SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE - A CROSSROAD OF CIVILISATIONS OR THE BELATED RENAISSANCE

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Abstract. *South-eastern Europe is a contact-conflictable zone including two trunk directions, through which expansionist waves with different potential, socio-cultural features and fortune conning from the Southeast and the Northeast penetrated. Persia and the Ottoman empire were fateful sings of colonisation pressure on the South-Eastern direction. The north-eastern threat, dated From the Avars and Ostgots, found it's traditional carrier in the Russian ambitions to Europe in the last few centuries. Founding itself in a powerful configuration of permanent aspirations South-Eastern Europe turned for long time into a border of civilisations and European identity.*

After the collapse of the Ottoman empire (1918) Europe did not meet a new serious challenge from the Southeast and since the 1991 the north-eastern treaty seemed to Ioos it's power too. Nevertheless, these strategic axes of civilisation pressure kept their potential. On the Southeast, the Muslim world was consolidating gradually. It was rid) in resources. Starting from Iran, passing through Algeria, (lie nature has treasured up some of the most mighty oil-belts. This world was a master of good armaments and comparatively high-grade human potential that could answer the progressive ideas about some civilisation "priority". However, it missed the cause that could provide "the topical" centre. Nevertheless, it could lie Found, for example, in the hostility to the technologies open societies whose borders were identical with the Christianity world borders. The open societies dissolved traditions, status quo and embedded new civilised standards into the social body of the modernising communities. Could we be sure that Bosnia was inscribed permanently in the list of offences caused to this world by the Christian civilisation?

At the Northeast, Russia gradually will accumulate it's energy, will tear up From self-contemplation and will seek for rehabilitation of it's place in the international relations.

Restored it's abilities, Russia will consolidate it's influences, will define their strategic validity and it is almost certain that one of the principle factors in this respect will be the recovery of it's leading position in the Slav world. Can someone be sure that "the Slav family" has not inscribed in the list of offences and punishing operations against Serbia and the special attitude to the Muslim community in Bosnia. The list of offences probably will be expanded with the strange, arbitrary, one-sided and hardly explainable proclamation of one side in the conflict as a "regional villain", while the other to gain "bonuses" For it's own analogical actions. The list of offences could be and probably will be prolonged. The South-Eastern part of Europe - associated with an exactly determined area on the European map - is not only geographic but civilisation space, built and approved in the complex continental history. The Southeast is a significant Fragment From the Bible of the European civilisation (if we paraphrase C. Jaspers). The more important and characterising the central position of the Southeast as a bridge and border between civilisations is the Fact that the European identity would be problematic without the cultural-integrative role of here cultivated common religion, without the values of the Greek-Rome civilisation. (Nish is one time Naisus - the place where Romans win a victim over Ostgots and at the same time it is the birth-town of Konstantinopol's Founder, the person who transmuted Rome into a Christian town.) Moreover, the European identity could not be thinkable without the European touch and the accompanying clashes with civilisations oriented towards other social-constructive values. A sensation of integrity and civilisation identity comes into world in the comparison - although the existing dramatic protuberances in this process. The Southeast is a meeting zone of civilisations and civilisation mediation. In this context it is not far-fetched to say that Europe identified itself as a social-cultural integrity after the Islamic pressure completed the destroying of the Greek-Rome civilisation and when the East was conquered and Turkish advanced from Asia Minor towards South-Eastern Europe. In the conditions of dramatic historic reverses the idea of Europe was put into final shape and the Christian values were the fortune prerequisite for the identification of the European population affiliation. If Europe is assimilated as a common valuable space in a clash with something opposing it's social-constructive and system-organising role. then the European civilisation is less thinkable without the Southeast, i.e. without the values of the Greek-Rome civilisation, without the prototypes of the Christian re-arrangement of the world and it's tragic role as a generator and at the same time as "a guard" and... civilisation mediator. In the end of the XXth century, the modern European self-awareness reproduces (he familiar ever since the Enlightenment and hard for solving with it's aspirations "central" valuable position - a position bringing on the painful choice of alternatives, fateful for the European integrity. It has to make a choice between the natural, priority rights of the national-limited interests and a new universal orientation. This choice will predetermine the European image whether it will freeze in the traditions of the national egoism hence all the consequences, or will inspire the evolution of new civilisation space. The choice is especially important. Due to the decades of struggle between the liberal democracy and it's communist alternative in Europe were Formed social spaces pretending For historical priority. Although the dramatic military-political hardships and tragical bleedings tins detachment could not erase completely the Feeling of a civilisation community of the European nations. Even the Second World War did not succeed to do this. although it damaged seriously the European integrity: nor the forcible new set-up and ordering of the European

space after Jalta's legalisation of war outcomes: almost five decades Greece - the spirit base of Orthodoxy - was West. and Czechoslovak Republic, Poland. Hungary, part of Germany and the Baltic Republics, which by their religion identity were bind to West Europe, remained East.

