Vol.7, No 2, 2009 pp. 173 - 182
UDC 81'23(049.32)
SEARLE'S CRITIQUE OF THE MULTIPLE DRAFTS MODEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS
Đorđe Vidanović
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Niš, Serbia
E-mail: vidanovic@gmail.com
In this paper I try to show the limitations of John Searle's critique of Daniel Dennett's conception of consciousness based on the idea that the computational architecture of consciousness is patterned on the simple replicating units of information called memes. Searle claims that memes cannot substitute virtual genes as expounded by Dennett, saying that the spread of ideas and information is not driven by "blind forces" but has to be intentional. In this paper I try to refute his argumentation by a detailed account that tries to prove that intentionality need not be invoked in accounts of memes (and consciousness).
Key words: Searle, Dennett, Multiple Drafts Model, consciousness,memes, genes, intentionality
O OGRANIČENJU SERLOVE KRITIKE DENETOVOG VIŠESLOJNOG MODELA SVESTI
U ovom radu pokušavam da pokažem koja su ograničenja Serlove kritike Denetove koncepcije svesti zasnovane na zamisli da je komputaciona arhitektonika svesti modelovana poput proste replikacije jedinica informacije koje Denet naziva "memama". Serl tvrdi da meme ne mogu zameniti postojanje virtuelnih gena kako to zagovara Denet, i ističe da su ideje i informacije uvek intencionalne, a ne nekakve "slepe sile" koje njima upravljaju. U radu pokušavam da takve argumente detaljno pobijem i da dokazem da nije nužno koristiti intencionalnost u objašnjenju informacionih replikatora.
Ključne reči: Serl, Denet, višeslojni model svesti, svest, meme, geni, intencionalnost
