Abstract. The goal of our contribution is to provide a programmatic foundations of a binding political paradigm. The outline has two main parts, where the first one gives philosophical principles justifying a few most fundamental ("metaphysical") positions (1. Only that which is organized as a system can be sustainable. 2. The sustention of the entirety of being is a value in itself. 3. The system can be sustained because the totality of being is always orientated to a pre-given model, whose sustention does not depend on the current condition of everything that enters (or should enter) the whole of the system. 3a: The inherently assembled whole is different from the totality of a random variety as much as its “ingredients” are pervaded by the internal substantive form emerging from the principle of the whole.), while the second part lays out practical, both individually ethical and generally political implications of the postulates given above. The text also has three appendices in which, in accordance with the programmatic part of the contribution, we attempt to anticipate and initiate a dialogue with possible objections and dilemmas over our principal theses or their consequences. In an effort to avoid an ideological type of language, the contribution fundamentally and systematically abstains from classifications, alternatives, and affiliations intrinsic to traditional ideologies.

Key words: National programme, political theory, common cause, crisis, totality, metaphysics.

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this text is not to present and interpret certain positions in political philosophy and/or ideological stances from a well-known spectrum of society and state doctrines. We shall attempt here to offer an independent philosophical foundation of a generally binding political paradigm, without delving into particular political and ideological details. For this reason, we shall strive to move the arguments and presentation away from the domain of ideological discourse – for this should precisely give a contribution to the development of a proper political language, which should, again, be “ideological” to the
least extent possible – not only in the sense of overcoming traditional ideological schools and alternatives (which is obvious already from the title of this contribution) – but even more in the sense of avoiding the serious epistemological and axiological limitations of such type of language in general. Therefore, this outline should be both ideologically and politically relevant, but in such a way as not to belong to the ideological type of language.\(^1\) Hence, in a sense, in this draft one will be able to recognize both "left" and "right", "radical" and "conservative", "communitarian", and even "liberalist" undertones, while, in another sense, the text that follows should either fully transcend, or partly even in principle precede those kinds of ideological discourse – in such a way as to serve as a remedy to moderate their almost "inherent" single-sidedness and incompleteness.

Although the topic here belongs to practical philosophy, it seems that an outline like this one can be more generally founded if the problem is viewed from the most general, fundamental theoretical position, so that subsequently, through their "application", i.e. "translation" to the domain of practical philosophy, one could get to more elaborated positions, immediately relevant to the domain in question. Since it presupposes the applicability of the most general fundamental insights to the practical realm, this outline could be considered as "Platonic" – in, conditional and partial, contrast to the Aristotelian distinction between the fundamental-ontological and practical-ethical problems, i.e. questioning of the theoretical norm on harmony between the individual and the community. The position given below on the community as an organic harmony between parts and the whole will also be Platonic. However, we shall not go so far as to claim that there are far-reaching comprehensive structural analogies between the topics of theoretical and practical philosophy. Instead of providing our position on such a view of the structures of theory and reality, which would impose serious obligations, we may just state that such a "strong" assumption will not be necessary for our purpose.

The outline itself will be presented as a series of fundamental theses that to which will be ascribed quasi-axiomatic validity. However, contrary to geometrical axiomatic systems, this set of postulates does not need to be even by far formally and methodologically impeccable – in this theoretical domain such a goal is unattainable, and one should thus not strive for it. First of all, if they are viewed as axioms, these postulates probably neither belong to the minimal set, nor are entirely interdependent.\(^2\) They are not positioned on equally general levels: rather, some of them can be read not as independent assumptions, but only as positions strongly linked to some other fundamental positions. In that sense, the increasing precision and specification in defining the later postulates – in the

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1 True, in one part of philosophy there have long been attempts to insinuate not only that philosophy sometimes represents concealed ideology (for instance, Marx's *The German Ideology*), but, much more radically, that philosophical language in itself has such power structures pledged at its core that there is no substantial difference between philosophical and ideological language, since, allegedly, both cases represent a variation of a unique strategic discourse, rational in terms of its aims, but not rational in terms of its pure arguments. Moreover, some consider that philosophy, in its self-concealing ideologicity, is a particularly subversive form of the ideological interpretation of the world. If the former strategy could be considered plausible to an extent, the latter represents not only a form of auto-destruction of philosophical thought, but also much more: the syndrome of its accelerated decline in the present culture and age – and thus we shall not consider it here as something that we should commit ourselves to.

2 These two prerequisites are common in geometric axiomatization, where the task of axiomatizing a domain is most clearly demonstrated. In that sense, geometry can work as a role model for analogous philosophical efforts.
exposition of the conception – will result in the transition from the domain of philosophizing on principles (in the sense of a 'heno(mero)logy', as we might call it on this occasion) to the domain of what is relevant to the philosophy of society/community, i.e. politics. However, these fundamental postulates, though interdependent, cannot be viewed as a firmly interlinked chain of inference.

Finally, the "axiomatics -similitude" of what follows is conditional in that, in spite of the corresponding practice in geometry, we shall attempt to suggest that each of the postulates has plausibility of its own. We shall therefore try, if not to prove them (as theorems), then at least to "reasonably" support them and thus, we hope, make them credible.

I FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS

a) POSTULATE 1: Only that which is organized as a system can be sustainable.

This may seem as an abstract and vacuous, fully "metaphysical" position. However, whatever we we may mean by this, be it an individual, be it systems constructed of a number of independent units, or be it the whole, all of these in some way imply a regularity which, naturally, cannot generally exclude the possibility of change. However, when the power of the permanent (the form) is not strong enough to constrain the unconstrained and unpredictable overflow of change, or: in circumstances in which the change from one state does not lead to another sustainable "state" (and a "state" is, one should add, a construction of proportionate stability in the midst of perpetual change) – the result is chaos and decay. When the system and organization become so weak that not a single condition possible at the moment can become rooted any longer, this most likely means that the process of decay has started, so that after the current inconsistence of forms there should follow a completely formless collapse, i.e. "creation" of nothingness itself. The "nothingness", of course does not have to imply any literal material destruction, fragmentation to the level of dust, physical "annihilation", but merely the destruction of the kind of being that the form of existence had had before, that had been typical and "inborn" for this being. That would mean that different types of beings can have different kinds of annihilation, i.e. that the transition to a certain form of non-existence for one kind of being would not would not necessarily lead another one to total annihilation.

b) POSTULATE 2: Sustention of the entirety of being, which is capable of building order, is a value sui generis.

