

**AN AESTHETICS
HELDEGER AND THE OVERCOMING OF AESTHETICS**

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Abstract. *Traditionally, art has been defined as essentially mimetic. Indeed, making things ever more complicated, mimesis (as a difference between the original and the copy) is constitutive of the very possibility of philosophy as thinking of (ontological) difference as a difference between Being and beings - origin, ground, principle, idea, on the one hand; and being, appearance, etc., on the other. In his project of overcoming aesthetics or what I call, recalling the movement back (ANA) or against (A), 'anaesthetics.' Heidegger tries to rethink art without recourse to the traditional determination of art as mimesis but, instead, in terms of his conception of truth which itself already attempts to exclude the mimetic dimension of the traditional conception of truth as agreement. I attempt to demonstrate that by so radically excluding mimesis Heidegger reaffirms it. More concretely, in his efforts at thinking Being as such, in its properness and purity, Heidegger reinscribes (translates, mimetizes) a properly metaphysical gesture of identification which, by necessarily passing through and always already appropriated and indifferent Other, reestablishes the well-known subordinations and hierarchies. And all this, on a 'textual level,' through a constant (yet unaddressed and unacknowledged) recourse to tropes and metaphores, illustrations and analogies - in a word, 'mimesis'. He thus - as if anaesthetized - falls victim to his own (an)aesthetics.*

CHAPTER I

OVERVIEW AND LITERATURE REVIEW

"The end of the world is upon us!," some say in fearful anticipation of the steadily approaching new century and, what is more, new millennium. Even though some have pronounced Him dead (finished), His age still seems to be reigning: Lord's Year (Anno Domini) still seems to be ticking...away... toward the end or toward another beginning, whichever one may prefer.

From the very beginning eschatology has permeated man's life. No different does it stand for philosophers and their thinking (if, indeed, they are to be so radically distinguished from "man" and his "life"). The *logos of telos* (as, for example, *eschaton*)

has for a long time preoccupied man's thinking, producing a variety of rather interesting results.

So, for instance, in the 1820s, in his famous *Lectures on Aesthetics*, Hegel proclaimed the end of art. Interestingly enough, it was not long thereafter that we have started to witness an enormous proliferation of new art forms and movements - a succession (or, perhaps, success) which continues well into today.

In 1964 Heidegger wrote an essay entitled "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking" in which he explicitly outlined the effects of his ongoing project of delimiting metaphysics (philosophy as ontotheology) - both in the sense of drawing out the inherent limitations of metaphysical discourse and of pointing out toward an other (way of thinking or Being). As a consequence, Heidegger's thinking has effected a whole array of treatises (including the one on "The End of Book and the Beginning of Writing"), an entire philosophical scene, meditating precisely upon the implications of this alleged closure and devising strategies for its transgression.

It is precisely here - within these limits, within the framework of this stage - that I situate this writing (*écriture*), this work (*ergon*), i.e., this thesis (*thesis*),¹ inquiring into the structure of the implications or multiple unfoldings concerning the variety of "ends" - of philosophy, of art, of aesthetics.

In the winter semester of 1935/36, within the colloquium on "Die Ueberwindung der Aesthetik in der Frage nach der Kunst,"² Heidegger delivered a series of lectures entitled "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes."³ These lectures raised some seemingly strange questions and arrived at some seemingly strange conclusions. What does it mean to say, for example, that "Art is the becoming and happening of truth" (UK, 59/71), or that "The essence of art is poetry" (UK, 63/75)? What are the implications of these and numerous other proclamations? More specifically, what are their implications precisely within the context outlined by the title of the colloquium - namely, within the project of overcoming aesthetics?

Traditionally, art has been defined as essentially mimetic. Indeed, making things ever more complicated, mimesis (as a difference between the original and the copy) is constitutive of the very possibility of philosophy or (ontological) difference as a difference between Being and beings (origin, ground, principle, idea, on the one hand: and beings, appearance, etc., on the other).

In his project of overcoming aesthetics or what I call, recalling the movement back (ana) or against (a), "anaesthetics", Heidegger tries to rethink art without recourse to the traditional determination of art as mimesis but, instead, in terms of his conception of truth which itself already attempts to exclude the mimetic dimension of the traditional conception of truth as agreement.

¹ All of these -- namely, writing, work, thesis -- will be operative throughout this essay and their meaning will be, to a greater or lesser extent, rendered explicit.

² "The Overcoming of Aesthetics in the Question Concerning Art"

³ Hereafter abbreviated as UK. Throughout this text I will be referring to the Gesamtausgabe version of the lecture (GA 5, pp. 1-74). Here I rely on the English translation by Albert Hofstadter, "The Origin of the Work of Art", in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, Martin Heidegger, pp. 17-87. In case of citations the first number refers to the original and the second to the English translation. All modifications will be indicated.

I attempt to demonstrate that by so radically excluding mimesis Heidegger reaffirms it. More concretely, in his efforts at thinking Being as such, in its properness and purity, Heidegger reinscribes (translates, mimetizes) a properly metaphysical gesture of identification which, by necessarily passing through an always already appropriated or indifferent other, reestablishes the well-known subordinations and hierarchies. And all this, on a "properly textual level," through a constant (yet unaddressed and unacknowledged) recourse to tropes and metaphors, illustrations and analogies in a word, "mimesis".

Finding it necessary to provide a proper framework or context, I start off, in Chapter 2, with a fairly detailed account of what is called metaphysics, its end, and possible transgression. Here I mainly rely on Heidegger's "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking".

Chapter 3 examines the possibility of transgression passing or overcoming or transgression of metaphysics and aesthetics. Heidegger's text "Ueberwindung der Metaphysik" proved to be very useful here.

Chapter 4 provides necessary background for the understanding of Heidegger's notion of truth as developed in *Being and Time* and "On the Essence of Truth".

Chapter 5 gives a brief historical account of aesthetics. Heidegger's notes *Zur Ueberwindung der Aesthetik. Zu 'Ursprung des Kunstwerkes'* give a nice lead toward "The Origin of the Work of Art".

In Chapter 6 I give a fairly comprehensive interpretation of "The Origin of the Work of Art". Indeed, as any other, this interpretation is by no means devoid of violence.

Extensive footnotes provide the necessary critical apparatus.

CHAPTER 2 THE END OF METAPHYSICS

In his essay "The End of Metaphysics: Closure and Transgression"⁴ Sallis proposes that the title be read under erasure for, on the one hand, it indicates nothing of the complex of senses, the multiplicity of determinations, of the end of metaphysics; and, on the other hand, there is a self-effacement operative in the very question of the end of metaphysics since the very notion of "end" (telos, peras, terminus) is a properly metaphysical one. Sallis distinguishes four primary senses of the end of metaphysics – namely, termination, completion, gathering, and closure. All of these senses, according to Sallis, are subject to a certain (self)-effacement or erosion which closes them down into the figure of the last of these determinations – the sense of end as closure. The figure of closure (of metaphysics) describes the situation in which we find ourselves today. It would be the task of thought in this contemporary situation to try to disrupt closure: "to think at the end of metaphysics would be to transgress closure".⁵ Such is, at least, the project outlined by Heidegger in his famous essay "The End of Philosophy and The Task

⁴ John Sallis, *Delimitations*, pp. 17-28.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

of Thinking".⁶

So, what is philosophy? What is metaphysics? And, moreover, what is this end or closure that haunts them?

In response to the title of the first section of his essay, "To what extent has philosophy in the present age entered into its end?", Heidegger gives a fairly comprehensive assessment, first of philosophy and then of its end or completion:

Philosophy is metaphysics. Metaphysics thinks beings as a whole – the world, man, God – with respect to their Being, with respect to the belonging together of beings in Being. Metaphysics thinks beings as Being in the manner of a representational thinking that gives grounds. For since the beginning of philosophy, and with that beginning, the Being of beings has shown itself as the ground (arche, aition, principle). The ground is that from which beings as such are what they are in their becoming, perishing, and persisting as something that can be known, handled, and worked upon. As the ground, Being brings beings in each case to presencing. The ground shows itself as presence.⁷

Here we can discern three interrelated determinations of metaphysics, three interconnected ways in which metaphysics represents beings – namely, with respect to their Being, i.e., their ground, i.e., their presence. This representing, this movement of referral, is precisely that fundamental question in which metaphysics is constituted – the metaphysical question of Being. Sallis explains that by this very movement the figure of closure begins to take shape or, rather, "comes to be the shape of metaphysics".⁸

Heidegger rigorously redetermines the sense of the ending, distinguishing it from simple termination and completion in the sense of perfection; instead, it is a kind of gathering:

The end of philosophy is the place, that place in which the whole of philosophy's history is gathered in its most extreme possibility [aeusserste Moeglichkeit]. End as completion [Vollendung] means this gathering [Versammlung].⁹

In clarifying this point, Sallis makes two important observations. First is that Heidegger's determination of end represents a kind of displacement of the classical sense of end as telos – as the fundamental sense of actualization articulated, for instance, by the movement of Hegelian *Aufhebung* as surpassing-and-elevating movement of gathering of what is lower into what is higher or as a process of incorporation or interiorization as gathering of what is extrinsic to the intrinsic, to the center. Thus, "the displacement which determines the Heideggerian gathering is governed by the two oppositions center/extreme

⁶ Martin Heidegger, "Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens" in *Zur Sache des Denkens*, pp. 61-90. Translation by David Faffell Krell, in *Basic Writings*, pp. 431-449.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 432. In many respects adhering to Heidegger's assessment of metaphysics of presence (philosophy as ontotheology), Derrida explains that if Being is in effect a process of appropriation, to it necessarily belongs the question of the proper/ty. Derrida distinguishes two kinds of appropriating mastery -- hierarchy (ontological subordination) and envelopment (the whole is implied in each part) -- by which philosophical discourse exercises its power of infinite incorporation or internalization (or every limit). See "Tympan", pp. xix-xx, Jacques Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, translation by Alan Bass.

