of the developments that are going on in this part of the world, then we can give a definite - yes - answer. The Balkan region is defined not by its awareness of itself as a coherent entity, but by the external discernment of the area as idiosyncratic. Perhaps, because of this attitude towards Southeastern Europe as a unique entity of its own, the regional actors try to disassociate themselves as much as possible from their neighbours in an attempt to dispel this view of the Balkans as a distinct region. However, these efforts further entrench the belief of the outside world, that Southeastern Europe is an area with its own inimitable characteristics. That is why the point should be made that these states enjoy a relatively modest level of (negative) both regional and wider Euratlantic integration (evident, for instance, in their absence from the EU, with the exception of Greece, and NATO, with the exception of Greece and Turkey, their position behind the states of East-Central Europe in terms of EU accession and the long-term international isolation of Serbia/Montenegro).

In spite of the current plethora of investigations that deal with the pattern of the prospective order in the Balkans, very few of them actually explain what *order* is and how its explanation can benefit their discussions. That is why an overview of some of these projected possibilities might evince alternative pathways to peaceful coexistence in the Balkans. The background of the present investigation is one of the internal competition between the regional Southeast European actors in their endeavour to become full members of Euratlantic structures. In spite of some reputed benefits of such a rivalry for attention from the EU bureaucracy and the NATO headquarters, the context of the present exploration deems it more advantageous for the individual applicants, as well as for the region as a whole, if the Balkan states were to join their efforts for the realisation of their common aspirations (something that might prove a faster and economically less taxing process). Naturally, these joint efforts would not suggest a development alternative to the

⁸ Ibid., p. 405.

⁹ Wendt, 'Collective Identity Formation', p. 386.

¹⁰ Mihály Simai, *The Future of Global Governance: Managing Risk and Change in the International System* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1994), p. v. Emphasis added.

Euratlantic process, but one that would facilitate the region's integration *as a whole* into these structures.

WHAT IS ORDER?

This investigation into order is not undertaken with the aim of providing some definitive answer as to its nature. It is undertaken rather to provide a background (in the sense of common ground) for the discourse on Balkan order. The pragmatic purpose for grappling with the issue of international order is to provide a definition that suggests a potential for reform in the Balkan region.

The starting point of this exploration is an understanding that order involves regulation (in the sense of self-sustaining continuity) of the exchange between the actors in the political realm; the manner in which they utilize their resources; the ends to which they exert their power; and the influence they have on the controlling function of the system itself. In this sense, order is marked by negotiation, coercion and a restriction of the extent to which interactions are worked out in the political domain, while at the same time promoting a 'condition of justice and equality among states or nations'.¹¹

The understanding of order used in this research is a combination between two separate views: order as 'process' and 'substance'.¹² In its essence, this dichotomy underscores the distinction between the actuality and the ideal of order. On the one hand, order emphasizes a non-violent conflict regulation. On the other, it ensures that certain social, economic and political conditions are fulfilled. The reality of order's praxis is not necessarily apposite with the expectation for a pattern of just interaction. However, in an applied sense order can thus be seen to combine both a process of conflict resolution (which is its practical dimension) together with the normative substance of post-conflict reconstruction (which stands for the theoretical value-base behind the practice).

Thus, order is understood to be a framework of predictability. Predictability (in the sense of self-sustaining continuity) is rationalized as a mechanism for maintaining a structure of power; and power stands for the exchange between different forms and sources of authority. In this way, a political order gives meaning to and makes sense of the relations and interactions in the international society. That is why order is about control (in the sense of checks and balances), regulating the participants' resources, their use and distribution. It sets the framework within which they can be meaningfully utilized and the types of interactions that the members can have.

Because (as it has already been stated) the aim of this exploration is not to exhaust the concept of order, but, instead, to suggest a framework for the discussion of Balkan order, this study would like to emphasize three distinct (nevertheless not independent of each other) aspects of order. These three aspects are: solidarity, regulation and security.¹³ In

¹¹ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1977), p. 93.

¹² This aspect of order is discussed by Adrian Hyde-Price, *Germany and European Order: Enlarging NATO and the EU* (Manchester and New York, NY: Manchester University Press, 2000), pp. 63-64.

¹³ These aspects were singled out, not only because of their significance for the concept of order, but also for their importance in outlining a viable order in the Balkans. For more information on the solidarity, regulation

spite of the fact that more often than not these aspects overlap in the exchange between different actors, their specifics are important for the understanding of international order as a particular structure of predictability. It is the distinct interaction between solidarity, regulation and security aspects that can provide a specific relationship-pattern to overcome the current stalemate in the meaning of order in the Balkans. The order that this study wants to proffer for Southeastern Europe is security community.