After the all-out alienation from and often vehement and even ruthless criticism of metaphysics, the effort to rehabilitate the Whole – not merely in the epistemological sense, but also in the ontological, even value-relevant sense – may seem unbearably obsolete. However, the impression is that the anti-metaphysical, i.e. the anti-whole reaction in philosophy, which – after all the blows it suffered from Kant and the Enlightenment – gained its decisive, devastating support in the Modern Age with Kierkegaard, while in its modern, virtually paroxysmal versions it would get as far as to say that "the whole is un-

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1 In Ancient Greek, "hen" means "one" and "meros" means "part".
true" (Adorno), is but an inopportune attempt to rehabilitate, in the midst of the totalizing reign of Ratio, the (actually or allegedly jeopardized) individuality, authenticity, and "un-repeatability". The subjection of particulars to the whole, where the former ones must also know how to subject their own purposes, needs, and peculiarities to this whole, cannot be sustainable from the viewpoint of a predominantly humanistic theoretical thought, or from any most broadly constructed fundamental theoretical position, either. After becoming familiar with the currents of the Western philosophical thought in the last one hundred and sixty years, one must be surprised, however, to learn that the anti-wholeness-reaction in philosophy has, most likely permanently and irreparably, assumed the negative attitude and sentiment, thanks to which one most often fails to have an inevitable insight that anything individual can become sustainable, functional, grounded, authentic, and recognized only under the auspices of a proportionately stable system. The whole, therefore, must not be reduced to always random "aggregates" (sums) of individual parts and constructions of the specific, but, as a principle, it transcendentally precedes the possible emergence and existence of everything "sub-holistic" (in terms of substance, form, and genesis), thus further determining the conditions responsible for the content of its being. Otherwise, the very possibility that the whole (being) should persevere would depend on contingent circumstances of everlasting adaptation or non-adaptation of singularities, conceived as existing in a self-sufficient and thus self-defining way. If, therefore, one can recognize the message of the previous two centuries of humanistic philosophy as the request to recognize the value of the specific and the individual, then one must – precisely for this individual – a fortiori contend that the whole is a value, of not only its own, but of the highest kind. This, finally, holds not only since the whole sets up conditions for the possibility of the existence of various individualities, but because everything particular, in order to exist at all, while it exists, must inhere a sufficient quantity of permanence and order – as required by its "nature" and its mode of existence.

c) POSTULATE 3: The system can be sustained because the totality of being is always orientated toward a pre-given model, whose sustention does not depend on the current condition of everything that enters (or should enter) the whole of the system.

It might seem that this call for the acknowledgment of the meaning of the whole as a being in itself is still a benevolent and too big step towards the metaphysical tradition. The response to this would first be that the question of the nature of this potential role model, especially the question of its ontological, i.e. transontological sense (as laid out in Plato's ontology) should be put aside. Still, if it has been pointed out above that the whole, or the principle of entirety, has a constitution which transcends anything individual subject to it, and which does not receive its meaning subsequently, from a current, accidental integration of the meanings of individualities, where, naturally, some relative change-ability is inevitably allowed, then this whole must be shaped as essential unchangeability, which must be able to effectively and incessantly exert proper influence on anything that is individual. Autonomy, aprioricity, unchangeability, and efficiency are exactly the attributes of what one can label a model. As the problem discussed here belongs to fundamental-ontological core, then the principle of the whole (however we understand it and as much as we can appropriately understand it at all) establishes itself as the primordial
source of the entire beingness (realitiness) and all modelness. Therefore, following the role model, or measuring the level of appropriateness to it – a consequence of the following – also represents a value for all that is directed to the role model – whether anything particular, or the (real) whole of it.

d) POSTULATE 3a: The inherently assembled whole is different from the totality of a random variety as much as its "ingredients" are pervaded by the internal substantive form emerging from the principle of the whole.

For the existence of an inherently jagged variety to possess a certain necessity (which should, however, be clearly differentiated from the scholastic "being by necessity"), it must have a certain internal interrelatedness which will vouch for its (future) or explain its (present) consistency. Having in mind the reigning tendency of contemporary philosophical education, one could note two possible strategies for refuting this position, and also such judgment. First, the fact that this world (in the real and ontic sense) has existed for so long (regardless of whether we can discover for how long exactly, and since when exactly in this particular way) does not have to mean that the fact of its existence has had to go hand in hand with a transcendental necessity immanent to the being. Not only this world (in terms of experience) but, in general, any kind of its organization would thus need to be conceived of as radically contingent. However, the assumption of a long-lived yet in "essence" accidental world, i.e. being in general, is intuitively implausible, and its acceptance would result in the banishment of one of the decisive questions man is facing from the most comprehensive, competent, and general discipline of his thought. And is this not, in Kant's words, quite "scandalous"?4

The second strategy in this sense would be to question the meaning of the very use of the word, not to mention the concept of the "whole" – in a scientific context, as, allegedly, it would be a mere illusion brought about by our natural language, where, however, such a concept could not withhold any serious theoretical verification. Namely, the "whole" could be interpreted as the word that we need in order to better find our way in everyday life, which, however, becomes very "dangerous" if one gets to believe that in reality there is actually something (real) corresponding to it. Such a position is a legitimate heir to extreme nominalism which shows posterior distrust of the possibility that there is any relevant way for Being and thought to be interwoven in an intelligible manner. First of all, such a position is ultimately very vulnerable. As it may be, man's very language and thought can be viewed as "worldly" phenomena, as "parts" of this world so to speak, i.e. as "beings". If the most potent metaphysical minds, those trusting that even the constrained human reason can notice the intelligibility and transparency of the connection between thought and Being, may consider them to have no essentiality, then there are no obstacles to translating such a view to all reality. In that case, any attempt of thinking, even radically skeptical and nominalistic, would be devoid of any meaning grounded in reality.5

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4 Thus one can claim that, historically viewed, the fragmentation of philosophy started within itself, when, in its desire to respect the ideal of scientificality, it gradually began to renounce its more traditional topics.