The echo of such a Forcible political inversion of parts of the social-cultural European space is trying to keep intensity in still traditional societies of the European Southeast. In one hand after the collapse of the Berlin wall, South-Eastern Europe is the area most definitely marked with instability and processes' conflicts but this is a certain sign that it would not fall out of "the history frames" and a sign that it is open for social creation and change. In the other hand - the phenomenon of east-European nationalism exactly, or rather national-populism symbolising directly "the defreezing " of regional history, is the true primary motive power of uneasiness and the processes of forcible social-cultural reshaping (this is the same nationalism that was described by Z. Bgeginski as the last shelter of communism).

'The tragic historical dramaturgy of the processes in this region and the lack of peace-making experience in the regional co-operation hold up the instability characterising the common environment of political relations. The profound crisis of the permanently ruling value stereotypes dramatically activates the necessity of new "identifying myth". Just the national-populism becomes this alluring project whose bitter results quite quickly were demonstrated by the conflicts in former Yugoslavia or by the shocking chaos of "the restored sovereignties" of former Soviet Republics. Although different, the symptoms of this identification myth can be observed even in the developed western societies where liberal democracy has certain traditions and mostly - successes. The fear from the different and "the foreigner" threatening the "unique" national virtues is the permanent ^ refrain of this national-populist motive (Le Pen - France was colonised by Algeria; similar mythological evaporations are drawing certain successes for the nationalistic parties in Belgium, Germany, Italy - U. Bossi and the project "Padanian Republic"...). The nostalgia of "the east" man for the security of recent times and the domestic dreaming of "the west" man for the affectionate tranquillity of the bipolar world are meeting each other at this moment. The renewing and reopening world demolishes certain values even in flourishing Europe so to intensify the live coal of xenofobia - the xenofobia that realises the extremes of self-identification illusory superiority of national identity. The mild version appears - Shengen is coming and may be it is not accidental the observation that in Western Europe "the ideological sources that are alternatives of liberal values are " made lip-to-day'" again [1].

This process of self-determination, cultural self-isolation and intense fear from the different and "the Foreigner" jeopardising the arranged with "exclusive" standards national style of life is more dramatic in the South-Eastern Europe. The political reality in the European Southeast -impregnated with ethic, religion and cultural variety - in it's dramatic historical adventure has scattered and legalised determined communities whose quite peculiar regional location provokes the aspirations of "ethno-homogenious" national country. That's why, the distrust and aggressiveness both in neighbour-state plan and regional relations are constant having different reincarnation forms, 'they intensify the deformation of the "Balkanisation" that demonstrated it's collapse in former Yugoslavia.

The hostility to the different, to "the Foreigner" is necessary also for the romantic glorification of the heroic past where not a single regional community seeks the evidences

for it's "sublimity". Ibis hostility complex sustains the stability of the conflict paradigm WE - OTHERS: it "predetermines each neighbour as a historically stated enemy" [2], 'this ' complex of hostility is presented even in the international relations.

The meeting of Christianity and Muslim there tenses the situation in the European South-East. They have been more than just religions for centuries. They have been synonyms for two types of civilisation building which "contact-conflict" has been weaving by the mankind history for ages. The giaour (gentile) is "a foreigner" - this way the Muslim community marks it's fears for the difference that isolated it. But in the Christian fears the Muslims are agarians (successors of Agar and her son - Ismail. showing sign of...... of their ancestors) and this is a mark for their rejection by the Christian community [3]. Altogether, for centuries, the direct contact between the two types of civilisation building has been overburdened by conflicts that caused numerous military clashes from the Caspian Sea to Gibraltar.