Order as Solidarity

The self-sustaining continuity of order is not wielded by one omnipotent and ubiquitous regulator, but is the result from a constant autonomous exchange between the actors. Predictability derives from the interaction between actors, whose behavior in the international arena is embedded in intersubjective understandings and expectations. This intersubjectivity is constituted by the collective meanings that actors hold for each other. At the same time, interaction is as much the result of a 'social contract' (in the sense of a recognition of the negative effects the disintegration of this system of exchange can have on the actors' own interests and that of the other participants) as well as a consequence of the '*solidarity*' among the participants, deriving from their 'shared values' and 'shared interests'.¹⁴ This should indicate that my understanding of order differs from a rationalist perspective (which claims that international relations do not affect the interests and identity of actors) and favors a more liberal reflectivist stance. The latter claims that the exchange between actors does not affect merely their behavior, but also asserts that order cannot be maintained 'without sufficient concessions to make it tolerable to those who profit by it least'.¹⁵ The recognition of the other's interests points to an awareness of the existence of international community. This communitarism stems from a belief that actors have to work together for the internationalization of the democratic community so that they can protect themselves from the negative effects of global economic and social forces.

Order is underscored by 'normative and ideological connotations, as it bears particular conceptions about how social, political and economic systems are and ought to be structured'¹⁶. Such ideational grid of order helps the establishment of trust (understood as knowledge of the system's self-regulatory checks and balances, which would prevent any one or a group of participants from abusing it) among the actors. Thus, the existence of such a base that recognizes the normative preponderance of political values over individual interests, succeeds in maintaining the equilibrium (in the sense of right to access and right to participation) in the pattern of order. Nevertheless, the particular interests of the actors are not neglected by the system (otherwise, they would not have an incentive to uphold it, let alone partake in it). Instead, they are moderated and accommodated in conjunction, cooperation or competition with the other participants.

and security aspects of order see: Nicholas J. Rengger, *International Relations, Political Theory and the Problem of Order* (London: Routledge, 2000).

¹⁴ Hellen Wallace, 'Pan-European Integration: A Real or Imagined Community?', *Government and Opposition*, vol. 32 (2), 1997, p. 228. Emphasis added.

¹⁵ Andrew Linklater, 'The Transformation of Political Community: E.H.Carr, Critical Theory and International Relations', *Review of International Studies*, no. 23, 1997, p. 333.

¹⁶ Quoted in Hyde-Price, *Germany and European Order*, p. 55.

In this respect, the solidarity aspect of order is the result of the interface between communitarian and cosmopolitan concepts on this issue. On the one hand, the identity of individual actors stems from their belonging to an international political community. It very much reflects an actor's individual identification as a representative of a particular community in the international arena. In this sense it is a '*corporate* identity [which] refers to the intrinsic, self-organizing qualities that constitute actor individuality'.¹⁷ Thus, the sense of belonging does not contradict the institution of sovereignty, but, rather, confronts the rationale of nationalism.¹⁸ The enlargement of the notion of political community undermines nationalism's 'totalizing project', marked by increased control over society in the aim of creating 'homogeneous national communities', through the overstatement of otherness.¹⁹

On the other hand, (and directly related to the previous assumption) is the increased importance of 'political values... not political structures'.²⁰ The normative framework of actors' relationship places a heightened significance on the knowledge of the benefits from upholding democracy and human rights. This refers to identification through the social roles that actors take in their interactions. Such identification is based on 'sets of meanings that an actor attributes to itself while taking the perspective of others'.²¹ For example, in the Balkans, the prominence of political ideas for the pattern of order has been recently emphasized in the context of humanitarian intervention and international socialization. Humanitarian intervention has been explained in terms of protecting the basic human rights of individuals (as seen by a democratic political system) in an attempt to mitigate their negative implications, both for the people involved and the normative structure of international order.²² International socialization is viewed in the context of projecting certain democratic, economic and social norms for the purposes of strategic interaction.²³ In both instances, actors embed their roles in the context of belonging to an international society. The understanding of their actions as conforming with a pattern of predictability is borne out of the social interaction between actors to preserve the structure of order. Therefore, humanitarian intervention and international socialization are not attempts to curtail actors' sovereignty, but examples of efforts to reinstate the self-sustaining continuity of order. Thus, the aspect of solidarity brings together communitarian belonging and cosmopolitan ideation within the notion of order.

