

EMOTIONS IN ENGLISH: CULTURAL SCRIPTS AS MEDIATORS BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND CULTURE

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Abstract. *Among studies on the English language, there is a notable absence of works on the relationship between English and its cultural underpinnings. Also, various research studies on language, emotion and culture lack descriptions of the situation in English, fostering the conclusion that English is culturally neutral. Anna Wierzbicka proposes the term Anglo-culture to cover the culture(s) behind the language, formulating cultural scripts that serve as a basis for modelling interaction, and which are founded on the linguistic behaviour. We present those scripts relevant for understanding the domain of emotions in Anglo-culture, connecting them to the stereotypes about English reserve and politeness to show that the domain of emotions is a building block in the totality of Anglo-culture. The lexical items investigated show strong cultural markedness in line with the more general cultural scripts, which serves to prove that they are a useful tool for investigating the relationship between languages and cultures.*

Key words: *English, language, culture, emotion, Anglo-culture, cultural scripts*

1. INTRODUCTION: IS THERE A CULTURE BEHIND THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE?

The English language, as a lingua franca of the contemporary world, is the subject of meticulous research, and every year hundreds of books are published dealing with English, either from a linguistic or from a pedagogical perspective. On closer inspection, though, books dealing with the relationship between the English language and culture are comparatively scarce, which becomes obvious when browsing through any of the virtual bookstores. Similarly, in studies dealing with theoretical aspects of interrelationships between language, culture, thought and society, as well as in those dealing with the relations between emotions, language and culture, most authors corroborate their claims using examples from languages and cultures distant from the Western world. This raises the question why it is so.

On the one hand, the answer seems self-evident: English is the official language in about 60 countries. The so-called Inner Circle, comprising the USA and the UK, has between 320 and 380 million speakers, and Crystal (2003:106; 108–109) estimates that the number of speakers of English as the first or second language reaches the number of about half a billion. The huge territory in which it is spoken and different social, economic and historical circumstances that led to the expansion of English complicate making safe generalizations on a unified cultural pattern reflected in language. Interestingly enough, the only time Crystal merely brushes on the relationship between the language and culture is when he discusses recent innovations in lexicography, putting the following caveat:

A dictionary which provides cultural perspective is a brave undertaking, because if its range is comprehensive and its definitions are accurate it will inevitably reflect aspects of the less pleasant side of life, and those reflected may take it amiss. (Crystal, 2003:444)

In her works, Anna Wierzbicka operates with terms Anglo-English and Anglo-culture, by which she understands the language and culture of the USA, the UK, Ireland, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. She states that the notion of Anglo-culture is problematic, but neither more nor less than the notion of the English language itself, having its diversity in mind. As constructs, though, they are both extremely useful in intercultural communication and education (Wierzbicka 2002:3). This, of course, does not deny the existence of separate cultural patterns within the more general Anglo-culture. To quote Quirk et al. (1985:8) on this,

The literal or metaphorical use of such expressions as *case law* throughout the English-speaking world reflects a common heritage in our legal system; and allusions to or quotations from Shakespeare, the Authorized Version, Gray's *Elegy*, Mark Twain, a sea shanty, a Negro spiritual or a Beatles song—wittingly or not—testify similarly to a shared culture. The Continent means "continental Europe" as readily in America and even Australia and New Zealand as it does in Britain. At other times, English equally reflects the independent and distinct culture of one or the other of the English-speaking communities.

Wierzbicka (2006:4) also raises the question why there is an opposition to the very idea of Anglo-culture within scientific circles, while there are no such restrictions when, for instance, Japanese culture is concerned. She also points out that speaking about Anglo culture means risking being accused of essentialism, imperialism and even racism (Wierzbicka 2006:7). She underlines one more feature in contemporary science, especially among the English-speaking researchers, which is resistance to the idea that there could be a single notion of Culture, as it is presumed that the existence of such a concept would inevitably lead to stereotypy (Wierzbicka 2006:3). This in turn, she claims, results in creating problems for immigrants, who are bound to learn the rules of Anglo-culture the harder way – by unconsciously breaking them.

In literature on the subject it is possible to encounter a slightly different argumentation about the relationship between the English language and Anglo-culture, which boils down to accentuating the cultural neutrality of English. Quirk et al. (1985:7–8) sum it up neatly:

English is preeminently the most international of languages. Though the name of the language may at once remind us of England, or we may associate the language with the United States, one of the world's superpowers, English carries less implication of political or cultural specificity than any other living tongue (Spanish and French so notable in this respect).

