

## **FIELDS OF HUMAN LIFE IN HANNAH ARENDT'S "THE HUMAN CONDITION"**

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**Abstract.** *The paper opens with the outline of its context, including identification of the methodological axis for the analysis of "The Human Condition" and two lines of inquiry, the main one and the collateral one. What follows is a short presentation of the first two parts of the axis, human condition and practical activities, and then the paper focuses on the third part of the axis, fields of human life. The study of fields of human life comprises defining the notion of fields, scanning the process of their constitution, their relations to practical activities and their mutual relations, their development and characteristics of each field. The goal of the study is to discover why the mapping of the fields takes place in the concrete case of "The Human Condition" and the answer reached at the end is that the reason lies in the evaluation of human body. However, this evaluation is to some extent self-conscious.*

**Key words:** *mapping, fields, private, public, social, intimate, evaluation.*

### CONTEXT OF ANALYSIS

The main line of inquiry in Hannah Arendt's book "The Human Condition" has for its subject three types of human practical activities, more precisely, why they exist and what their essence is.<sup>1</sup> Hannah Arendt's position in "The Human Condition" can be interpreted by using tripartite methodological axis:

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<sup>1</sup> Here is what the author herself says about it: "What I propose in the following is a reconsideration of the human condition from the vantage point of our newest experiences and our most recent fears. ...

'What we are doing' is indeed the central theme of this book. It deals only with the most elementary articulations of the human condition, with those activities that traditionally, as well as according to current opinion, are within the range of every human being. For this and other reasons, ... the book is limited to a discussion of labor, work, and action, which forms its three central chapters." This quotation is from Arendt, Hannah, *The Human Condition*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago & London, 1958, p. 5.

For all other quotations from the same book I will use abbreviation HC. All italics, quotation marks etc. in cited quotations are original.

human condition \_\_\_\_\_ human activities \_\_\_\_\_ fields of human life

The main line of inquiry starts with the first part of this axis and is concentrated on the second part, on human activities, which are the focus of attention. In this paper I want to introduce and elaborate on the secondary or collateral line of inquiry that is not directly articulated in "The Human Condition". This line starts with the second part of the axis and is oriented toward the third part, toward the fields of human life. This line relies on what is present in the original text of "The Human Condition" and shows Hannah Arendt's implicit view on the fields of human life. This paper could be a contribution based on the concrete text to the problematization of the phenomena of field and demarcation, key phenomena lying at the intersection of several philosophical disciplines.

Human activities and fields in which they are practiced are in a relation fundamental to both of them, so that the explanation of activities, at which Hannah Arendt primarily aims, can not be complete unless fields are thematized and taken into consideration. Fields are marginal subject of her inquiry, like the shadow of dominant interest for activities themselves. In this paper the order is turned upside-down, because my central effort is to analyze the mapping of the fields and to try to discover what stands behind it. Consequentially, I will select what Hannah Arendt, writing about the activities, writes about private, public, social and intimate fields of human life (in which fields a person can live or can practice all activities).

Hannah Arendt's statements about fields will be foregrounded in this paper and checked from the aspect of their possible modification. The underlying hypothesis is that the changes in the number of the fields and history of various fields' mappings indicate that new solutions are possible, besides the fact that they open the question of the meaning of mapping as such (what is its purpose etc.). Every study of private, public, social and intimate fields of human life has to deal with some fundamental issues raised about them: definition of the field, relation between fields and activities practiced in them, mutual relations between the fields, development of the fields, most important characteristics of each field, options present in or absent from each of them. After dealing with all that, the study dares suggest the ratio *essendi* of field creation and the meaning of mappings.

#### HUMAN CONDITION

Hannah Arendt believes that it is not possible to say what man is.<sup>2</sup> However, it is possible to say what man is like or what human existence is like. "Men are conditioned beings because everything they come in contact with turns immediately into a condition of their existence."<sup>3</sup> She gives one apparently rather large definition of condition: "Whatever touches or enters into a sustained relationship with human life immediately assumes the

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<sup>2</sup> "Moreover, nothing entitles us to assume that man has a nature of essence in the same sense as other things. In other words, if we have a nature of essence, then surely only a god could know and define it, and the first prerequisite would be that he be able to speak about a 'who' as though it were a 'what'." In: HC, p. 10.

<sup>3</sup> HC, p. 9.

character of a condition of human existence."<sup>4</sup> The distinctive characteristic of human existence, its conditions, can be classified into two groups. The first group of human conditions consists of basic conditions under which life on earth has been given to man, and these are: life itself, worldliness, plurality, natality and mortality, and the earth itself. The second group of human conditions consists of conditions made by the men themselves, and these are man-made things and relations. "Whatever enters the human world of its own accord or is drawn into it by human effort becomes part of human condition."<sup>5</sup> The first and second group of conditions together are labeled by a Latin term *conditio humana*. A common trait for all conditions is that "they never condition us absolutely."<sup>6</sup> According to Hannah Arendt, they are somehow changeable and flexible, but our condition itself is persistent and unavoidable. "The most radical change we can imagine in human condition would be an emigration of men from the earth to some other planet ... Yet even these hypothetical wanderers from the earth would still be human; but the only statement we could make regarding their 'nature' is that they still are conditioned beings, even though their condition is now self-made to a considerable extent."<sup>7</sup> In is important to notice that the number of conditions is unlimited but from all of them Hannah Arendt directs her attention to a few, taken to be most influential. This thesis about the condition of human existence is the starting point of the whole theory, the first part of the tripartite axis drawn at the beginning of this paper, and for the needs of this paper it will not be questioned, which does not imply that it can not be criticized.

#### REACTION TO HUMAN CONDITION

Presenting three human practical activities, labor, work and action, Hannah Arendt explains that they are "fundamental because each corresponds to one of the basic conditions under which life on earth has been given to man."<sup>8</sup> The relation between conditions and activities is not so simple as it may at first appear. There are several definitions of this relation:<sup>9</sup> activity responds to condition - condition of activity is that

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<sup>4</sup> HC, p. 9.

<sup>5</sup> HC, p. 9.

<sup>6</sup> HC, p. 11.

<sup>7</sup> HC, p. 10.

<sup>8</sup> HC, p. 7.

<sup>9</sup> "Labor is the activity which corresponds to the biological process of the human body, whose spontaneous growth, metabolism, and eventual decay are bound to the vital necessities produced and fed into the life process by labor. The human condition of labor is life itself.