5 A more elaborated form of this argument is provided by Jens Halfwassen: "Therefore, this objection challenges the view that structures of our thought can fundamentally match the structures of Being – and, exactly through this, it shows itself to be meaningless. Namely, one who believes that reality can also consist of a dis-
In addition, it would not be too difficult to provide an entire range of significant examples – from everyday experience to natural sciences or humanities – where one could prove the efficiency of conceptual dichotomies, such as not only part–whole, many–one, but also others, such as essence–being, etc. Naturally, each and every criticism of metaphysics and its language cannot be fully ungrounded. To say the least, conceptual thinking, instead of trying to fathom elementary nodes and structural elements of intelligibility in reality (i.e. provide such thinking that would "follow" the Being), has in time come to the situation in which it elaborates on almost endless conceptual distinctions, trusting that they are not only cognitively and technically, but also actually relevant and real. Historically, however, after this reaction to such an attempted organization of reality followed – in the structures of human thought that made a turn in proclaiming that conceptual distinctions were relevant primarily to thinking, but not to reality and Being, if they should be granted independent meaning at all.

However, there is impression, that this was an undue deviation from the desirable position of theoretical thought, which also renounced not only that which endangers a particular tradition in European thinking but also that which enables philosophical and theoretical thinking at all. The issue in question here is an unreasonably strong reaction with long-term effect – caused both by the imperfection of metaphysical thinking in philosophy (from the meticulous scientific standpoint) and by the obvious and serious difficulties of its language (and no language one wishes to think in can provide answers without facing major difficulties).

The final fundamental postulate essentially claims that, if it were not pervaded by the subject ("substrate") of singularity (which the former lacks)\(^6\), the whole would break down into the mutually indifferent or accidentally correlated many, wherein there would always be a danger of its sudden (accidental) transition into nothingness (more precisely: "the nothingness of the whole" – in the sense of the clarification provided above on meaning in the varieties of nothingness), precisely because its getting things together would be accidental, and not necessary.

Naturally, one should stress that the presentation of the wholeness of being as pervaded by an internal, substantive form is the other side of the conception of the wholeness of being as reflecting an external model. In essence, adaptedness to an external model assumes its expression from the permeation with a particular internal form, which means that this postulate is neither theoretically nor axiomatically autonomous (and is thus labeled 3a instead of 4).

\(^6\) In Plato's *Parmenides* 157 d it is claimed that *everything* (\(\alpha\nu\)) becomes a *whole* (\(\omega\lambda\)) only if pervaded by the principle of unity.
Interconclusion and Transition to the Second Section

Decisive for political philosophy from this derivation is the insight that this fundamental position is also applicable to "human affairs", more precisely, to human community. Therefore, a political community devoid of the subject (substance) of consolidation/inclusion, devoid of the principle of the whole, etc. – could no longer exist as such, it would dissolve, and, in practice, become ontically destroyed. Therefore, the substrate of the whole (state/nation), which at least includes the tradition of the nation and the state, must be present in its parts (citizens), both in the objective sense (in the way in which such tangible given actually forms them) and in the subjective sense (meaning corresponding explicit self-identification, irrespective of how much it is actually appropriate). A nation becomes that which it is, and a nation in general, when it consolidates and includes the totality of its members with a unique idea/form, through which process it assumes both identity and integrity. The gathering of the many into a whole is possible since the subject of the whole, the derivative of, so to speak, "the national universal" becomes present in (almost) all individual members, where, to an extent, and in a certain form, this is explicitly perceived by the members within themselves. Henceforth a third element is obtained for the individuality of the people/nation – the self-perception of its own dignity, otherwise known by the name (and feeling) of patriotism.

II ETHICAL AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES

The starting point for this outline is the premise that the whole should have advantage over a part – if their "interests" should collide, i.e. if the part – in a broader sense – is not in the function of the whole. How should one understand this whole, however? Some radical ideologies, whether "left" or "right", in their own way also assume that the majority and the many have advantage over the particular and the minority, believing, therefore, that the interest of the group in itself has much greater importance than individual rights and interests. However, in articulating, and particularly in applying their programmes,
they have often not realized that the advantage of the whole over a part should not be understood in an external, mechanical sense as the primacy of a bare factually given over the particular. Rather, the point is that the particular should be **subject** to the whole based on a principle which has an **ontological** and **ethical** sense, which can be used to lay foundations and legitimacy for the whole. The sense of this distinction is avoid that this whole could be distorted and turned into a force exerting unjustified violence over the particular. However, given the assumption of the true foundation of the whole in that which is appropriate, the **service to the common cause** would not only represent a first-degree ethical commandment, but would also affect every individual member of the community (irrespective of how he should actually act in his daily existential and ethical practice). Hence the type of the relationship to the whole provides feedback which determines the quality of the ontological and ethical shaping of individual(s). One should, thus, decisively stress that the meaning of the whole is not just in itself; that it does not exist for its own sake, but that its true meaning, and also ideal projection is – **reciprocal fertilization** of itself and its parts, i.e. self-giving of the parts to the whole, and service of the whole to its parts. The need for some parts to possibly sacrifice themselves to the whole at a given point exists only if this desirable harmony between particulars and the whole has not been reached yet, but solely if this really projected and at least partly achieved whole actually corresponds to the demands for the whole described above.

Therefore, the issue here must not be any slavish subjugation and devaluation of individualities, or the individual as such; rather, all individuals, being in the service of the whole, would receive certain stability, value, and truly veracious and permanent recognition as individualities. One should conceive of this analogously to the ancient philosophical formula, well-known even before it was pronounced in Latin – **conicidentia oppositorum**. For this reason, in practical matters, it is unacceptable to work to one's own (alleged or actual) **individual** advantage by harming the whole, and thus self-excluding oneself from the whole, by making an artificial opposition between the transient and perishable self as opposed to the whole, which, if kept in line with the model, *should* be durable and, in the hope of every nation – intransient. Thus he who harms the whole for his apparent own benefit, among other things – although unconsciously – harms himself. Our point of departure, in turn, is that every individual is more valuable as a **part** of the long-lasting and encompassing community than when taken as a transient particular. Therefore, individualistic understanding of personal good cannot be normatively and theoretically justified, and its lack of foundations and unhealthy partiality actually qualify it as something perishable, apparent, and, ultimately, harmful and dangerous. Through the possible confrontation of our existence as individuals with ourselves as parts of a "sacred" whole, the better (higher) part of the self (ethical and reasonable) becomes contrasted with the worse (lower) part (lustful and hedonistic). The individual, as a member of the community based on genus and ethnicity, is in a sense intransient – conditionally speaking, the community may provide for its unlimited prolongation in time thus reproducing ontic, ethical and cultural universals, while the individual in himself can last only as long as his lifetime. Thus the supremacy of the individual good as something "counter-general" to true generality means to choose the transient and not the (relatively and potentially) intransient.

