FACTA UNIVERSITATIS
Series: **Linguistics and Literature** Vol. 5, Nº 1, 2007, pp. 59 - 69

ISSUES OF HISTORICAL LINGUISTICS IN THE GG FRAMEWORK

UDC 811.111'364 81-112

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Abstract. *The aim of the paper is to explore and exemplify the most pertinent questions relating to the interconnections between historical linguistics and generative grammar, the two in various aspects being rather disparate and dissimilar approaches to the overall study of English. The major objectives attempted at will be: 1) to explore the treatment of language change from the viewpoint of generative grammar (the paper will focus on syntactic change) and 2) to illuminate and exemplify the contribution of historical linguistics into the contemporary linguistic treatment of English (and vice versa), through establishing a generative interface between Modern Standard English and one of its previous developmental stages (by means of comparing some relevant aspects of EME syntax to that of MSE).*

Key words: *Generative Grammar, Historical Linguistics, language change, synchronic and diachronic studies*

1. INTRODUCTION

Prior to the opening of the 20th century, English linguistics had a predominantly historical orientation, examining the development of English and its position within the Indo-European language family. Since the beginning of the previous century, it has furthermore emphasized the *synchronic* study of language, that is the analysis of English as a system at a particular time. English linguistics thus (like linguistics in general) distinguishes between the *historical* (diachronic) and the *systematic* (synchronic) study of language. Under such an assumption, it would probably be true to say that what any linguist aims to achieve are two potentially distinct but simultaneous and overlapping types of understanding: *structural* and *historical*.

1.1Background remarks on GG

Most specific work in the latter half of the twentieth century on diachronic syntax stems to some extent from the essential foundation of *generative grammar*. Furthermore,

Received July 16, 2007

generativism as such is most frequently presented as having developed out of, and in reaction to the previously dominant school of post-Bloomfieldian American *descriptivism*: a particular version of structuralism. According to Lyons (1992), generativism develops out of, and in part continues even, a particular version of structuralism.

What is also characteristic of generativism is that it should see language change in terms of addition, loss or reordering of rules that determine a speaker's linguistic competence. If we accept the idea that the competence/performance distinction can be identified to an extent to the langue/parole distinction of Saussurean structuralism, we can say that the contribution made to the theory and methodology of historical linguistics by generativism can be seen as a refinement and development of the structuralists' conception of language change. Preference is given in both cases to what are classified as *internal factors*. The structuralists' notion of self-regulation has been replaced with that of the *reconstructing* of the rules of the language system and the tendency towards simplification. However, one important difference between the Chomskian competence/performance distinction and the Saussurean distinction of langue/parole is that the former lends itself more readily than the latter to a psychological interpretation. Generativists have been much concerned with the problem of language acquisition by children.

Over the years, one of the most controversial aspects of generative grammar has been Chomsky's hypothesis that humans have a cognitive ability for learning language. This hypothesis is what connects linguistic theory most closely to biology, cognitive development, ethnology and evolutionary psychology. It also has been a main driving force in research on language typology, language acquisition and linguistic change, not to mention day-to-day research on the structure of language. Chomsky is concerned with what is *universal***.** He attaches more importance to the formal properties of languages and to the nature of the rules that their description requires, than he does to the relation that holds between languages and the world. The reason for such emphasis is that Chomsky is looking for evidence to support his view that the human language faculty is *innate* and *species-specific*: i.e. genetically transmitted and *unique* to the human species. Furthermore, Universal Grammar (UG) is not a grammar of any single language; it is the prespecification in the brain that permits the learning of language to take place. So, the grammar-acquiring capacity is what Chomsky claims is innate. The term Universal Grammar is also sometimes used interchangeably with *linguistic universals* which are classified into formal and substantive. This suggests that UG is to be found in the structure of all languages. By *substantive universals*, Chomsky means the basic building blocks of linguistic structure and those are phonological distinctive features and the notion of syllable in phonology, and parts of speech and the notion of tree in syntax. These parts are used differently in different languages, but one cannot construct a human language without them. Chomsky therefore wishes to attribute them to the brain's prespecification. By *formal universals*, Chomsky means the overall organization of the grammar. These might also be further divided into subcategories; the child has to have a repertoire of rule types – what kinds of rules a language might have for combining the basic units into more complex structures. Jackendoff (2002) distinguishes *phrasal formation rules*, *derivational rules*, several varieties of *constraints*, *lexical formation rules*, *lexical redundancy rules*, and *inheritance hierarchies*. The combination of universal grammar (UG) with principles and parameters has inevitably led to a complex overall theory involving several sub-theories, but simultaneously it has created a new kind of simplicity: knowledge of language comes down to variations in a small number of properties. The nature of