⁸ Sallis, "The End of Philosophy: Closure and Transgression", @ p. 26.

⁹ Heidegger, "Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens" (63/433, translation modified).

and actuality/possibility. It is a matter of gathering not to the center but to the most extreme and of gathering not into actuality but into possibility".¹⁰ Second, Sallis connects Heidegger's phrase "the most extreme possibility" (*aeusserste Moeglichkeit*) to its earlier occurrence in *Being and Time*, in the existential analysis of death, where death is described precisely in those terms – namely, as *Dasein's* extreme possibility which cannot be surpassed or outstripped and which closes off all other possibilities. This is exactly analogous to the "death" of metaphysics – that is, to "an end which takes the form of closure",¹¹ and which has always already been there, at the very inception of metaphysics as well as at its end.

In response to the title of the second section of the lecture, "What task is reserved for thinking at the end of philosophy?", Heidegger offers a strategy for the *Verwindung der Metaphysik* – an overcoming of metaphysics by means of a rigorous critique of the metaphysical question of Being. According to Sallis, Heideggerian transgression takes the form of questioning beyond Being (*epekeina tes ousias*) – beyond Being, that is, as determined by metaphysics – and begins as early as *Being and Time* where the transgression occurs "precisely into the movement beyond Being to time as the meaning of Being".¹² In "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking" the transgression is even more explicit. Heidegger begins with the programmatic call of phenomenology for the rigorously scientific return "to the thing itself" (*zur Sache selbst*) which is, in fact, a reiteration of the classical demand found already in Plato who calls on binding thought to "the thing itself" (*to pragma auto*), or in Hegel's speculative dialectic which similarly summons thinking "to the things themselves" (*zu den Sachen selbst*). Heidegger next asks as to what remains unthought in this call – that is, what is the condition for the possibility of such a call and its various articulations and manifestations, whether it be in the form of Platonism, speculative dialectic, or Husserl's phenomenology:

Such appearance necessarily occurs in luminosity. Only by virtue of some sort of brightness can what shines show itself, that is, radiate. But brightness in its turn rests upon something open, something free, which it might illuminate here and there, now and then. Brightness plays in the open and strives there with darkness.¹³

This open space in which brightness and showing come into play Heidegger calls clearing (*Lichtung*):

Light can stream into the clearing [*Lichtung*], into its open [*Offenes*], and let brightness play with darkness in it. But light never first creates the clearing. Rather, light presupposes it [...]. The clearing is the open region for everything that becomes present and absent.¹⁴

¹⁰ Sallis, "The End of Metaphysics: Closure and Transgression", p. 21.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 26.

¹³ Heidegger, "Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens", p. 72/441.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p.

72/442. Speaking (or, rather, writing) no longer in terms of discourse or even thinking but in terms of text, instead of asking "the question about Being", Derrida asks "the question of the margin". To ask the question of the margin is to interrogate philosophy beyond its meaning, beyond the self-enclosure in the representation of its

Thus, beyond the totality of speculative dialectic or the immanence of Husserl's phenomenology and as a condition for their possibility – e.e., the possibility of the very belonging together of Being and thinking – there arises the "well-rounded concealment" (*aletheias eukukleios*) – the self-concealing clearing (*Lichtung*), *a-letheia*.

In the texts presiding this one Heidegger translates *aletheia* as "truth". So, we could say, it is truth as self-concealing clearing that comes (in)to play as the open region of beings, that is, Being. In fact, this is precisely what Heidegger asserts when in "The Origin of the Work of Art", specifying the ways in which truth takes place or establishes itself, he defines art as "truth's putting itself (in)to (the) work" (*das Sich-ins-Werk-Setzen der Wahrheit*). It appears, then, that art is to be thought ontologically, even if ontology is to be considered anew – as passing above or, rather, below (in the form of fundamental ontology) the metaphysical question of Being.

So, what does it mean to think (about) art in this novel space or, rather, *as* this novel space? In what way does the *Verwindung der Metaphysik* correspond to the *Ueberwindung der Aesthetik*?

own limit; it is to treat philosophy not as a discourse but as a determined text, inscribed in a general text (a weave of differences of forces without any center of reference), which overflows and cracks its meaning; and to inquire into the superfluous implications (unfoldings of the structure of the limit [margin/remark/march or walk], of interiority always already implied in exteriority and vice versa) and fissures or caesuras (openings, spacings or interruptions in the presumed firmness and solidity of univocity or regulated polysemia) is to propose a double understanding/hearing which no longer forms a singular, unitary system. It is also, and perhaps above all, to trace the remnants and vestiges of the metaphysical traits in Heidegger's own text, normally under the rubric of logo- or phonocentrism manifested in the (pre)supposed privilege given to speech (*Rede*), nearness (*Naehe*), or Ereignis Derrida, "Tympan", pp. xix-xxiii.

In a similar fashion (with, however, more pronounced political or "ethical" overtones), Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe declares that *La philosophie est finie*, philosophy is finite/finished, proposing that we should be modest by recognizing the uncrossable limit of philosophy's "closure", of the exhaustion of the possibility of determination of thinking. This recognition consists in, what Lacoue-Labarthe calls, an "obscure imperative", a paradoxical task of resistance (or, as Lacoue-Labarthe often calls it, "desistance") to the voluntaristic habitus or suspension of the will (to a thesis) and thus a will without will. As a consequence, this modesty forces upon us, what Lacoue-Labarthe calls, a "disarmed responsibility" which, concretely speaking, calls for another kind of writing: "There is no other possibility except that possibility apparently without possibility that is interruption, suspension, fragmentation or extenuation. Hence, work-lessness. "This worklessness, on Lacoue-Labarthe's account, has been at work from the very beginning of philosophy (in a way making possible the very presentation of the hyperbolic idea of the oeuvre), has become increasingly apparent since Romanticism, to the point where it now designates the commentary on philosophy (this being, self-admittedly, especially evident in "incontestably the greatest thinker of the age", Heidegger). See "The Age's Modesty", pp. 1-9, in Lacoue-Labarthe's *Heidegger, Art, and Politics: The Fiction of the Political*, translation by Chris Turner. Therefore, for instance, this very (long) footnote, this interruption, this extenuation, this prosthetic limb offsetting the main body of the text and at the same time providing support or footing to the very work of its posit(ion)ing, to its (in fact, this) thesis by, for instance, a further reference to my own text and, more precisely, a footnote concerning the subject of footnote and responsibility in my "Reading Derrida's "Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority", or, yet even better, by a reference to the remarkable writings by David Wills concerning *Prosthesis*.

CHAPTER 3
ANAESTHETIC IMPASSABILITIES

To step over or transgress is to re-affirm a limit B even if that be a new frontier (limes) or threshold (limen) leading (in)to the radiant meadow (leimon) or Lichtung. To turn over or overcome *Ueberwinden* is to transgress and thus re-establish, through repetition, the same totality only slightly altered or transformed. Heidegger is very much aware of this and realizes that his project of overcoming metaphysics cannot consist in a simple move of abolishing or leaving behind. Instead, the move is more complicated, more twisted: instead of *Ueberwindung*, we should think of it as *Verwindung* an involutive shifting or dis-placing (Verruecken) that is more torsional (verdreht) and that twists free (Herausdrehen) even to the point of no longer making sense or to the point of going crazy (verrueckt).¹⁵

In his further readings of the end of philosophy Sallis proposes that this movement be dubbed "double" B as a movement at the limit of metaphysics incorporating *Einblick* as well as *Rueckblick*, *Einkehr* as well as *Rueckkehr*, that is to say, transgression (moving ahead or above) that is at the same time regression (re-turn or moving below).¹⁶ This operation is to a greater or less extent at work in every segment of Heidegger's corpus B from the task (Aufgabe) of de(con)struction of the history of ontology by stepping back (Schritt zurueck) to its fundamental manifestations, to the task (Aufgabe) of thinking the history of (the oblivion) of Being in terms of expropriating appropriation (Ereignis).¹⁷

¹⁵ In Part One of his *Nietzsche* entitled "The Will to Power as Art", in the chapter on "Nietzsche's Overturning [Umdrehung or Ueberwindung] of Platonism", which, according to Heidegger, represents the inversion of the Platonic hierarchy supersensible/sensible and which Heidegger sees as in the end remaining caught or entangled (Verstrickung) in metaphysics Heidegger writes, indicating the dangers of possible passability or transgression: "During the time the overcoming [Umdrehung] of Platonism became for Nietzsche a twisting free [Herausdrehung] of it, madness befell him" (GA 6.1, p. 204; also quoted in Sallis' "Meaning Adrift", in *Delimitations*, p. 160); Heidegger, "Ueberwindung der Metaphysik", in *Vortraege und Aufsaeetze*, pp. 71-99.