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8 In that sense Plato says: "You become angry because you do not realize that all which is best for you is good for both the whole and for you, and this is so because the two of you have a common origin." (*Nomoi* 903 d–e).
That this is not just intellectual imagination can be seen in the careful analysis of the behavior of citizens of big, successful states. They often (tacitly or consciously, and thereby usually decisively) express loyalty to their state, from which, on the other hand, they gain some (patriotic) self-awareness, and their characteristic (often distinctive) pride in contacts with members of other nations. Patriotism can, therefore, be viewed as a subjective expression having emerged from a bidirectional process in which the individual invests himself in the whole with his actions, thoughts, and feelings in order to gain foundation from it in return in those areas in which as an individual he would never (or rarely, hardly, and extraordinarily) be able to get, which do not pertain to his individually "unrepeatable" personal traits. Patriotism, thus, ideally implies the (not necessarily constant and fully balanced) fitting of parts and whole, the harmony of "roles" and "contributions", and finally of the (social) Being (i.e. practice) and social (self)awareness.

One should not, however, lose track of the fact that the concept of patriotism should not be reduced only to the rationally justifiable loyalty to the community since it also encompasses the emotional bond to the particular community and its historically-shaped given. Even more, the nature of this bond is such that it usually does not allow that citizen – excluding additional theoretical training or corresponding intellectual curiosity – should reach the fundamental insight into the obligation that he should be loyal to his community as a community, but his loyalty is primarily his loyalty being primarily mediated by various forms of concrete, as a rule proportionately unreflected given, and by the intimate strongholds of national identification capable of producing the sense of national obligation. Since that which is given through history and tradition being typical cannot be rationally well-founded, it is understandable that the attitude to it is mediated primarily through emotions, and, to a lesser extent, and with the few – also through reason.

However, if the intent of this contribution is to provide as rational view of the essential foundation of the political community as possible, and also the analysis of relations within it and against it, it might seem that the introduction of emotions, and respect of the given, as (hypothetical) foundations for the primary constitution of a political community is – inconsistent, and that, if nothing else, it undermines the plan and intention of the exposition announced at the beginning of this text. Nevertheless, a political community, as a practice for organizing a group of people on a rational basis, and not just on the grounds of natural necessity and the traditionally given, must have a pre-given, potential "subject-matter" for the application of the rational principles it is supposed to be based upon. A political community cannot be construed on the grounds of the already existing traditional natural community which is internally consolidated through the joint identification of its members and things which are given and are experienced as specific for the pre-political organization of this community. Therefore, the rational principles on which a political community is based cannot fully ground this community, but only pre-ground it – counting in this process on the already present points of support and acting within the limits that have already been delineated in the pre-political (even pre-historical) facts of the emotional framework of its existence. This additional foundation may change the nature of factual relations within the community, but it can in no way either rationally ground the given that provides a basis for rational identification with this community or replace it with some more encompassing or comprehensive rational arrangements. Therefore, a political community is not solely rational for, as potentially such, it would need to be able to reasonably establish itself (through the "voice" of some thinkers), and accordingly estab-
lish its *beginning* (αρχή) and its *essence* (οὐσία). Since this obviously is not and cannot be possible, every political community, including the one with the longest political tradition – a tradition of relatively public-open, transparent, and rationally grounded organization, will experience the need to include certain forms of speech (no matter how scientific) in public awareness on the beginning and (quasi)essence of the nation, which will, however, necessarily remain outside the boundaries of rationality – the former in the guise of the *national myth*, and the latter in the form of predominant, self-interpreting *opinions*. Political reconstitution of a community, therefore, represents a form of upgrade of the *natural* organization of the already existing (proto)community.9

It is thus shown that in the language of the organization of a community the given and the justified, the a-rational and the rational, the specific and the (relatively) general inevitably intertwine. This becomes pronounced anew when one tries to inspect the morally relevant components in the formation of a political community. Namely, one could say in advance that the political community is a *moral organism*, to use the ancient phrase. Primarily, this means that from the obligation of the individual to the whole derive mutual obligations to all its members. In other words, the reciprocity of the mutual solidary and moral communication between members of the community is at least partly mediated by their attitude to the whole. Therefore, the ethical *solidarity principle* is a result of the analogous application of the onto-henological formula of the unity of the many onto the political community.

In the ethnic community which has still not developed itself to the level of political organization the general commitment to help all members also goes without saying, but its nature is quite different and limitations are considerable. Namely, solidarity with compatriots there emerges only from the awareness of belonging to the same people/ethnicity (and this awareness sometimes exists even when there is no actual blood relation), while there is no trace of the *consciousness* of the mutual obligation to help members of the community as parts of the whole which encompasses and defines them. Second, regardless of the fact the foundation for the construction of a political community is always ethnic and nation-bearing, during the historical construction of peoples, and nations in particular, members of other ethnicities have become constituent parts, so that, in some cases, limiting the solidarity community to blood relations (or alleged blood relations) would banish some members of the (potentially) political community, even if their attitude to the common cause were impeccable. Finally, if the solidarity is grounded in the principle of blood, rather than constitution through self-perception, solidarity with compatriots would be the last of the types of solidarity, starting from the family, over clan, tribe and region, and would only then, perhaps, reach the people or nation stage.10 In this process, the smaller the number of persons involved in these solidarity circles, the stronger the bond and obligation. While solidarity with compatriots and fellow citizens (of mainly the same ethnicity) has the same range of validity – but a different character, on the lower levels of solidarity communities this bonding can collide with the principle of commitment to the political community as a moral body, and particularly with morality if it, more broadly, applies not only to the community but to humanity as a whole.