Order as Regulation

Order can be 'defined primarily in terms of negotiated connections among externally autonomous and internally integrated' actors.²⁴ It regulates the relationship between actors'

¹⁷ Wendt, 'Collective Identity Formation', p. 385. Emphasis original.

¹⁸ Since, for most theoreticians of International Relations, the sovereign, nation-state continues to be the main and important actor in international relations.

¹⁹ Linklater, 'The Transformation of Political Community', p. 328.

²⁰ Hyde-Price, *Germany and European Order*, p. 57.

²¹ Wendt, 'Collective Identity Formation', p. 385.

²² Noam Chomsky, *The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo* (London: Pluto Press, 1999).

²³ Kenneth A. Schultz, *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

²⁴ James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, 'The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders', *ARENA Working Papers*, 98/5 at http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp98_5.htm

corporate identities and their social roles as participants in the international arena. As it has already been mentioned, these actors are still mainly referred to as sovereign states.²⁵ In the field of international activities, the order between sovereign states is characterized by 'asymmetries of power'²⁶. In many respects, this interstate order is seen as governed by anarchical relations (when compared with its domestic aspect) and marked by 'cycles of war, breakdown, and reconstruction'.²⁷ But alongside this realist model of international relations, there are a number of perspectives that differ from this point of view. Some of them look at order as a system of governance focusing on the agency through which a political unit exercises authority and performs its functions. Others proffer institutionalism and the way institutions develop networks for influencing actor' interests and identities. And there are still others who see order as the result of regime theories. However, for the purposes of the present exploration into order, it is viewed as 'a pattern of activity that sustains the *elementary* or *primary* goals of the society of states'.²⁸ These goals relate broadly speaking to the 'preservation of the system and society of states', as well as the protection of the 'common goals of all social life'.²⁹ Order thus involves a means to regulate the *basic* interaction among the different actors who otherwise would be unable to accommodate their respective interests. The establishment of this *elementary* and *primary* framework is the necessary prerequisite for the achievement of 'objectives that are *advanced*, *secondary* or the *special* goals of particular societies'.³⁰

Thus, contemporary international order establishes different structures for accommodating the *special* objectives of the individual actors within a framework of interaction in which all actors share a general interest in the establishment and maintenance of order. Specific institutions mediate states' interests in the international arena. In turn, this has ushered an indirect (and in some cases direct) interference of such organizations in the domestic affairs of the participants (questioning not their sovereignty, but rather regulating the way they exercise it). In this way, through the regulatory aspect of order, what used to be interstate interaction gradually developed into (or more precisely is still developing towards) supra-national, non-territorial relations. In such a qualitatively new type of exchange 'territory loses its meaning as an instrument of power'.³¹

In this way, order identifies actors as separate entities and develops a pattern of predictability through which it mediates their individual goals. At the same time, however, it initiates a process of structural change within its participants, in which they substitute a portion of their identity in favor of their own (as well as that of the system of order)

²⁵ This does not mean that the influence of non-state actors on international order would be ruled out by this research. However, in the context of framing an understanding of order as a background for the subsequent discussion of Balkan order, sovereign, nation-states are mainly the political entities inferred by the use of the term 'actors'.

²⁶ G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars* (Princeton, NJ and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 17.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

²⁸ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, p. 7. Emphasis added.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 16-19.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 93. Emphasis added.

³¹ Ola Tunander, 'Post-Cold War Europe: Synthesis of a Bipolar Friend - Foe Structure and a Hierarchic Cosmos - Chaos Structure?' in Ola Tunander, Pavel Baev and Victoria Ingrid Einagel, eds., *Geopolitics in Post-Wall Europe: Security, Territory and Identity* (London: SAGE Publications, 1994), p. 36.

stability. Such identity transformation results from the process of social interaction among actors. Changing the context of interaction (i.e. increased interdependence and societal convergence) modifies actors' expectations (in the context of 'character planning'), which, subsequently, affects not only their behavior, but brings about 'critical self-reflection... to think of oneself in novel terms'.³² Thus, their identity is influenced by the relationship-pattern of predictability, where order allows for reevaluation of actors' interests and identities without endangering the continuity of its stability.

