ON COMMUNICATIVE INTENTION AND SAYING/IMPLICATING DISTINCTION

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Abstract. Theory of communication describes communication as speech acts which produce communicative intentions. Grice thinks that it is important for successful communication that the hearer recognizes the speaker's communicative intention. For Relevance Theorists, intention determines truth conditions of utterance content. Meaning determination is an inference process which aims at the articulation of the speaker's intention. It is not just the communicative intention phenomenon which determines meaning; implicatures and explicatures do so, too. Grice distinguishes between the content of "What is said" and "What is implicated". "What is said" is equated with the truth-conditional content of the utterance and with sentence meaning, while "what is implicated" is equated with the pragmatic domain (communicative intention). Relevance Theorists have a different view, according to which linguistic semantics is the output of a modular linguistic decoding system and serves as an input to a pragmatic processor. In this paper, the author will present the distinction between Grice's and Relevance Theorists' (Sperber and Wilson, Carston) determination of the communicative intention and the implicature/explicature distinction.

Key words: communicative intention, implicature, explicature, Grice circle.

INTRODUCTION

In everyday life we communicate. This could be: body communication, communication by the eyes, or by dress, car and so on. The well known classification of communication is that into verbal and non-verbal communication. In verbal communication people decode the meaning of people's language. Theory of communication describes communication as speech acts which produce communicative intentions. Theorists of semantics and pragmatics describe meaning differently.¹ Communicative intention is one of the

¹ There are literalists, syncretists, indexicalists, quasi-contextualists, contextualists. Recanati wrote about these distinctions in Literal Meaning.
phenomena helping hearers to recognize the meaning of an utterance. We will explore Grice's and Relevance Theorists' positions (Sperber, Wilson, Carston).

It is well known that every operative meaning is not literal meaning, and that in many cases context helps us determine it. For example, the utterance "I cut it all" could mean many things: I cut all my hair, or all bushes, all grass and so on. Context and pragmatic saturation can help us determine the operative meaning: "I cut all my hair". For Relevance Theorists ostensive elements can help the hearer to recognize operative meanings. But for Grice ostensive elements are not sufficient, we must say for example: "I cut it all". It could mean that "I cut a lot of my hair", but that must not implicate that I am bald.

When a speaker utters: "Do you want coffee?", it means that the speaker wants to give the hearer some coffee and not that the hearer should get it by himself. Or when the speaker says: "Turn off the light", in the context in which he is very tired and lies in bed, the hearer could recognize the speaker's intention to sleep. In this example we can see that the pragmatic domain gives us more information than semantic meaning. Articulations as communicative intentions and implicit and explicit content help us determine operative meaning and enrich meaning.

When we are decoding utterance meaning, since we are communicating, it could make a difference between linguistic and communicating meaning. Grice describes the double nature of the utterance as "What is said" and "What is implicated". Grice and Relevance Theorists describe the meaning of those elements differently. For Grice "What is said" is determined by truth-conditions and "what is implicated" is determined by the communicative intention. Let's see an example:

X: "Do you want to play bridge?"
Y: "I have a headache".

Explicature: "Y has a headache at this moment, and he can't play bridge."
Implicature: "Person Y would not be playing bridge".

"What is said" is that Y has a headache, and "what is implicated" is that he couldn't play bridge; his intention is to have a rest.

Explicature is part of utterance content, but implicature is deduced. We could say that person Y wouldn't say that he couldn't play bridge, but he implicated it. Relevance Theorists make a difference between Saying and Implicating. It is not truth-conditions that are necessary for Saying: what they say equals explicit content. It depends on cognitive information, and they say that "What is said" or Saying is located between linguistic meaning and cognitive information. In their opinion, explicatures consist of causal and temporal conclusions. Implicatures consist of implicated premises and conclusions.