9 See more on this in our above cited text "On the Verge of the European".

10 In other words, a people may emerge when the scope of the solidary community overpowers blood and family bonds.
It has turned out, therefore, that in the domain of practical politics, the natural versus
self-interpreting bonding alternative is neither decisive nor comprehensive, since in reality
both these principles mediate the concrete life of political communities as moral organ-
isms entailing general obligation – as applied to a factually given, and specifically shaped
segment of humanity. The question is posed whether it is possible that something which
by its nature applies generally (humanity) should be applied restrictively (people), and, if
the answer were "yes", how would then this "limited universality" coexist with the mand-
datory, general human morality? The answer to the first question is easy when we recall,
for instance, the slaveholding democracy of the Greek polis, in which generally applicable
and reasonably grounded principles applied for citizens, but not for slaves through the
very fact of their social, and sometimes ethnic or racial descent. Secondly, the actual
blending of the moral and natural community (resulting in the emergence of a political
community) does not at all mean that, viewed in the sense of its factual "embodiment" –
the abstract, universal morality would have to be suspended. In this process, universally
human moral obligations toward all members of humanity do not cease to be valid.
Rather, in addition to the general obligation to man as such, a lower circle of obligations
is made, to those standing in between the closest relatives and beloved persons on the one
hand, and man in general, on the other. Moral obligations existing to members of the peo-
ple-bearing community are exclusive – since they cannot apply (unless self-chosen) to
members of other nations, but not in such a way as to suspend the moral obligations re-
lated to general humanity.

The crucial question that emerges here is whether loyalty to a political community
may collide with moral imperatives as such. This question can be viewed on different lev-
els, which in effect means that no elegant or simply coherent answer is possible. First of
all, it is clear that in practice, commonly, real or proclaimed state interests force individu-
als to choose between morality and the (often formalized) duty to the state. Formulas of
the unity of the many, the whole above the parts, and of integrity, identity, and dignity of
parts based on the "substance" of the whole represent merely the formal traits (and also
commandments) of the way in which a community is organized which, as we have seen,
must be completed with the "substantive" factors of origin, memory, and tradition. The
last factor limits the room for the possible application of the formal postulates given
above, but, as such, at least the way things seem at present, its meaning should be morally
indifferent. If so, the political organization of a community conformed to the formal
postulates provided above should result in the moral acceptability of this community's be-
havior, so that in their mutual communication (i.e. international relations) political com-
communities should, in principle, act in a moral way. The fact this is often not so in reality
should probably be ascribed to the circumstances in which actual political communities
are not optimally morally governed from within, so that they are not constituted as moral

\[1\] Of course, in principle one cannot exclude the possibility that there are such nations in whose memory and
self-identification morally unacceptable moments persist, but this is unlikely because in collective memory own
identity and dignity must be affirmed – which is hardly conceivable if there are parts in this memory at odds
with moral intuition – naturally, on condition this intuition is working at all in the concrete situation. However,
not even this can exclude that there might be nations which have the self-awareness of their own dignified
historical character, and yet, in spite of this, time and again, as if after a "recipe", they make decisions of whose
moral controversy individual members of this nation are, as a rule, unaware.
subjects, either toward the inside (in the relationship between the state, standing for the authority of the whole, and its parts), or, particularly, toward the outside.

Is it possible – to ask another Kantian question – that optimally organized states should not pay attention to moral commandments in external relations? Yes and no. If states are well-organized, this is so because they hold on to rational and this means, at least partly also moral principles. Moral principles, however, have universal validity, i.e. apply also to other people and their states, which is why a well-organized state should not be capable of acting immorally. If the state, even though perhaps morally well-organized, still does so, this means that it makes conscious exceptions to the rules that cannot tolerate exceptions, for reasons which cannot be justified in terms of rational principles (selfishness, distrust, negative prejudices of others and their attributes), and which urge it to act immorally. And that is obviously what describes the reality of international relations.

Although few states can boast that they are (at least) relatively just toward the inside, and probably no state can boast that it acts justly in foreign relations, one can still essentially explain their problematic behavior toward other partakers in international relations with the formula: injustice toward the inside leads to injustice toward the outside. "Injustice", here, does not have to entail actual committing injustice to citizens of a state. However, if the two are principally interconnected by pre-political and a-rational grounds (for instance, membership in a tribe through blood relations), this means that such a community has not been politically constituted, that the (rational) concept of justice is not yet rooted in it, which creates preconditions that harming non-members of this community is not, or should not be taken, as morally unacceptable and unjust.12

The stage of "embodied morality" incarnated in European (as a rule nation-) states cannot be overcome since, due to the lack of grounds of the forces of common descent and memory, which are irremovable from the foundation of the national state, as the primary legal subject of international relations, cannot be overcome. Humanity, on the other hand, is not a concrete community: instead of the all-out "Cosmopoliteia", in actuality there are only individual nation-states, most of which, at least European ones, are based on a particular ethnic foundation. This is why a common human interest cannot be rationally recognized, so that the nation shall remain the primary referent of emotional attachment, which must provide, if not reflexive and rational, then certainly emotional sway to national identification over universally human identification, which, inevitably, determines the corresponding perception of reality and judgment of it.

Appendix: Possible Objections to the Outline and Responses to Them

From the idea of the community in general presented this way, one may derive appropriate practical guidelines for individuals, that we shall call citizen's moral and political imperatives:

a) As an individual, everyone is obliged to perceive and support his interests in such a way as not to harm the interest of the whole, which, in individual matters, implies that the whole should further persist and advance in relevant domains.

12 Hitler's Third Reich, for instance, would be unjust from within even if all Germans were unanimous, and if not a single German within it was repressed, because the grounds for the bond between the citizens were only natural and biological, and not rational and moral.
b) Everyone is obliged to carry out his life projects in such a way as to contribute to the benefit of the whole at least in some way – and, certainly, in such a way as not to harm the whole. The whole should represent a model organic order which will be hierarchically distinguished and interlinked from within. A criterion for internal hierarchical distinction among individuals should be the question of the degree of individual contributions to the sustention and affirmation of the community. This encompasses both theoretical and practical components, i.e. the question how much an individual, by his own behavior, represents/embodies the essence of the given political community, but also how much, through his theoretical and practical involvement, he actually contributes to the common cause of the community in general – irrespective if its individual specificity.

In response to this, from an individualist position one may say: "I am primarily an individual, and I am not interested at all in affiliation with particular entities (ethnicity, nation, religion, civilization)." A more moderate variant of this objection would be that, for individuals personally, some of these affiliations may be important for self-determination, but that is purely a private, contiguous matter. Hereby, on our part, we could respond from both empirical-phenomenological and fundamental-normative strategies.