Work is the activity which corresponds to the unnaturalness of human existence, which is not imbedded in, and whose mortality is not compensated by, the species' ever-recurring life cycle. Work provides an 'artificial' world of things, distinctly different from all natural surroundings. Within its borders each individual life is housed, while this world itself is meant to outlast and transcend them all. The human condition of work is worldliness.

Action, the only activity that goes on directly between men without the intermediary of things or matter, corresponds to the human condition of plurality, to the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world. ... Plurality is the condition of human action because we are all the same, that is human, in such a way that nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives, or will live.

All three activities and their corresponding conditions are intimately connected with the most general condition of human existence: birth and death, natality and mortality." In: HC, p. 7-8.

and that - activity is closely connected to the condition. In addition to this, we can remark that not all of basic conditions are equally treated: for example, natality and mortality as well as earth are only "connected" with the activities, while life itself, worldliness and plurality are each directly responsible for one of three mentioned activities. Other conditions are not explicitly mentioned in this context, but it is logical to suppose that they take part in shaping concrete manifestations of practical activities.

Can we agree that the relation between the conditions of human existence and the activities is clarified enough? The last of the mentioned and in the same time weakest statement (that the conditions and activities are closely connected) is surely true, but how are they connected? It is legitimate to conclude that each of the three types of practical activities is a response to something that conditions and provokes it. I believe that the origin of those human activities is this way acceptably conceptualized. However, the same can not be said for subsuming them under one common denominator.

*Vita activa* is a common name for labor, work and action. Definition by which Hannah Arendt introduces this name is undoubtedly stipulative. "With the term *vita activa*, I propose to designate three fundamental human activities: labor, work and action."<sup>10</sup> Being known since Roman antiquity, although not in the sense which Hannah Arendt gives it, the term was a part of many centuries long tradition of systematization of human activities.<sup>11</sup> This tradition established a certain evaluation and certain hierarchy between *vita activa* and *vita contemplativa*. In this tradition *vita contemplativa* is a supradordinated, more valuable, dominantly significant notion, and *vita activa* is a subordinated, less valuable, marginally significant notion.<sup>12</sup>

#### FIELDS OF HUMAN LIFE: NOTION AND CONSTITUTION

An inevitable starting question is: can we speak of a notion of the field in Hannah Arendt's theory in "The Human Condition" or is every field so specific that it makes impossible to separate a set of characteristics of the field in general? In other words, what is understood by field?

At first glance it looks like there is no common denominator for all the fields, nor did Hannah Arendt have an intention to create it. Moreover, favorization of one field, the public, is apparent; is it a legitimate next step to conclude that this field is the field par excellence? My hypothesis in this paper is that the answer to this is positive. Regardless

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<sup>10</sup> HC, p. 7.

<sup>11</sup> "And this tradition ... grew out of a specific historical constellation: the trial of Socrates and the conflict between the philosopher and the *polis*." In: HC, p. 12.

<sup>12</sup> Reason that moved Hannah Arendt to reaffirm the notion of *vita activa* is displayed in the following way: "... it is because I doubt not the validity of the experience underlying the distinction but rather the hierarchical order inherent in it from its inception." In: HC, p.17. She continues: "My contention is simply that the enormous weight of contemplation in the traditional hierarchy has blurred the distinctions and articulations within the *vita activa* itself ..." In: HC, p. 17. She finds also Marx's and Nitsche's reversals of this hierarchy dissatisfying, because although *vita activa* came by it to the top position in hierarchy, it still failed to be adequately articulated in itself. Hannah Aarendt implies not only that her definition of *vita activa* ensures distinctions in this notion, but also that it enables its equal footing with *vita contemaplativa* in regard to the dignity bestowed on it.

of the first impression, it is not impossible to extract an implicit notion of the field in Hannah Arendt's position. The field is the result of conceptual organizational scheme for distribution of human activities, and more broadly speaking - aspects of human life, in totality of space understood as both physical and symbolic. This is what each field is as far as it is a field. It doesn't mean that fields don't differ among themselves in many characteristics, but it means rather they have a common denominator.

A fundamental question for the status of fields in "The Human Condition" is a question concerning their relation with activities. It would be impetuous to grant ontological and/or temporal priority either to fields or to activities, or to use causality for explanation of the relation of fields to activities or vice versa. The theory of Hannah Arendt aspires to a far more subtle solution, unsuitable for quick and cliché readings. The essential idea in her solution can be read in the moment of transfer of the activities from one field to another, by which the activity is the subject of a certain transformation caused by the influence of a new field in which it is situated, while the field is the subject of certain transformation caused by entering of a new activity in it, but in spite of this, both of them keep some properties that belonged to them before the transfer.<sup>13</sup> I will call this idea cardinal thesis. This thesis comprises one-sided options in a complex, symmetrically articulated answer. As activities change at entering un-proper fields for them (for the proper, in Hannah Arendt's opinion, the standard is Ancient Greeks' mapping) and at the same time they stay the same regardless of the movement, so the fields undergo the changes from acceptance of un-proper activities in them (for proper, in Hannah Arendt's opinion, the standard is Ancient Greeks' mapping) and remain untouched by this acceptance in some important aspects. In both directions, specific susceptibility and specific resistibility of both the activities and the fields are present. The best description of this cardinal thesis is non-radicalism, fluidity, complexity.

In "The Human Condition" it is possible to find several examples supporting this thesis. When the activity of labor moved from private to public field, it changed in the sense of conformity to the principle of organization, dominant in the public field, and such change left consequences in the form of the division of labor.<sup>14</sup> However, the movement from private to public field has not influenced one very important aspect of labor, and that is productivity. Or, when the activity of speech moved from public to private field, it suffered change by losing glory and shine and relevance, which, in Hannah Arendt's opinion, can not exist in the private field. However, such movement didn't change the speech in its essential trait - to be the way and the medium of disclosure of the subject. (Here a note is necessary. Namely, in "The Human Condition" speech and action are treated as related, almost as unique activity, which doesn't necessarily need to be accepted without question, but for the purpose of this paper it can not be problematized. Action is defined as starting, that is launching an initiative, whose source is the beginning entering the world with our birth; every one of us is born unique, and

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<sup>13</sup> In: HC, p. 46-47.

<sup>14</sup> Hannah Arendt comprehends the division of labor as the splitting of labor process into series of minimal operations, and not as division in the sense of different branches of economy. This can be concluded from her footnote in HC, p. 47-48.

each initiative will start something unexpected, unforeseeable, new. The meaning and a kind of explanation of this (initiating) action will be completed in words.)