this knowledge is inseparable from how it is acquired; a proposal for the nature of language necessitates an explanation of how such knowledge came into being.

> 'UG theory is not making vague or unverifiable suggestions about properties of the mind but precise statements based on specific evidence. The general concepts of the theory are inextricably connected with the specific details; the importance of UG theory is its attempt to integrate grammar, mind and language at every moment.' (Cook & Newson, 1996:2-3)

Learning a language can then be thought of roughly as 'customizing the settings in a software package' (Jackendoff, 2002: 75). So, it is commonly understood that UG provides possibilities, instead of just certainties, for the structure of the grammar the child is to develop.

2. HISTORICAL LINGUISTICS, GG AND LANGUAGE CHANGE

2.1. Language Change and Language Acquisition

Language change is one of the subjects of *historical linguistics*, the subfield of linguistics that studies language in its historical aspects. What is now called historical linguistics was developed, in its main lines at least, in the course of the nineteenth century. Scholars had long been aware that languages *change* with time. They also knew that many of the modern languages of the world were descended, in some sense, from more ancient languages. For example, it was known that English had developed out of Anglo-Saxon, or that Romance languages all had their origin in Latin. However, until the *principles* of historical linguistics were established it was not generally realized that language change is regular, continuous and *universal***.** No one knows exactly how or why languages change. What we do know for certain is that linguistic changes do not happen suddenly.

According to many, the very *basic* cause of change is the way children acquire language. Early generative work on syntactic change for example, depended directly on generative grammar's view of linguistic change in general. It holds that linguistic change is *grammar* change: it is what happens in the *transition of grammars* from one generation to the next. Children presented with the output of the adult's grammar construct their own grammar whose internal structure does not need to fully coincide with those of their adult models.

> Each child constructs a personal grammar alone, generalizing rules from the linguistic input received. The child's language develops in stages until it approximates the adult grammar. The child's grammar is never exactly like that of the adult community, because children receive diverse linguistic input. Certain rules may be simplified or overgeneralized, and vocabularies may show small differences and accumulate over several generations. (Fromkin & Rodman, 1993: 348)

Therefore, after learning an *optimal* grammar as children, adults later in life may add changes which were not integrated into their initial optimal version of grammar. Later, children who receive such non-optimal adult outputs will *reconstruct* their own internal grammars to be more *optimal* (simple) to achieve the targeted output, and so on. The

older generation may, for example, be using certain rules optionally. At certain times they may say "It is I" and at other times "It's me". The less formal style is usually used with children, who then, as the next generation, may use only the "me" form of the pronoun in this construction. When something like this happens, the *second generation* grammar will have changed. Let us briefly consider another 'hypothetical' example of the process (cf. Harris & Campbell 1995). Let us suppose that an earlier generation had learned a grammar with the rule that the pronoun *who* requires an object case marking (*whom*) when it occurs as the object of a verb or a preposition, and then as adults these speakers added a rule that just deleted the object marking. The next generation of speakers would hear only *who* and would simply learn *who* in all contexts. That is, the adults' non-optimal grammar would have two rules, R1 to add case marking (*whom*) in all relevant contexts, and R2 to convert *whom* to *who* (deletion of case marking). The child language learner would hear only the output *who* and would therefore learn neither of the rules (R1 or R2), constructing a grammar with *simpler internal structure* but with *the same output* as that of the adult model. (Harris & Campell 1995: 34-35) Hence, central to the generative view of language change is the notion that linguistic change in general takes place in the language acquisition process and in the *transition of grammars form one generation to the next.*