First the "phenomenological" answer. Cultural, national, religious descent can hardly be deleted, not because these respective entities come to us in an objective and biological way, through "genes", but because in all domains of "the world of human affairs" – in all things that decisively depend on man's thinking and activity – durability, upgrade, creative remodeling from one generation to another, common descent and tradition in general – for the very nature of intercultural socialization – are inevitable and constitutive. In human final and transient world reality always bears the reflection of his origin. Furthermore, man, mostly non-verbally, "remembers" all his opinions, so that man, already by his birth, is always situated in a series of webs of origin and traditions, so that each one of us – for ourselves and others – can always be or "come from" (a) tradition and (an) origin.

The sense of affiliation with a tradition is not found only in the fact that one is pre-defined (naturally, not pre-determined) by what happened in the past, i.e. in the fact that man, being finite, cannot be the originator of his own being, nor, in principle, as an individual, in full power over it. On the other hand, the tradition I am affiliated with is never only mine – although there are circles of tradition higher and lower than national tradition. We are affiliated with it together – as members of a community. Therefore, denial of tradition on the diachronic plane, i.e. denial of the very affiliation with it as such, is directly connected to the denial of the whole on the synchronic plane. The link between the whole and tradition is found in the fact that the whole (i.e. people) always lasts much longer and remembers more than any of its individual parts (i.e. individuals), so that, in the study of history, which generally moves forward within the element of tradition, collective entities of longer duration (peoples, cultures, and religions) are considered as primary objects of tradition, while people belonging to these are considered as historical only in a derived, though certainly necessary, form. In other words, tradition is a way in which a community lasts, so that the denial of one of necessity results in the denial of the other. Consequently: since tradition cannot be meaningfully denied, the same applies to the denial of the whole, i.e. to the position: I do not belong to the group/community, but am primarily/only an individual.
By this we have simultaneously made a step towards the second type of answer to already presented objection.

**The normativist reply:** Man is a finite being, so he always comes to existence from a system which possesses much longer duration than himself, and which also has a more deeply grounded and farther-reaching meaning than it might seem at first glance. As such, man's individual life is a sequence of The Life of Man (i.e. the life of the human species), and the duration of this life and what man does during it is, at least in certain aspects, a sequence of a tradition (or, sometimes, of a number of parallel traditions). There were humans before me (factual proposition) just like there should be people after me (normative judgment). For my existence, I am indebted to my parents, just like they are indebted to their own, etc. so that, finally, it turns out that each of us is indebted for his existence – to the family, people, mankind. In general, a human being as a debt, is not a "corny phrase" at all, but a truth, which has, unfortunately, "worn out" through constant (mis)use, so that today the feeling of its truthfulness has been almost lost. This debt should be paid back – both individually, and through generations – first by the fact an individual will have his own offspring, and then in the activity which will not be oriented exclusively to himself, and the exclusive good of himself and his family, but to the actual constructions of his own "wholification", whether current, national and ethnic one, or virtual, "cosmopolitan" one.

**Appendix 1: What is a nation?**

Another objection is possible here, and it could be interpreted as another variation of nominalism – in this case ethnic nominalism. Namely, one can question the very existence of what we called ethnic universals, as supra-empirical foundations of the constant existence and formation of a nation. The talk of national or "ethnic" universals must first be understood as an attempt to eliminate two beliefs that are ingrained in modern "philosophy of nation": a) that ethnicity, i.e. nationality, is merely a construct, b) that there are actually no features or factors determining the specificity of peoples as such, but that they are, allegedly, only a result of socialization on the grounds of narratively/historically organized, and then systematically carried out and internalized constructs. On our part, we believe that in the greater part of most distinguishable European nations (i.e. mostly, but not exclusively in their case) certain factors are noticeable which have defined their ethnic and national features that, through history, or starting from some of its decisive points, members of this people share, i.e. take part in.\(^{13}\) Precisely this participation in a common project is the foundation of the typical for members of a nation and their "typical" features.

Naturally, affiliation of individuals with a nation should not be taken as an unchangeable given – whether in the sense of the impossibility that this individual consciously select his nation as opposed to the one against which, due to factual circumstances, the primary socialization was made (although in this case it is impossible to "shake off" the consequences of the latter), or in the sense that the universal is not a permanently "en-chained", but rather an entity that is re-shaped and changed in the course of historical time. However, when an ethnic (that is, "particular") universal is historically made, then

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\(^{13}\) The translation of Platonic παρουσία was not accidentally chosen here.
subsequent changes cannot be fully arbitrary (except if a nation succumbs to such a fundamental identity change that this could be interpreted as its transformation or even disappearance), but the scope, impact, and nature of possible change are to a great extent pre-designated – which does not mean that we can discursively predict them or demonstrate them in advance, or that the factual flow of history allows that all its possible changes should become expressed. Otherwise, if the changeability of an already established ethnic universal were fully arbitrary in its identity, then, it would not be compulsory. That way, as a matter of chance, some nations could transform into others, already present, or, after accumulating new features beyond a critical point, one could claim that a new nation has been made from an already existing nation, or at least ethnicum. Naturally, both things happen, but even the very fact that, for instance, an ethnic-cultural group in time started to call itself by a new name testifies to there being a certain awareness of the substantial change of what had by then been its identity. Or, more strictly put: the fact that, during time, a nation can change its own name and self-identification\(^\text{14}\) testifies to the fact that changes within the same nation cannot accumulate *ad infinitum* with the nation still remaining within the boundaries of the identity that it had already constructed in its previous history.

How do ethnic universals come into being? One must assume that their foundation can be located in their tribal and proto-ethnic substrates. What will emerge after this in the process of historical building of the nation, and which nations will emerge, this cannot be determined in advance, because it depends on the whim of historical accident, and not only on the individual "nature" of the original substrate. Therefore, in contrast to "real" conceptual and philosophical universals, ethnic universals carry with them a great deal of contingency – because they do not transcendentally precede the flow of actual history, but assume and develop their individuality and identity only through history. However, when a critical point in the formation of an ethnic identity is passed (and a key indicator of this is the presence or absence of nation-like self-awareness), then a particular ethnic universal is created which is, as a quasi-ontic ingredient, present in individual members of this community. Naturally, such an established generality faces the temptation time and again that, due to the changeable circumstances of actual history, a new, sometimes even radical, change might occur. One can even envisage a situation in which, during turbulent historical change, a people should preserve the continuity of name and awareness of affiliation, yet, in the collective *What*, they should still not just append their image a bit, but also experience true transformation – without being properly aware of it.\(^\text{15}\)