The private field was transformed by the displacement of economic activities from it - the transformation is manifested in the decadence of the institution of family and in changes in its functions and forms. However, what could not be disturbed in the private field is the possibility of property possessions and house possessions as symbolic strongpoints of the subject. The public field underwent changes when economic activities, labor and work, got access to it; at that, public field has been deprived of speech and action as essentially political activities, which meant that the type of disclosure and expressing of the subject in it was changed. However, its specific resistibility reflects itself in the fact that public field's analogons made by economic activities, primarily the exchange markets, have no essential importance for the public. Those analogons for Hannah Arendt are actually pseudo-public, quasi-public.<sup>15</sup> From that can be inferred that the real public, although not in the place where it used to be, is eventually in some other place. Naturally, the question is whether this really is a conclusive argument for public field's resistibility to the change or a mere nominalistic game, as it may appear. I think that there is one specific firmness of the public, without which Hannah Arendt's call for the rehabilitation of the notion of the political would be a mere appeal for *creatio ex nihilo* and every reader of her bitter criticism of the modern age would agree with me that this criticism is never perfectly nihilistic.<sup>16</sup>

What could be seen as a shortcoming of my interoperation of Hannah Arendt is the absence of examples in "The Human Condition" concerning other two fields - the intimate and the social. It could indicate a doubt over conceptual unity of the notion of field (which should hold for all four fields). Or, it could indicate that the relation between the activities and the fields is not completely defined in what I called cardinal thesis (on the moment of transfer). But I declare both conclusions inadequate, and I believe that both the conceptual unity of the notion of the field and the cardinal thesis can be sustained, because there is a valid answer to the lack of examples concerning the intimate and the social fields.

The intimate field has its resistibility and its susceptibility, although they could not be tested in any transfer of activities in or out of it, for the simple reason that such displacement, theoretically conceivable, so far has never happened. Hannah Arendt in "The Human Condition" doesn't tell which activity corresponds to the intimate field (it makes sense to suppose that those are activities of *vita contemplativa*). It is also connected to the way she defines the intimate field. Later in this paper I will come to her definition of the intimate field and present the idea of including activities of speech and action into the intimate field defined somewhat differently. I will elaborate the idea of a

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<sup>15</sup> Hannah Arendt emphasizes that the real public field can not exist if all that is visible in it is man as laborer, because all that is achieved by this are private activities performed publicly and not public space in the proper sense. Similarly, the exchange markets as the results of meetings of the men as workers can not be real public space either.

<sup>16</sup> As support for this we can find: "The instrumentalization of action and the degradation of politics into a means for something else has of course never really succeeded in eliminating action, in preventing its being one of the decisive human experiences, or in destroying the realm of human affairs altogether." In: HC, p. 230.

hypothetical transfer to intimate field, which Hannah Arendt didn't have in mind, but which is ultimately possible.

The social field is also in accordance with the cardinal thesis on resistibility and susceptibility. It is unquestionable that Hannah Arendt's view is that the social field appears in an attempt to move in and out - it is a failure of the move, a lock of the transfer, so that all activities included in the transfer remained together in one field, which established the social field. The social field has specific status, it seeks to encompass all activities in itself, as a blotter. It is not quite similar to the other three fields, but rather an exception, because the try-transfer is its logical and causal priority. But after its constitution, the social field is marked by a similar dynamics of its development as other fields, and the transfer in and out of it is conceivable. The indirect argument that this is so is Hannah Arendt's call to dismiss activities of speech and action from the social and to place them back into the public field.

A principal ontological characteristic of all the fields is the equilibrium between the two poles of susceptibility-resistibility in their relation to activities.

#### RELATION BETWEEN HUMAN ACTIVITIES AND FIELDS IN WHICH THEY ARE PRACTICED: CONNECTION CRITERIA

Hannah Arendt's opinion about the organizational mechanism which generates fields is characterised by an extreme ambivalence of its description.

From one standpoint, she writes that the connecting of activities and fields follows criteria external to activities and fields themselves, non-inherent criteria.<sup>17</sup> From the other standpoint, she allows that there is a certain correlation and not necessarily discrepancy between the inherent and non-inherent criteria of the connection between activities and fields.<sup>18</sup> Finally, there is a third variation which gives priority to inherent criteria.<sup>19</sup> Based on all this, it is hard to decide how to qualify the criteria of the connection between activities and fields. Perhaps the solution is in realizing that the distinction between inherent and non-inherent criteria seems to be a superficial level of a deeper criteria feature: their historicity.

The following quotation tells us most directly about the historicity of field mappings: "... we know that the contradiction between private and public realms, typical of the initial stages of the modern age, has been a temporary phenomenon which introduced the utter extinction of the very difference between the private and public realms, the submersion of both in the sphere of the social."<sup>20</sup> Therefore the question can be raised: if a solution is

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<sup>17</sup> "... the modern age was as intent on excluding political man, that is, man who acts and speaks, from its public realm as antiquity was on excluding *homo faber*. In both instances the exclusion was not a matter of course ..." In: HC, p. 159.

<sup>18</sup> "... the historical judgements of political communities, by which each determined which of the activities of the *vita activa* should be shown in public and which be hidden in privacy, may have their correspondence in the nature of these activities themselves." In: HC, p. 78.

<sup>19</sup> "If we look at these things (things that are to be hidden and things that are to be shown - *remarque mine*), regardless of where we find them in any given civilization, we shall see that each human activity points to its proper location in the world. This is true for the chief activities of the *vita activa*, labor, work, and action ..." In: HC, p. 73.

<sup>20</sup> HC, p. 69.

applied that is adequate to its time, what are the possibilities for its criticism and change? Are those only the critiques from the point of view of some other time? Or, a certain period does not define uniquely the demands to be fulfilled, so the response can be created in various ways within the scope of those same demands? What does the temporariness of certain mappings actually mean: absolute temporariness (being tied to one unique moment) or potential transposition through different periods (repeating)? Hannah Arendt is nearer to the latter view, especially by her undertaking to revitalize some elements of the antiquity's mappings of the fields.