2.2 Syntactic change as part of Language change

> It's hard to chart syntactic change. If a schoolboy says *I didn't bash Pete, I never bashed Pete*, are the two different negative structures interchangeable, signaling that a change may be in progress? Or is the second statement emphatic, meaning: 'I really and truly didn't bash Pete'? It's almost impossible to tell.
> But one thing is certain. All syntactic change involves variation. As in the case of sound change, the old and the new co-exist…The reverse is not necessarily true. Variation can exist without change. Stylistic variations (such as *The octopus which/that I caught*) can persist for decades, or even centuries, without necessarily involving a change. However, variation creates a situation in which change can easily occur. (Aitchinson, 1993: 89)

Aitchinson offers an example of such gradualness. The separation of modal verbs from other verbs happened gradually. First, they stopped taking direct objects. Then, in the sixteenth they no longer occurred with *–ing* or (some) after *to*, they were no longer (except perfectively) found with *have*, and they were limited to one per sentence. In the seventeenth century, ordinary verbs stopped undergoing inversion, and no longer preceded the negative *not*. However, as with other changes, there are still a few remnants which never go swept away. It is still possible to say *I dare not* in ordinary conversation. In brief, we seem to have a 'syntactic S-curve with the steep part of the curve occurring in the sixteenth century.' (Aitchinson 1993: 98-99)[1]

The role of *biologically endowed* universals in syntactic change is rather important. Language universals provide the most excessive constraint in syntactic change. However, there is evidence that grammatical change is *not* always limited to the language acquisition process. In generative approaches, all universals are taken to be part of the human biological endowment, hard-wired in the brain of the child language learner and therefore

[1] This is parallel to the S-curve in phonological change (c.f. Aitchinson,1993)

very important in regulating syntactic change. However, some *functionalist* orientations (involving typology, discourse analysis, etc.) for example, see universals as not necessarily genetically controlled and exhibited in child language acquisition, but rather as a result of language fulfilling its discourse and communication function. This raises the question, whether or not all linguistic universals *must be* innately available to the child language learner, or do some universals stem from the function of language, independently of the speaker's genetic make-up? [2] It might be, for instance, that there are purely abstract properties that any system must have in order to serve the expressive purposes that language serves; and there might be properties that language has because of the social context in which it is embedded. The mentalist stance would say, though, that we eventually need to investigate how such properties are spelled out in the brains of language users, so that *people* can use language.

2.3 The Harris & Campbell Model

Given everything previously stated, it seems plausible to claim that the grammar of an adult is best viewed not as an inflexible completed object, but as an adaptable, constantly growing *set of generalizations*. Children learning a language have a special role to play in furthering linguistic shifts and the possible changes adults may take into their grammars may be highly constrained by the form of the very grammar they acquired as children. The theory of syntactic change supported by Harris and Campbell (1995) on one hand provides an approach to the problem of diachronic syntax as a whole and, on the other, a framework for the analysis of the history of the syntax of particular languages and language families. According to this theory, alternation of syntactic patterns takes place by means of specific mechanisms of change. Early treatments of diachronic phenomena within generative grammar described changes as *rules*, with the implication that such changes must be abrupt. Contrary to that, Harris and Campbell posit a hypothesis that there are only three basic mechanisms of change (all of them *gradual* by nature) and those are: *reanalysis*, *extension* and *borrowing*[3]. They also claim that no other mechanisms exist, and that anything else that may seem relevant in that respect (processes like lexical diffusion for example) is merely an instance and/or a consequence of one or a combination of these mechanisms.