Order as Security

The other important aspect of international order is the establishment of a sense of security (among the individual participants). Security is understood as knowledge of order's ability to overcome successfully (without disintegration into violence) disruptions to its patterns of predictability. Security is a process of continuous sanction (in the sense of guarantee) that the system of order protects the participating actors from adverse contingencies. In an applied sense, security indicates 'a low probability of damage to acquired values'.³³ The values of order (already outlined as its regulatory aspect) derive from its pattern of predictability. The threats to order's security ensue from strategic, military, social, economic, etc. sources. However, these contingencies indicate different forms, but essentially the same concept of security.³⁴ Therefore, 'security can be defined as the freedom to exercise certain values'.³⁵

This characteristic is intimately related to the stability aspect of order. Stability derives from the system's ability to mediate the *special* interests of different actors, without incurring major structural instability. This does not imply that the durability (or self-reinforcing arrangement) of international order is indicated by 'slow, gradual and peaceful'³⁶ changes, while the opposite necessarily indicates instability. Stability indicates an 'ability of political order to contain and overcome disturbances to order'.³⁷ This is why the importance of the normative culture (already mentioned) among the actors in the international arena, becomes so important: it constitutes a base that buttresses individual confidence in the potentiality of the mutual control over the system's checks and balances. In effect, the durability of order exemplifies that the 'international system is stable (i.e., in a state of equilibrium) if no state believes it is profitable to attempt to change the system'.³⁸

The security paradigm of order, however, is very closely related to its solidarity aspect. Its success is based on the ability to maintain control (in the context of regulation) of international actors in 'an economically polarized and environmentally constrained

³² See Wendt, 'Anarchy Is What States Make of It', p. 419.

³³ David A. Baldwin, 'The Concept of Security', *Review of International Studies*, no. 23, 1997, p. 13.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

³⁵ Michael Mihalka, 'Cooperative Security: From Theory to Practice' in Richard Cohen and Michael Mihalka, eds., *Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order* (Garmisch-Partenkirchen: The Marshall Center Papers, no.3, 2000), p. 34.

³⁶ John Herz, 'The Impact of the Technological-Scientific Process on the International System', in Abdul Said, ed., *Theory of International Relations* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 115.

³⁷ Ikenberry, *After Victory*, p. 45.

³⁸ Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 50.

world'.³⁹ The way order copes with the volatility deriving from the disparity between its participants is vital to the stability of its structure. The radicalization of the issue of uneven wealth distribution is one of the major threats to order. Thus, its value-base is confronted with the issue of intensifying sustainable development with the aim of reversing 'the global apartheid of 24 richer countries, a dozen rapidly developing countries and 140 that are growing slowly or not at all [which] becomes one of the major new threats to global security'.⁴⁰

In this respect, order does not entail 'an unchanging preservation of the status quo'.⁴¹ It reflects the constant development of the relationship between the actors as well as the modification within the very nature of these actors. That is why, the constancy (in the sense of continual transition) of order should be able to accommodate the ever evolving exchange between states in the international domain as well as the alteration in the state structure, itself. Thus, 'on the one hand, order requires a delicate balance of structural solidity, and flexibility on the other'.⁴² The key aspect in the adaptation of such changes is the scope within which order can accomplish the accommodation without a recourse to violence.

In other words, this reiterates the ability of a system of order to regulate the relationships between the different actors by establishing some common rules according to which they can utilize their resources. Such predictability is premised on a 'sense of a common future'.⁴³ The awareness of a shared destiny results from the intersubjective interaction between actors. It requires that actors deal together with the 'increasingly transnational' threats to international order from 'corruption, organized crime, migration, epidemic diseases, environmental catastrophes, and terrorism'.⁴⁴ In a pragmatic sense, this emphasizes the framework of order as a network for cooperative security, which has developed to sustain the values of its pattern of continuity. The cooperative security of order connotes 'consultation rather than confrontation, reassurance rather than deterrence, transparency rather than security, prevention rather than correction, and interdependence rather than unilateralism'.⁴⁵ Actors' interaction within the context of interdependence (based on shared values) is conducive to cooperation. It succeeds in 'creating the conditions of stability in which respect for human rights, consolidation of democratic reforms and economic patterns of trade and investment can flourish'.⁴⁶

The pattern of interaction between actors 'reinforced by cooperation, which further develops shared norms, which then creates interaction, in a positive feedback loop'⁴⁷ em-

³⁹ Paul Rogers, 'International Security in the Early Twenty-First Century', *ISIS Briefing Paper*, no. 76, January 2000, p. 1.