If we want to sum up all those various statements, we will get to the conclusion that mapping and remapping are primarily under the influence of human conceptual fiat, that activities and fields signalize the place that suits them best and that supports their key features, but that they are subjects of historical development too. Being as it is, human conceptual horizon is the very place where intervention is most efficient, so that oblivion and misunderstanding of concepts of our predecessors are for Hannah Arendt what should be fought against. She wants to remind us of the antiquity's mappings of the fields because she considers them superior, although she is aware of the historicity of all mappings. Isn't it a paradox to be aware of historicity and to value one historical (temporary) pattern as superior to others? Isn't it a paradox to defend one "inherent" criterion as the most adequately embodied in one (let's say antiquity's) map, in spite of historicity of each possible map?<sup>21</sup>

#### MUTUAL RELATION BETWEEN THE FIELDS

Hannah Arendt's view about the mutual relation between the fields splits the period from antiquity to her time in two phases: 1) the phase in which there was no conflict and fluctuation among the fields and 2) the phase in which the demarcation lines are unstable.

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<sup>21</sup> Hannah Arendt analyzes the problem of different historical judgements on the location of human activities, especially in terms of later ages' difficulties in comprehension of their predecessors' views. Besides epistemological and theoretical problems, this miscomprehension can have a serious impact on the dangerous trend of the society's development. Hannah Arendt's estimations of modern age are quite striking. She writes: "It is quite conceivable that the modern age - which began with such an unprecedented and promising outburst of human activity - may end in the deadliest, most sterile passivity history has ever known." In: HC, p. 322. Short explanation of this dark diagnosis/prognosis is: "If we compare the modern world with that of the past, the loss of human experience involved in this development is extraordinarily striking. It is not only and not even primarily contemplation which has become an entirely meaningless experience. Thought itself ... became a function of the brain, with the result that electronic instruments are found to fulfil these functions much better than we ever could. Action was soon and still is almost exclusively understood in terms of making and fabricating, only that making ... was now regarded as but another form of laboring ... Meanwhile, ... an elimination of laboring from the range of human activities can no longer be regarded as utopian. ... The last stage of the laboring society, the society of jobholders, demands of its members a sheer automatic functioning ..." In: HC, p. 321-322. This pessimistic picture of modern age is the consequence of the oblivion and miscomprehension of the past, which started as: "... the extraordinary difficulty with which we ... understand the decisive division between the public and private realms, ... between activities related to a common world and those related to the maintenance of life, a division upon which all ancient political thought rested as self-evident and axiomatic. In our understanding, the dividing line is entirely blurred ..." In: HC, p. 28.



A short review of mapping and demarcation between the fields through history would be as follows.

The oldest mapping of the fields of human life (that is, the oldest of those analyzed in "The Human Condition") stems from Ancient Greece, which considered the divide between private and public fields most suitable for organizing the total space. Several centuries later the Romans introduced the third field, the field of the intimate, but in the way not to disturb the demarcation line between already established fields, giving to the intimate a space inside the private field. With those three fields completed the map of human activities was valid until 17th century. In the fields of intimate, private and public the whole human life has been taking place. That was the first phase in mutual relations among the fields. Hannah Arendt used the term coexistence for such a relation. A big reconstruction of the map took place<sup>22</sup> in 17th century. A new map, still valid in 20th century, has one field more compared with previously existing ones: the social field.<sup>23</sup> Why does it enter the map?<sup>24</sup> Because of the transfer of activities from private to public field. Since this transfer was not sustainable, what resulted was the intersection of elements of the private and the public, which was de facto a constitution of a new field. This new field had to find its place between private and public fields and at their expense, taking away the space that previously belonged to them, minimizing them, marginalizing them. If we compare this with previous remapping, it strikes us that the disturbance and outdateding of the main demarcation line is now taking place, reworking the line between the private and the public. In the second phase, for describing the relation among fields Hannah Arendt uses several metaphors (ruffle of waves, growing).<sup>25</sup> The main demarcation line now is the one between the social and the intimate fields.<sup>26</sup> The difference between the first and second demarcation lines can be identified in their sharpness and propulsion.

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<sup>22</sup> Hannah Arendt praises the political sense of the Romans compared with the Greeks because the Romans "... never sacrificed the private to the public, but on the contrary understood that these two realms could exist only in the form of coexistence." In: HC, p. 59.

<sup>23</sup> "... the emergence of the social realm, which is neither private nor public, strictly speaking, is a relatively new phenomenon whose origin coincided with the emergence of the modern age and which found its political form in the nation-state." In: HC, p. 28.

<sup>24</sup> If it was stated that the fields existed because the activities existed, we would have to claim the emergence of a new type of activity, previously not known nor practiced by men. But Hannah Arendt is far from such a claim. There is no new type of activity.

<sup>25</sup> "... with the rise of society, that is, the rise of the 'household' (*oikia*) or of economic activities to the public realm, housekeeping and all matters pertaining formerly to the private sphere of the family have become a 'collective' concern. In the modern world, the two realms indeed constantly flow into each other like waves ..." In: HC, p. 33. "Since the rise of society, since the admission of household and housekeeping activities to the public realm, an irresistible tendency to grow, to devour the older realms of the political and private as well as the more recently established sphere of intimacy, has been one of the outstanding characteristics of the new realm." In: HC, p. 45.

<sup>26</sup> The modern map has four segments. However, Hannah Arendt's expectations are that the number will decrease to three or two. The public and private fields are rapidly disappearing. It is not surprising because they are the biggest losers from the emergence of the social field, which takes over their functions and features. Moreover, according to Hannah Arendt, from the emergence of the social field negative consequences are created for the field of the intimate as well; it loses its protective shell in the private field and it is now directly exposed to the interaction with society, and the underlying hypothesis is that the intimate field is a weaker, less influential part in that interaction. But in the end, the social field can not and will not suppress the intimate field, because it can not take over its role and features. It is realistic to expect that at the end of the trend of

## PRIVATE FIELD

The private field in Ancient Greece was an interpersonal construction physically materialized in the form of the household, that is the house and the estate on which one family lived. The family understood in their sense of the word meant lord, his wife, his children and relatives and his slaves. The whole property belonged to the lord, all material objects of the property and all living persons regardless whether they were acquired slaves or his blood kins. In the house the lord and his subordinates undertook various activities, and all those activities had something in common - they were regarded as non-free and therefore less worthy. The only activity in the family which was the lord's task was to command, to order, to force and to be master over the rest of the household members.<sup>27</sup> What he forced his subordinates to do was to work, to perform the activities which led to the satisfaction of direct human bodily needs (food, clothes, housing, warfare, sex, reproduction ...).<sup>28</sup> Because the necessities of the biological life were active there, the belief that they should be performed secretly was wide-spread in Ancient Greece, that is that they should be hidden in the household.<sup>29</sup>