Reanalysis is a mechanism which changes the *underlying structure* of a syntactic pattern and which does not involve any modification of its surface manifestation. The concept of *underlying structure* here is taken as to include at least the following (i) constituency, (ii) hierarchical structure, (iii) category labels and (iv) grammatical relations. By *surface manifestations*, they mean (i) morphological marking (case, agreement and gender-class) and (ii) word order. Another important point on reanalysis is that it depends upon a pattern closely implied and characterized by *surface ambiguity*. An example of reanalysis offered by Harris and Campbell is the case from French development of Modern French yes/no questions. Old French used intonation together with inverted word order as

[2] There are other relevant approaches to the question offering a certain amount of criticism and/or counterevidence even, to the innateness hypothesis and language acquisition as the most relevant mechanism of change (e.g. some contemporary views of **sociolinguistics**), but this paper will not deal with consequences of such findings since they would require a rather extensive study of their own.

[3] Harris and Campbell through the mechanism of extension, for example, offer an account of the gradual aspect of syntactic change, while tightly constraining the ways in which it may proceed.

a device for marking questions. In question inversion, the entire verb used to invert with the entire subject.

1. est morte m'amie?
   is dead my friend
   "Is my friend dead?"

From the fifteenth (or sixteenth) century, a biclausal structure starts appearing in yes/no questions, for instance:

2. est-ce que mon amie est morte?
   (a) Is it that my friend is dead?
   (b) "*Is it (the case) that my friend is dead?" "Is my friend dead?"

The matrix clause in the preferred yes/no question pattern (2a) has been *reanalyzed* as a sentence initial interrogative expression. It functions as a particle, which is shown by the fact that the former verb can no longer occur in the full range of tense/aspect forms available for "be", but occurs in the invariant form *est*, as a fixed construction est-ce que is attached sentence initially to a sentence which otherwise has a form of a simple declarative sentence:

3. Est-ce que l'homme voit la femme?
   QUESTION the man sees the woman?
   "Does the man see the woman?" (Harris & Campbell 1995: 65-66)

Extension is a mechanism which results in changes in the surface manifestation of a pattern and which does not involve immediate or intrinsic modification of underlying structure. It is not exclusively limited to morphology though it is sometimes more common and easier to explain in that domain than in the domain of abstract syntax. It is not the same as analogy; rather it is 'analogies', by which we mean a condition where a structural similarity exists between two or more items or classes, or constructions etc. The existence of the *analogue* (cf. Harris and Campbell 1995) often stimulates change through extension, but it may also prompt change through reanalysis or through borrowing; it is not however, necessary for any change to occur. Extension is a mechanism that operates to change the syntax of a language by *generalizing a rule*. Harris and Campbell offer an example of reported speech in Estonian. The change involves two alternative complement structures with essentially the same meaning.[4]

Though the terms *language contact* and *borrowing* are sometimes used interchangeably, Harris and Campbell distinguish between them. By language contact, they mean a situation where the speakers of one language are *familiar* in some way with another. That is, language contact is a situation, it is not in itself a process, or change. *Borrowing* however, is taken to denote a *mechanism of change* in which a replication of one syntactic pattern is incorporated into the borrowing language through the influence of a host pattern found in a contact language. More precisely, it has been claimed for several languages that they borrowed conjunctions and/or various subordinating devices only after and because they came into contact with other languages already possessing these things seen as 'gaps' in the grammars of the borrowers, thus explaining why they set upon acquiring the new material so rapidly when the notion became familiar to them from contact languages. Furthermore, a rather large number of cases have been reported in which basic word order patterns have been borrowed, thus well-establishing the fact that basic

[4] These structures were used with speech-act (SAV) or mental-state (MSV) main verbs. (c.f. Harris and Campbell 1995:65)

word order can be borrowed or can change due to language contact. For example, much influence from English and western languages on the syntax and discourse functions of Japanese subjects has been documented in the literature. Also, there has been considerable syntactic convergence among languages in the Balkan linguistic area. This includes the development of postposed articles, periphrastic future, lack of infinitives, syncretism of the dative and genitive, and so on.