**GRICE AND RELEVANCE THEORISTS ON COMMUNICATIVE INTENTION**

Why are intentions important for communication? They are important because of the nature of utterances, i.e. their ambiguity. The recognition of an intention tells us about illocutionary force and improves communication. An illocutionary intention differs from a perlocutionary intention. The recognition of a perlocutionary intention is not important for producing a perlocutionary effect. The fulfillment of an illocutionary intention consists in the recognition of the intention (Searle, Strawson). For Grice, a reflexive intention is an intention which serves for producing effects by the recognition of the intention. He
describes a reflexive communicative intention in this way: speaker S thinks something by utterance p only if he intends to produce some effects on the public by means of a speech act, i.e. when the public recognizes his intention. But Grice allows that the hearer could recognize semantic meaning even if she doesn't know the speaker's communicative intention. It is enough that the public believes that the speaker truly believes in the sentences he utters. Grice's basic idea is that we are able to present the meaning of a sentence in terms of speaker meaning and non-semantic terms- communicative intentions. For Relevance Theorists, intention determines the truth-conditions of the utterance content. Meaning determination is a process of inference which aims at the articulation of the speaker's intention. They make a difference between informative intention and communicative intention. The first is the intention to present a manifest group of presuppositions which serves to present the meaning of an utterance, and the second is a higher class of intentions by which the informative intention is shown, manifested to the hearer and to the listener. They think that semantic meaning could not present relevant meaning. The pragmatic meaning of an utterance is a sufficient and precise indicator of the speaker's meaning.

There are subintentions, too. Those are intentions to perform an utterance, locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts. Bach noticed that pragmatic intentions which include subintentions depend on mutual contextual beliefs, beliefs about the hearer's beliefs, beliefs about the social and physical context, and the speaker's desires and beliefs (Bach, 1984: 237).

SAYING/IMPLICATING DISTINCTION OR EXPICATURE/IMPLICATURE DISTINCTION

There are distinctions between explicit content and implicit import (Relevance Theory). Grice makes a distinction between "What is said" and "What is implicated". Grice's standard interpretation means that "What is said" (the truth conditional content of utterances) is very close to the conventional meaning of a linguistic proposition. The linguistic proposition could be ambiguous, but using Grice's maxims we can determine its exact meaning. "What is implicated" can be conventional (when the speaker uses: but, moreover) and conversational (if the utterance follows any rational principles). Or we could say that "What is said" represents the meaning of the sentence and "What is implicated" is the pragmatic domain. Grice was careful to use the verb implicate, but not imply. Implicate means what the speaker is doing, implicature means what speaker implicates, "If a sentence is true, what it implies must be true, whereas a speaker can utter a true sentence and implicate something false. For example, you could say that there is a gas station around the corner and falsely implicate that it is open and selling gas (maybe it's closed for the night or maybe there's a gasoline shortage). If there is a gas station around the corner, it does not follow that the gas station is open and selling gas. But it does follow that a gas station is not directly across the street", explains Bach (Bach, 2005:3). What the speaker implicates depends on his communicative intention in uttering a sentence, not on the semantic content of the sentence, Bach thinks. In different situations someone could utter an unambiguous sentence and implicate different things. But, what is implicated will be constrained by the semantic content of the sentence: yet this does not make the implicature a property of the sentence itself (Bach, 2005).
Relevance Theorists have different distinctions: semantic representations are not propositional at all. The pragmatic system should interpret "What has been communicated". Sperber and Wilson make two distinctions: linguistically decoding meaning and pragmatically inferring meaning. "What is said" is the process of mapping elements of linguistic forms and types of cognitive information, rather than mapping the linguistic shape and the truth-conditions of the real world.

Grice and Relevance Theorists make a distinction between explicature and implicature. Relevance Theorists think that explicature pragmatically follows from linguistically encoded logical forms. They think that explicature consists of temporal and causal conclusions.

In their opinion, there are two types of implicatures: implicated premises and implicated conclusions (Carston, 2004:13). Implicated premises are subsets of their contextual implications. Those implications are communicated (speaker-meant). Let's discuss Carston's example:

"15. A: Let's go to a movie. I've heard "Sense and Sensibility" is good. Are you interested in seeing it?
   B: Costume dramas are usually boring.