⁴⁰ John Cavanagh, 'Globalization: Fine for Some and Bad for Many', *International Herald Tribune*, 24 January 1997.

⁴¹ Hyde-Price, *Germany and European Order*, p. 55.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ Mihalka, 'From Theory to Practice', p. 29.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

⁴⁵ Gareth Evans, 'Cooperative Security and Intra-State Conflict', *Foreign Policy*, no. 96, 1994.

⁴⁶ Javier Solana quoted in Mihalka, 'From Theory to Practice', p. 55.

⁴⁷ Mihalka, 'From Theory to Practice', p. 37.

phasizes order as a security community. The security community⁴⁸ indicates the importance of shared norms for giving meaning to the relations and interactions in the international society.

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The definition of order as interaction between its three aspects (solidarity, regulation and security) articulates a distinct pattern of predictability, which regulates the intersubjective relationship between actors. The significance of this framework of order (i.e. for the discussion of Balkan order) derives from its emphasis on international relations as a process of learning and socialization, during which actors develop a cognitive understanding (based on their experience of interaction in the international arena) of the reciprocity of international society as a security community. This reciprocity (in the context of solidarity) underscores the belonging to a community sharing a common normative base. Such interdependence mediates actors' interests and regulates their exchange within a secure framework of order's stability. Thus, this particular understanding of order constitutes a pattern, which allows for peaceful exchange and interest-mediation, as well as joint decision-taking and non-territorially-based policy-making.

NEOLIBERAL-CONSTRUCTIVIST VIEW ON ORDER

As it has already been mentioned, the purpose of this exploration into order is not to exhaust its meaning, but rather to position it in a way that would suggest a viable model for conflict regulation in the Balkan region. Bearing in mind this pragmatic approach to the issue, the present research is objective as to its awareness of the different theoretical perspectives on order, but it is at the same time prescriptive as to its goals. The main question for this theoretical investigation is how to transform the current Balkan politics into something distinctly different and closer to the order outlined in the previous section (underscored by the current trend of *sociology of international relations*). Constructivism develops the role of identity and interests in international interaction. The experience of inter-actor relations develops a repository of knowledge about each other, which they use as a basis for their action towards one another. It also suggests a way for achieving positive identification and closer cooperation among actors. However, constructivism alone would not be sufficient to construct a theoretical model for a prospective Balkan order. Owing to the prevalent rationalism of Southeast European relations, as well as the dominant position of negative identification among the main actors in the region (mainly nation-states, or entities aspiring to such status), the only viable approach would be one that would combine neoliberal practices with constructivist ideation.

Neoliberal constructivism (being an eclectic approach) combines in its understanding of international order rationalist (interest-based and power-based) and cognitive (knowledge-based) perspectives. Applying it to the Balkans involves foregrounding the aspects

⁴⁸ The concept of 'security community' is explored in the following section.

that hold the promise of establishing a stable and cooperative pattern of relations. The main aspects of neoliberal-constructivist order are: institutions - based on mutual agreements, whose normative 'stickiness' and institutional autonomy proffer cooperation; and interaction - the process of interest and identity formation, which develops experiential knowledge among actors and introduces positive identification and community building. Thus, neoliberalism provides the rules and procedures for institutional co-binding, while constructivism facilitates the learning of new practices and the establishment of trust among actors. Combining these two theoretical concepts of international relations allows putting the issue of prospective Balkan order in its rightful context: as a distinct pattern of predictability based on the interaction between the solidarity, regulation and security aspects of order.

Establishing a pattern of self-sustaining continuity in the Balkans entails the development of institutional networks that help develop positive intersubjective meanings among actors. This guarantees that the system of order protects participants from adverse contingencies and that it allows the actors equal access to exercise authority (order's normative relation of regulation). It is this context that allows developing a certain pattern of interdependence, based on shared norms and collective identity, which emphasizes order as a security community.

Security community is an inter-actor relationship that maintains 'dependable expectations of peaceful change'.⁴⁹ Security community represents a peaceful, nonviolent international order that elicits the importance of non-national, collective identity. In many respects it is the very opposite of realist power politics. Security community arises from the process of interaction in which actors develop their knowledge of shared meanings and values. This knowledge (and pattern-predictability) allows them to redefine (continually) order among them as a security community. The self-sustaining continuity of security communities is the result of the institutional self-enforcing agreement among actors. Thus, the normative base of institutions constitutes the regulatory authority of order.