Hannah Arendt ascertains that for Ancient Greeks the private field had depriving and non-depriving features. Depriving features stem from the fact that staying at home occupied by the activities of labor and/or childbirth a person was deprived of some other possibilities which were highly valued, to the extent to be considered essentially human and the highest human capabilities.<sup>30</sup> All except the lord suffered from the depriving features of private field, because they were left no other options. Non-depriving features<sup>31</sup> of private field in Ancient Greece stem from the fact that, due to the activities in the household, most urgent and intense human needs, closely connected with the life itself, were satisfied. In addition to that, the property owned by the lord of the house provided him with a place in the world and in the public sphere.<sup>32</sup>

Hannah Arendt writes: "The distinctive trait of the household sphere was that in it men lived together because they were driven by their wants and needs. The driving force was life itself ... which, for its individual maintenance and its survival as life of the species

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decreasing the number of fields, the number will be at least two.

<sup>27</sup> "Because all human beings are subject to necessity, they are entitled to violence toward others; violence is the prepolitical act of liberating oneself from the necessity of life for the freedom of the world." In: HC, p. 31.

<sup>28</sup> Since there is no logic in supposing that the lord had to force them to satisfy their own needs, because they would do it anyway, without anyone's orders, the precise formulation would be that he had to force them to take care of and to satisfy primarily his needs and in the next step the needs of the household as a whole (which was also one on his needs).

<sup>29</sup> A more careful look at that claim would show that the word "hidden" does not mean that the members of a household perform economic activities within the house secretly from each other, but on the contrary the word "hidden" means that those activities are hidden from those outside the house, from non-members of the household. But why? Isn't it true that in other houses as well the same economic activities are being performed? In spite of this apparent paradox, the explanation offered is that those activities are shameful, humiliating, degrading, rendering man similar to animals. This is an evaluation evidently belonging to only one group of those included in household matters - evaluation belonging to lords, who are the only to have an additional option of participating in the other type of activities, outside the house.

<sup>30</sup> In: HC, p. 38.

<sup>31</sup> In: HC, p. 61, 70-71.

<sup>32</sup> "... the fact that without owning a house a man could not participate in the affairs of the world because he had no location in it which was properly his own." In: HC, p. 29-30.

needs the company of others. That individual maintenance should be the task of the men, and species survival the task of women was obvious, and both of these natural functions, labor of men to provide nourishment and labor of women in giving birth, were subject to the same urgency of life. Natural community in the household therefore was born of necessity, and necessity ruled over all the activities performed in it."<sup>33</sup> This interpretation of antiquity's views on family and household is unacceptable from several reasons. Slaves didn't labor/work and live with their masters driven by their needs and wants; among the members of one household there was no natural community in the sense of biological spontaneity, but rather all was regulated by (cultural) norms and therefore artifact, construct; childbirth was not a natural function and even less necessity of life for all. The unacceptability of this interpretation leads us to the private field today. Property and wealth are most important aspects of the private from the perspective of the other fields. Family is today differently understood, economic functions are not its dominant goal. Depriving features of the private, stressed in antiquity, are lost and only non-depriving features remain.

#### PUBLIC FIELD

The public field in Ancient Greece was an interpersonal construction materialized in places where the families' lords met, yet the place, for example a square, was not crucial for it but the presence of people qualified to make the public space. Their qualification was that they were free, and they saw themselves as free from the worry for elementary (biological) survival, because they had satisfied all basic needs before entering the public. The activities with which they were occupied in the public field were speech and action. These were, in the opinion of the Greek civilisation, the highest human possibilities, that which made man a man, and this for the reason that in them man disclosed who he was, although not to himself but to others.<sup>34</sup> The public field required the presence of people which were audience to each others' words and acts. Words and acts, according to Hannah Arendt, being something non-tangible and immaterial,<sup>35</sup> need witnesses to be real.

The implicit thesis underlying the possibility of the public as such is the ontological thesis that there is no reality without appearance. The importance of (public) appearance<sup>36</sup> comes from the attitude that: "... appearance - something that is being seen and heard by others as well as by ourselves - constitutes reality."<sup>37</sup> Man is real if he, that is his words and acts in which he discloses himself, can appear and be noticed by others. But who are the others? Here comes a more precise ontological thesis: not every appearance is equally

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<sup>33</sup> HC, p. 30.

<sup>34</sup> "... the 'who', which appears so clearly and unmistakably to others, remains hidden from the person himself ..." In: HC, p. 179.

<sup>35</sup> I just draw attention to the fact that the underlying conception here is a primitive and narrow interpretation of the material, according to which words are not material. We need not agree with such a conception, but in this paper I can not deal more with it.

<sup>36</sup> It is worth mentioning that public appearance is only one sort of appearance and there could be others beside it. The room for philosophical exploration is obvious here.

<sup>37</sup> HC, p. 50.

valuable, because not every audience is of equal value. The real audience for a subject consists of others who are recognized and accepted by that subject as equal to him. In antiquity, for a lord of a family, such audience was only and exclusively other families' lords.<sup>38</sup>

The public field is corresponding to the notion of the world.<sup>39</sup> This relation between the world and the public field is mutually beneficial, as can be inferred from the following passage: "... common world is what we enter when we are born and what we leave behind when we die. It transcends our life-span into past and future; it was here before we came and will outlast our brief sojourn in it ... But such a common world can survive the coming and going of the generation only to the extent that it appears in public."<sup>40</sup>

The answer to the question why the public field was for Greeks privileged in value has two parts, because two reasons established the dignity of the public field. We could call those reasons a synchronic one and a diachronic one. The synchronic one is that in the public field a simultaneous presence of numerous perspectives is guaranteed, as many perspectives of seeing and hearing are embodied in the participants of the public field. The more participants, that is more audience for someone's words and acts, the bigger quantum of appearance, that is of the reality by which the subject (the author of the words and acts) is granted. Therefore: "Being seen and being heard by others derive their significance from the fact that everybody sees and hears from different position. That is the meaning of public life, compared to which even the richest and the most satisfying family life can offer only the prolongation or multiplication of one's own position with its attending aspects and perspectives."<sup>41</sup> The diachronic reason is that: "It is the publicity of the public realm which can absorb and make shine through the centuries whatever men may want to save from the natural ruin of time."<sup>42</sup>

The result of action and speech can be analysed on more than one level. The first level is the space of appearance "... where men exist not merely like other living or inanimate things but make their appearance explicitly. This space does not always exist, and although all men are capable of deed and word, most of them - like slave, foreigner and barbarian in antiquity, like laborer or craftsman prior to the modern age, like jobholder or businessman in our world - do not live in it."<sup>43</sup> The second level are modalities of this space of appearance, and the most important among them is the one "... where word and deed have not parted company, where words are not empty and deeds not brutal, where words are not used to veil intentions but to disclose reality, and deeds are not used to

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<sup>38</sup> However, this leaves a possibility of some non-real, non-standard audience, and that would be an audience consisting of unequals. This phenomenon has received more increased affirmation in the Roman than in the Greek culture, but theoretically speaking it was open already in Greek culture. In: HC, p. 59.