Borrowing is also an *external mechanism* of change, involving motivation towards change from outside the affected language, whereas *reanalysis* and *extension* are *internal mechanisms*. Reanalysis and extension are also *complementary processes* in the sense that the former affects the underlying structure but not surface manifestations and the latter affects the surface without affecting the underlying structure. Only reanalysis and borrowing can introduce an *entirely new* structure into a language, and in this sense the changes they cause are more radical than those caused by extension. It is important to note that language never does change so rapidly that speakers of immediately succeeding generation lose the ability to communicate; *communicability* must remain preserved. The independence of the process of reanalysis, operating on underlying structure, and extension operating on surface structure, contribute, together with other factors, to preserving communicability. Borrowing, as suggested by Harris and Campbell, makes it possible to change underlying and surface structure at the same time because it makes reference to an outside system. In syntactic borrowing, introduction of an exotic construction will be recognized by speakers and identified with the donor language; it is this that makes it possible to change underlying structure and surface structures in a less constrained way through borrowing.

There is another aspect of Harris and Campbell's theory that is worthy of attention from the GG point of view. Harris and Campbell propose the existence of a set of *universally available syntactic constructions* from which any language may draw for alternative syntactic expressions. One respect in which syntax differs from phonology and morphology is that syntactic patterns allow for far greater *creativity*. Harris and Campbell suggest that isolated, creative, exploratory expressions are made constantly by speakers of all ages. These kinds of expressions may be developed for emphasis, for stylistic or pragmatic reasons, or they may result from production errors. The vast majority of them is never repeated but a few are, and those become part of standard language material. Only when the expression is used in additional contexts and is generalized (by means of one of the mechanisms described above) may we speak of a grammatical change having taken place.[5]

3. HISTORICAL LINGUISTICS VS. MINIMALISM: FROM *EME* TO *MSE*

When looking at a language such as Early Modern English (EME) solely from written records (e.g. Shakespeare's works), we see only sentences that are grammatical, unless ungrammatical sentences are used deliberately. Without native speakers of EME to query, we can only *infer* whether something was grammatical or not. For example, the loss of case endings in English occurred together with changes in the rules of syntax,

[5] A simple example of such a construction is that of negation through use of an 'expression of minimal value' (Harris & Campell 1995: 54).

which took constraints on word order to the next level. Such syntactic changes may take centuries to be fully completed, and there are often intermediate stages.

While Contemporary English makes a distinction between auxiliary verbs and main verbs, it is interesting to note that prior to the sixteenth century these syntactic distinctions did not exist. At that time it was possible for main verbs to take *not*, or they could be fronted in forming questions; examples such as the following can be found in Shakespeare's writings:

a) *I deny it not*. ("I don't deny it.")
b) *Forbid him not*. ("Do not forbid him.")
c) *Revolt our subjects*? ("Do our subjects revolt?")
d) *Gives not the hawthorn-bush a sweeter shade*?
("Does the hawthorn-bush not give a sweeter shade?")

(Akmajian et al., 1990: 297)

However, by Shakespeare's time such patterns were already beginning to disappear as a series of grammatical changes was taking place in the mid- 1500s. After the sixteenth century, the grammar of English has changed so that auxiliary verbs - and never main verbs – *had to* be used in negation, questions etc. (cf. Akmajian et al., 1990).