We, however, believe that it is impossible for a language to be culturally neutral, since it emerges as a result of the interaction of different cultural and social factors on a particular territory during a particular period of time. Environments in which communities live (including, among other things, the climate and relief) differ, which is necessarily reflected in their language. This weaker version of linguistic relativity hypothesis, which Edwards (2009:60) calls "linguistic adaptation to circumstances", can be summed up in "language *influences* our *habitual* ways of thinking" (ibid., 61), which means that every language depicts natural circumstances and social values characteristic of the community in question, fulfilling at the same time its needs.

The emphasis on the seeming neutrality of English is also present in Paul Ekman's investigation on basic emotions (cf. Ekman 1992; 1999; 2003), which, apparently, precisely coincide with the English words for them. It follows that the emotional lexicon of English is somehow perfectly balanced with biologically determined basic emotions, which makes English the epistemologically superior language, to use Goddard's term (Goddard 2010:85). This, in turn, makes it absolutely culturally neutral, because this stance implies that physiological and chemical processes that take place when experiencing emotion are directly mapped onto English, without any other mediating factors. It also implies that other languages, whose categories vary from those in English, have emotion terms that more or less deviate from "real" basic emotions. We do not accept this point of view, but its very existence begs the question about the origin of the idea present among the English-speaking researchers of English – that English is absolutely objective and culturally neutral.

The thesis that we present may seem paradoxical at first: in our view, this idea is the result of the cultural values that are unconsciously observed as key in Anglo-culture, and which involve appreciating reason, fairness and personal autonomy. Since all three assume control and self-control, the idea of neutrality logically follows. From it stems the relative sensitivity to cultural markedness in other languages. Combined with the fact that for the members of one community their cultural norms are consciously invisible as long as they are not violated, it becomes obvious that the greater the differences between the norms of different cultures are, the more conspicuous they get. We believe that this explains the disproportion of works on language and culture about English and other languages: since the greatest number of studies is published in English, and by scientists who belong to Anglo-culture, the issue of the English language and culture is rarely brought up.

2. CULTURAL SCRIPTS

To avoid the problematic term of Anglo-culture, Wierzbicka operates with cultural scripts, which she defines in this way:

...they [cultural scripts] present a certain 'naïve axiology', that is, a 'naïve' set of assumptions about what is good and what is bad to do – and what one can or cannot do – especially in speaking. ... [A]nd although not everyone has to agree with these assumptions, everyone is familiar with them because they are reflected in the language itself. (Wierzbicka 2002:2)

It is worth noting that cultural scripts should not be the repetitions of common stereotypes about the national character, but they are hypotheses that have to be substantiated with linguistic evidence. It is, in fact, linguistic evidence that she poses as the fundamental methodological principle when formulating cultural scripts. These scripts are always from the insider's perspective, i.e. they are not objective representations of human behavior. Nonetheless, it is possible to formulate them in a culturally unbiased way using a metalanguage comprising simple words and grammatical patterns that have equivalents in most, if not all languages (Goddard & Wierzbicka 2004:153; 157). These "semantic primes", as they call them, are in fact linguistic universals, and although Wierzbicka and Goddard postulate their scenarios in English, the sparseness which characterizes it reduces it to a set of symbols. They call it Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) English, which is actually "a subset of 'full English', easy to learn, and culture-free as calculus, with no literary, aesthetic or emotional aspirations, and in a very basic sense, communicatively adequate" (Goddard & Wierzbicka 2007:14)". What follows is an overview of cultural scripts that Wierzbicka offers and which we find relevant for understanding the domain of emotions in Anglo-culture and English.

One of the characteristics of English that captures the attention of members of other cultures is the tendency to be precise and not to exaggerate, which is exemplified by numerous adverbs, such as *comparatively*, *kind of*, *more or less*, *in part*, *moderately*, *slightly*, *somewhat*, *practically*, *technically*, *virtually* and so on. What English favours is an almost scientific style of expression, devoid of emotionality and overstatement when things are concerned. With people, the focus shifts to tactfulness rather than precision. Wierzbicka (2006:30) formulates this script in the following way:

the Anglo script for 'accuracy' and 'nonexaggeration'

[people think like this:]

sometimes people say words like *all*

when they want to say something like *many*

sometimes people say words like *many*

when they want to say something like *some*

sometimes people say words like *none*

when they want to say something like *not many*

it is not good to speak like this [i.e., to say things in this way]

[people think like this:]

when I want to say something about some things

it will be good if I think about it like this:

"I will say some words now

I want to say something with these words

I don't want these words to say more"

Wierzbicka says that the development of English understatement logically follows – "If one thinks that it is essential to be careful not to say 'all' when one means 'much,' it is easy to start saying 'much' when one actually means 'all'..." (Wierzbicka 2006:34).