<sup>39</sup> "Second, the term 'public' signifies the world itself, in so far as it is common to all of us and distinguished from our privately owned place in it. This world, however, is not identical with the earth or with nature ... It is related, rather, to the human artifact, the fabrication of human hands, as well as to affairs which go on among those who inhabit the man-made world together." In: HC, p. 52.

<sup>40</sup> HC, p. 55.

<sup>41</sup> HC, p. 57.

<sup>42</sup> HC, p. 55.

<sup>43</sup> HC, p. 198-199.

violate and destroy but to establish relations and create new realities."<sup>44</sup> This is one smaller subset of all possible spaces of appearance, and its main distinctive characteristic is the birth of power. Power born in it is the result of an agreement of many wills and intentions, but an extremely unstable and insecure result.<sup>45</sup>

According to Hannah Arendt, today the public field is destroyed, and that only means that it has lost its characteristics of antiquity's conceptual framework. Primarily those are the characteristics concerning disclosure of subject through words and acts, expressing who someone is in his unique individuality, and unexpectedness, originality of impetus which builds human affairs and relations among people. What used to be the functions of the public field were mostly taken over by its modern substitute - society.

#### SOCIAL FIELD

As already mentioned, the appearance of the social field is not related to some new type of activity that was not there before.<sup>46</sup> Actually, the very correspondence

labor, work / private field  
words and acts / public field

has lost the status of explanatory kit at the moment the society emerged. Now all types of activities are practiced in the social field. Hannah Arendt defines the social field in the following way: "Society is the form"<sup>47</sup> in which the fact of mutual dependence for the sake of life and nothing else assumes public significance and where the activities connected with sheer survival are permitted to appear in public."<sup>48</sup> At its first steps, society was the organization of private property owners who demanded to be guaranteed peaceful conducting of their economic affairs and enjoying of their property and wealth, previously disturbed by the lack of protection and regulation. They didn't accept antiquity's motivation for entering the public - the search for audience and appearance, but brought their own motivation which primarily aimed at the protection of oneself and of one's interests (in their understanding, the interest was private property). The society is similar

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<sup>44</sup> HC, p. 200.

<sup>45</sup> "... power springs up between men when they act together and vanishes the moment they disperse. Because of this peculiarity, which power shares with all potentialities that can only be actualized but never fully materialized, power is to an astonishing degree independent of material factors ..." In: HC, p. 200. "The only indispensable material factor in the generation of power is the living together of people. Only where men live so close together that the potentialities of action are always present can power remain with them ..." In: HC, p. 201. It seems to me that what is mentioned is not enough to develop potentialities of action. What is also needed, in my opinion, is a willful intention to act, intention of participants of the public field to interact so that the power is born. It is not a material factor, but is a factor nonetheless. Moreover, it is needed that participants of the public field keep their character of unique subjectivities to be able to bring something new into the world, to view the world from their own perspectives.

<sup>46</sup> Perhaps it could be said about behavior as a new type of practical activity, but since it is only a degenerated form of action, it is not legitimate to count on it as the fourth type of practical activity.

<sup>47</sup> The word "form" could be replaced here by the words "interpersonal construction".

<sup>48</sup> HC, p. 46.

to a giant (antique) family which as its main concerns put forward economic activities, in other words biological survival. Hannah Arendt stresses one feature of the society so understood, and that is the social pressure to conformity, pressure unbearable for individual to stand against and which essentially threatens plurality, so important for politics and reality itself (reality in the ontological sense).<sup>49</sup>

From the moment the social field emerged, a trend begins that all practical activities be practiced in it. But for some of them this is a favor, for others it is not. Labor and work in the social field experience rise, and words and acts here face the environment which deforms and distorts them and therefore they "flee" to the remaining patches of the public field.<sup>50</sup> According to Hannah Arendt, the society ultimately excludes the possibility of action. People in a society don't act, they behave in the prescribed and expected way. Behavior is a hybrid type of activity, meaning establishing relations among people not based on action, launching an initiative, but based on labor and work. Members of society are not each other's audience but collaborators laboring together for the sake of an easier and more successful survival. They are also uniform by characters, and instead of initiatives and starting something new they just reproduce existing models, roles - they don't disclose themselves as subjects but through stereotyped social roles. The sort of relations established among behaving people leads in the end to the automatization of behavior, that is to the alienation and depersonalization.

#### INTIMATE FIELD

Hannah Arendt rarely mentions the intimate field. For her concept of the intimate field the following are relevant places: "... modern discovery of intimacy seems a flight from the whole outer world into the inner subjectivity of the individual, which formerly had been sheltered and protected by the private realm."<sup>51</sup> and "Compared with the reality which comes from being seen and heard, even the greatest forces of intimate life - the passions of the heart, the thoughts of the mind, the delight of the senses - lead an uncertain, shadowy kind of existence unless they are transformed, deprivatized and deindividualized, as it were, into a shape to fit them for public appearance. The most current of such transformations occurs in storytelling and generally in artistic transposition of individual experiences."<sup>52</sup> On the basis of this, it can be concluded that the intimate field is in "The Human Condition" a field only in the metaphorical sense, being in this conception limited only to the internal space of the subject's body.

I would like to propose another definition of the intimate field. It would be an interpretation according to which it would be a field. This interpretation requires that the

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<sup>49</sup> It is interesting that Hannah Arendt nowhere in "The Human Condition" mentions conformity pressure in antiquity's public realm, nor allows the distinctions among various types of societies that would be to a greater or smaller extent conformistic (corrupting) for individuals.

<sup>50</sup> It could be imagined that the real safeheaven for words and acts is in the intimate field, but Hannah Arendt doesn't allow such a statement because of her notion of the intimate as exclusively limited to intrapsychic boundaries of subjectivity.