Let us stress once again: if rendering an account on the substance of an ethnic essence is burdensome and hardly practicable, where methodological purity or removal of paradoxes or aporiai is hardly attainable, this, in itself, need not, indeed *must not* mean that such a thing does not really exist. In general, a tacit quasi-rule that a thing around for


\(^{15}\) As an example one can mention the Bulgarians, whose continuity of the national historical idea is questionable (which might be related to the ethnic and racial change that original, Asiatic Bulgarians were subjected to in the Balkans), or the Croats, for whom both the continuity with the historical idea of medieval Croatia and ethnic continuity are questionable. Naturally, there are very successful nations (the English), or nations relatively resistant to the tumults of history (e.g. the Jews), who, in spite of all changes, remain firmly faithful to their (again historically) coined paradigm, thus testifying that the discussion of ethnic universals need not be a mere chimera.
which one cannot provide a relatively uncontroversial interpretation ("knowledge") does not exist, that the very existence of difficult and crucial paradoxes is an indicator that we have strayed – is one of the most dangerous, but unfortunately very efficient prejudices of the scientific spirit of Modern Age and Enlightenment.

However, this reflection of warning cannot, naturally, help us understand what an ethnic universal means even in some rather formal sense. Is it a sort of idea and, if it is, is it so in the strict Platonic sense, i.e. as essence determining all its realizations, or in the sense of its reinterpretation from the modern age – a sense of an expected or desired project / "ideal"? If the former were the case, this idea would represent the generalizing and individualizing summary of the totality of inevitable, formative properties of the group fitting to the idea. The issue here would, therefore, be what they already are. If one considers the latter sense, this would entail an awareness of a mission in history that this nation is given due to its "nature" (recourse to the former meaning) – which is also found in the self-image of some (so-called "big") nations – but, again, certainly not all of them.

However, regardless of the fact that consciousness of own mission may be seen in some nations only, it is certain that an ethnic universal implies a specific mixture of the given which is fixed and the normative which is (self)-given. In other words, that which is (actually or allegedly) true as suppressed, and already present in the (historically shaped) history of a people in its orientation to eternal values – is actually only about to be accomplished, which means that a particular people should accommodate to its (permanent and "quasi-eternal") role model.

On the diachronic, just like on the synchronic level (provided when we discussed the organization of a community), the fundamental/ normative/ necessary/ intransient and the factual/ given/ contingent/ transient intertwine here. In both the temporal and the ontological sense, a nation, therefore, represents a specific mixture of necessity and arbitrariness.

**Appendix 2: Is Being "Apolitical" a Legitimate (Political?) Position?**

If one takes a political position, this means that one is interested in common cause, i.e. in oneself as a part of the "body" of the political community (people/nation/civic community). If one presents as one's political position the view that for him a "political" option is attractive only when it suits him personally – no matter if this results in the benefit for the community, or even no matter if this would directly hamper the community, then this would no longer be a political position, i.e. a position articulated as concern for a com-

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16 Which justifies the introduction and use of the word "idea" in this context also.

17 Just like an ethnic universal is not a "clean" universal, the discussion of the "eternity" of a nation cannot be equal to eternity in general, for a number of reasons. However, that the discussion of the eternity of peoples can be justified is suggested in the well-known phrases of "eternal" Serbia, Russia, France, England, Germany, etc. By this an intuition is expressed that a nation, as a permanently self-perpetuating sequence of generations with equal/similar identity and self-awareness is not simply liable to stringent transience – as is the case with individual persons. Therefore, although peoples – as peoples, made of mortal and transient individuals, are, ontically, in principle, both transient and mortal, still every people in general, having entered history as such, has an opportunity to resist historical forces and become intransient to a point; or, to use a paradoxical phrase, to reach "supra-transient sub-eternity".

18 One should notice another analogy: just like in the discussion of the organization of the community, in addition to intransient principles and relations, the accidental given also comes to the scene, thus in the temporal domain the duration of a nation is a concept whose "mean value" is difficult to measure – between mere transience and pure intransience.
mon cause. It would rather be a position that, though seemingly "apolitical" is actually anti-political, and for sure morally questionable. Political pursuit is admittedly possible only under the assumption of self-interest, but again only if it is defined and conducted all along as a deliberately pre-conceived contribution to common cause. In situations in which self-interest is detached from interest in the community, this means not only putting an end to the political domain but endangering the political outright. One who is ready to view one's personal welfare outside of or independent from the welfare of the community will quickly succumb to the temptation to augment one's wellbeing not just irrespective of but openly against the interests of the community. (Actually, this would most likely be the consequence of the former decision, rather than an unexpected, surprising coincidence).

Therefore, this, so to speak, pragmatic solipsism, is in itself anti-political, i.e. politically illegitimate, and thus actually inadmissible. More precisely: as an individual belief, such a position should not and must not be forbidden, but, as a possible grounds for the establishment of a "political" position, it is reasonably untenable. In other words, any such position which one wishes to understand, and then carry out, under the label of the "political" is not only conceptually and in principle unrelated to politics, but it also inevitably clashes with it and virtually represents an inherent danger for the survival of the community.

In other words, what one wishes to call political practice corresponds to the concept of politics only if it entails the unbreakable bond between the general and the particular – regardless of the way in which we look upon the nature of this bond. On the one hand, the ultimate horizon (both allowed and desirable), and, so to say, the marginal condition of all individual projections of own good and fortune is the good of the community one belongs to – and the most concrete, emotionally and reflexively most tangible, "most understandable" community of belonging is the people. On the other hand, again, the good of the people/state cannot become a construction of common interest alienated from the lives of individuals, which the majority would blindly serve, where, not only from their viewpoint – which could be wrong – but objectively, in the long term, they would fail to see that their efforts are justified.

From all this one can draw a twofold conclusion. An imperative for any member of the political community – always, and particularly if this community is deeply endangered, is to help it as much as possible – doing all the things he knows best, on condition this is in the interest of the community. Even further: no one has the right to expect and build his own fortune (or perhaps the appearance of fortune – where the question of how authentic individual projections of fortune are remains secondary) at the expense of his own community. Finally, when a community (people) is facing disaster, it is inadmissible to abandon it, seeking further individual survival, i.e. "fortune" elsewhere (in a "happier" place) – which particularly applies when the venue of personal fortune and self-actualization coincide with those "locations" from which the gravest danger for the survival of the community springs.