¹⁶ Sallis, "Nonphilosophy", in *Echoes: After Heidegger*, pp. 15-44.

Questioning the status or stature of metaphysics and its closure (clôture), Derrida asserts that here we are not dealing with a linear or circular closure surrounding a homogenous space (this precisely representing the auto-representation of philosophy in its onto-encyclopedic logic) but, instead, with a structure that is twisted and the figure of which Derrida proposes to call "invaginated" (invaginée). (Indeed, in the word "invaginated" we should not fail to hear the echoes [out] of the same "vagina" [Scheide] constitutive of the German Unter-Schied [Heidegger's preferred word for "difference"]: "invaginated" or, we could also say using Lacoue-Labarthe's translation of Heraclitus' *en diaphero heauto* [which is, as Lacoue-Labarthe reminds us, Hoelderlin's idea of the essence of the beautiful], "en différance"). Derrida concludes by a series of quotations from his "Différance": "the text of metaphysics' is 'not surrounded but traversed by its limit', 'marked on its inside by the multiple track of its margin', 'a simultaneously traced and effaced trace, alive and dead simultaneously'. "La retrait de la métaphore", in *Psyché*, p. 72. Translation by Frieda Gardner, et al. in *Enclitic II* (Fall 1978), p. 14.

In his "Vom Wesen des Grundes" Heidegger proposes that the ecstatic freedom of Dasein's transcendence as Being-in-the-world should be thought of as *Ueberstieg* (GA 9, pp. 123-175). In his *Le pas au-delà* Meurice Blanchot translates "Ueberstieg" as precisely "pas au-dela", "step (not) beyond" signifying a paradoxical movement of simultaneous coming (à venir) and return (revenir). We shall return to this soon he reafter.

¹⁷ "The Ueberwindung of metaphysics is thought of in terms of the history of Being. It is the sign of the original Verwindung of the oblivion of Being. More primal, even though more concealed than the original sign, is what shows itself in that sign. This is the appropriation [Ereignis] itself [...]. The Ueberwindung is worthy of thought only in so far as it is thought of in terms of Verwindung. This persistent thinking at the same time still thinks about Ueberwindung. Such remembrance [Andenken] experiences the unique appropriation [Ereignis] of the

Thus, in this rather complex context (rendered even more difficult by Heidegger's constant rereadings and reinterpretations) I take up the task of retracing and eventually assessing the effects of Heidegger's attempt at overcoming metaphysics as inscribed in his project of overcoming aesthetics itself being situated at a difficult point (in fact, itself constituting that very moment) of Heidegger's turning (Kehre) from fundamental ontology toward thinking (about) *Ereignis*.

I contend, bearing in mind Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche, that, if we are to think about *Ueberwindung* as merely an inversion and thus a repetition or mere translation of a properly metaphysical gesture of re-founding and re-establishing, Heidegger's attempt at rethinking *Ueberwindung* in terms of the dis-placing movement of *Verwindung* is only of partial success, suffering from similar "metaphysical entanglements" which Heidegger observes in Nietzsche. More concretely, in his move against (a[n]) aesthetics which is also a move back or beyond (*ana* a move upstream, toward the origin ([Urprung]) the metaphysical determination of art as essentially mimetic B Heidegger performs a radical exclusion and re-placement of mimesis. By doing so he renders his powers impassible and, as if anaesthetized, fails to notice that by so decisively excluding mimesis he, in effect, reinscribes it throughout the very space of its "absence". In other words, still thinking about difference precisely in terms of terms and thus virtually effacing it, Heidegger comes short of carrying out the (dis)torsional movement of displacement B the movement of *deposition*, that is to say, *différance*. In his quest after the origin(al), Heidegger fails to notice that the origin(al) (Being: *aletheia* as the work of art) is always already de-positated or differed/deferred i.e., it is always already traversed or "contaminated" by imitation or mimesis, it is always already translated, and thus can never be extracted in its purity by the appropriative move of expropriation or excommunication of mimesis from the philosophical city.

CHAPTER 4 ONTOLOGY OF ART

Some twenty years after the delivery, as if reassuring the "truth" of his earlier writings,¹⁸ Heidegger supplemented his lectures on "The Origin of the Work of Art" with an Addendum. There he explains that the question concerning art, the entire essay on "The Origin of The Work of Art", is to be thought exclusively with regard to the question of Being: "Art is considered neither an area of cultural achievement nor an appearance of spirit; it belongs to the Ereignis by way of which the "meaning of Being" (cf. *Being and Time*) can alone be defined" (UK, 73/86, translation modified).¹⁹ Even though in the text

expropriation [Enteignung] of beings, in which the need [Not] of the truth of Being, and thus the origination [Anfaengnis] of truth, opens up and radiates upon human being in the manner of departing [abschiedlllich]. Die Ueberwindung ist die Ueber-lieferung der Metaphysik in ihre Wahrheit ("The Ueberwindung is the delivering over of metaphysics to its truth" or "The Ueberwindung is the tradition of/as metaphysics in its truth")." Heidegger, "Ueberwindung der Metaphysik", p. 79.

¹⁸ Observation made by Marc Froment-Meurice in his "On the Origin (of Art)", p. 149, *That Is to Say Heidegger's Poetics*, pp. 149-177. The practice of reassessment or supplementation by means of notes, marginal remarks or addenda is constantly at work throughout Heidegger's corpus.

¹⁹ The word "Ereignis" is translated in many ways. In his essay "Transitions of *Lichtung*", Krell proposes

proper the move is only "implicit" or "tacit" (unausgesprochen) it is, nevertheless, "deliberate" (wissentlich). It is also a move that, by means of a direct reference, takes us back to Section 44 of *Being and Time*, "Dasein, Disclosedness, and Truth", in which Heidegger offers the first version of his radical reinterpretation of the essence of truth.²⁰

In Section 44, proceeding along the lines of *legein* (apophainesthai) ta phainomena,²¹ Heidegger begins by inquiring into the way in which truth is defined proximally and for the most part, that is, he begins by investigating the traditional conception of truth. Traditionally, the essence of truth has been defined as *adequatio* [correspondentia] *intellectus et rei* – an agreement, adequation, or correspondence between knowing (subject) and the thing (object). Heidegger next asks as to what makes this relationship possible, what is there "tacitly posited" (unausdruecklich mitgesetzt), that is, what kind of Being belongs to this relational totality. Closing the circle, Heidegger concludes that the Being of truth lies in discovering (Entdecken) – precisely in the sense of *apophansis* as "taking beings out of their concealment and letting them be seen in their unconcealment

"appropriation" as the proper translation and also reminds us that it has often been forgotten that "Heidegger's own way of giving Ereignis concrete meaning is through thought on *Lichtung*, the clearing of Being", p. 81., David Ferrell Krell, *Intimations of Mortality*, pp.80-89.

²⁰ "If we recollect how truth as unconcealment [Unverborgenheit] of beings means nothing but the presence of beings as such, that is, Being – see page 72 [60] – then talk about the self-establishing of truth, that is, of Being, in all that is, touches on the problem of ontological deference (cf. *Identität und Differenz*, 1957, pp. 37ff.)" (UK, Addendum, 73/86). For this reason there is a note of caution which, practically, is given the task of spanning the period of some thirty years – i.e., from *Being and Time* to the Addendum, and beyond to *Identity and Difference* – and thus mediating the movement from the question concerning the meaning of Being to thinking (about) the event (Ereignis); the cautionary passage reads:

"In referring to the self-establishing [Sich-einrichten] of openness [Offenheit] in the open [Offene], thinking touches upon a sphere that cannot yet be explicated here. Only this much should be noted, that if the nature of unconcealedness of beings belongs in any way to Being itself (cf. *Being and Time*, Sec. 44), then Being, from its own nature, lets the play [Spielraum] of openness (the clearing of "there") [die *Lichtung des Da*] take place, bringing it in in such a way that in it each being emerges [aufgeht] in its own way" (UK, 49/61, translation modified).

²¹ In the Introduction, outlining "The Phenomenological Method of Investigation" (Sec. 7), Heidegger explains that, formally, *legein* (apophainesthai) ta phainomena, as "letting that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself" (i.e., its Being), corresponds to the maxim "Zu den Sachen selbst!" Proximally and for the most part, however, each phenomenon remains hidden or covered up. So, it is the de(con)structive task of phenomenology (the theme of *Destruktion* is more explicitly elaborated in *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, the text which in many respects represents a [still unfinished] continuation of *Being and Time* B Division Three as a projected sequel of the incomplete Division Two of Part One briefly outlined in the Introduction (Section 6) as "The Task of a Destruction [Die Aufgabe einer Destruktion] of the History of Ontology", indeed, as under the guidance of the problem of temporality [SZ, 20, 39-40]) to uncover that which lies hidden and which essentially constitutes its meaning and its ground – i.e., its Being. Heidegger concludes: "Only as phenomenology is ontology possible. In the phenomenological conception of 'phenomenon' what one has in mind as that which shows itself is the Being of beings, its meaning, its modifications and derivations. Moreover, "it is necessary that there should be a fundamental ontology taking as its theme that being which is ontologico-ontically distinctive, Dasein, in order to confront the cardinal problem – the question of the meaning of Being in general" (SZ, 35). Opening up Section 44, Heidegger reproduces a series of citations from Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, culminating in the definition of philosophy as the science of truth (episteme tes aletheias) and the science of being as being (to on he on) – i.e., being in its Being. From there, from the essential confluence of truth and Being, Heidegger similarly concludes that the phenomenon of truth is also to be considered within the problematic of fundamental ontology (SZ, 213). All citations from *Being and Time* follow the original annotation. I am using the *Gesamtausgabe* (GA 2) edition which also includes marginal notes. I have consulted the Macquarrie and Robinson English translation.