Another prominent script focuses on emphasizing the limits of one's knowledge and marking a difference between what one knows and what one thinks. In Wierzbicka's (2006:39) terms

the Anglo "I think" versus "I know" script

[people think like this:]

if I think something about something, I can say "I think like this about it"

I can't say "I know it"

it is not good if a person says about something "I know it" if they don't know it

[people think like this:]

when I want to say to other people that I think something about something

it can be good to say something like this at the same time:

"I say: I think like this

I don't say: I know it"

Any opinion based on rational thought is highly appreciated, but no additional value should be ascribed to it. Hence the high frequency of *I think* phrases in the discourse.

The next prominent script in Anglo-culture is insisting on factuality (Wierzbicka 2006:44):

[people think like this:]

if someone says to other people about something: "this happened"

it is good if these people can know because of this what happened

[people think like this:]

if someone says to other people about something: "it happened like this"

it is good if these people can know because of this how this thing happened

Although on the first blush it might seem that this script is based on the concept of truthfulness, the more important feature is whether the speaker is a reliable source of information, i.e. whether or not he KNOWS what has happened and how. This is what connects this script to the previous one. According to Wierzbicka, the concept of truthfulness is not key in the contemporary Anglo-culture, especially in interpersonal relationships, as the existence of an expression *white lie* indicates (Wierzbicka 2006:45). This does not mean, however, that lying is benevolently looked upon in Anglo-culture. Rather, the notion of lying includes an additional component, which is the intention to deceive the interlocutor into believing that what has been said is true. Instead of truth, in Anglo-culture reason becomes a more significant value, and the concept of truth itself is connected to and closer to the concept of knowledge (Wierzbicka 2002:22).

The next cultural script is directly related to the domain of emotions, and refers to the infamous English reserve. Heated arguments are not valid, as they are not based on rational thought. Ratner (2006:84–85) relates emotional reserve in speech among members of American culture to the economic changes that took place in the seventeenth century. To succeed in the market economy, members of the middle class had to develop some level of self-discipline and calculation. Unemotional manner of communication, especially among men, became a crucial means of concealing relevant information from the

one can't say to someone: 'You have to do X because I want it'
 'You can't do X because I don't want
 it'(Wierzbicka 1991:80)

Of course, this does not imply that members of Anglo-culture can do whatever they please, or that there are no rules determining how to behave in particular situations. What follows from this script is that it is not acceptable that somebody else's will alone makes one do something, or prevents one from doing it. In the form of a script it looks like this:

[people think like this:]
 when I do something it is good if I do it because I want to do it,
 not because someone else wants me to do it (Wierzbicka 2006:52)

Or, in more general terms,

[people think:]
 when I do something I want to know:
 "I do it because I want to do it
 not because of anything else" (Wierzbicka 1999a:266)

This last script includes the internal pressure that one feels when experiencing intense emotions, which in turn instigates the attempt to control them.

In language, this tendency is reflected by a relatively rare use of imperatives in English, and the multitude of the so-called whimperative constructions, including *can you*, *could you*, *would you*, etc., that aim at affirming the interlocutor's autonomy while requesting him to do something for us. The whole situation is conceptualized as if it depended on the addressee whether or not the order will be carried out.