Authority derives from a normative scale of attraction and detraction of anticipated actor's actions. The expected outcome of every action motivates actor's participation in a security community. The foreseen negative effects from not taking part (i.e. violent conflict regulation) versus the positive ones (i.e. non-violent conflict mediation) are the result not only of game's theory maximizing of gains and minimizing of losses (though, initially, this might be the case). Participating in a security community indicates actor's constant and continual renewal of the contract with the normative basis of order. Being always in process, actors' interests and identities constantly relearn the benefits from developing positive meanings of each other. In this way, order regulates actors' relations through a normative scale of attraction and detraction of outcomes.

The defining moment of any international order is its handling of crises. Crisis marks the boundary of a security community. It indicates a denial of the 'trust and shared values among actors'.⁵⁰ Keeping order's stability involves the 'use of representative force, a form

⁴⁹ Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., *Security Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p.30.

⁵⁰ Janice Bially Mattern, 'The Power Politics of Identity', *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 7 (3), 2001, p. 356.

of power exercised through language to stabilize their [actors'] collective identity' (in other words this is the security aspect of order).⁵¹ Representational force is a direct result of both rationalist and cognitive aspects of order. Being a regulatory function of the security community, it is based neither on violence nor brute force, but on a narrative commitment to perpetuate the norms of order. Nevertheless, representational force is coercive (since it has to keep the system of order together and the actors in check) and exercises its authority through order's normative basis. In other words, representational force 'fastens' actors' identities in a security community and counters the vulnerability of 'we-ness'.⁵² This *fastening* is a result of 'rhetorical practices' that aim to 'create solidarity' among actors.⁵³ The function of these rhetorical practices is to maintain the security community by eliminating the challenges to its stability, regenerating the collective identity and reinforcing the expectations for peaceful crisis management. Thus, rhetorical practices constitute a representational force, which is a form of coercive power. Its power derives from order's 'authority to determine the shared meanings that constitutes the "we-ness"'.⁵⁴ The authority of a security community regulates the operation of social forces and institutional practices among actors. In this way, the process of learning collective identity involves power.⁵⁵ The power of representational force as a coercive force derives not from threats of recourse to violence (which is irrelevant in a security community order), but from its normative legitimacy (based on the authority to enforce the shared purpose of a security community). Hence, it comes to preserve the identity of neoliberal-constructivist order.

Thus, combining the insights of neoliberalism and constructivism informs the study of international orders, and proffers a potential model for a Balkan pattern of international relations. The theoretical implications of combining institutionalism with interest and identity-interaction suggests a system of order based on the exchange between different forms and sources of authority, which regulate actors' resources (their use and distribution) in the environment of a security community.

THE PROSPECTIVE BALKAN ORDER

Informed by the neoliberal constructivism, the question that arises from this interpretation of *order* is what kind of structure would be able to channel and moderate the processes generated by both types of relationships. Perhaps, the only viable answer to this query is the 'networked polity'.⁵⁶ This stands for a 'state-in-society' perspective,⁵⁷ which gives autonomy to small communities to establish face-to-face types of trust among their members, while political decision-making is done through a process of linking together or

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 349.

⁵² Ibid. See also Iver B. Neumann, *Uses of the Other: The East in European Identity Formation* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).

⁵³ Wendt, 'Collective Identity Formation', p. 391.

⁵⁴ Adler and Barnett, *Security Communities*, p. 9.

⁵⁵ Mattern, 'Identity', p. 354, and Wendt, 'Collective Identity Formation', p. 391.

⁵⁶ Chris Ansell, 'The Networked Polity: Regional Development in Western Europe', *Governance: An International Journal of Policy Administration*, vol. 13, no. 3, 2000, pp. 303-33. The 'networked polity' is understood as a form of the security community.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 303.

co-operation. This type of organisation also gives the option for a more viable tackling of some of the main posers for the Balkans: stability, sustainable growth (or development) and democracy. In spite of being decentralised, communication and co-ordination is undertaken by "project teams" that transcend the boundaries of public and private, the turf of different governmental bureaus, and the vertical and horizontal jurisdiction of the state.⁵⁸ In other words, the networked polity (by availing itself of neoliberal tools) offers the opportunity to members from different subcommunities to come together and work on a project beneficial for all of them. This would entail a further empowerment of nongovernmental actors and would also facilitate the co-operation between the participating members (in the constructivist context of identity-interaction). Such a change of governmentality would open the ground for the promotion of new modes of regional coexistence in the Balkans. In this way the networked polity becomes a specific form of governance based on neoliberal constructivism. It becomes a forum for the joint resource-mobilisation of different communities (as opposed to the present politically and institutionally fragmented Southeast European region). In other words, the networked polity moderates the *co-operation* between different *security communities* through 'webs of relatively stable and ongoing relationships, which mobilise and pool dispersed resources so that collective (or parallel) action can be orchestrated toward the solution of a common policy'.⁵⁹