(discoveredness)" (SZ, 219). This discovering of beings, their unconcealment (Unverborgenheit), is, in turn, grounded in the disclosedness (Erschlossenheit) of Dasein.

In its disclosedness, "*Dasein is 'in truth'*" (SZ, 221). Moreover, Dasein is also in untruth – i.e., just as it uncovers and discovers beings, so does it, in its falling (Verfallen) among *das Man*, cover them up or close them off. Concluding the Section (and, in fact, the entire Part One), Heidegger writes:

"There is" Being – not beings – only in so far as truth is. And truth is only in so far and as long as Dasein is. Being and truth "are" equipromordial. What it means that Being "is" where it is to be distinguished from every being,²² can be concretely asked only if the meaning of Being has been clarified. Only then can be originally analyzed what belongs to the concept of a science *of Being as such*, its possibilities and variations. And in delimiting this research and its truth is the research as discovering (Entdecken) of beings and its truth to be determined (SZ, 230).²³

The movement of *the Verwindung der Metaphysik* by means of fundamental ontology as a movement away from anthropologicist and subjectivistic representational thinking toward questioning that engages in a transformed relationship to Being, bringing the truth of Being nearer B this movement is carried out even more decisively in the essay "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit".²⁴ Similar to the procedure in Section 44 of *Being and Time*, Heidegger begins by inquiring into the possibility or essence of the traditional concept of propositional truth only to conclude that the essence of truth that is to say, the truth of essence B lies in freedom of the transcendent or ecstatic Dasein. The essence or truth of Dasein is ecstasy or existence and, in turn, Dasein's existence or freedom constitutes the essence or truth of truth or essence.²⁵ More concretely, in its freedom i.e., in its existence

²² That is to say, what is the meaning of ontological difference. In the margins Heidegger remarks: "ontological difference".

In his essay "Différance", drawing a difference between *différance* and ontological difference (which itself is not a difference at all -- at least not between two kinds of things or beings), Derrida writes: "Différance is not a 'species' of the genus ontological difference. If the 'gift' of presence is the property of Appropriating = (Die Gabe von Anwesen ist Eigentum des Ereignens)= ['Time and Being', in *On Time and Being*], *différance* is not a process of appropriation in any sense whatever. It is neither position (appropriation) nor negation (expropriation), but rather other. Hence it seems, but here, rather, we are marking the necessity of a future itinerary that *différance* would be no more a species of the genus Ereignis than Being." Derrida, *Margins*, p. 27. See also Froment-Meurice, "The Different Step: From Heidegger to Derrida", p. 217, in his *That Is to Say: Heidegger's Poetics*, pp. 195-221.

²³ Similarly, concluding the Introduction, Heidegger emphatically asserts that "Being is the transcendent pure and simple", and that "Phenomenological truth (disclosedness [Erschlossenheit] of Being) is *veritas transcendentalis*" (SZ, 38). Indeed, these are not to be thought metaphysically. Marginal notes assure of this: "Of course, not 'transcendent' -- despite all its metaphysical connotations -- in the scholastic sense or in the sense of Platonic *koinon*, but transcendence (Transcendenz) as the ecstatic (das Ekstatische), i.e., temporality (both Zeitlichkeit and Temporallität), i.e., 'horizon'. Being 'houses' beings (Seyn hat Seyendes 'ueberdacht'). Transcendence of the truth of Being here means: the Ereignis".

²⁴ "On the Essence of Truth", GA 9, pp. 177-202, translation by David Farrell Krell in *Basic Writings*, pp. 115-138. This is how Heidegger outlines or frames the intended project almost twenty years later by a note added to the text in 1949, p. 201/137.

²⁵ Once again we find ourselves in the difficult domain of ontological difference. In the note of 1949 Heidegger explains that the question about the essence of truth stems from the question about the truth of essence. The "subject of proposition" (truth of essence) is to be understood in the following way: "essence" here signifies

as ecstatic standing out in the open Dasein provides for the possibility or essence of such an openness i.e., of *aletheia* as the essence of truth. Truth in its essence, however, is also untruth and as such, in Dasein's insistence (as opposed to existence), takes the form of mystery and its forgottenness, and errancy.

Now, around the same time of inquiring into, what we may call, the fundamental possibility of ethics,²⁶ Heidegger begins his investigations of aesthetics.²⁷

CHAPTER 5 MINMETOLOGY,²⁸ A NOTE ON HISTORY OF AESTHETICS

In the Epilogue to "The Origin of the Work of Art" (which was, according to Heidegger, added to the text shortly after its completion) Heidegger offers a quick retrospective view onto the outcome by saying that, far from attempting to solve the enigma (Raetsel) of art, the task (Aufgabe) is to see the enigma.²⁹ Heidegger explains that an attempt has been made at thinking the essence of art by taking a few steps (Schritte) toward the question concerning the origin of the work of art (where origin is to be thought precisely in terms of the essence of truth) and all this as a response to the judgment passed

"Seyn" Heidegger's new name (but, in fact, an archaic name for "Being") for the difference between Being and beings, for the ontological difference; and "truth" signifies "sheltering that clears" (lichtendess Bergen), i.e., Being as *Lichtung*, i.e., *aletheia*, i.e., the essence of (propositional) truth. Now, if we relate this rather complicated proposition to the one of the marginal note to *Being and Time* where "Beyng 'houses' beyngs" and where the transcendence of the truth of Being is to be thought in terms of Ereignis (note 20 of this text), we may conclude that the essence of truth resides in Ereignis, i.e., the truth of Being, i.e., Seyn, i.e., ontological difference. And here we seem to begin to flounder, losing the footing or ground (fundus) and turning from the seemingly – edifice of fundamental ontology toward a more (ethe)real yet also more eventful thinking and experience of Ereignis.

²⁶ Heidegger explains: "Freedom is not merely what common sense is content to let pass under this name: the caprice, turning up occasionally in our choosing, of inclining in this or that direction. Freedom is not mere absence of constraint with respect to what we can or cannot do. Nor is it on the other hand mere readiness for what is required and necessary (and so somehow a being). Prior to all this ('negative' and 'positive' freedom), freedom is engagement in the disclosure of beings as such. Disclosedness itself is conserved in existent engagement, through which the openness of the open region, i.e., the 'there' (Da), is what it is" (GA 9, 189/126).

²⁷ The first version of Heidegger's essay on the origin of the work or art appeared under the corresponding title "Vom Ursprung des Kunstwerks". And in the Epilogue to the *Gesamtausgabe* edition (which is, according to the editor, the third and, evidently, considerably expanded and altered version appearing some four years after the first) we are reminded that the word "origin" is to be thought of in terms of the essence of truth: AWas das Wort Ursprung hier meint, ist aus dem Wesen der Wahrheit gedacht [UK, 69].

²⁸ Explaining the way in which identity (la propriété, properness, property; or être-propre, being in oneself, being-proper) derives from mimetic appropriation, Lacoue-Labarthe shows that the Hegelian formulation of the dialectical principle (according to which identity is the identity of identity and difference) presupposes an original attribution of identity. Speculative dialectic, thus, could be seen as an eschatology of the identical and as such could be called "mimetology". And, "as long as this logic underpins the interpretation of mimesis, one can only ever move endlessly from the same to the other under the authority of the same". This logic, which is also the basis of what Lacoue-Labarthe calls "onto-typology", must be rethought rigorously and soon hereafter we shall inquire into the strategies of doing so. See Lacoue-Labarthe's "The Truth of the Political", in his *Heidegger, Art, and Politics: The Fiction of the Political*, pp. 71-91.

²⁹ How one sees an enigma is yet another enigma, for in principle an enigma can only be heard", observes Froment-Meurice rather humorously in passing that is, in taking a "Step (Not) Beyond", (pas audelà), in his *That Is to Say: Heidegger's Poetics*, pp. 178-194.

by Hegel concerning the end of art upon which a decision has not yet been made. Hegel's *Lectures on Esthetics*, according to Heidegger, represent the most comprehensive account on the essence of art that the West possesses. It is the most comprehensive consideration because it stems from metaphysics; for this reason its judgment is still in effect (UK, pp. 66-70).³⁰

In his examination of "Mimesis and the End of Art"³¹ Sallis explains that the metaphysical determination of art is essentially mimetic and that it comes to its culmination precisely in Hegel's judgment concerning the end of art.³² Hegel's consideration of aesthetics represents a synthesis or thinking together or *Aufhebung* of what Sallis calls the ancient "axiomatization of contrary values".