Understanding B's utterance requires deriving the following implicatures:
16. A: "Sense and Sensibility" is a costume drama.
   B: "Sense and Sensibility" is likely to be boring.
   C: B isn't interested in seeing "Sense and Sensibility", (Carston, 2004:13).

16a is derived and 16b follows deductively from 16a, and 16c follows from 16b. 16a is an implicated premise and 16b and 16c are implicated conclusions. But, what about the premise, asks Carston? "A assumes that B's response will meet his expectations of relevance, and the most obvious way it could do this is by supplying an answer to A's previous question…Note that none of the inferred assumptions in 16 follows deductively from the basic explicature of B's utterance, though 16b and 16c are derived from deductively (by modus ponens) once other particular assumptions have been accessed." (Carston, 2004:14). Here, Carston does not see differences between Relevance Theorists and Griceans: both these communicated assumptions are described as implicated premises and implicated conclusions are qualified as implicatures for Grice. A disagreement arises because Relevance Theorists treat certain cases as pragmatic inferences contributing to explicature and Grice treats them as implicature.

Before we say something about deriving explicature and implicature, we will show the distinction between entailment and implicatures. Consider the following example offered by Carston:

"17. X: Does John like cats?
   Y: He doesn't like any animals.
   a. Cats are animals.
   b. John doesn't like cats.
   c. Dogs are animals.
   d. John doesn't like dogs " (Carston, 2004:14)

According to Relevance theorists a,b,c,d are implicatures of utterance Y. A and b are strongly communicated and they describe the meaning of utterance Y. C and d are communicated less strongly. But, b and d are entailed in utterance Y. Vicente thinks that they
cannot be implicatures or explicatures. But Relevance Theorists think differently: since they are communicated by the utterance, they could be implicatures. They could not be explicatures because the utterance doesn't encode a logical form from which they could develop.

Let us see, now, how we could derive explicature and implicature. According to Relevance Theorists when we look for a valid implicature, we should consider all interpretations (disambiguations, saturations and so on). The results should consist of premises and conclusions which form valid argument. Let us take an example, to see what free enrichment is.

Nikola: Shall we go walking in town?
Ana: It's raining all day.

Explicature: It's raining all day in town.
Implicated premise: If it is raining all day in town, it's not a good idea to go walking in town.
Implicated conclusions: It is not a good idea for Nikola and Ana to go walking in town.

Explicature is constructed from the logical form, and has to be enriched with a location constituent. It is the relevance theoretic term for the pragmatically imbued level of truth conditional content. Recanati and Levinson use the term "what is said". Carston thinks that Grice's statement is different from Recanati, Levinson and others and that he uses the term "what is said" for content which is independent of consideration of the speaker's intention. According to him, implicature comes into being as a process derived from the explicit content of an utterance. "According to that view, they are inferentially derived on the basis of the antecedently determined "what is said" and arise as a response to rational consideration of why the speaker is saying what she said, what she means (communicatively intends) by saying it", (Carston, 2004:19).

**GRICE'S CIRCLE**

According to Grice "what is said" is very closely related to the conventional meaning of the linguistic expression. Linguistic meaning could be ambiguous or include indexical elements so the consideration of context should result in the full determination of meaning. Grice's maxims could help one find out why the speaker said what she said or what she means (intends to communicate). The issue of how context-sensitive aspects of truth-conditional content are determined by an addressee/interpreter has become more pressing in recent years, when many pragmatists have accepted the semantic underdeterminacy view of verbal utterances. Levinson describes Grice's differentiation between saying and implicating as Grice's circle. "Grice's account makes implicature dependent on a prior determination of "what is said". The said in turn depends (on the implicature: it depends) on disambiguation, indexical resolution, reference fixing, not to mention ellipsis unpacking and generality narrowing. But each of these processes, which are prerequisites to determining the proposition expressed, (may) themselves depend crucially on (processes that look indistinguishable from) implicatures. Thus what is said seems both to determine and to be determined by implicature. Let us call this *Grice's circle*...Then truth condi-

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2 According to the semantic underdeterminacy, the discrepancy between explicit content (what is said) of utterance and conventional (encoded) meaning of linguistic expression is far greater than that presented by ambiguous worlds or indexical.
tional content depends on most, perhaps all, of the known species of pragmatic inference; or the theory of linguistic meaning is dependent on, not independent of, the theory of communication", (Levinson, 2000:286,287). Levinson thinks that truth-conditional content depends on pragmatic inference, or that the theory of linguistic meaning depends on the theory of communication. Bach thinks that implicature depends on "what is said" and vice versa, too.