The Euratlantic accession process itself urges such a development, where the EU and NATO administrations promote joint projects from the Southeast European applicants. In this connection the evidence from two inter-related processes is vital for understanding this position. First, the policies of international organisations themselves towards the Balkan region; and second, the development of statehood and governance within and amongst states in the region. One of the main hypotheses that emerges from the examination of these two developments is that the first can have a profound effect on the second. The research question which then follows is whether these processes in conjunction can assist in (i) the development of statehood (ii) the integration of the Balkan region into the wider European political space (iii) the development of regional political community and even, in a longer-term perspective, in the cultivation of a regional 'pluralistic security community'.⁶⁰ The methodology of such an approach could be based on several complementary steps. The first involves a consideration of historical precedents for Balkan co-operation and even community building (and the dynamic of how this interacts with the development of statehood in the region). The second involves an analysis of current regional trends and the influence of international structures' mediation/intervention and assistance in the Balkan region. These trends, thirdly, are extrapolated in order to identify probable outcomes in light of neoliberal-constructivist security communities. In this manner, regional initiatives can be linked to what has been termed as 'EUropeanisation' (which, per se, attests to a networked form of governance). From this point of view, multi-level governance allows for networking to proceed through

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 309.

⁵⁹ Patrick Kenis and Volker Schneider, 'Policy Networks and Policy Analysis: Scrutinising a New Analytical Toolbox', in Bernd Marin and Renate Mayntz, *Policy Network: Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Considerations* (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1991), p. 36.

⁶⁰ Karl Deutsch, *Political Community in the North Atlantic Area* (New York, NY: Greenwood Press, 1957), p. 6.

negotiations and compromise across different realms of the political, social and economic domains, advancing itself as a 'new paradigm for the architecture of complexity'.⁶¹

Both EUropean multi-level governance and networking have the capacity to serve as a point of reference for Southeast European policy-making and decision-taking. Unfortunately, the Balkan societies are confronted with a bipolar choice.⁶² On the one hand is the option to remain ossified within the present exclusive nation-'state' existence as represented by the current political entities in the region. On the other is the possibility for developing a regional co-operation framework linking Southeast European communities in a network of mutual coexistence and sustainable growth (something reminiscent of the EUropean community). The former choice very much condemns the region to remain caught in the vice of taxonomised understandings of nationhood. Such encapsulation of Balkan political *imagination*, within the hostile perceptions derived from biased interpretations of mythologised history, is partly responsible for the present imbroglio in South-eastern Europe. The latter one gives the opportunity for a Balkan networked polity of co-operation to furnish the basic requirements for sustainable development in the region. Per se, this means the following:

- A) The achievement of *political stability* through the foundation of policy coherence and integrity, independent of administrative succession.
- B) The building of *stable democratic institutions* based on efficient and competent government 'bureaucracies' (in spite of the fact how value-laden this term is, it is taken in its most objective meaning).
- C) The development of a robust *civil society*, through the encouragement of citizens' participation, and the recognition of individual, minority and human rights.
- D) The promotion of *economic progress*, through a credible market reform consolidating public confidence in the transformation schedule.
- E) *Fighting organised crime and corruption* via the establishment of publicly accountable (but also well-trained and equipped) security services, allowing them the breadth and scope to fulfil their obligations.

The attractiveness of achieving these goals modelling the success (in the sense of better outcome than the one in the Balkans) of EUropean structures in similar areas might liberate Southeast European political imagination from its shell of fictitious primordial fears.⁶³ A simple definition of *political imagination* is that it is the fuel behind the process of community networking and the vision transcending the limitations set by the present quagmire of current institutional confrontation in the Balkans.

Thus, the ideology of community imagination (seen as a rhetorical practice of the networked polity) establishes itself as an alternative mapping of political relationships, effectively rewriting the present contract between the people (viewed as the electorate) and

⁶¹ Patrick Kenis and Volker Schneider, 'Policy Networks and Policy Analysis: Scrutinizing a New Analytical Toolbox' in *Policy Network: Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Considerations*, ed. Bernd Marin and Renate Mayntz (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1991), p. 25.