In the *Republic* Plato sets up a well-known proposition (in this case an "antithesis")

³⁰ The completion [Vollendung] of metaphysics begins with Hegel's metaphysics of absolute knowledge as the spirit of the will [...]. In spite of the superficial talk about the breakdown of Hegelian philosophy, one thing remains true: only this philosophy determined reality in the nineteenth century, although not in the external form of a doctrine followed but rather as metaphysics, as the dominance of beingness in the sense of certainty. The counter-movements to this metaphysics belong to it. Ever since Hegel's death (1831), everything is merely a counter-movement, not only in Germany but also in Europe". Heidegger, "Ueberwindung der Metaphysik", p. 76.

³¹ Sallis, *Deleuzian Truth*, pp. 171-189.

³² Inquiring into the origin of aesthetics, in a note on "Aesthetics. Truth and Beauty", Heidegger reminds us that, curiously enough, aesthetics has existed long before the word and the notion appeared:

"Where does it begin? Some place where the beautiful is essentially applied to art? No!

Then the question is still how the beautiful and beauty are understood. As long as beauty is considered as a figure of truth in the original sense (aletheia), that is, even more originary than the truth in the sense of proposition and correctness and expression and logical thought (e.g., Schiller and also Kant), beauty remains essentially related to Being and its 'uncovering' ['Enthuellung'], i.e., to the Greek foundation.

However, here [we must take into consideration] the position of the reign of nothing [Nichtbewaltigens] together with the reign of nothing of truth as aletheia.

As soon as truth collapses, beauty can no longer be grasped. That is to say, Plato apprehends beauty as the captivating rapture [das Entzueckend-Berueckende]. But while he apprehends it and does not ground aletheia, the beautiful becomes only the he apprehends it and does not ground aletheia, the beautiful becomes only the captivating [Berueckenden] which, as the sensual, only points at or indicates the proper Being (idea). E.G., *techne B trition apo tes aletheias B as Being qua idea!*

The first time the beautiful starts referring to the state of affairs and this as such is elevated ('lived experience' ['Erlebnis']), i.e., where aletheia collapses in all its consequences, and where *techne*, likewise not as the departure of aletheia there begins the 'aesthetic', long before the notion and the word came to be". Heidegger, *Zur Ueberwindung der Aesthetik. Zu "Ursprung des Kunstwerks"*, the notes produced, according to the editor, around 1934, somewhere between the first and the third version of the text, published in *Heidegger Studies* (1990).

Outlining the genealogy of aesthetics, Froment-Meurice asks: "But what is aesthetics? Recently invented (at the end of the eighteenth century), the word is first of all a scholarly term translated literally from Greek. From the beginning, mimesis, the imitation of nature, but here of a dead language, presides over its destiny". Froment-Meurice continues, commenting on Heidegger's curious comment (here found in Heidegger's *Nietzsche*):

"Aesthetics as a theory of art thus appeared before the word, and essentially as the ontological point of view on the phenomenon that never claimed for itself the pure contemplation or *theoria* of Being. If the *aistheton* names the sensible not for itself but already in opposition and subordination to what gives sense to the sensible, namely, the idea, which is never sensible, then the name 'aesthetics' reveals its metaphysical origin. The beautiful has the privilege of making the non-visible of pure sight seen, of therefore being the postman [facteur] of Being, he who carries the letter of Being [la lettre de l'être] to the right destination. The beautiful produces Being, not in the sense of fabricating it (Being is neither made nor engendered), but in the sense that it displays or exposes it. Hence, art has always been thought according to what I call the 'principle of exposition'. "Step (Not) Beyond", pp. 179-181.

according to which "the old quarrel between philosophy and poetry is to be settled (there is now order in the house in the oikos or, in this event, *polis!*) by an ontological subordinative economical ordering which enthrones philosophy (truth, *eidos*) at the cost of excommunicating poetry (phantom, *phantasma*). On the other hand in fact, as Sallis aptly observes, in the fields outside the city B in *Phaedrus* Plato offers a view upon (in this case a "thesis") beauty (to kalon) as the exquisite shinning forth (ekphanestaton) that is most lovely (erasimotaton) and by which, consequently, the work of art receives a privileged site. This thesis is reinforced in Aristotle's *Poetics* where mimesis is defined as the a priori of poetry B providing delight as well as disclosure of truth.

Now, Hegel begins his *Aesthetics* by a radical criticism of mimesis as a formal imitation (Nachahmung) of what is merely present, of particular thing in nature. This purely formal principle, on Hegel's view, cannot constitute the end or purpose (Zweck) of art. The work of art is an appearance that presents (Darstellen) something else, through which some *content* distinct from the work is presented. So, not unlike in Aristotle, art is to be defined as a sensuous presentation (Darstellung) and uncovering (Enthüllen) of truth or spirit whose appearance (Schein) is, like in Plato, the beautiful. Therefore, mimesis is reaffirmed and reinscribed (thesis), this time under the name of *Darstellung*. However, on the other hand (antithesis), as such art appears inadequate with respect to the high phase of the content to be presented inadequate with regard to the highest end of spirit as the self-presentation of itself in its true form and content which is the purpose of philosophy. Falling short of that end, art is at an end. Thus, thinking the axiomatics of contrary values together in the synthesis of its *Aufhebung*, art is declared, through the notorious *Vergangenheitsthesen*,³³ to have always already been at an end, surpassed, (left) past (behind).

In the Epilogue Heidegger reproduces a series of passages from Hegel's *Aesthetics*: Art no longer counts for us as the highest manner in which truth obtains existence for itself.

One may well hope that art will continue to advance and perfect itself, but its form has ceased to be the highest need of the spirit.

In all these relationships art is and remains for us, on the side of its highest vocation, something past (UK, pp. 68-80).

Hegel's judgment is still in force, observes Heidegger,³⁴ and in it latently yet

³³ On *Vergangenheitsthesen* as well as for a more detailed account of Hegel's view on art see Andreas Grossmann's *Spur zum Heiligen: Kunst und Geschichte zwischen Hegel und Heidegger*.

³⁴ Hegel's judgment here refers to the function of art in relation to truth or spirit or historical people. Hegel never denied the possibility of emergence of new art forms and movements. What he did put in question, however, was, as Heidegger points out, art's role in the constitution of the destiny of the historical people, something, as I see it, Heidegger himself is attempting at reconstituting or re(in)stituting or, we could say, healing and which will not come to pass without certain political consequences which I will sketch out toward the end of the essay.

In his "The Stilling of the *Aufhebung*: *Streit* in Heidegger's "The Origin of the Work of Art", John Protevi demonstrates the way in which a certain stilling of the Hegelian *Aufhebung* takes place in Heidegger's notion of *Streit*. Hegelian conception of truth resides in an always already resolved or healed contradiction (*Widerspruch*) which is, being situated in the same sphere (the certainty of the movement of spirit), achieved

forcefully mimesis. Is mimesis then also at work in Heidegger's reflections upon the essence of the work of art? We set out to quickly find out.

CHAPTER 6 TOWARD THE ORIGIN

Origin is the source of essence or nature. To ask about essence or origin is to engage in metaphysics. Heidegger is aware of this and for this reason from the start displaces the question: instead of asking about the origin of art, he poses the question concerning the origin of the work of art. Indeed, art is that from which both artwork and artist receive their name and thus their origin. Consequently, to ask concerning the origin of the *work* of art is to ask about the essence of art. A circle with no foreseeable exit whose movement we are to retrace by precisely questioning the essence of the work of art in order to find art prevailing in it.

Art theory and aesthetics provide a conceptual schema (Begriffsschema) of form an content which, coupled up with the subject/object relation, creates a mechanism (Begriffsmechanik) which hardly anything could resist. The form/matter structure (Gefuege) conceives of a work of art as a thing with certain properties formal or artistic features saying (agorein) something other (allos) than the mere thing. The work of art is an allegori: in it something other than the thing is brought together (sumballein). The work of art is a symbol. This conceptual schema of thing as formed matter, proceeds Heidegger, is inadequately founded for it does not derive from the essence of the thing but, instead, from the essence of the product (Zeug). This improper application, this unjust translation,³⁵ commits an assault (Ueberfall) upon the determination of the thing and, consequently, of the work of art. This violent mechanism creates a preconception (Vorgriff) that prevents us from directly experiencing (unmittelbaren Erfahren des Seinden) in their Being. So, in order to bring the Being of beings closer, we must proceed by setting aside the dominant formulations of aesthetics. And, to do so, to get on the right track (Weg), proposes Heidegger, we must take

by the movement of *Aufhebung* as a movement of language (*Sprache*). For Heidegger, on the other hand, the strife (*Streit*) is the locus of the battling out (*Bestreitung*) of the conflict between the self-concealing earth as never giving in to the total revelation of the world, which thus instigates the primal strife (*Urstreit*) between the clearing and double concealing and thus producing an unhealable rift (*Riss*).

It remains to be seen how still is this stiling that is, to what extent the earth remains an other. Perhaps only too still, turning earth into a mere figure (Gestalt), a still-frame (Gestell), in a word, a stillborn.

³⁵ "Aliteral" translation also takes place, Heidegger assures us, when the Greek hupostasis and sumbebekota turn into Latin substantia and accidens, which, divorcing us from the origin(al), inaugurates an utter loss of foundation:

"Diese Uebersetzung der griechischen Namen in die lateinsche Sprache ist keneswegs der folgenlose Vorgang, fuer den er noch heutigentags gehalten wird. Vielmehr verbirgt sich hinter der anscheiend woerterlich und somit bewahrenden Uebersetzung eine Uebersetzung griechischer Erfahrung in eine andere Denkungsort. Das roemische Denken uebernimmt die griechischen Woerter ohne die entsprechende gleichurspruengliche Erfahrung dessen, was sie sagen, ohne das griechische Wort. Die Bodenlosigkeit des abendlaendischen Denkens beginnt mit dieser Uebersetzung" (UK, p.8).