In the light of concern with the syntax of *head movement* (as it is proposed in Minimalism) for example, we may begin by looking at auxiliary inversion in questions in English, arguing that this involves an *I movement* operation whereby an auxiliary moves from INFL to COMP. One of the suggestions (c.f. Radford 1997a) is that auxiliaries move to COMP because an interrogative COMP is *strong* (perhaps by virtue of containing an abstract question affix Q), and a strong head position *must be filled*. Radford supports the claim that an inverted auxiliary leaves behind a *trace* (i.e. a silent copy of itself) in the INFL position out of which it moves when it moves to COMP. He goes on to show that finite verbs in Early Modern English (EME) could move from V to INFL by an operation of V movement, but that this kind of movement is generally no longer possible in Modern Standard English (MSE). What the relevant discussion here suggests is that there is a *parametric variation* across languages in respect of whether finite verbs carry strong or weak agreement features, and that the *relative strength* of these features determines whether nonauxiliary verbs can raise to INFL or not.[6] However, this still poses the question of *why* finite verbs should raise out of V to I in languages like EME where they carry strong agreement-features. One answer to this question is provided by *checking theory*: let us suppose that movement checks strong features which would otherwise remain unchecked. As noted previously, finite verbs in EME carry strong agreement-features; hence a finite verb raises to INFL in order to check its strong agreement features (i.e. its person/number specifier features) against those of the subject occupying the specifier position within IP. To see how this might work, let us consider the syntax of a sentence such as

e) *Thou thinkest not of this*. (Radford, 1997: 115)

The verb *thinkest* originates in the head V position of VP, and (because it contains strong agreement features) then raises to INFL. (the [2SNom] features of *thou* mark the second person singular nominative of *thou*, the [Pres] feature of *thinkest* marks the present-tense head-feature, and the [2SNom] feature carried by *thinkest* and specifier-features which mark the fact that it requires a second person singular nominative subject as

[6] Also whether null subjects are permitted or not, and so on

its specifier (all other features are omitted, to simplify exposition.) Since subject-verb agreement involves a local checking relation between INFL and its specifier, an obvious consequence of moving *thinkest* from V to I is that it enables the specifier-features of *thinkest* to be checked: this is because *thinkest* ends up in INFL, and from there can check its [2S Nom] head-feature of *thou*. Since the two sets of features match, the specifier-features of *thinkest* are erased along with the nominative case-feature of *thou*, thereby ensuring that the derivation does not crash. Movement of *thinkest* to INFL also ensures that INFL carries a tense-feature, in that way ensuring that INFL will be interpretable at the level of logical form (if we assume that INFL must carry a tense-feature in order to be interpretable at LF).

As we have seen, the agreement properties of finite nonauxiliary verbs in EME are checked by moving the verb into INFL, but the specifier-features of finite nonauxiliary verbs are checked in a rather different way in MSE – as we can illustrate in relation to a sentence as simple as

f) *She* mistrusts *him.*

This example is an IP headed by an empty INFL constituent with the verb *mistrusts* occupying the head V position of VP, and the subject *she* occupying the specifier position within IP. It has been posited in minimalism that the head- and specifier-features of finite nonauxiliary verbs *percolate* from V to INFL in MSE, to satisfy the requirement that INFL carry a tense-feature (in order to be interpretable at LF), and to enable the specifier-feature of the verb to be checked. Chomsky (1995) refers to the relevant process of feature-percolation (such as in cases like this) as *attraction* (the idea being that INFL in structures like this one *attracts* the relevant features carried by *mistrusts*.)