It looks like there are two kinds of circularity in Levinson's explanation:
1. between saying/implicating
2. between semantics/pragmatics.

For Levinson, the linguistic meaning and "what is said", seem to be equal. But there are cases where this equality does not exist, which does not depend on the theory of communication, thinks Carston. This is the case with meaning or encoded information in linguistic expression. This meaning provides an output which is not dependent on the extra-linguistic context (communicative intention). This could be a semantics independent of a theory of communication.

In her paper "Truth-Conditional Content and Conversational Implicature", Robyn Carston analyzed the alleged Saying/Implicating circle. In her opinion, one inescapable issue of accepting the thesis that "what is said" depends on pragmatics (the underdeterminacy thesis), complies with the following assumptions of Grice:

a) All pragmatically-derived (maxim-dependent) meaning constitutes conversational implicature;

b) Conversational implicatures arise from the application of conversational maxims to "the saying of what is said" and so require prior determination of what is said.

Semanticists Jason Stanley, Zoltan Szabo and Jeffrey King involve revision of a.): "'broadly Gricean mechanisms" do play a crucial role in determining "what is said"," (Carston, 2004:6). The maxim has only a weak effect on "what is said" and a strong pragmatic effect on implicature. Carston presents the Gricean account in this way: the maxim first, can perform its role in determining "what is said", which then becomes an input to implicature derivation. Levinson accepts that there are strong pragmatic effects on truth conditional content (along with weak ones). He does not offer any solution for the circularity problem, but he suggests that his theory of default (generalized) conversational implicature can make substantial inroads on it. He distinguishes between two kinds of implicature: generalized and particularized. While the particularized one depends on the context of the utterance, the generalized one arises across context. The generalized implicature can contribute to the truth conditional-content of the utterance. Here is an example:

"A: Did the children's summer camp go well?
B: Some of them got stomach flu.
GCI: Not all the children got stomach flu.
PCI: The summer camp didn't go as well as hoped," (Carston,2004: 7).

According to Levinson's claim the Gricean assumption a). appears to be preserved, while b). is modified so that a restricted kind of inference can apply without the prior determination of "What is said". For Relevance Theorists, no implicature is important for default (generalized) implicature. All of them must be warranted by contextual relevance. Relevance theorist Carston concludes that the Gricean assumption a) is dropped since one
and the same pragmatic principle is responsible for both, all cases of conversational implicature and all pragmatic contributions to truth-conditional content. The assumption b) is relaxed, and the two levels of communicated content are taken to be derived in parallel via the mechanism of "mutual adjustment," (Carston, 2004:8).

CONCLUSION

When performing pragmatic derivation, as a result we have implicatures. Of course, we must have a starting point, because implicature means that which the speaker implicates and it must be implicated from something else. A starting point could be "What is said", or "saying", or encoded information and if it is true or false. If we use Gricean maxims, it must be true. But Relevance Theorists do not have those maxims. According to them, our communication is tied to our cognition, and it serves to maximize our cognition. Implicatures could be true or false, which does not always depend on the truthfulness of the starting point.

To derive an implicature one needs to determine "what is said" first, which is Grice's second premise (b.)). We could conclude that Relevance Theorists have a correct explanation of Grice's assumption. Also, they think that Grice's circle is not real, because, as they explain: when the hearer recognizes the speaker's intention, the process of understanding meaning is not finished. It is necessary for the hearer to start the inference process and to determine the relevant meaning.

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O KOMUNIKATIVNIM NAMERAMA I DISTINKCIJI IZMEDJU KAZIVANJA I IMPLIKATURE

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Ključne reči: komunikacijska namera, implikatura, eksplikatura, Grajsov krug