Now, without even inquiring into the value of experience (Erfahrung), I remark here critically, the question looms from the outset: if, as we shall see, the truth is described as a conflict between unconcealment and double concealment, in what way is the bottomless translation (mimesis) which hides itself (verbirgt sich) beneath the more innocent translation, different than the very structure of truth?

a detour (Umweg) by inquiring into the nature of the product without a recourse to violent preconceptions B that is, we must employ an unmediated description (eine unmittelbare Beschreibung) of a product without any philosophical theory (ein Zeug ohne eine philosophische Theorie einfach beschreiben).³⁶

A simple example (Beispiel) will suffice a pair of shoes (ein Paar Bauernschuhe) B and a direct description of it a pictorial representation (bildliche Darstellung), a painting of (a pair) of shoes by Van Gogh which, quite remarkably, tells us (Dieses hat gesprochen) the story of earth and world, thus revealing the deeper origin (Ursprung) of the essence of product in its truth. Interestingly enough, we come to learn about the truth of product through artwork.

What is happening here? What then is at work in artwork? Nothing other than truth the well-known *aletheia* in which a being steps out into the unconcealment of its Being (Dieses Seinden [das Zeug, das Paar Bauernschuhe] tritt in die Unverborgenheit seines Seins hinaus). From this we can then safely conclude that the essence of art is the truth setting itself (in)to (the) work (So waere denn das Wesen der Kunst dieses: das Sich-ins-Werk-Setzen der Wahrheit des Seinden) and that both product and thing are to be thought of out of the essence of work namely, out of truth.

Indeed, Heidegger further clarifies, here we are in no way dealing with truth in the sense of *adequatio* or *homoiosis* which would lead us back to the traditional view (which has luckily been overcome [gluecklich ueberwundene Meinung]), conceiving of art as mere imitation (Nachahmung) and depiction (Abschilderung) of an actually existing being or a reproduction (Widergabe) of that being's general essence.

So ends the untitled introduction and the first section, "Thing and Work", of "The Origin of the Work or Art" (UK, pp. 1-25/17-39). Illustrating the last point made, according to which the work of art is not a reproduction of general essence, Heidegger gives an example by way of a poem by C.F. Meyers:

Der roemische Brunnen

Aufstiegt der Strahl und fallend gisst
 Er voll der Marmolschale Rund
 Die, sich verschleierend, ueberfließt
 In einer zweiten Shale Grund;
 Die zweite gibt, sie wird zu reich,
 Der dritten wallend ihre Flut,
 Und jede nimmt und gibt zugleich
 Und stroemt und ruht.

In translation:

Roman fountain

The jet ascends and falling fills
 The marble basin circling round;

³⁶ "Zur Sache selbst!", we could almost hear Husserl crying out, instructing his renegade pupil (who this time follows the lead) into taking the first steps of philosophical or phenomenological reduction.

This, veiling itself over, spills
 Into a second basin's ground.
 The second in such plenty lives,
 Its bubbling flood a third invests,
 And each at once receives and gives
 And steams and rests.

Is this a reproduction of a general essence or an actually existing being? By no means, Heidegger assures us. Perhaps only, I critically remark, Heidegger's own poetic illustration of the overabundant gift that gives (*Es gibt*) in excessive overflow from Being (*Sein*) to its clearing (*Lichtung*, *Offenheit*, *Unverborgenheit*, *Wahrheit*) and from there to its open place (*Stelle*, *Offene*). Perhaps.

Heidegger opens up a second section, "The Work and Truth", with a recap and setting out of a new task which is to consist in clearly displaying the pure self-subsistence (*reine Insichstehen*) of the work. How are we then to gain access (*Zugang*) to the relations (*Beziege*) pertaining purely and solely to the work? Here, Heidegger points out emphatically, we are dealing only with great art and is not this what takes place there when in the process of creation artist appear vitually insignificant or indifferent (*etwas Gleichgueltiges*) with respect to work, almost as a self-annihilating passage (*fast wie ein im Schaffen sich selbst vernichtender Durchgang fuer den Hervorgang des Werkes*) which lets the work be in its pure self-subsistence (*zu seinem reinen Insichselbsten entlassen sein*).

In an apparent attempt at undermining the modernist subjectivistic model of aesthetic creation and perception, is not Heidegger, I rhetorically ask, making a retreat to a latent yet potent dream of absolute (self-)transparency³⁷ which is at bottom a desire for identification, that is, appropriation a metaphysical (re)trait par excellence.

Moving on, we learn that the pure relations of the work cannot be found in art industry either for there the work is treated only as an object which, despite the efforts of tradition (*Ueberlieferung*) and conservation (*Aufbewahrung*), can never be recovered from the effects of its world-withdrawal (*Weltentzug*) and world-decay (*Weltzerfall*).

Where than does a work belong? Or, more precisely, what is truth and how does it take place in the work? In order to make this visible one more time (*das Geschehnis der Wahrheit im Werk erneut sichtbar zu machen*) Heidegger offers another example deliberately chose as not representing representational art. A building, a Greek temple, copies nothing. It encloses a figure (*Gestalt*) of god making him there present. The temple with its precinct thus joins (*fuegt*) and together and gathers (*sammelt*) around itself the unity (*Einheit*) of those paths (*Bahnen*) and relations (*Beziege*) which bring to human being the shape (*Gestalt*) of its destiny (*Geschickes*). This is the world of a historical people (*geschichtlichen Volkes*) set up and set back upon the earth, the homely ground (*heimatliche Grund*).

In a similar fasshion the statue of god is not a copy whose purpose is (as Aristotle might suggest) to make it easier to learn how the god looks: instead, remarkably enough,

³⁷ It should be brought to attention that the theme of transparency (*Durchsichtigkeit*) is greatly in play in *Being and Time* where it transpires as, what we may call, a standard of phenomenality.

it is a work that lets the god himself be present and this is the god himself. It is here, I critically observe, that we start to witness as increasingly operative an effacement of difference this time in the name of an unrecognized or unacknowledged analogy with Being itself.³⁸

The same holds for the linguistic work (Sprachwerk) of tragedy which, I critically remark, as emerging from the saying (Sagen) of a people, Heidegger never allows us to see in terms of theater or theatrical presentation; just like the temple and the god, it gives the people its world that is set up on earth.

Thus we arrive at the essential features of the work constitutive of its work-being: installing or setting up (Aufstellung) a world in the sense of erecting (Errichten) (thought, in turn, in terms of dedication [Weißen] and praise [Rühmen]) which frees the open in establishing it in its structure (Gezuege); and setting forth or producing (Herstellung) earth as the self-secluding (Sichverschliessende) which is brought into the open as remaining uncovered (unentborgen) and unexplained (unerklärt).

The exclusion of mimesis (which is, in effect, the effacement of difference) and its consequent reinscription also become evident in certain subordinative shifts. If, according to the dialectical principle, identity is to be thought of as identity of identity and difference, it is constituted through subordination for example (it this is only an example), through a pick-up or envelopment (Aufhebung) of what is other, of what is different. In this sense, as Lacoue-Labarthe points out, identity is constituted through mimetic appropriation. Consequently, difference comes to be thought of precisely in terms of terms that is, in terms of an always already reconcilable opposition or contradiction. Examining the mimetological traits from this point on I wish to draw them out more emphatically.

For instance, to world is accorded the privilege of self-governance, *Die Welt weltet*, and as such structures the open, whereas, on the other hand, the earth has to wait upon the work in order to be moved and held in the open, *Das Werk laest die Erde eine Erde sein*. Despite Heidegger's efforts to demonstrate otherwise, this will become ever more apparent as we move on.

So, the setting up of the world and the setting forth of the earth constitute the essential features or the work-being of the work. Thinking them together, in their unity (Einheit), Heidegger proceeds, is to address the self-subsistence of the work the closed, unitary repose of self-support. What is then the relation (Bezug) between the setting up of the world and the setting forth of the earth? It is one of strife (Streit) in which world and earth remain essentially different from each other yet never separated and in which the world grounds itself on earth and earth just through world thus achieving, through this battling out (Bestreitung) an intimacy and repose as a highest degree of motion.

Next, in what way does truth take place in this battling out of the strife between world

³⁸ Addressing the way in which Heidegger leaves the ontological status of the statue undetermined (it cannot be the god himself yet it "is" the god), Froment-Meurice writes:

"Just as the god manifest himself, makes a remarkable modality of itself (visibility, eidos) that has entered into presence, so too the statue brings the truth of appearing into presence. In its brilliance, what appears effaces all difference between the present and presence, what appears and appearing. The work as bringing into the open of presence 'is' presence, difference that has been effaced because returned into the work. But the effacement of difference takes place in the name of analogy with Being, a metaphoricity, a transfer about which Heidegger does not speak". "On the Origin (of Art)", pp. 157-58.

and earth. First of all or once again, what is truth?