The matter of the processes born in this direct contact-conflict has justified the appraisal of the Ottoman invasion as a civilisation disaster for South-Eastern Europe. The historically modelled catastrophe of the direct contact - the Ottoman invasion in the European South-East is related to the Arabic's at the South Mediterranean - set up the endurance of menace from the different as well as from the "Foreigner" and provides the vitality of the idea for a constitutional incompatibility of both types of civilisation buildings. This is the reason for their civilisation determination to be preserved up to nowadays, This historical dramatism modelled the uniqueness of the European South-East as a contact 7one of civilisations. Even now, due to the immanent incompatibility of essential social-cultural characteristic it is rather a border than a civilisation mediator.

THE NEW WORLD ORDER AND THE NEW REGIONALISM

After the restoration of national sovereignties of the South-East European countries (the end of XIXth - the beginning of XXth century). they adopted the state construction of industrial Europe as a standard. This process was activated again after the collapse of the Berlin wall. The active centripetal movements towards new cultural standardising centres and new values reflected in a certain extend the monstrous discomfort of the crossroad, central position of European South-East as a zone for contact between civilisations as well as a border between civilisations. Unfortunately, the efforts of the countries in the region to dehermetize the contact zone, already predestined because of the fact that it has sheltered not contractual but statute states, didn't meet any active assistance by modern Europe. On the contrary, modern Europe seemed to put the foundations of a new policy of isolation by delaying the incorporation procedures for the South-Eastern European countries as well as by promoting the priorities of projects for some regional unions (Euroslav - for example) that practically strayed them away from the continental processes...

With such n political adjustment Europe preserves the contact zone in it's usual existence as a permanent disordered regional world gravitating to the spectrums from it's past and activates the conflicts of civilisation destruction in this zone. Such a policy unnoticeably gives priority to the regional neo-isolationism. It can't be productive and

can't detach new standards. Such a policy could incite the region to self-isolation in the remnants of the contact - conflict zone, in (he monstrous mixture of beginning to walk modernity and futureless of the more and more alienated regional communities. Thus this pseudo-healthy zone of contacts that has not managed to create new civilisation models, could give life to the conflict rages - a misfortune which high price has to be paid even by the creators of the new world order, will be perpetuated.

The suppression of the European South-East aspiration (or modern politic-economic technologies available in the prospering democratic societies is installed in the incoherent and to some extend, isolation policy of flourishing Europe. Tins peculiar protective dogmatism of prosperity makes the hopes of the South-East problematic and the humiliation more noticeable hence more discrediting. The regional communities are doomed to stay at the level of domestic understanding of the free development choice accepting the regular domination of technical-economic. governing, scientific and cultural priorities of the developed democracies. The contact zone will remain exactly the same municipal and deeply segmented as before, conquered by the national-populist idea and by the strict identification of ethnic "spaces" with motherland...

The stimulated neo-isolation policy is not a decision for the people living in this contact-conflict zone [4]. They have an inner necessity for freedom, they overcome gradually the aspirations for "their historic priorities" and tear up the mythological curtains to free themselves from the illusions of the past in their national construction. They are creating new authority structures which tolerate everyone who does not menace the conditions for public prosperity and works for approbation of a new, more attractive regional image. Those of them, who parts from their past in the way of renovation, protects their dignity in the hard times of this process and assists the national construction released of the mythological curtain of "the historic advantages", will put the Foundations of overwhelming the national loftiness in the regional unstability.

South-Eastern Europe, like the whole post-communist east-European space, is "a boiling historical caldron at whose bottom the History has Finished it's way, while on the boiling surface only the little histories remain" [5]. The European South-East is not just a series of nostalgic memories about one or another tsar or honoured statesman. With youthful curiosity it has discovered the Lord of liberty and new possibilities for it's development - a discovery and a desire that brings together it's population communities by the St. Pavle's idea for principle equality for anyone who believes in the one Lord. If it is so and the Lord is the Got of freedom, then the approach to developed Europe has to be released of the asymmetry of the subordination and to be tied down with the enriched equality.

The youthful aspiration is necessary, useful and sufficient just for the beginning of the quite serious work for leaving " the local pathology for universal sanity" [6] of the region. The overcoming of the inertial social constants reproducing traditions in type-organisation of interstate relations and in the attitude toward antiquity and alohtonum, etc. is fatal for the fortune of the universal sanity. The inertial socio-cultural stereotypes should not be underestimated because they rather successfully usurp (lie public psychology. Stimulated (by media curiosity, for example, as well as by political amateurishness more frequently), they can activate destructive processes in the region, or at least an additional "meaning" of the chaos in the regional space.