<sup>51</sup> HC, p. 69.

<sup>52</sup> HC, p. 50.

intimate field is transformed from intrapsychic to interpersonal construction marked by some specific features which would distinguish it from other such constructions (all three other fields are this - constructions). The main argument in favor of such redefinition of the intimate field is that it is just a continuation of what Hannah Arendt started anyway. Namely, citing Rousseau as the first researcher and theoretician of the intimate, Hannah Arendt underlines: "The intimacy of the heart, unlike the private household, has no objective tangible place in the world, nor can the society against which it protests and asserts itself be localized with the same certainty as the public space. To Rousseau, both the intimate and the social were, rather, subjective modes of human existence ..."<sup>53</sup> For Hannah Arendt the social field did not remain what it was for Rousseau, because she treats the social field as a field analogous to its older counterparts. However, she didn't carry out the same process of modification for the intimate field. I think that it could and had to be carried out. Conceptualized as (ontologically) parallel and equal to the social field, the intimate field could become a domain in which subject discloses itself in a similar way as in antiquity's public field. My suggestion for materialization (operationalization) of the intimate field would be the following: the intimate field represents an emotional order each person creates for him/herself for negotiate transactions with equals about the personal connections that will exist among them. This definition relies on the ideas of Anthony Giddens in "Transformation of Intimacy: Sexuality, Love and Eroticism in Modern Societies". In his introduction he writes: "Some have claimed that intimacy can be oppressive, and clearly this may be so if it is regarded as a demand for constant emotional closeness. Seen, however, as a transactional negotiation of personal ties by equals, it appears in a completely different light. Intimacy implies a wholesale democratising of the interpersonal domain, in a manner fully compatible with democracy in the public sphere."<sup>54</sup> A principal characteristic of the intimate would be disclosure as opposed to functioning - in the intimate there are possibilities for authentic expression, for individuality, for intense and concentrated relation of actor to his/her own acts.

In Hannah Arendt's theory the main obstacle for intimate field to take over the possibilities previously open in antiquity's public field is a difference in the number of participants. Since a great number of others can not be around one subject in the intimate field, a modification of ontological thesis is necessary.

More audience means more appearance means more reality should be changed in order for synergic effects of combining quantity and quality of audience to appear, after which the thesis would be:

Less audience but of intensified presence and witnessing means more appearance means more reality.

This way a new field for action is open. It could be also an auxiliary argument for why suggested reinterpretation of the intimate field is justified. Hannah Ardent's basic idea is a call for recovering of the public field, that is she wants that the society, which has "swallowed" the public field, back up and release at least some space for it. I agree with

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<sup>53</sup> HC, p. 39.

<sup>54</sup> Giddens, Anthony, *The Transformation of Intimacy: Sex, Love and Eroticism in the Modern Societies*, Polity Press, Cambridge, Oxford, 1993; p. 3.

that idea completely. However, I think that other strategies should be explored to find additional place for activities of speech and action. (All the more so since there is no reason for one type of activity to be practiced only in one field.) One such additional place would be in the intimate field. But what still has to be checked is whether action can be preserved if it was to be practiced in the intimate field operationalized in a certain (Giddens') way.

Hannah Arendt lists two reasons why action can not be preserved in the social field: one touches upon the quality of subject and the other upon the conceptual inversions in the social field. In society the action as an expression of uniqueness, individuality, non-repeatability, as starting something new and unexpected, loses its agent due to the influences of conformity pressures and compulsory depersonalization. Moreover, action encourages equality rather than the sameness of acting subjects - which was crystal clear to Ancient Greeks, according to Hannah Arendt, while her contemporaries have inclinations to miss that point of distinction. She draws attention to specially dangerous aspects of equality often emphasized by modern men which are, rightly speaking, only formulae of hidden sameness (equality in the face of death, or before god, lists Hannah Arendt, and I can add: equality by race, national origin etc.).<sup>55</sup>

Nevertheless, none of the mentioned reasons is valid in the case of intimate field - either the reason touching upon the quality of subjects, or the reason touching upon the conceptual inversions of equality and sameness. Therefore the intimate field can substitute the former public field or serve as its complement. There is no incompatibility between the action as described in "The Human Condition" and possibilities open in the intimate field defined in the above suggested way.

#### MEANING OF THE MAPPING OF THE FIELDS - VALUATION

Earlier in this paper I defined the field as a segment of totality identified by being a product of conceptual scheme for distribution of human activities and aspects of human life in the space understood as physical and symbolic. What is the purpose of the mapping of fields? The questioning of the purpose of the scheme which generates segments, that is fields, inevitably leads to perceiving the valuation background of the whole construction. My conclusion therefore is that fields are conceptualized in order to be valued differently, in other words so that what is happening in them can be valued differently.

Hannah Arendt in "The Human Condition" transmits antiquity's value treatment of fields, with which she agrees openly, while she also presents modern value ranking of fields.<sup>56</sup> For fundamental antiquity's dichotomy private/public she writes that it "equals the

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<sup>55</sup> "In these instances, no equalizer is needed because sameness prevails anyhow; by the same token, however, the actual experience of this sameness, the experience of life and death, occurs not only in isolation but in utter loneliness, where no true communication, let alone association and community, is possible. From the viewpoint of the world and the public realm, life and death and everything attesting to sameness are non-worldly, antipolitical, truly transcendent experiences." In: HC, p. 215.

<sup>56</sup> Before presenting her evaluation, it should be stressed that she is conscious of historicity of all value judgements, since she writes, for example about the private, the following: "The emergence of society has changed the estimate of this whole sphere but has hardly transformed its nature." In: HC, p. 46.