Similar to the procedure in *Being and Time* and "On the Essence of Truth", we are told that here we are moving beyond the notion of propositional truth as correctness and toward the very possibility of such a notion namely, unconcealment or *aletheia*. However, as in relation to the account of truth in "On the Essence of Truth" and even more so *Being and Time*, a certain shift or turn (Kehre) takes place here:

And yet: beyond beings, not away from them but before them, happens still and other [ein Anderes, which in the 3. Auflage 1957 Heidegger qualifies with Ereignis]. In the midst of beings as a whole an open place [offene Stelle] occurs. A clearing [Lichtung]. Thought of in reference to beings, it is to a greater extent than beings [seiender als Seiende]. This open midst [Mitte] is therefore not enclosed by beings; rather, the clearing midst [Lichtende Mitte] encircles the beings, like the nothing [Nichts] which we scarcely know (UK, pp. 39-40/53, translation modified).

It is no longer Dasein that in its resoluteness (Entschlossenheit) decides the disclosure (Erchlossenheit). Instead, it is the clearing that provides a passage (Durch-) and access (Zugang)³⁹ to the being that we ourselves are not and the beings that we ourselves are. However, the passage and access are by no means easily granted for the clearing is in itself at the same time concealment (Verbergung) and, what is more, a double concealment consisting of both refusal (Versagen) and dissembling (Verstellen):

The concealment can be a refusal or merely a dissembling. We are never fully certain whether it is one or the other. This means: the open place [Stelle] in the midst of beings, the clearing, is never a rigid stage with a permanently raised curtain on which the play [Spiel] of beings is played out. The unconcealedness of beings is never merely a state present at hand but a happening [Geschehnis, in 1. Auflage 1950 qualified as Ereignis]. Unconcealedness (truth) is never a property of factual things in the sense of beings, nor one of propositions (UK, p. 41/54).

There is clearly a metaphor, a trope, in play here in the play (Spiel), that is, of this very illustration or example (Beispiel) that is being played out at the great theater of Being. This, indeed, is a rather curious theater: the play is on but the curtains keep moving. In fact, the play keeps playing with the curtains, the play keeps playing with itself, opening up the ways in which the drama (indeed, tragedy!) of the primal strife (Urstreit) unfolds.⁴⁰

³⁹ Here we should recall the self-annihilating "passage" and "access" that the artist is supposed to be (p. 25 of this text).

⁴⁰ Stil at the temple, contemplating the statue, Froment-Meurice remarks:

"The fact of deliberately choosing the temple because it is made 'in the image of nothing' clearly indicates the rejection of a mimesis from the pure (sacred) domain of the Open. The temple, as the Greek name indicates, is the cut, the enclosure that is sacred because it is withdrawn from the profane. At the same time, the paradox of this delimitation is that it exposes nothing but pure facade, a pure in front of, before. The behind, the inside, remains empty. There is nothing but the purely phenomenal, nothing that would be behind and of which it would be but the appearance or representation. There again, we must acknowledge that Heidegger is right. The temple represents nothing at all, no more than does the statue (in the temple). But it represents in an other sense, in a sense we must call theatrical in the sense that the theater and theory are representations conceived of

The primal strife takes place as a conflict between the clearing and the double figure (Doppelgestalt) of concealment. To the essence of truth thus belongs untruth.⁴¹

Another subordinative ordering? It appears so, if only through the curtains. It is untruth that belongs to truth: the "un" always comes too late given, indeed, that truth disposes of it or dispossesses it. And how about the clearing as being more (of a) being than beings? In a moment. For now let us quote another passage:

In the work it is truth, not only something else, that is at work. The picture that shows the peasant shoes, the poem that says the Roman fountain do not just make manifest what this isolated being *as such* is, if indeed they manifest anything at all; rather, they let unconcealment as such [my emphasis] happen in relation to beings as a whole. The simpler and more essential the shoes and the more plainly and purely the fountain emerge in their essence, the more directly and engagingly do all beings attain to a greater extent of being [seiender] along with them. That is how the self-concealing Being is illuminated. Light of this kind joins [fuegt] its shining (in)to the work. This shining, joined in the work, is the beautiful. Beauty is one way in which truth occurs as unconcealment (UK, p. 45/56, translation modified).

Concluding the section, Heidegger asks as to in what way is there art (Inwiefern gibt es Kunst?), that is, what is truth that can or even must happen as art. This means to inquire into the attraction or impulse of truth toward the work (Zug zum Werk), that is, the way in which truth is put (in)to (the) work.

Section three, "Truth and Art", thus inquires into the work's createdness (Geschaffenein) and the process of creation (Schaffen), indeed as Heidegger reminds us, all along keeping in mind what has been said about the picture of the peasant shoes and the Greek temple.

Since *techné* never signifies the action of making but, instead, a mode of knowing o aletheia as the uncovering (Entbergung) of beings pertaining to both art and craft, it does not provide us with a recourse to thinking about the essence of creation. We must then, Heidegger says, think createdness and creation in terms of the work-being of the work. So, in what way does truth, out of the ground of its essence, have a Zug zum Werk?

It is here that we come across an essential, perhaps even impassable, limit B that of (ontological) difference recognized by Heidegger yet as if only in passing: "In referring to the self-establishing of openness in the open, thinking touches upon a sphere that cannot be explicated here..." (UK, 48/61, the whole passage is quoted in the note 20 of this text). A certain breakage seems to be taking place here, a short circuit which contracts if not collapses the entire edifice. Heidegger seems to be crying out for a salvage: *Being and*

as putting into presence, that is to say, by the same token, stagings. Lichtung is the theater of Being, its scene, and thus implies staging the works that (re-)present it. Otherwise, there is no possibility whatsoever of understanding Greek tragedy as the ne plus ultra of the putting (in)to work(s) of truth. Truth is this open scene and nothing else, the exposition that is also a deposition, a written deposition, truth being unable to present itself as such except, for example in Parmenides' *Poem* [or, I add, Heidegger's play]. The 'as such', which is the essence of presence and thus of sight, implies the gap of a double that precedes it. But the double also takes its place as the figure, the *persona*, the mask of this entity essentially without figure, without face, without presence, and that would be called Aletheia". "On the Origin(of Art)", pp. 158-59.

⁴¹ "Zum Wesen der Wahrheit als der Unverborgenheit gehoert dieses Verweigen in der Weise des zweifachen Verbergens. Die Wahrheit ist in ihrem Wesen Un-wahrheit" (UK, 41).

Time is recalled and suddenly, indeed only in parenthesis, the *Da* as the locus of truth reappears only to quickly disappear in the Epilogue commentary by a reference to Ereignis, etc.

Indeed, Heidegger informs us that clearing of openness and establishment of truth are the same single nature of the happening of truth. The establishment of truth in the open is the bringing forth (Hervorbringen) and this is precisely what creation is. Truth is, therefore, in many ways historical.

Indeed, it is here that Heidegger reaches the high point of his thought: finitude of Being. Being is finite: it is an identity that can be established only through the effects of an utterly different difference (and thus certainly not a "simple" [ontological] difference: therefore, the short circuit threatening to break the entire corpus, to make it fall and turn into a mere cadaver a corpse, something left behind [meta], like metaphysics). It is here, specifying the ways in which createdness takes place as the establishing of truth in the strife between the world and the earth,⁴² that Heidegger introduces the rift (Riss):

Der Streit ist kein Riss als das Aufreissen einer blossen Kluft, sondern der Streit ist die Innigkeit des Sichzugehoerens der Streitenden. Dieser Riss reisst die Gegenwendigen in die Herkunft ihrer Einheit aus dem einigen Grunde zasammen. Er ist Grundriss. Er ist Auf-riss, der die Grundzuege des Aufgehens der Lichtung des Seienden zeichnet. Dieser Riss laest die Gegenwendigen nicht auseinanderstehen, er bringt das Gegenwendige von Mass und Grenze in den einigen Umriss.

The conflict is not a rift as a mere cleft as a mere cleft is ripped open; rather, it is the intimacy with which opponents belong to each other. This rift carries the opponents into the source of their unity by virtue of their common ground. It is a basic design, and outline sketch, that draws the basic features of the emergence of the clearing of beings. This rift does not let the opponents break apart; it brings the opposition of measure and boundary into their common outline (UK, p. 51/63, translation modified).

Outlining and then commenting on the passage that follows in his "The Retrait of Metaphor" Derrida writes:

The trait is "einheitliche Gezuege von Aufriss und Grundriss, Durc-und Umriss", the united, adjoined (Ge-) ensemble of reassembled traits, the contraction of the contract between these forms of traits, these apparent modifications or properties of Riss (Auf-, Grund-, Durch-, Um-, etc.) among all these traits of the trait which do not come upon it as predicative modifications to a subject, a substance, or a being (which the trait is not) but on the contrary which open the delimitation, the demarcation from which ontological discourse on substance, predicate, proportion, logic and rhetoric, can then be stripped away. I arbitrarily interrupt my reading here, I cut it with a slash (trait) at the moment when it would lead us to the *Ge-stell* (framing) of the *Gestalt* in the adjoinment of which (Gefuege), der Riss sich fuegt (the trait joins itself).

⁴² "Die Wahrheit will als dieser Streit von Welt und Erde ins Werk gerichtet werden" (UK, 50). Indeed, it is *truth's* will to be established in the work and moreover *as* this strife.