Moreover, they are projected in medium, heterogeneous in ethnic, religious and socio-

cultural meaning and it emits "antique" massages concerning the regional relations that have their own code and meaning which is decodable by regional and, non-regional actors. This heterogeneous medium supports the idols of determining, self-isolating, non communicative national identity (using the services of it's peculiar self-isolation).

The emergence from the regional pathology supposes to have the answer to the question where are, if any. the borders of aspirations of the minorities to the public space dominated by the value system and the mythological motive of the state-constructive ethnos. The ethno-central movements seem to be a serious sign for a crisis of social identification due to the loss of power of the state-organised integrating centres and the detonators will probably multiply seriously so that they can blow up this space if the aspirations of the ethnic maximalism are supported. May he then one or another social tragedy will find it's justification into the imperatives of the common values. However, who is the carrier of these common values?

The practise has revealed the fact that the assistance or acceptance of the collective violence for rearrangement of the value layers and organising symbols is disastrous not only for a single national integrity but also for numerous aspects concerning the regional relations (the Yugo War is one of the respectful proofs). In (his context, the stimulation of initiatives for ethnic status quo transformation is unacceptable - even when they are dressed in confidence into the liberal values; nor is acceptable (not only in the European South-East) the approval of new communities' borders by the means of "inter-regional" or/and external violence. New "bosnian" procedures are a common menace for the European South-East and will prove to he a device of regional self-identification in negative sense.

Even today, the centralised state system is an important accent in the regional specific. With it's massive presence each attempt for more crucial modernisation of the regional relations becomes problematic. Christianity is constructed successfully an area of opposite communities and it is not by accident that numerous middle-aged countries are trying to situate the new centre into themselves, i.e. "to reduce and nationalise" it's nondescript-integrating character" [7]. The social function of the Christianity today is quite unclear, but the local claims for regional relations "centre" remain.

The local provincialism is a powerful destructive factor deforming the international relations in this contact-conflict zone. It reveals it's claims also in the reproduction of traditional concepts about integration procedures which bring under control the political practise of each country with the idea of patronage in the regional relations. This corroboration of the concept For traditional societies concerning the political practise of the European Southeast is embarrassing and it can he surmounted only in case they no longer he state societies. The separation could he realised if there is an answer of the question how it is possible the existence of modern social political purposes in this quire "noisy" common political environment and what are the appropriate instruments for it. For present, the fragmentation dominates the European South-East - a proof that the ideas for serious changes in the philosophy of regional relations have not any practical support. It is an evidence that the centripetal movement, although imposed by non-political instruments, is unsuccessful. A poetical utterance of the fragmentation is the quick moving apart of yesterday's partners searching feverishly possibilities for incorporation to new politic-economic and cultural communities. The disintegration of state organisations is also a practical illustration that the limited sovereignty from the time of block's

opposition is replaced by the sovereignty maximisation and the turbulence of ethnic differentiations.

The radicalisation of the classic nationalism that has replaced the Soviet-American condominium from the time of "the cold war" accelerates "re-Balkanisation" of the region. It's political and social-cultural unfriendliness arouses apprehensions again so can be proved the U. Rostow conclusions that the transition to democracy does not increase the security of new democracies, but just because of the radicalism of this transition it turns out a certain loss and even certain de stabilisation of regional and European relations. It is not by chance that the idea of Europe suffers one of it's first defeats exactly in this region; and it is not by chance that the new architecture of European security strengthen some of it's elements in this dynamic continental region.

The key question for building the new architecture of regional cooperation (and for building the new system of European security) is the surmounting of rejection radicalism interpreting tins area in civilisation, socio-philosofic and political context. Radicalisation can be restrained if the renovation of this region is subordinated to assimilation of the technology of evolutionary political and social-cultural building that creates lasting conditions For the prosperity of the west societies. Because oft he Fact that the much neuralgic the region is, the much it is dependable on powerful out-regional Factors, so this political reorientation has to gain the assistance of the developed democracies.

The new configuration of co-operation has to restrain gradually the permanent efforts of the South-Eastern European countries to reallot the regional area. Only this way they will give up the temptation of Forming coalitions reproducing the stereotypes of an out-of-date political decision making and to set to the building of their relations based on the attracting commonness in their individual goals.

