Vol.3, No 2, 2006 pp. 179 - 187
UDC
338.23:336.74
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN SERBIA:
AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Vesela Yordanova Todorova
UNWE, Sofia, Bulgaria
The traditional view on the choice of the exchange rate regime a century ago was very simple. It was between specie standards and fixed exchange rates on one hand, and fiat money and floating on the other. The prevalent view was that adherence to specie, standard meant adherence to sound money, as well as fiscal probity and avoiding the transactions costs of exchanging different currencies into each other. The second view on the choice of the exchange rate regime is based on the concept of a nominal anchor. In an environment of high inflation, as was the case in most countries in the 1970s and 1980s, pegging to the currency of a country with low inflation was viewed as a precommitment mechanism to anchor inflationary expectations. This argument was based on the theory developed by Barro and Gordon who discuss the case of a central bank using discretionary monetary policy to generate surprise inflation in order to reduce unemployment. They demonstrate that with rational expectations the outcome will be higher inflation but unchanged employment because the inflationary consequences of the central bank's actions will be incorporated in workers' wage demands. The only way to prevent such time inconsistent behavior is by instituting a precommitment mechanism or a monetary rule.
KOMPARATIVNA ANALIZA KRITERIJUMA U IZBORU REŽIMA DEVIZNOG KURSA
Tradicionalni pogled na izbor režima deviznog kursa pre jednog veka bio je veoma jednostavan. S jedne strane bili su standardi kovanog novca i fiksni devizni kurs, a sa druge strane plivajući kurs. Drugi pogled na izbor režima deviznog kursa bazira se na konceptu nominalnog utvrđivanja. U uslovima visoke inflacije, kao što je bilo u većini zemalja 70-tih i 80-tih godina, vezivanje za monetu zemlje sa niskom inflacijom se posmatralo kao preduslov za utvrđivanje inflatornih očekivanja. Ovo stanovište bazira se na teoriji koju su razvili Baro i Gordon, koji su razmatrali slučaj kad centralna banka koristi diskrecionu monetarnu politiku da bi generisala iznenadnu inflaciju kako bi smanjila nezaposlenost. Oni pokazuju da će sa racionalnim očekivanjima rezultat biti viša inflacija ali nepromenjena zaposlenost, zato što će inflatorne posledice aktivnosti centralne banke već biti uključene u zahteve za nadnicama. Jedini način da se spreči ovakvo nekonzistentno ponašanje je uvođenje monetarnog pravila.