⁶² However, a well-informed and justified argumentation is possible for other 'middle ground' propositions. Nevertheless, in my opinion, all other options are only nuances of these two extremes.

⁶³ For a recent, very good and exemplary discourse on the issue of fictionalizing historical data see Julie A. Mertus, *Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War* (Berkeley, Ca.: University of California Press, 1999).

the partocracy. It evinces itself as a confluence between the sites of politics, society, economics and creativity; but at the same time it constitutes itself as an overriding compatibility with the articulation of individual desires for coexistence. Thus, the inverted locution of constructed reality brings forth an interpretation of this conceptual shift in the alignment of social conduct and political apparatuses, according to the manner in which the different systems of identification relate to each other. Therefore, the ideology behind the networked community is construed as a reaction to the parochial interpretations of historical exigencies offering a 'locus of resistance'⁶⁴ for imaginative structuring of individual experience aimed at transforming the conditions of living. Thus, the vocabulary of the *sociology of international community* enters the discourse of political institutions in the Balkans and breaks the traditional hold of bipolar political localism and the way in which people meaningfully relate among themselves. In such context, community co-operation develops into a process of producing knowledge, in the sense of 'an unveiling of being and at the same time an unanswered question as to the validity of this unveiling'.⁶⁵ The articulation of this creative identity would situate the solution of regional posers within the textuality of transnational determinations, beyond the limits of local or ethnic self (beyond the images of nation-bound politics).

It is in this way that the theoretical framework of neoliberal constructivism can inform a Balkan pattern of order, underlined by regional co-operation and community development. The co-operation between actors opens the possibility for a positive transformation of the inter-ethnic exchanges towards peaceful coexistence. It arises from the acknowledgement of a process of domestic democratic orientations that sustains community civil identities through a reorganisation into a regional civic identity. This inference comes from the normative base of networked policies (which prerequisite rules for representative negotiation), furthers the democratic exchange and mitigates the danger from violent outbreaks of conflicts. Moreover, the suggested order as a security community indicates the structural relationships, interdependencies and dynamics between actors in global politics from the perspective of regional policy-making.

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⁶⁴ Aijaz Ahmad, *In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures* (London: Verso, 1992), p. 307.

⁶⁵ Jean-Paul Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, trans. Alan Sheridan-Smith, ed. Jonathan Ree (London: Verso, 1976), p. 7.

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SOCIOLOGIJA GLOBALNE POLITIKE I BUDUĆNOST REGIJA NA BALKANU

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*Tekuća rasprava o globalizaciji previdja sve veću međuzavisnost sveta u čijem stvaranju učestvuje. Svest o **globalnom društvu** postavlja izazov tradicionalnim definicijama. One su na Balkanu dovele do unutrašnjih podela da bi se ostvarila bezbednost i zaštita identiteta. Međutim, ovaj rad istražuje noviju literaturu iz **sociologije međunarodnih odnosa** i nudi mogući model za otklanjanje sadašnjeg (značenjskog) zastoja u ovoj regiji. Istraživanje ponovo obradjuje i redefiniše koncept **poretka** kao obrasca samoodrživih predviđanja zasnovanih na njegova tri aspekta: solidarnosti, regulativnosti i sigurnosti. Ovaj rad predlaže neoliberalni konstruktivizam kao način da se poredak u jugoistočnoj Evropi skicira kao zajednica sigurnosti. Cilj ovih teoretskih razmatranja jeste da se procesi utvrđivanja politike i donošenja odluka u regionu prožmu mogućnostima koje proističu iz kooperacije i izgradnje zajednice u procesu pristupanja evroatlantskim strukturama (npr. EU i NATO). Održivost kolektivnog balkanskog identiteta u ovom procesu može se izvesti putem političke imaginacije, oblika retorskog praxis-a, koji označava reprezentacijsku silu koja reguliše zajednicu sigurnosti. Implicira se da, mada danas jugoistočna Evropa predstavlja otrcan termin za nestabilnost, sociologija globalne politike nudi moguću opciju za miroljubivu koegzistenciju u ovoj regiji.*

Ključne reči: *pristupanje, Balkan, neoliberalni konstruktivizam, mreža političkih tela, međunarodni poredak, politička imaginacija, regionalizam, zajednica sigurnosti.*