This process probably will Find it's dynamic Formula in the commercialisation of the Foreign-political relations in the region. The determination of the common regional-economic space will provide room For much closer political and cultural connection. At First, the political context will lead because with the appliance of the political instruments the partners will try to discover a horizon of an active partnership in all spheres. At "the preliminary" stage of the regional relations development this context will remain leading but it has to model such parameters of regional relations that can make the economic relations dominant. Then the European South-East processes will achieve their own logic without the need of cruches of the political modelling - something too hard to achieve in a region that has not still Found it's self-conviction For such an approach, while it can loos it's illusions as well.

MEETING THE RETURN OF THE REGIONAL CO-OPERATION

The global outlook on the regional specificity may give precious references for the positive transformation of the basic characteristic featuring the regional policy. It would be useful, first of all, to outline the **zones of severe rivalry** in interstate relations, that are most likely to host conflict charged processes, the **zones of non-severe rivalry,** that may produce contradictions, pliable to the mechanisms of political administration and the zones **of artificial** rivalry, the tacit purpose of which is to sound out the intentions of the partners or to have a destructive impact along with some current operational troubles (it is

said to be the realm of the political strategy). Differentiation of that kind between the political situations will let the responsible political bodies to implement effective mechanisms for the prevention of regional conflicts.

It is well-known that the zones of severe rivalry are due to the existence of utterly contradictory interests maintained by the collaborating states. They influence rather vigorously the system of regional relations. The states, engaged in a zone of severe rivalry make a lot of efforts to minimise the value of the political shares of their opponents and to augment their own one. Therefore, the zone of severe rivalry is marked with some duplicity concerning the nature of the intentions of those who maintain the relations: once, it should store the ambitions for maximising the effectiveness of one's own political efforts and furthermore every one's strategy to minimise the capability of the rivals. Evidently, in terms of severe contention there is metrics in the productivity of the foreign political undertaking and that is why the attempts to both maximise and minimise it are correlated.

The impossibility of regarding only one of the dimensions without showing concern about the other, explains why the competition in that zone is on the verge of turning into conflict. The imperatives of the interests maintained in the zone of severe rivalry impede the agreement on compromises that are some of the most substantial indicators of the political regulation. The achievement of maximum in regard to the claims for national identity, the impelling forces to the ethnic-confessional aspirations, the attempts to change the national identity, the illusions about the historical privileges and the territorial claims Find a stable ground within the zone. That suitably explains why the South-Eastern European states still reside in history, that is, they constantly look back to the past which has been definitely "monologuous", while nowadays, their attempts to "melt" the history are coupled with lot of dramatisation and tragic ineffectiveness. The idols of the past rule the regional history so »s to predestine the imitative reconfiguration...

Within the zone of non-severe rivalry the interests, related to the national priorities do not exclude each other: furthermore, while being in competition under certain circumstances, they arc, to a definite degree, in compliance with each other and even, sometimes, enhance the co-operation between the Foreign political initiatives. The efficiency of the political activities is, in the zone of non-severe rivalry, subordinated to the idea of reaching the optimum which is being tolerated, but there is still perceived an effort to minimising the efficiency of the enemy's performance. The mutual reliance and common responsibility of the rivals to stimulating the positive aspects of their relations is clearly discernible in the zone. The instigation to the positive aspects is facilitated by the fact that the various optimums of the political efforts do not coincide and their minimum do not as well. The political instruments are easy to apply when solving some or other situational contradictions.

The zone of non-severe rivalry is not marked with a double standard in estimating the capability of the strategies and the opponents. It is not difficult to see that the attempts to limit the efficiency of the rivals' performance is up to reasonable extent. The effectiveness of the political activities is not related to the common metrics - some regional agents may seek economic priorities while others - military ones. The zone of non-severe rivalry is believed to be a zone of incongruous objectives and that is why the relations relevant to the achievement of certain purposes are more tranquil and the patient pursuit of resolutions satisfying each party is completely imaginable. 'the regional relations may be

given an extra-stimulus for developing in a positive direction when transforming some of the elements in the zone of severe rivalry, by their distinguishing between basic and nonessential, and turning them into factors of the non-severe rivalry zone. That is how the "hierarchy of stability" is being defined and (he participants in the regional relations could distinguish the margin of risk in realising the particular political initiatives.

The zone of artificial rivalry is established on the basis of the preventive conduct of the opponents that either do not realise the criteria measuring the efficiency of their political efforts (such is the Bulgarian case), or are conscious of their disadvantageous position in regard to the regional disposition that may turn to not be in favour to the national interests in case of conflict. The zone is not related to Firmly established objectives and with a view to evading an adverse position that minimises the efficiency of the political behaviour in certain conditions there are usually employed opportunist instruments that destroy the peace in the area of collaboration.