distinction between things that should be shown and things that should be hidden".<sup>57</sup> A few paragraphs later a more explicit statement is to be found, according to which "the distinction between private and public coincides with the opposition of necessity and freedom, of futility and permanence, and finally, of shame and honor."<sup>58</sup> Such value polarization is crude enough that its author herself soon mitigates it by stating that "it is not by no means true that only the necessary, the futile, and the shameful have their proper place in the private realm"<sup>59</sup> and she offers the example of good deeds (in the sense of Christian duties) which could be performed only in the private field but which, according to hers and the opinion of wide range of people, are neither necessary, nor futile, nor shameful. The same view is refracted also through the value axis relevant/irrelevant. "Yet there are a great many things which cannot withstand the implacable, bright light of the constant presence of others on the public scene; there, only what is considered to be relevant, worthy of being seen and heard, can be tolerated, so that irrelevant becomes automatically a private matter."<sup>60</sup> Of course, like in the above mentioned case, she immediately mitigates such sharp value polarization: "This, to be sure, does not mean that private concerns are generally irrelevant; on the contrary ... there are very relevant matters which can survive only in the realm of the private. For instance, love ..."<sup>61</sup> In speaking about contemporary time and fields in it, Hannah Arendt uses a different language pattern. A negative appraisal about the social field is given in the form of fear for its extinction, and there are expressions such as: danger comes from it, trend of its promotion is frightening, it destroys some very necessary things. A positive valuation appraisal about the intimate field, although scarce and modest, is given in the form of respect for how rich and diversified it can be.<sup>62</sup>

I would say that Hannah Arendt's value judgements about fields of human life are deeply rooted in her value judgement about the body, that is judgement about the so called biological nature of man. This negatively valued human body as such relies on antiquity's value optics, but lasts until the 20th century. Many people of the 20th century, especially feminist theoreticians, can not agree with it, and I step on their side in this rejection of disrespect towards the body. Namely, this value optics claims: "... from the beginning of history to our own time it has always been the bodily part of human existence that needed to be hidden in privacy, all things connected with the necessity of life process itself, which prior to the modern age comprehended all activities serving the subsistence of the individual and the survival of the species. Hidden away were the laborers who 'with their bodies minister to the (bodily) needs of life' and the women who with their bodies guarantee the physical survival of the species. ... The fact that the modern age emancipated the working classes and the women at nearly the same historical moment must certainly be counted among the characteristics of an age which no longer

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<sup>57</sup> HC, p. 72.

<sup>58</sup> HC, p. 73.

<sup>59</sup> HC, p. 73.

<sup>60</sup> HC, p. 51.

<sup>61</sup> HC, p. 51.

<sup>62</sup> HC, p. 72.

believes that bodily functions and material concerns should be hidden."<sup>63</sup> To complete this view, it should be added that speaking of the hidden as a domain of birth and death, Hannah Arendt relates it to that what is impenetrable to human knowledge "... because man does not know where he comes from when he is born and where he goes when he dies."<sup>64</sup>

It seems, paradoxically enough, that the destiny of the hidden is to provoke its disclosure, which I also undertake here. If hiddenness is not understood as hiddenness from oneself, the unconscious, which Hannah Arendt doesn't propose, then it is hiddenness from the others/audience. The key for interpretation then is how we understand the others/audience. Only in antiquity's interpretation of the others/audience, as exclusively those equal to the subject outside his home/family, the relation hidden/private becomes equivalence, because in Ancient Greece that what is private/in the house is hidden from those outside. In every other possible interpretation of the others/audience, where anybody can be understood as the others/audience, whether this noun be in singular or in plural form, this relation becomes contingent. The hidden then can be equally put in relation to the public, social or intimate, as well as to the private field. In other words, the hidden becomes contingent practice with regard to any field of human life, to any object of hiding. We saw, moreover, that Hannah Arendt brought the hidden in a relation to what is impenetrable to human knowledge. Isn't that relation something like a feedback: what is not known is suppressed from the center of attention, but what is out of the center of attention can not be explored and known? As the breach of that cycle, the very epistemological reasons lead to a negation of impenetrability of the hidden. It could be added that the body has never been in absolute darkness, and the proof for that is that it is in a certain way included in Hannah Arendt's theory, as well as in many others.

As to the judgement that the 20th century is the age which does not believe any more that bodily functions and material concerns should be hidden, I would take it with some reserve, because it can be noticed at least that contemporary attitudes don't necessarily mean that this époque believes that body matters should be open. Certain uneasiness towards the body is still present, but at the same time the awareness of that uneasiness is present, which is the first step toward overcoming and disappearing of that uneasiness. The usage of ethical operators should/should not in regard to this is rare. The appraisal of the body becomes self-conscious, questionable, problematized, chosen. Perhaps the 21st century which has just begun will fulfill the hope of demystifying of the body.

In "The Human Condition" there is an evaluation hierarchy of the fields of human life and a corresponding hierarchy of practical human activities. However, what must be emphasized in the end is that there is also a clear awareness of how differing evaluation statements conflict among themselves because they are what they are - evaluation statements. It is displayed in the following part of the text, which I take the most lucid one of many lucid parts in "The Human Condition". "The conviction that the greatest that man can achieve is his own appearance and actualization is by no means a matter of course. Against it stands the conviction of *homo faber* that a man's products may be more - and not only more lasting - than he is himself, as well as the *animal laborans*' firm belief that

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<sup>63</sup> HC, p. 72-72.

<sup>64</sup> HC, p. 63.

life is highest of all goods. Both therefore ... will incline to denounce action and speech as idleness, idle busybodies and idle talk, and generally will judge public activities in terms of their usefulness to supposedly higher ends - to make the world more useful and more beautiful in the case of *homo faber*, to make life easier and longer in the case of *animal laborans*.<sup>65</sup> Hannah Arendt's view is that human dignity lies in human words and acts, that is in his own disclosure or his political expression/appearance. She is an open proponent of the first of the three mentioned beliefs. However, she realizes that it is equally legitimate to be a proponent of each of the three views. What I want to close this paper with is the conclusion that only in coming to the evaluation underlying mappings (remappings) of the fields of human life do we come to the possibility of choice of our own attitude toward mapping and toward inevitable demarcations on it.

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## PODRUČJA LJUDSKOG ŽIVOTA U "VITA ACTIVA" HANE ARENT

Ivana Ivković

*Na početku rada određuje se metodološka osa za analizu "Vita activa" kao i dve moguće linije razmatranja, glavna i sekundarna; sledi kratko predstavljanje prva dva dela ose, ljudske uslovljenosti i praktičnih aktivnosti, nakon čega u fokus dolaze područja ljudskog života. Rad se bavi definisanjem pojma područja, njihovim konstituisanjem, njihovim odnosima prema aktivnostima i njihovim međusobnim odnosima, njihovim razvojem i odlikama svakog od njih. Cilj istraživanja je otkriti zašto se vrši mapiranje područja u "Vita activa", a odgovor do koga se stiže je da je razlog za mapiranje zapravo vrednovanje ljudskog tela.*

Ključne reči: *mapiranje, područja, privatno, javno, društveno, intimno, vrednovanje.*

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<sup>65</sup> HC, p. 208.