A politically legitimate and morally tenable view of oneself in the community must, in principle, always entail readiness to sacrifice, where this implicit oath given by every member of every concrete historical community becomes expressed, i.e. tested, only when the community is actually in grave danger. In essence, never, and particularly then, may one be allowed to choose between oneself and the community – unless the current prac-

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19 On this, see our text: "Sacrifice: Concept, Problem, and Meaning".
tice and course of the community are defined by something which is deeply immoral and antihuman. Namely, the one who "chooses himself" has thus renounced those "parts" and aspects of himself without which he would not exist at all – both in the sense of physical existence (since I came to this world only because, through history, from one generation on to the other, my community has successfully struggled for its further survival), and in the sense of my own personal identity, which is always essentially and unbreakably mediated by my affiliation with the cultural and spiritual identity of my historical community. If someone is ready to sacrifice for others (from his community) – if the reason for this is truly valuable – he does not commit a masochist act of self-negation because he believes his existence is worth less than the existence of the many, or people as whole. Rather, he subjects his individuality to the generality, embodied in the many others. However, since this generality, present in the others – is also present in himself, it turns out that, by sacrificing himself for others, i.e. sacrificing for the common cause, the less durable part of ourselves is pledged in the name of the part of us which is more durable, and thus more valuable. So, finally: self-sacrifice means sacrificing for one's own good!

However, if one claims that one can choose himself against the community, he interrupts not only the chain of wows of all previous generations which have fought also for themselves by fighting for the community (here, the advancement of the individual and the general would match), but with such a choice he actually renounces his own self. More precisely, the "part" of what had been his identity by then, which would remain after such a choice, would be rid of historical routedness. It would be devoid of spiritual memory, social and moral connections, and would not preserve much more than bare psychophysical existence. Namely, if individual spiritual identities "purged" themselves of everything general – which are, as a rule, things belonging to the domain of the common spirit – then physical survival would have to overbalance all intellectual, spiritual, and emotional factors – which, however, make a (concrete) human. The choice between Me and We is theoretically fabricated, fictitious, and truly impossible, while practically untenable and, ultimately, immoral.

Readiness to sacrifice is, therefore, a pledge penetrating the essence of that which makes the core of the political and inspired humanity, which have been historically cultivated in survival with others, not beside them, and certainly not against them. Naturally, the position given here is certainly not fatalistic, claiming that, allegedly, individual lives could reach a more sublime sense and justification only through sacrifice for what is higher, more permanent, and more inclusive. Readiness to sacrifice is but one side of the interrelation between the individual and the community which entails not only (self)giving but, as stated and derived many times above – receiving. A sacrifice for community is welcomed not as a consequence of such a wish of the victim – for, allegedly, the individ-

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20 This argumentation may also hold in boundary situations for the political community, where some of its members are put in the position in which the supreme sacrifice (that of one's own existence) is one of the choices they are facing. Namely, if the community perishes, those ("permanent") elements of identity that it once carried have perished, too, so that physical survival and further (only) individual existence of people who have until that moment been its members can have immeasurably smaller moral and spiritual value. In the case of self-sacrifice, however, those who sacrifice themselves are "placing a bet", so to speak. They essentially claim the following: "if I sacrifice myself, perhaps, thanks to this sacrifice of mine – whether or not I survive – the community will live, so that, in that way, me too, although non-existing, will, in a specific way, keep on 'living' through those who have actually survived."
The Philosophico-Political Outline

ual existence of the victim was not valuable enough. Rather, it may be explained through the fact that only the community can provide a true framework for (true) individual existence: for its sustention and affirmation. When the individual gives himself to the community, and when this giving is correct, proper, and fruitful, then the community becomes better, and then all its members benefit – even those (better: particularly those) who have shown they are willing to sacrifice. Naturally, this readiness is not an end in itself, but, ultimately, represents an expression of noble egoism: if I truly wish not only to preserve, but also to advance and ennoble myself, I must always commit myself anew to a genuine generality (while always trying to recognize and apprehend it), which, ultimately, is the only end to provide a true and dignified (i.e. my) existence.

Finally, we have implicitly started from the position that the present of the ethnic community is always a derivative and expression of all its prior generations (which, naturally, includes not only continuity but also discontinuity of tradition of common cause). If all previous generations (who have passed away) "live", in a way, through the current generation, then the existence of this current generation is not only its own, but also belongs to all of those who "live" in it, but also to coming, at the moment non-existing generations. It follows then that no current generation has unconditional powers over itself and its own existence and their conditions (environmental issue!), i.e. that one generation cannot be fully free to choose its future (its own, but not only its own – since our future is also the future of those who have been, and those who will be). Rather, a human of the present generation is always bound by the efforts of previous generations, that is to say by the particular legacy and tradition. When crucial decisions on the future of a community are made, one should be aware of the fact that these are not only decisions for us and about us, but also for all those who have lived before and due to whose efforts and decisions we who are now are where we are and are who we are.

FILOSOFSKO-POLITIČKI NACRT

Časlav Koprivica

Namjera našega priloga je da na programski način izloži osnovne postave jedne obavezujuće političke paradigme. Nacrt ima dva glavna dijela od kojih prvi obuhvata načelno-filosofski dio u kojem se navode i obrazlaze nekoliko najnačelnijih ("metafizičkih") stavova (1. Samo ono što je ustrojeno kao poredak može biti održivo; 2. Održavanje u biću cjeline bivstvujućega predstavlja samostalu vrijednost; 3. Cjelina poretka svega bivstvujućega se održava zahvaljujući ugledanju na neki uzor, 3a. Cjelina bivstvujućega posjeduje unutrašnju formu koja je održava u biću;), dok drugi izlaže praktične, dakle i individualno-etičke i skupno-političke implikacije prethodno izloženih stavova. Tekst je snaždjeven i trima dodacima u kojima, u dosluhu sa programskim dijelom priloga, nastojimo da anticipiramo i uđemo u dijalog sa mogućim prigovorima i nedoumicama oko nekih naših glavnih teza ili pak njihovih posljedica. U prilogu se, u nastojanju da se izbjegne ideološki govor, načelno i sistematski upstrahuje od podjela, alternativa i afilijacija koje su svojstvene tradicionalnim ideologijama.

Ključne reči: nacionalni program, teorija politike, opsta stvar, kriza totalitet, metafizika.