The artificial rivalry should pull the resources of the opponent into the imaginary Field of interests and damage the classification of the priorities concerning his political objectives. The zone of artificial rivalry is a zone of political tactics and it is dependent on the political mechanisms for managing the "debates". Tactics, that makes the everyday policy have sense (what else then could be the periodically aggravated and artificially created problems concerning the "Bulgarian Mohammedan" nation). What is characteristic of the behaviour in the zone of artificial rivalry is the lack of resolution to defend the advertised objectives that have formally provoked the behaviour...

After the end of the "Cold war" it was not the exterior contradictions in regard to South-Eastern Europe, but the common interests of the states in the region that gradually turned into actual, pragmatic conditions for a coalition partnership. It is well-known that in case the foreign political effects and the so provoked confrontation dominate the interior, regional opposition, the centripetal force influencing the relations is much more stronger than the centrifugal one. Nowadays, in the recently destroyed bipolar world, the proportion between the centripetal and centrifugal force is kept constant when the national interests enjoy some respect in the international relations. The laws of the civilised competition have been applied to the regional relations and thus, the mutual interest of the partners is more intense than the eventual regional disagreements. The centripetal forces harness the so expected to reveal centrifugal ones.

The presence of asymmetric relation between the exterior and the interior, raising the worth of the inner to the coalition contradictions, the centrifugal processes look impossible to be standstilled: the world of Yugoslavia, the former Soviet Union and the transformation of the Southeastern European area have come into being. The world is characterised by strong liability, morbid experience of the conflicts and difficult to apply political mechanism to their management. The moral system of the opponents is being made absolute along the development of the awkward and complicated regional situation (the same could be perceived when it comes to certain processes concerning the interior political relations - the ethnic aspirations, for example). These characteristics of the situation do explain why foreign political behaviour in the South-Eastern part of Europe is stern and insensitive to the compromise: behaviour that rests so little liberty for taking part in the particular relations.

The resolution to stand for the uniqueness of the so chosen political and cultural self-identification have transformed the South-Eastern part of Europe into a mechanical

merger of distinctive "feuds", it turned out that inside the cultural area. historically determined as a mediator among the civilisations, there are established firm boundaries and the autonomous communities are jealously vigilant over their own sovereignty. One should bear in mind the idea of the peculiarity characterising the South-Eastern part of Europe if making analysis of the prospects to the currently displayed tendency in the international relations domain for increasing the "freedom of relations". If freedom means tolerance on part of the international community toward each state's inclination for destroying the stereotype patterns of the relations and establishing new relations, based on the common, corresponding part of their national interests, then, it is obvious that the South-Eastern European region is very far from the process of modernisation.

The up-dating of the foreign political tendencies and the orientation of South-Eastern Europe has been deterred by the still powerful influence exercised by the dogmatic art of the traditional policy and the discernible reminiscences from the doctrinaire stereotypes in the political practice dating From the time of the "Cold war". If the modernisation of the relations has chosen as a prototype and universal model the western liberal democracy, which comprises the two basic values - equality and freedom, it turns out that the European Southeast should, like the post-communist societies in Eastern Europe, take the road to confirming the new moral system. It would be definitely more difficult for the states from the region that are about to carry out the transition from the synthesis of the October Revolution, strongly respecting the social equality and the liberal cult, to freedom. Moreover, the region has made them co-exist with societies, untouched by the equality syndrome and residing the "other camp", but nevertheless having promptly applied the atavistic obsession to their political practice.

The modernisation of the European Southeast is detained also because of "imported" contradictions, the secret initiator of which are:

- the technological distance between the prosperous Western Europe and the states from the region - a factor, the retarding effect of which will have a negative influence on the regional relations and the integration intercourse with the developed democracies;

- the democratic "distance", that is going to be overcome in different moments of time by each separate state. The gradual consolidation of the democratic regimes will be carried out in a different rhythm - it will imply the correspondent impairments to the regional relations (the ostensibly democratic nature of the parliamentary election in Albania, for example);

- later on, there should he expected to emerge the resource problem that will determine both the rapidity in relaxing the relations and the perspectives for their evolution among the stales;