The cultural script that favours autonomy in doing is reflected as the nonimposing script in the domain of thinking. When expressing an opinion, speakers of English use constructions including *in my opinion*, *so it seems to me*, *as I see it*, *to my mind*, and so on, that show a respectful attitude towards the interlocutor and the appreciation of a different point of view. This reflects the Anglo script of tolerance (Wierzbicka 2006:55–56):

[people think like this:]
 no one can say to another person about anything:
 "you have to think like this about it because I want you to think like this about it"
 [people think like this:]
 no one can say to another person about anything:
 "you can't think like this about it because I don't want you to think like this about it"

[people think like this:]
 no one can say to another person something like this about anything:
 "I think like this about it, you have to think the same about it"
 [people think like this:]
 when I want other people to know what I think about something
 it is good to say something like this:
 "I think like this, I know that other people don't have to think like this"

Elsewhere, Wierzbicka (1991:86) summarizes it like this:

In white Anglo-American culture, the main emphasis is not on preventing displeasure, or on spontaneous and uninhibited self-expression, or on generating good feelings among one's 'audience', but on personal autonomy (for everyone), or on non-imposition and non-interference. It is a culture which encourages everyone to say freely – at the right time – what they want and what they think, and (in a characteristic phrase) to 'agree to disagree'.

Cultural scripts of autonomy and tolerance can be brought into connection with a comparatively small number of linguistic units for expressing intimacy in English. First and foremost, the second person pronoun *you* is a very democratic and egalitarian form, but at the same time it keeps everyone at the same distance (Wierzbicka 1991:47; 106). In non-verbal communication, the physical distance between the speakers is greater than in some other cultures (Wierzbicka 1991:106). Also, a very small number of diminutive suffixes and the low frequency of diminutives in discourse bear witness to the fact that intimacy is not a key value in Anglo culture.

3. EMOTIONS IN ENGLISH AS PART OF CULTURAL SCRIPTS

The next issue we are going to tackle is the place of emotions in Anglo-culture. What we propose to do is relate the common stereotypes about English reserve and unemotionality to the cultural scripts from the previous section.

When experiencing emotion, many physiological changes in one's organism occur, and one is aware of them to a higher or lesser degree. What is more, one can report on these changes in a way that is customary in one's language – every culture filters what is considered as important in experiencing and expressing emotions in language. When this is connected to the cultural script about precision and non-exaggeration, we have the following situation: emotions are simultaneously deeply personal and social phenomena. When someone is emotionally aroused, one is incapable of registering precisely all psychological and physiological changes that take place. It should also be noted that the actual physiological experience need not fully coincide with linguistic means available to the speaker to report on it in a linguistically habitual way. The non-exaggeration cultural script requires that the emotions should rather be expressed in a subdued way than violate the norms referring to the precision of the description and norms of habitual linguistic expression. The already mentioned understatement, when applied to the domain of emotions, might be interpreted as being cold or insensitive.

The second relevant cultural script refers to giving precedence to what is known rather than to what is thought. The incompatibility of emotions with this script is obvious – it is empirically impossible to verify one's own emotions. In addition to this, Western culture in general imposes a dichotomy between reason and emotions, and as reason is "responsible" for what is known, the discrepancy between emotions and this cultural script is so great that being reserved is a cultural script on its own.

Interestingly enough, the English lexeme *emotional*, when used non-technically, has developed the negative connotation. OALD defines it as *(sometimes disapproving) showing strong emotions, sometimes in a way that other people think is unnecessary*, as in

(1) He tends to get emotional on these occasions. (OALD)

CC also brings this adjective into the connection with negative emotions: "If someone becomes emotional, they show their feelings very openly, especially because they are upset".

It is interesting how LDOCE reflects two cultural scripts in its definitions. According to one, emotional means "having strong feelings and showing them to other people, especially by crying", bringing to the foreground a typical reaction to a strong, negative emotion. According to the other one, emotional means "influenced by what you feel, rather than what you know", which directly reflects the above mentioned cultural script. The same contrast between reason and emotions is illustrated in a RHW definition, which says "based on emotion rather than reason".

MED also relates this adjective to negative emotions, underlining sadness and anger: "affected by and expressing strong emotion, especially sadness or anger", and also "causing strong emotions such as sadness and anger".

MW in its non-technical definitions emphasizes the reason–emotion dichotomy, as in "dominated by or prone to emotion <an *emotional* person>" and "appealing to or arousing emotion <an *emotional* sermon>", or focuses on negative consequences of experiencing emotions, as in "markedly aroused or agitated in feeling or sensibilities <gets *emotional* at weddings>".

OED gives a rather neutral connotation to this adjective: "Liable to emotion; easily affected by emotion", although the wording reveals that emotions are seen as something antagonistic to which people are imminently to succumb. CIDE seems to be the mildest in its definition, stating simply that "An emotional person is someone who often has strong feelings and expresses them".