So, it would appear that EME and MSE make use of two very different ways of checking the agreement properties of finite (nonauxiliary) verbs: EME makes use of ***movement*** of the verb from V to INFL; MSE makes use of ***attraction*** of the head-specifier features of the verb from V to INFL. These two different ways of checking the relevant features of finite verbs correlate with the relative *strength* of the agreement-features carried by the verbs. In a language like Early Modern English (EME) verbs could move from V to INFL by an operation of V movement, but this kind of movement is generally no longer possible in Modern Standard English (MSE). I movement and V movement are two different reflexes of a more general *head movement* operation and that head movement is subject to a strict *locality constraint* (the head movement constraint) which requires it to apply in a successive cyclic (stepwise) fashion. Hence, verbs in EME used to have strong agreement-features (by virtue of the relatively rich agreement inflection they carried) and consequently allowed a null *pro* subject, whereas their counterparts in MSE have weak agreement-features (by virtue of their impoverished agreement morphology) and so do not allow a *pro* subject. Radford argues that the strong agreement features of finite verbs in EME were checked by movement of the verb (along with its features) from V to INFL, whereas the weak agreement features of finite verbs in MSE are checked by attraction (i.e. percolation) of the relevant agreement features from V to INFL (with the verb itself remaining *in situ* in the head position of VP). If (following Chomsky) we take words to be sets of *phonetic, grammatical and semantic features*, it is clear that movement too involves 'movement of a set of features'. So what is the difference between the two? The answer is that movement is an operation which affects the complete set (phonetic, grammatical and semantic) features carried by a word, whereas attraction affects

only the grammatical features carried by an item (more specifically, those grammatical features which cannot be checked otherwise.) We might clarify by saying that strong agreement-features cannot be separated from the other (phonetic, grammatical and semantic) features carried by the relevant word, hence the only way of checking strong agreement-features is to move the whole word. Conversely, what it means to say that a verb like *mistrusts* carries weak grammatical features is that relevant grammatical features can be moved on their own, with the other (phonetic and semantic) features carried by the word being left behind. It might further be stated that in consequence of the *economy principle*, attraction is *more economical* than movement, since movement affects *all* the features carried by a word, whereas attraction involves movement of *grammatical features alone*: hence, the economy principle will ensure that attraction will be preferred to movement wherever possible, with movement being forced only where the relevant features being checked are strong.

4. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Although generativists are probably not the first to have sought an explanation of language-change in the process of transmission of language from one generation to another, they have looked more carefully than others at the process of language acquisition in terms of the nature of the rules that are required at identifiable stages in this process.[7] While various 'shades' of the generative approach all have an orientation of favoring a particular version of GG, they all try to manipulate the data of syntactic change to fit the relevant version of the theory. In all of them (including minimalism) grammatical complexity builds up gradually in a language, and it happens through two major types of changes: those reflecting something like a 'new parameter setting' (e.g. reanalysis), and those which could be characterized as 'environmental' changes (e.g. borrowing).

GG has also benefited from historical linguistics every time it got confirmation for its linguistics data from any previous developmental stage of a relevant language, where historical study managed to, by means of its principal methodologies, reconstruct and reconfirm its principal linguistic organization. Such 'historical' levels could then be tested by generative theories in their respective frameworks, not only as separate languages which would need to confirm or revoke some previously established principles and/or parameters for example, but also in comparison with the contemporary versions of those languages, offering further confirmation (or encouraging relevant debatable issues) for their current generative linguistic description.

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O NEKIM TEMAMA ISTORIJSKE LINGVISTIKE KROZ PRIZMU GENERATIVNE GRAMATIKE

Nataša Milivojević

Rad se bavi zajedničkim aspektima dva raznorodna i različita pristupa ukupnom proučavanju engleskog jezika, istorijske lingvistike i generativne gramatike. Prikazano istraživanje imalo je dva osnovna cilja: 1) da prikaže fenomen jezičke promene sa aspekta generativne gramatike (rad se specifično bavi sintaksičkim promenama u jeziku), i 2) da ilustruje doprinos istorijske lingvistike savremenim lingvističkim teorijskim modelima (i obratno), a putem uspostavljanja generativnog sučelja između modernog standardnog engleskog i srednjoengleskog kao jednog od prethodnih stadijuma razvoja engleskog jezika, upoređivanjem relevantnih aspekata sintakse srednjoengleskog sa sintaksom savremenog engleskog jezika.

Ključne reči: *generativna lingvistika, istorijska lingvistika, jezičke promene, sinhronijske i dijahronijske studije.*