- the national populism constitutes a permanent destructive and hard to be eliminated factor from the European Southeast. The damages, caused by it, are the reason why the regional discords are of First importance to the regional relations. The apprehension of endangered national interests ensures them defensive priorities in accordance with the contradictions imported from abroad. That explains why in South-Eastern Europe the centrifugal tendencies dominate over the centripetal ones;

- the nature of the regional integration is also of importance to the modernisation of the European Southeast or in other words - whether it will turn out be a False integration, carried out by way of upper state association of the regional communities around a new centre (Turkey, for example), or by way of interstate regional integration, as an inherent

part of the integration into Europe. The other procedure is Far more difficult but it responds to the nature of the consolidation processes and tendencies in Europe.

In the near future the European Southeast would be one of the points of instability on the continent. Apart from this, the point is surrounded by an area, itself being a source of miscellaneous effects. The Mediterranean and part of South-Eastern Europe, both having well-developed economies. evident desire to join European the moderate nationalism, will positively influence the regional processes. Turkey is an intermediate unit - it is part of South-Eastern Europe and meanwhile embodies the shade of Asia. It is the link to other civilisations and traditions and a force, as well. that exercises direct influence on the Muslims residing in the European Southeast.

Besides the secular nature of the state (questions of the kind have arisen after Prof. Erbakan won the parliamentary elections), it could be expected that in her foreign political orientation Turkey will maintain the separation and seclusion on ethnic basis of "relative" communities in the European Southeast in order to prolong the comparatively autonomous development of these ethnic "cantons". They would be regarded as a natural continuation of the social basis of its Foreign policy. Similar influence may be detected also in Bulgaria.

It could be expected that such a policy will step by step manufacture the next serious challenge to Europe, because in its South-Eastern part could once more be discerned compiled the elements of a regional conflict on an ethnic basis. The strategy of the intermediary risk that takes into consideration the prognostication For development of the regional relations should not exclude a scenario of the kind. Besides, if thinking such a risk conceivable, the dimensions of the situation, if it ever happens, will bring into being a serious regional conflict.

Similar scenario should be bore in mind whenever making analysis. because the regional disposition could not be simplified by expressing any admissions or doubts that the relations may take a destructive way of developing, only taking stand on some "widespread concerns" for a commonwealth in the future civilizational building on the continent or for the reliability on the political behaviour based on "sound reasoning". What widespread concerns and sound reasoning could pacify the social environment charged with the demolishing impulses produced not only by the Bosnian conflict but also by the Cyprus, Curds, Georgia-Abhasian, Aser-Armenian and the Tchetchnyan "local" conflicts. Judgements on some effective co-operation in establishing the regional relations may be expressed only if there is:

- correspondence between the standpoints and the strategic political and military objectives of each state, taking part in the relations:

- common strategy with a view to the probable opponents to the consolidation process carried out in developing the regional relations;

- identical attitude toward the non-regional factors, standing for particular interest in the region;

- close position regarding the major players on the international arena, whose interests may be deeply affected or eliminated by the dynamic regional development;

- accordant viewpoints on the conceivable dimension of each regional state's developing military potential;

- compliant positions about the necessary co-operative strategy for guarding the common regional interests;

- preparedness to devising a mechanisms for undertaking coordinated military and non-military measures with a view to overcoming the crises in the region;

- stubborn repudiation of the single acts as inapplicable to resolving the crisis in the regional relations.

The above-mentioned judgements on the co-operation in the regional establishment, in order to becoming principles of the international relations. should overcome significant obstacles, some of which:

- the reinvigorated influence of the classical nationalism:

- the existence of substantial discord in the interests of the separate states in the security field;

- firm discrepancy among the power, traditions and immunity of the relations concerning the non-regional factors;

- the differences between the traditional relationship and the preferences within the regional relations; the residual effect of the traditional affiliation to regional and non-regional powers maintain certain symmetry in the development of the balanced interstate relations;

- difficult to be defined common interests that are to reveal the way toward the regional identity. Only after their giving a definition, that "identity" will be delivered from the negative aspects, having served an instrument for political evaluations.