We would like to point out once again that there is no difference in approach between British and American dictionaries.

Another cultural script connected to emotions that Wierzbicka (1999a:259–260) posits states:

[people think:]
it is good if I know what I feel
it is good that I know why I feel like this
it is good that I think about this

By analyzing rationally their own feelings and emotions, members of Anglo-culture manage to distance themselves from them, which is a precondition for controlling emotions, and their expression in particular. Wierzbicka goes on to describe how culture plays the key role in every stage of the process in this script. Firstly, emotions are defined on the bases of concepts already present in one linguistic and cultural community. Contemplating on the causes of emotions reflects the Anglo-value of rational thought, and the goal that this script aims to achieve, i.e. controlled behavior, reflects the Anglo-attitude by which the rational is valued more highly than the irrational. Still, it is worth mentioning that emotional control does not mean suppression, but expressing emotions in the right way at the right time. In the form of the script, Wierzbicka (1999a:266) sums it up as

[people think:]
it is good if other people know what I feel when I want them to know it
it is good to say what I feel when I want other people to know it

The cultural script affirming personal autonomy has a double manifestation: on the one hand, it is present in the conceptualization of emotions themselves, while on the other it can be seen in the syntactic patterns with nouns denoting emotions. When emotions are strong enough, one cannot restrain them, so one loses control over oneself and acts under their coercion. Hence, emotions in English are conceptualized as entities separate from a human being, most frequently as some kind of force capable of independent and volitional action. This can be seen in the linguistic units available to the speakers of English. That emotions are conceptualized as states in which the experiencer found himself not by his own will can be seen in the fact that syntactically the experiencer is coded as Subject, and the Nominal Predicate complement of the copula is either an adjective or adjectival past participle, as in

- (2) a. She was angry and anger denied her articulacy. (OED)
 b. I am worried about this year's Vote on Account. (OED)

As seen from the second clause in the example (2a), the emotional noun can be coded as Subject, which shows even more clearly that agentive characteristics can be ascribed to English emotions.

Also, it is worth noting that in the transitive construction with the verb *feel* the experiencer is coded as Subject, while what is felt is coded as Direct Object, i.e. as an entity existing on its own in reality and on which the experiencer is focused, as in

- (3) I feel joy and contentment in the merciful task for which I am sent forth. (OED)¹

Since no form of coercion is an acceptable pattern of behavior in Anglo-culture, emotions are not very highly valued concepts in it. The supremacy of autonomy is also obvious in the fact that emotions too are conceptualized as bounded entities, either objects or locations. What is more, tolerance, as one of the key conventions of Anglo-culture, puts constraints on emotional expression so as not to compromise the interlocutor's autonomy, which is all in accordance with the principle of negative politeness, which aims not to impose on the other, rather than to include them in one's social activities. The same applies to causing emotional episodes in others:

- it is not always good to say to another person what I think
 if I say it, this person can feel something bad because of this.
 (Wierzbicka 1999a:272)

With all this in mind, it is revealing to take a look at the English adjective *cool*. According to Stearns (1994:1) the development of the positive connotation and the more widespread use of this adjective symbolizes the establishment of restraint in American

¹ This does not mean that the speakers of English do not have other linguistic means available to suit their communicative goals. It is also possible to report about an emotional experience using verbs, as in

- (4) He rejoiced at seeing the children frisking about in the happiness of youth. (OED)

From this perspective, the experiencer is the active participant in the emotional process denoted by the verb, and the emotion is conceptualized as if the experiencer herself generates the feelings that she can keep under control – she can stop them at will (cf. Wierzbicka 1999b: 59). It is worth noting, though, that the number of verbs in the emotional vocabulary of the English language is considerably smaller than the number of nouns, which also substantiates the thesis that in English emotions are typically conceptualized as separate entities, independent of the experiencer's will.

culture (and, we would add, Anglo-culture as a whole). Comparing English *cool* with its opposite *hot*, he notices that, while *cool* entered the standard vocabulary, *hot* is predominantly used symbolically and can refer to any cultural novelty, ranging from music and consumer goods to contemporary pop icons (Stearns 1994:267). It remains detached and is felt as more dangerous than the accepted and positively marked *cool*, as the definition of *cool* from OED shows: "Of persons (and their actions): Not heated by passion or emotion; unexcited, dispassionate; deliberate, not hasty; undisturbed, calm."