Derrida concludes:

The trait is therefore nothing. The incision of the Aufriß is neither passive nor active, neither one nor multiple, neither subject nor predicate; it does not separate more than unites. All the oppositions of value have their proper possibility in différance, in the between of its divergence which brings together as much as it demarcates (p.32).

Différance?⁴³

In his "Différance" (see also note 22 of this text) Derrida explains that différance is neither a word nor a concept that is, it is neither a signifier nor signified but what makes this difference possible. Différance is different from any other difference if only by a letter and a letter that cannot be heard but only seen. In addition to the dimension of space it also at the same time has a temporalizing effect. It cannot be made present or manifest B that is exposed or presented as such and thus it exceeds the order of truth by simultaneously appearing and disappearing, by simultaneously writing and erasing itself (pp. 3-27). It is therefore a trace or a ghost. This sheaf of heterogenous meanings does not presuppose their unification or synthesis into a figure (Gestalt). It is not, therefore, a sheaf as, for example, *fascio* a constricted cluster gathered around a single unified object and, what is more, an ideal object of force (an axe) a pure figure, a fiction, that is to say, *The Fiction of the Political*, the fiction of fascism.

Indeed, just a paragraph later which Derrida cut off with an "arbitrary" slash (Was in indeed an arbitrary cut? Most likely not for, if otherwise, he would not call it "arbitrary"), the *Riss* gets fixed in place into a figure (Gestalt) that is to be thought in terms of placing (Stellen) and framing (Gestell). Createdness thus becomes truth's being fixed in place in the figure (Festgestelltsein der Wahrheit in die Gestalt) which stands as the silent thrust (stille Stoss) of its "that (it is)" in the open.

The more solitary this fixing in place is, the simpler the thrust into the open is the thrust that through the displacement (Verrueckung) out of the familiar (Gewoehnliches) takes us into the extraordinary or unheard (of) (Ungeheuer). This letting the work be a work is preservation (Bewahrung).

Thus, creation and preservation constitute the reality of the work. Since art is the origin of the work, art is thus the becoming (Werden) and happening (Geschehen), the setting (in)to (the)work of truth. This, Heidegger teaches us, is called poetry (Dichtung) and, therefore, all art is essentially poetical.

Heidegger proceeds, once again addressing the finitude of Being:

The essence of art, on which both the artwork and the artist depend, is the setting (in)to (the) work of truth. It is due to art's poetic essence that in the midst of what is it opens an open place [Stelle] in whose openness everything is other than usual. By virtue of in the work projected design [Enwurfes] of the unconcealment of beings cast toward us all familiar and hitherto existing beings turn into unbeings [Unsein]. These have lost the capacity to give and keep the Being as measure.

⁴³ In his "The Truth of the Political" Lacoue-Labarthe also observes the affinity between Heidegger's *Riss* and Derrida's *archi-trace* and *archi-writing* (p.84).

What is unusual here is that the work in no way affects the hitherto existing beings by casual connections. The effectiveness [Wirkung] of the work does not consist in an effect[Wirken]. It lies in a change, happening from out of the work, of the unconcealment of beings, and this means: Being (UK, p. 60/72, translation modified).

However, we do not have to wait long before things start increasingly gravitating toward language spiraling into the pull of logocentrism. First, linguistic work (Sprachwerk) is given a place of honor (ausgezeichnete Stellung) in relationship to other art forms for, most certainly, it is language (Sprache) (indeed, not as a form of communication) that by naming (Nennen) names the beings for the first time.

Das entwerfende Sagen ist Dichtung: die Sage der Welt und der Erde... "The projective saying is poetry: the myth of world and earth..." This very myth (of the origin), we could say, and which continues by saying that *Dichtung ist die Sage der Unverborgenheit des Seienden*, "Poetry is the saying of the unconcealedness of what is", in Hofstadter's translation, "Poetry is the myth of the unconcealment of beings", in mine. *Das entwerfende Sagen ist jenes, das in der Bereitung des Sagbaren zugleich das Unsagbare als ein solches zur Welt bringt*, "The projective saying is saying which, in preparing the sayable, simultaneously brings the unsayable as such into the world", I emphasize and add by recalling the way in which the uncovered (unentbergt) and unexplained (unerklärt) cryptohilic earth is nevertheless brought out of hiding, moreover brought out as such as earth or as "earth", it does not make a difference. In solchem Sagen werden geschichtlichen Volk die Begriffe seines Wesens, d.h. seiner Zugehörigkeit zur Welt-Geschichte vorgepraegt, "In such saying, the concepts of a historical people's essence, i.e. of its belonging together to world history, are prepared" (UK, 61-62/74).

The logocentric subordination becomes even more explicit in the relationship of poetry to other arts:

Language [Sprache] itself is poetry in the essential sense. But since language is the happening in which for man beings first disclose themselves for the first time as beings, poesy or poetry in the narrower sense is the most original form of poetry in the essential sense. Language is not poetry because it is the primal poesy; rather, poesy takes place in language because language preserves the original essence of poetry. Building [Bauen] and plasticv arts [Bilden], on the other hand, happen always already and always only in the open of saying and naming. It is the open that pervades and guides them. But for this very reason they remain their own ways and modes in which truth orders itself (in) to work. They are an ever special poetizing within the clearing of beings, which has already happened unnoticed in language (translation modified).

In the Reclam-Ausgabe 1960 Heidegger rhetorically supplements the last sentence by a corrective not: "What does this say? Does clearing happen through the speech or does the appropriative clearing [ereignende Lichtung] first grant myth [Sage] and unsaying [Entsagen] and thus language [Sprache]? Language and body (speech [Laut] and writing)" (UK, p. 62/74).

In these rather involving enclosures and involutions which establish a hierarchy among the arts with poetry presiding over architecture and pictorial arts, there appear

another subordinative positioning in which the truth of clearing assumes the dominant position, a position analogous to the one traditionally accorded to speech (soul) over writing (body). By clearing out the space for the taking place of truth that is, by delimiting the con-figuration or self-centering of the work around language once again Heidegger effects an utter ob-literation, that is to say, an absolute exposition.

The essence of art is poetry and the essence of poetry, in turn, is the founding (Stiftung) of truth. The founding is understood as bestowing (Schenkung) which is an overflow (Ueberfluss) of the thrusting into the extraordinary or unheard (of) (Un-geheure). Also as grounding (Gruenden):

Truly poetic projection [wahrhaft dichtende Entwurf] is the opening up [Eroeffnung] of that into which Dasein as historical is already cast. This is the earth and, for a historical people, its earth, the self-closing ground on which it rests together with everything that it already is, though still hidden from itself. It is, however, its world which prevails in virtue of the relation of Dasein to the unconcealment of Being. For this reason everything with which man is endowed must, in the projection, be drawn up [herausgeholt] from the closed ground and expressly set upon this ground. In this way the ground is first grounded as the bearing ground [...]. All creation, because it is such a drawing-up [Holen] is a drawing (as of water from a spring) (UK, p. 63/76, translation modified).

Suddenly, Dasein makes its way back onto the stage and, moreover, Dasein in its relationship to the unconcealment of Being. By drawing up (Aufholen) the essential traits of its poetic projection, Dasein sets up the ever prevailing word... And out the elevating *Aufholen* (just like water out of the spring) piercing echoes and vigorous repercussions (Rueckwirkungen literally, "counter-effects") of the Hegelian *Aufhebung*...

The founding is also a beginning(Anfangen). It is the beginning of the beginning B that is, the beginning of origin or Being or history, a clean cut by a decisive stroke: Greece. Whence does this beginning come? What does it depart from? Is there an origin to this origin?

Departing, having come to and end, I only remark in passing: what is in play, what is the originary essence of art without works?

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ESTETIKA HAJDEGER I PREVAZILAŽENJE ESTETIKE

Vladimir Đokić

Umetnost je, tradicionalno gledano, tvrdi Hajdeger, u suštini mimeza. Mimeza, međutim, ne definiše samo umetnost već, kao razlika između originala i kopije, konstituiše samu mogućnost filozofije kao promišljanja (ontološke) razlike kao razlike između bitka i bića - porekla, osnove, principa, ideje, s jedne strane; i bića, pojave, itd., s druge strane. Projekat Hajdegerovog prevazilaženja estetike stoga se mora sagledati u okviru opšteg projekta prevazilaženja metafizike. Prevazilaženje estetike Hajdeger nastoji da izvrši jednim novim promišljanjem umetnosti - ovog puta ne oslanjajući se na tradicionalno uslovljavanje umetnosti kao mimeze već, umesto toga, na svoju koncepciju istine koja sama po sebi već isključuje mimetičku dimenziju tradicionalne koncepcije istine kao slaganja. Osnovna teza ovog rada sastoji se u tvrdnji da, i pored tolikog njenog isključivanja, Hajdeger ponovo utvrđuje mimezu. Preciznije govoreći, u svom nastojanju da (pro)misli bitak kao takav, u svojoj osobenosti i čistoti, Hajdeger ponovo ispisuje metafizički gest identifikacije koji, nužno prolazeći kroz (od)uvek aproprijatizovano i indiferentno Drugo, opet uspostavlja dobro poznate subordinacije i hijerarhije. I sve ovo, na 'tekstualnom nivou,' uz pomoć stalnog (ali nikada eksplicitnog ili priznatog) oslanjanja na trope i metafore, ilustracije i analogije - rečju, 'mimezu'.