The constant peering into the past revives the ghosts of discord, such that have brought so much troubles to the European Southeast under the pretext of salving the ideas that concern the dimension of the regional partnership. In order that the box of Pandora be closed and the European Southeast restores its initial position of a bridge, mediator of the civilizational messages, it is necessary that a sincere, unprejudiced dialogue concerning the problems of the regional relations be held. it should focus its energy towards the following more important fields of the political cleansing:

1. Some problems of the legacy, that continue to iniluence the regional particularity:

- the present influence of the legacy, that encompasses the specific. characteristics of the region as Euro-Asian passage and the imperatives of the European integration (national populism, actively detaching traditions):

- the rights of the legacy reflect also over the recent configuration of states in the region. The destructive potential of the reconstitution concerning the ethnic and state order established in the European Southeast is advertised as a restitution of the civilisation legacy (that pushes, with great velocity, the region back to the beginning of the century);

- the restoration of the legacy may be detected in the current attempts to assign the boundaries of the "bipolar world" non-ideological, civilizational dimensions.

2. Special attention should be turned to the complex of factors that maintain the regional instability:

- the ethnic centralisation and the Forceful practice of "confederating", provoked by the problems of the national identity:

- the social and cultural emancipation of separate communities, carried out under the direction of non-regional factors, tint constantly evokes the deficiency of stability;

- the translation of the regional security mainly into ethnic and religious problem and its complementary agitation by the expansion of the Islamic Fundamentalism;

- the low political culture of the emancipating communities, that allows their manipulation;

- the xenophobia that makes evident a national complex and the revival of the tradition, rejecting the "foreigner";

- not quite clearly determined poles of the economic dynamism and flexibility of the new power constellations in the region.

3. These Factors happen, in broader terms, to determine the logic of the destructive Forces operating on the regional political arena, identified in:

- the crisis concerning the identity of the new democracies;

- the confrontation as generator of political reasoning - it is here that the Framework of the tolerable expansion of the conflict charged areas should be considered;

- the minor political priorities that have banked mainly the privileges of the national interests;

- the ignorance of the real political opponent in the regional relations and the extension of the discussions by way of attracting non-regional Factors as "translators" and "mediators";

- the lure of the instruments For exercising violent pressure, that promises immediate results and ensures the brilliant impression gained by the opponents of the way the result was accomplished;

- the inherent conflict nature of the alternatives that should resolve the disputable questions;

- the maintenance of the symmetry in the military instruments of the policy.

The XX century has provided lot of evidences that the substitute of the mechanisms For manufacturing the political decisions is perilous to the European Southeast. The most trivial temptation to the local politicians, (hat do not have the patience of the political dexterity For searching mutually satisfying decisions, is to splinter with a single blow the Gordian knot. containing irresolvable problems, accumulated during the development of the interstate relations. The results arc well-known - catastrophes. Followed by the extension of the detachment mode. the maintenance of frigid interstate relations quite close to turning into an open confrontalion. If the regional agents, enlightened at last, try to define the dimensions of the constructive regional policy that will neutralise the effect of the neo- detachment mode and activate the integration processes, they should first of all regard:

- the emphasis on (he economic connections in the context of the international relations;

- the possibilities For establishing regional "common market", as means for activating the regional political, economic and cultural relations. that enhance the harmonisation of the intercourse and the transition from mechanic to systematic co-operation;

- the common characteristics of the regional security policy looked in the light of the interests maintained by the states in the region;

- the dimensions of the regional policy as a tolerant one to the national choice;

- the agreement upon the areas where the common regional policy is being applied;

- the establishment of mechanisms and procedures of a common regional security policy;

- lucidity in the military settlement, in clarifying the possibilities for influencing its

substance and detecting the factors that have impact on the military expenditure. They would appeal to reasonability. to such a sensibility called "sufficiency", that may stimulate the positive processes in the region.

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JUGOISTOČNA EVROPA - RASKRSNICA CIVILIZACIJA ILI ZAKASNELA RENESANSA

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Jugoistočna Evropa je kontaktno-kofliktna zona koja uključuje dve transverzale kroz koje su sa jugoistoka i severoistoka prodirali ekspanzionistički talasi različitog potencijala, socio-kulturnih karakteristika i sudbine. Persija i Otomansko carstvo bili su sudbonosni primeri kolonizacijskog pritiska sa jugoistoka. Pretnje sa severoistoka koje datiraju još iz vremena Avara i Ostrogota, našle su u poslednjih nekoliko vekova svog tradicionalnog nastavljača u ruskim ambicijama prema Evropi. Koreneći se na moćnoj konfiguraciji stalnih aspiracija, jugoistočna Evropa se već odavno pretvorila u granicu civilizacija i evropskog identiteta.