Similarly, in the twentieth century, the word *passion* began to be used predominantly in the sphere of sexuality, shifting from the earlier meaning described in OED as "Any kind of feeling by which the mind is powerfully affected or moved; a vehement, commanding, or overpowering emotion; in psychology and art, any mode in which the mind is affected or acted upon (whether vehemently or not), as ambition, avarice, desire, hope, fear, love, hatred, joy, grief, anger, revenge" (cf. Stearns 1994:302).

Examining the diachronic outlook on emotions from the Victorian period up to now, Stearns claims that in the contemporary cultural scheme, emotions, which were already recognized as potentially dangerous, such as anger or fear, do not have any positive function, and instead of making attempts to channel them, one should avoid them at any cost. In the Victorian Age, emotions were divided into two groups: good emotions, and dangerous, but useful ones. In the twentieth century the axis moved towards the good versus bad dichotomy, with the bad emotions being described as those that cause discomfort in others (Stearns 1994:95–96). The recommended emotional restraint does not constrain itself on the negative emotions only – the new cultural scheme requires that even the positive ones should be curbed: "amid an increasingly uniform sense ... no emotional tug should be pulled too hard" (Stearns 1994:96). While the Victorians thought that by directing negative emotions they could become useful, the twentieth-century cultural patterns focus on the internal distress emotions cause, and they are treated as impulses that cripple one's normal functioning. Gradually, this led to the attitude that all emotions, whether good or bad, should be subdued:

The most impressive feature of the new, underlying attempt to replace intensity with a blander emotional regime involved the spreading impulse to keep not only unpleasant experiences but even agreeable emotions under careful wraps. Playing it cool meant not being carried away in any direction, even one that in moderate proportions could be approved. (Stearns 1994:141)

The twentieth-century culture requires that no emotion overpowers reason, which becomes a key value, and the adjective *cool* "began to creep in as a talisman of desirable emotion control" (Stearns 1994:125).

Such a change in the emotional worldview in an individualistic culture, which Anglo-culture represents², brought about a few difficulties. On the one hand, members of individualistic cultures highly value ego focused emotions with the aim of self-affirmation. The new emotional picture requires control over emotions so as to avoid discomfort in an individual and the group alike. Stearns believes that this conflict was resolved in favour of the defence of personal autonomy with the laudation of reason: controlling fear or anger shields the ability of an individual to make reasonable decisions, and controlling the exaggerated outpours of love, for example, is seen as the fundamental step in the

² On individualistic versus collectivistic cultures cf. Markus & Kitayama 1991

process of individuation. In this way, the general tendency to control emotions in fact reinforces the individualistic orientation of Anglo-culture, because emotional outbursts are seen as a threat to individuality. Conversely, this new emotional picture of the world emphasizes good relationships between an individual and the rest of the group:

The growing aversion to dealing with the emotions of others was in fact one of the most powerful effects of the new emotional culture. It sustained a growing sense of individualism as people became emotionally more separate, and it supported the enforcement of emotional control through embarrassment, for the belief that strong emotions might unfavorably affect peers' reactions was often quite accurate. (Stearns, 1994:248)

Stearns associates this with the changes in language that have occurred, and which favour pleasantness, but without strong emotionality, illustrated by the widespread use of the adjective *nice*:

In American culture, 'nice' did have a meaning – it connoted a genuine effort to be agreeably disposed but not deeply emotionally involved while expecting pleasant predictability from others. (Stearns 1994:292–293)

What is more, avoidance of any kind of displeasure is set as a dominant value in all spheres of life:

[C]ontemporary western culture encourages us to pursue a fantasy life. Ours is a society of denial that conditions us to protect ourselves from any difficulty or discomfort, including pain, insecurity, loss and death. To insulate ourselves from the natural world, we have air conditioning, insurance policies and a whole array of ways by which we seek to colonize and control the future. Thus, as discussed above, we shut away the elderly, sick and mentally ill within institutions where the existential truth of these states is hidden from us. In addition, the widespread existence of addictions to alcohol, heroin, sex, and so forth, marks the compulsively repetitive attachments we use to deny the difficulties of our lives. (Barker 2002:218)

This culturally dictated and desirable way of living devoid of all discomfort can be connected to a kind of cultural pressure existent in Anglo-culture, which is to be happy and publicly express the emotions that one need not necessarily be experiencing. Since expressing negative emotions does not play any role in making the above mentioned "fantasy life" real, and as it does nothing else but ruin the culturally favourable picture of one experiencing them, it can also affect the rest of the group in a negative way. Wierzbicka (1999a:249) believes that being happy for purely personal reasons is fully compatible with a culture dominated by the expressive and utilitarian individualism. To illustrate this, we would like to mention the titles of just a few readily available self-help books: "Engineering Happiness: A New Approach for Building a Joyful Life"³ and "Happiness: A Guide to Developing Life's Most Important Skill"⁴. We believe that the very fact that

³ Baucells, M. and R. Sarin, (2012), *Engineering Happiness: A New Approach for Building a Joyful Life*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

⁴ Ricard, M., (2007), *Happiness: A Guide to Developing Life's Most Important Skill*, New York: Little, Brown and Company.

happiness can be considered as a skill throws light on the attitude of contemporary Anglo-culture towards happiness: it is not only a desirable value, but also a value that can be mastered. By putting this in the foreground, happiness is conceptualized as an attainable goal, while the individual has an upper hand in the process. Thus, instead of being strongly emotionally marked, the every-day concept of happiness becomes socially acceptable and easily available niceness.

4. CONCLUSION

Culture and many other aspects of reality are not a given, but they are constantly being construed and manifested in language. They are acquired and transmitted from one generation to the next through social interaction and language. When this is applied to the domain of emotions, it suggests that language has a key role in conceptualizing them. It is likely that people learn how to represent emotions and emotional states in the same way as they learn representations of other abstract concepts which are not biologically grounded. Children acquire those emotional categories that are habitual and significant in the culture in which they were born not because of the biological features of the emotions in question, but because these emotional categories and no others are functional in the society they belong to (Feldman Barret & Lindquist 2008:252–253). The functionality of particular emotional strategies can be seen in the fact that they are compatible with other, more general cultural patterns present. The cultural script technique provides a good basis for studying different cultural phenomena by focusing on what people say and what linguistic means they use. This reduces the speculating on the slippery grounds such as national character of a particular nation, or mere stereotypy. On the other hand, although revealing and useful, cultural scripts based on linguistic routines need not always represent the current state of affairs in the domain investigated, because changes in languages and cultures are not always simultaneous and parallel. For that reason, cultural scripts should be seen just as one possible mediating factor between languages and culture, while a fuller investigation should comprise empirical findings from developmental psychology, psycholinguistics and cognitive sciences. What we have tried to show with this paper is that universalist tendencies that Western researches have are actually based on the emotional picture of the world stemming from Anglo-culture and which is by no means universal. The Anglo view on the emotions is just one building block in a wider picture of a culture that values rationality and individuality, as Wierzbicka's cultural scripts succinctly and aptly demonstrate.

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- OED *Oxford English Dictionary Second Edition on CD-ROM (2009),* (v. 4.0), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- RHW *Random House Webster's Electronic Dictionary and Thesaurus, College Edition (1992),* Version 1.0. Reference Software International.

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EMOCIJE U ENGLESKOM: KULTURNI SCENARIJI KAO POSREDNICI IZMEĐU JEZIKA I KULTURE

Jelena Rakić

U moru studija o engleskom jeziku, primetno je odsustvo radova o vezi između engleskog jezika i njegove kulturne potpore. Takođe, različita istraživanja o jeziku, emocijama i kulturi često ne daju detaljnu sliku o situaciji u engleskom, što može dovesti do zaključka da je engleski kulturno neutralan jezik. Ana Vježbicka predlaže termin Anglo-kultura, koji bi obuhvatao postojeće kulturne obrasce iza jezika i formuliše kulturne scenarije koji funkcionišu kao osnova za prilagođavanje u društvenoj interakciji, a koji se zasnivaju na jezičkom ponašanju. Mi smo izložili one scenarije koji su relevantni za razumevanje domena emocija u Anglo-kulturi, povezujući ih sa rasprostranjenim stereotipima o engleskoj uzdržanosti i uglađenosti da bismo pokazali da je domen emocija sastavni element u ukupnosti Anglo-kulture. Lekseme koje smo ispitivali snažno su kulturno markirane u skladu sa opštijim kulturnim scenarijima, što pokazuje da su oni korisno sredstvo za istraživanje odnosa između jezika i kulture.

Ključne reči: engleski, jezik, kultura, emocije, Anglo-kultura, kulturni scenariji